The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-ietf-dane-protocol-17
The information below is for an old version of the document |
Document |
Type |
|
Active Internet-Draft (dane WG)
|
|
Authors |
|
Paul Hoffman
,
Jakob Schlyter
|
|
Last updated |
|
2012-02-29
|
|
Stream |
|
IETF
|
|
Intended RFC status |
|
(None)
|
|
Formats |
|
pdf
htmlized (tools)
htmlized
bibtex
|
|
Reviews |
|
|
Stream |
WG state
|
|
WG Document
|
|
Document shepherd |
|
None
|
IESG |
IESG state |
|
I-D Exists
|
|
Consensus Boilerplate |
|
Unknown
|
|
Telechat date |
|
|
|
Responsible AD |
|
(None)
|
|
Send notices to |
|
(None)
|
Network Working Group P. Hoffman
Internet-Draft VPN Consortium
Intended status: Standards Track J. Schlyter
Expires: September 1, 2012 Kirei AB
February 29, 2012
The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-ietf-dane-protocol-17
Abstract
Encrypted communication on the Internet often uses Transport Level
Security (TLS), which depends on third parties to certify the keys
used. This document improves on that situation by enabling the
administrator of a domain name to certify the keys used in that
domain's TLS servers. This requires matching improvements in TLS
client software, but no change in TLS server software.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 1, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Hoffman & Schlyter Expires September 1, 2012 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft DNS-Based Auth for TLS February 2012
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Background of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Securing the Association with a Server's Certificate . . . 5
1.3. Method For Securing Certificate Associations . . . . . . . 6
1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. The TLSA Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. TLSA RDATA Wire Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1. The Certificate Usage Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2. The Selector Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.3. The Matching Type Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.4. The Certificate Association Data Field . . . . . . . . 9
2.2. TLSA RR Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3. TLSA RR Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Domain Names for TLS Certificate Associations . . . . . . . . 10
4. Use of TLSA Records in TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. TLSA and DANE Use Cases and Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Mandatory-to-Implement Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.1. TLSA RRtype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. TLSA Usages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.3. TLSA Selectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.4. TLSA Matching Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.1. DNS Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Operational Considerations for Deploying TLSA
Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.1. Creating TLSA Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.1.1. Ambiguities and Corner Cases When TLS Clients
Build Trust Chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.1.2. Choosing a Selector Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Show full document text