Extensible Delegation for DNS
draft-ietf-deleg-02
The information below is for an old version of the document.
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| Authors | Tim April , Petr Špaček , Ralf Weber , David C Lawrence | ||
| Last updated | 2025-08-15 (Latest revision 2025-07-07) | ||
| Replaces | draft-wesplaap-deleg | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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draft-ietf-deleg-02
deleg T. April
Internet-Draft Google, LLC
Updates: 1034, 1035, 6672, 6840 (if approved) P. Špaček
Intended status: Standards Track ISC
Expires: 16 February 2026 R. Weber
Akamai Technologies
D. Lawrence
Salesforce
15 August 2025
Extensible Delegation for DNS
draft-ietf-deleg-02
Abstract
A delegation in the Domain Name System (DNS) is a mechanism that
enables efficient and distributed management of the DNS namespace.
It involves delegating authority over subdomains to specific DNS
servers via NS records, allowing for a hierarchical structure and
distributing the responsibility for maintaining DNS records.
An NS record contains the hostname of the nameserver for the
delegated namespace. Any facilities of that nameserver must be
discovered through other mechanisms. This document proposes a new
extensible DNS record type, DELEG, for delegation of the authority
for a domain. Future documents then can use this mechanism to use
additional information about the delegated namespace and the
capabilities of authoritative nameservers for the delegated
namespace.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://github.com/
ietf-wg-deleg/draft-ietf-deleg-base/tree/gh-pages. Status
information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-deleg/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the deleg Working Group
mailing list (mailto:dd@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dd/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dd/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ietf-wg-deleg/draft-ietf-deleg-base/.
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Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 February 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. DELEG and DELEGI Record Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Use of DELEG Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Signaling DELEG support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Referral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3. Parent-side types, QTYPE=DELEG . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.4. Algorithm for "Finding the Best Servers to Ask" . . . 7
3.1.5. Actions in Delegation Information . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.6. Populating the SLIST from DELEG and DELEGI Records . 10
3.2. Authoritative Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1. DELEG-unaware Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.2. DELEG-aware Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. DNSSEC Signers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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3.4. DNSSEC Validators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4.1. Clarifications on Nonexistence Proofs . . . . . . . . 13
3.4.2. Insecure Delegation Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4.3. Referral downgrade protection . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4.4. Chaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. Preventing Over-work Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. Changes to Existing Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. New Registry for Delegation Information . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2.1. Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2.2. Initial Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.1. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.2. DO bit clear, DE bit clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.2.1. Query for foo.example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.2.2. Query for foo.test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.3. DO bit set, DE bit clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.3.1. Query for foo.example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.3.2. Query for foo.test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.4. DO bit clear, DE bit set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.4.1. Query for foo.example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.4.2. Query for foo.test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.5. DO bit set, DE bit set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.5.1. Query for foo.example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.5.2. Query for foo.test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix B. Acknowledgments {:unnumbered} . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix C. TODO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Introduction
In the Domain Name System, subdomains within the domain name
hierarchy are indicated by delegations to servers which are
authoritative for their portion of the namespace. The DNS records
that do this, called NS records, contain hostnames of nameservers,
which resolve to addresses. No other information is available to the
resolver. It is limited to connect to the authoritative servers over
UDP and TCP port 53. This limitation is a barrier for efficient
introduction of new DNS technology.
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The proposed DELEG and DELEGI record types remedy this problem by
providing extensible parameters to indicate capabilities and
additional information, such as addresses that a resolver may use for
the delegated authority. The DELEG record is authoritative and thus
signed in the parent side of the delegation making it possible to
validate all delegation parameters with DNSSEC.
This document only shows how a DELEG record can be used instead of or
along side a NS record to create a delegation. Future documents can
use the extensible mechanism for more advanced features like
connecting to a name server with an encrypted transport.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Terminology regarding the Domain Name System comes from [BCP219],
with addition terms defined here:
* legacy name servers: An authoritative server that does not support
the DELEG record
* legacy resolvers: A resolver that does not support the DELEG
record
* DELEG-aware: An authoritative server or resolver that follows the
protocol defined in this document
2. DELEG and DELEGI Record Types
The DELEG record (whose RRtype is TBD) has Rdata is one field, a list
of key-value pairs called "delegation information". The delegation
information field has wire and display formats that are based on the
rules in Appendix A of [RFC9460]. A DELEG record is authoritative
for the named zone, and creates a delegation and thus lives in the
parent of the named zone.
The DELEGI record has the identical format as the DELEG record. The
use of the DELEGI record is different from the use of the DELEG
record: it gives information about delegation. DELEGI records are
treated like regular authoritative records in their zone.
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Some delegation information key-value pairs are actions that a DELEG-
aware resolver takes when it gets a DELEG or DELEGI record. The
actions defined in this document are described briefly here, and more
fully described in Section 3.1.5.
* server-ip4: a set of IPv4 addresses for nameservers of the given
zone
* server-ip6: a set of IPv6 addresses for nameservers of the given
zone
* server-name: the domain name of a nameserver of the given zone;
the addresses must be fetched
* include-name: the domain name of a zone that has more information
about the nameservers of the given zone
Future documents might define additional delegation information that
are actions, and might also define delegation information key-value
pairs that modify actions.
TODO: Add some introduction comparing how resolvers see legacy
delegatation (set of NS and A/AAAA records) and DELEG delegation
(DELEG and DELEGI records with server-ip4 and server-ip6 keys)
3. Use of DELEG Records
A DELEG RRset MAY be present at a delegation point. The DELEG RRset
MAY contain multiple records. DELEG RRsets MUST NOT appear at a
zone's apex.
A DELEG RRset MAY be present with or without NS or DS RRsets at the
delegation point.
3.1. Resolvers
3.1.1. Signaling DELEG support
A resolver that is DELEG-aware MUST signal its support by sending the
DE bit when iterating.
This bit is referred to as the "DELEG" (DE) bit. In the context of
the EDNS0 OPT meta-RR, the DE bit is the TBD of the "extended RCODE
and flags" portion of the EDNS0 OPT meta-RR, structured as follows
(to be updated when assigned):
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+0 (MSB) +1 (LSB)
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
0: | EXTENDED-RCODE | VERSION |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
2: |DO|CO|DE| Z |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
Setting the DE bit to one in a query indicates the resolver
understands new DELEG semantics and does not need NS records to
follow a referral. The DE bit cleared (set to zero) indicates the
resolver is unprepared to handle DELEG and hence can only be served
NS, DS and glue in a delegation response.
Motivation: For a long time there will be both DELEG and NS needed
for delegation. As both methods should be configured to get to a
proper resolution it is not necessary to send both in a referral
response. We therefore purpose an EDNS flag to be use similar to the
DO Bit for DNSSEC to be used to signal that the sender understands
DELEG and does not need NS or glue information in the referral.
3.1.2. Referral
The DELEG record creates a zone cut similar to the NS record.
If one or more DELEG records exist at a given delegation point, a
DELEG-aware resolver MUST treat the name servers from those DELEG
records as authoritative for the child zone. In such case, a DELEG-
aware resolver MUST NOT use NS records even if they happen to be
present in cache, even if resolution using DELEG records have failed
for any reason. Such fallback from DELEG to NS would invalidate
security guarantees of DELEG protocol.
If no DELEG record exists at a given delegation point, DELEG-aware
resolvers MUST use NS records as specified by [RFC1034].
3.1.3. Parent-side types, QTYPE=DELEG
Record types defined as authoritative on the parent side of zone cut
(currently DS and DELEG types) retain the same special handling as
described in Section 2.6 of [RFC4035].
Legacy resolvers can get different types of answers for QTYPE=DELEG
queries based on the configuration of the server, such as whether it
is DELEG-aware and whether it also is authoritative for subdomains.
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3.1.4. Algorithm for "Finding the Best Servers to Ask"
This document updates instructions for finding the best servers to
ask. That information currently is covered in Section 5.3.3 of
[RFC1034] and Section 3.4.1 of [RFC6672] with the text "2. Find the
best servers to ask." Section 3.1.4.1 of [RFC4035] should have
explicitly updated Section 5.3.3 of [RFC1034] for the DS RRtype, but
failed to do so; this was remedied by [RFC6672]. This document
simply extends this existing behavior to DELEG RRtype as well, and
makes this special case explicit.
When a DELEG RRset exists in a zone, DELEG-aware resolvers ignore the
NS RRset for that zone. This means that the DELEG-aware resolver
ignores the NS RRset in the zone's parent as well as any cached NS
RRset that the resolver might have gotten by looking in the apex of
the zone.
DELEG and NS RRtypes can be used differently at each delegation
level, and DELEG-aware resolvers MUST be able follow chains of
delegations which combines both types in arbitrary ways.
An example of a valid delegation tree:
; root zone with NS-only delegations
. SOA ...
test. NS ...
; test. zone with NS+DELEG delegations
test. SOA ...
sld.test. NS ...
sld.test. DELEG ...
; sld.test. zone with NS-only delegation
sld.test. SOA ...
nssub.sld.test. NS ...
; nssub.sld.test. zone with DELEG-only delegation
delegsub.sub.sld.test. DELEG ...
TODO: after the text below, refer back to this figure and show the
order that a DELEG-aware resolver would take when there is a failure
to find any good DELEG addresses at sub.sld.test, then any usable
nameservers at sub.sld.test, and then maybe a good DELEG record at
test.
The terms SNAME and SLIST used here are defined in Section 5.3.2 of
[RFC1034]:
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SNAME is the domain name we are searching for.
SLIST is a structure which describes the name servers and the zone
which the resolver is currently trying to query. Neither [RFC1034]
nor this document define how a resolver uses SLIST; they only define
how to populate it.
A DELEG-aware SLIST needs to be able to hold two types of
information: delegations defined by NS records and delegations
defined by DELEG records. DELEG and NS delegations can create cyclic
dependencies and/or lead to duplicate entries which point to the same
server. Resolvers need to enforce suitable limits to prevent damage
even if someone has incorrectly configured some of the data used to
create an SLIST.
This leads to a modified description of find the best servers to ask"
from earlier documents for DELEG-aware resolvers. That description
becomes:
1. Determine deepest possible zone cut which can potentially hold
the answer for given (query name, type, class) combination:
1. Start with SNAME equal to QNAME.
2. If QTYPE is a type that is authoritative at the parent side
of a zone cut (currently, DS or DELEG), remove the leftmost
label from SNAME. For example, if the QNAME is
"test.example." and th eQTYPE is DELEG or DS, set SNAME to
"example.".
2. Look for locally-available DELEG and NS RRsets, starting at
current SNAME.
1. For given SNAME, check for existence of a DELEG RRset. If it
exists, the resolver MUST use its content to populate SLIST.
However, if the DELEG RRset is known to exist but is unusable
(for example, if it is found in DNSSEC BAD cache), the
resolver MUST NOT instead use an NS RRset, even if it is
locally available; instead, the resolver MUST treat this case
as if no servers were available.
2. If a given SNAME is proven to not have a DELEG RRset but does
have NS RRset, the resolver MUST copy the NS RRset into
SLIST.
3. If SLIST is now populated, stop walking up the DNS tree.
However, if SLIST is not populated, remove leftmost label
from SNAME and go back to the first step, using the new
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(shortened) SNAME. Do not go back to the first step if doing
so would exceed the amount of work that the resolver is
configured to do when processing names; see Section 4.1.
The rest of the Step 2's description is not affected by this
document.
(TODO: Determine what to do about ". DELEG" or ". DS" queries,
which by definition do not exist.)
3.1.5. Actions in Delegation Information
The DELEG and DELEGI records have four keys that describe actions the
resolver takes. The purpose of these actions is to populate the
SLIST with IP addresses of the nameservers for a zone. The actions
defined in this document are:
* server-ip4: a set of IPv4 addresses for nameservers of the given
zone
* server-ip6: a set of IPv6 addresses for nameservers of the given
zone
* server-name: the domain name of a nameserver of the given zone;
the addresses must be fetched
* include-name: the domain name of a zone that has more information
about the nameservers of the given zone
The presentation values for server-ip4 and server-ip6 are comma-
separated list of one or more IP addresses of the appropriate family
in standard textual format [RFC5952] [RFC4001]. The wire formats for
server-ip4 and server-ip6 are a sequence of IP addresses in network
byte order (for the respective address family).
The presentation values for server-name and include-name are as full-
qualified domain names. The wire formats are the same as the wire
formats for domain names, and MUST NOT be compressed.
If any of these keys are used, it MUST have a value (that is, it
cannot be a key with a zero-length value).
A DELEG or DELEGI record SHOULD have only one of the following:
* one server-ip4 key
* one server-ip6 key
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* one server-ip4 and one server-ip6 key
* one server-name key
* one include-name key
3.1.6. Populating the SLIST from DELEG and DELEGI Records
Each individual DELEG record inside a DELEG RRset, or each individual
DELEGI record in a DELEGI RRset, can cause the addition of zero or
more entries to SLIST.
A resolver processes each individual DELEG record within a DELEG
RRset, or each individual DELEGI record in a DELEGI RRset, using the
following steps:
1. If one or more server-ip4 or server-ip6 actions are present
inside the record, copy all the address values from either key
into SLIST. Ignore any server-name or include-name keys that are
(erroneously) present in the same record. Stop processing this
record.
2. If a server-name action is present in the record, resolve it into
addresses from the resolver cache or using A and AAAA queries.
Copy these addresses into SLIST. Ignore any include-name keys
that are (erroneously) present in the same record. Stop
processing this record.
3. If a include-name action is present in the record, resolve it
into a DELEGI RRset from the resolver cache or by sending queries
for the domain name in the value of the include-name pair. Go
through these same steps with the result of the DELEGI RRset,
after checking that the maximum loop count described in
Section 4.1 has not been reached.
4. If none of the above applies, SLIST is not modified by this
particular record.
A DELEG-aware resolver MAY implement lazy filling of SLIST, such as
by deferring processing remaining records if SLIST already has what
the resolver considers a sufficiently large pool of addresses to
contact.
3.2. Authoritative Servers
DELEG-aware authoritative servers act differently when handling
queries from DELEG-unaware clients (those with DE=0) than from DELEG-
aware clients (those with DE=1).
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The server MUST copy the value of the DE bit from the query into the
response. (TODO: not really necessary protocol-wise, but might be
nice for monitoring the deployment?)
3.2.1. DELEG-unaware Clients
DELEG-unaware clients do not use DELEG records for delegation. When
a DELEG-aware authoritative server responds to a DELEG-unaware
client, any DELEG record in the response does not create zone cut, is
not returned in referral responses, and is not considered
authoritative on the parent side of a zone cut. Because of this,
DELEG-aware authoritative servers MUST answer as if they are DELEG-
unaware. Please note this instruction does not affect DNSSEC
signing, i.e. no special handling for NSEC type bitmap is necessary
and DELEG RRtype is accurately represented even for DELEG-unaware
clients.
Two specific cases of DELEG-aware authoritative responding in DELEG-
unaware manner are described here.
3.2.1.1. DELEG-unaware Clients Requesting QTYPE=DELEG
In DELEG-unaware clients, records with the DELEG RRtype are not
authoritative on the parent side. Thus, queries with DE=0 and
QTYPE=DELEG MUST result in a legacy referral response.
3.2.1.2. DELEG-unaware Clients with DELEG RRs Present but No NS RRs
DELEG-unaware clients might ask for a name which belongs to a zone
delegated only with DELEG RRs (that is, without any NS RRs). Such
zone is, by definition, not resolvable for DELEG-unaware clients. In
this case, the DELEG record itself cannot create a zone cut, and the
DELEG-aware authoritative server MUST return a legacy response.
The legacy response might be confusing for subdomains of zones which
actually exist because DELEG-aware clients would get a different
answer, namely a delegation. An example of a legacy response is in
Appendix A.3.2.
The authoritative server is RECOMMENDED to supplement these responses
to DELEG-unaware resolvers with Extended DNS Error "New Delegation
Only".
TODO: debate if WG wants to do explicit SERVFAIL for this case
instead of 'just' EDE.
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3.2.2. DELEG-aware Clients
When the client indicates that it is DELEG-aware by setting DE=1 in
the query, DELEG-aware authoritative servers treat DELEG records as
zone cuts, and the servers are authoritative on parent side of zone
cut. This new zone cut has priority over legacy delegation with NS
RRset.
3.2.2.1. DELEG-aware Clients Requesting QTYPE=DELEG
An explicit query for the DELEG RRtype at a delegation point behaves
much like query for the DS RRtype: the server answers authoritatively
from the parent zone. All previous specifications for special
handling queries with QTYPE=DS apply equally to QTYPE=DELEG. In
summary, server either provides an authoritative DELEG RRset or
proves its non-existence.
3.2.2.2. Delegation with DELEG
If the delegation has a DELEG RRset, the authoritative server MUST
put the DELEG RRset into the Authority section of the referral. In
this case, the server MUST NOT include the NS RRset into the
Authority section. Presence of the covering RRSIG follows the normal
DNSSEC specification for answers with authoritative zone data.
Similarly, rules for DS RRset inclusion into referrals apply as
specified by DNSSEC protocol.
3.2.2.3. DELEG-aware Clients with NS RRs Present but No DELEG RRs
If the delegation does not have a DELEG RRset, the authoritative
server MUST put the NS RRset into the authority section of the
referral. Absence of DELEG RRset must be proven as specified by
DNSSEC protocol for authoritative data.
Similarly, rules for DS RRset inclusion into referrals apply as
specified by the DNSSEC protocol. Please note in practice the same
process and records are used to prove non-existence of DELEG and DS
RRsets.
3.3. DNSSEC Signers
The DELEG record is authoritative on the parent side of a zone cut
and needs to be signed as such. Existing rules from DNSSEC
specification apply. In summary: for DNSSEC signing, treat the DELEG
RRtype the same way as the DS RRtype.
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In order to protect validators from downgrade attacks this draft
introduces a new DNSKEY flag ADT (Authoritative Delegation Types).
In zones which contain a DELEG RRset, this flag MUST be set to 1 in
at least one of the DNSKEY records published in the zone.
3.4. DNSSEC Validators
DELEG awareness introduces additional requirements on validators.
3.4.1. Clarifications on Nonexistence Proofs
This document updates Section 4.1 of [RFC6840] to include "NS or
DELEG" types in type bitmap as indication of a delegation point, and
generalizes applicability of ancestor delegation proof to all RRtypes
that are authoritative at the parent (that is, both DS and DELEG).
The text in that section is updated as follows:
An "ancestor delegation" NSEC RR (or NSEC3 RR) is one with:
* the NS and/or DELEG bit set,
* the Start of Authority (SOA) bit clear, and
* a signer field that is shorter than the owner name of the NSEC RR,
or the original owner name for the NSEC3 RR.
Ancestor delegation NSEC or NSEC3 RRs MUST NOT be used to assume
nonexistence of any RRs below that zone cut, which include all RRs at
that (original) owner name other than types authoritative at the
parent-side of zone cut (DS and DELEG), and all RRs below that owner
name regardless of type.
3.4.2. Insecure Delegation Proofs
This document updates Section 4.4 of [RFC6840] to include secure
DELEG support, and explicitly states that Opt-Out is not applicable
to DELEG. The first paragraph of that section is updated to read:
Section 5.2 of [RFC4035] specifies that a validator, when proving a
delegation is not secure, needs to check for the absence of the DS
and SOA bits in the NSEC (or NSEC3) type bitmap. The validator also
MUST check for the presence of the NS or the DELEG bit in the
matching NSEC (or NSEC3) RR (proving that there is, indeed, a
delegation). Alternately, the validator must make sure that the
delegation with NS record is covered by an NSEC3 RR with the Opt-Out
flag set. Opt-Out is not applicable to DELEG RRtype because DELEG
records are authoritative at the parent side of a zone cut in the
same way that DS RRtypes are.
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3.4.3. Referral downgrade protection
When DNSKEY flag ADT is set to 1, a DELEG-aware validator MUST prove
the absence of a DELEG RRset in referral responses for a zone.
Without this check, an attacker could strip the DELEG RRset from a
referral response and replace it with an unsigned (and potentially
malicious) NS RRset. A referral response with an unsigned NS and
signed DS RRsets does not require additional proofs of nonexistence
according to pre-DELEG DNSSEC specification, and it would have been
accepted as a delegation without DELEG RRset.
3.4.4. Chaining
A Validating Stub Resolver that is DELEG-aware has to use a Security-
Aware Resolver that is DELEG-aware and, if it is behind a forwarder,
that forwarder has to be security-aware and DELEG-aware as well.
4. Security Considerations
TODO: Add more here
4.1. Preventing Over-work Attacks
Resolvers MUST prevent situations where accidental misconfiguration
of zones or malicious attacks cause them to perform too much work
when resolving. This document describes two sets of actions that, if
not controlled, could lead to over-work attacks:
* Names with many subdomains can cause walking up the tree to
populate SLIST (Section 3.1.4) to be burdensome. To prevent this,
the resolver SHOULD NOT walk up more than %%TODO: come up with a
number%% labels in order to contribute to SLIST.
* Long chains of include-name actions (Section 3.1.5), and those
with circular chains if include-name actions, can be burdensome.
To prevent this, the resolver SHOULD NOT follow more than 3
include-name chains in an RRset when populating SLIST. Note that
include-name chains can have CNAME steps in them; in such a case,
a CNAME step is counted the same as a DELEGI step when determining
when to stop following a chain.
5. IANA Considerations
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5.1. Changes to Existing Registries
IANA is requested to allocate the DELEG RR in the Resource Record
(RR) TYPEs registry, with the meaning of "enhanced delegation
information" and referencing this document.
IANA is requested to assign a new bit in the DNSKEY RR Flags registry
([RFC4034]) for the ADT bit (N), with the description "Authoritative
Delegation Types" and referencing this document. For compatibility
reasons we request the bit 14 to be used. This value has been proven
to work whereas bit 0 was proven to break in practical deployments
(because of bugs).
IANA is requested to assign a bit from the EDNS Header Flags registry
([RFC6891]), with the abbreviation DE, the description "DELEG
enabled" and referencing this document.
IANA is requested to assign a value from the Extended DNS Error Codes
([RFC8914]), with the Purpose "New Delegation Only" and referencing
this document.
5.2. New Registry for Delegation Information
IANA is requested to create the "DELEG Delegation Information"
registry. This registry defines the namespace for delegation
information keys, including string representations and numeric key
values.
5.2.1. Procedure
A registration MUST include the following fields:
Number: Wire-format numeric identifier (range 0-65535) Name: Unique
presentation name Meaning: A short description Reference: Location of
specification or registration source Change Controller: Person or
entity, with contact information if appropriate
The characters in the registered Name field entry MUST be lowercase
alphanumeric or "-". The name MUST NOT start with "key".
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The registration policy for new entries is Expert Review ([RFC8126]).
The designated expert MUST ensure that the reference is stable and
publicly available and that it specifies how to convert the
delegation information's presentation format to wire format. The
reference MAY be any individual's Internet-Draft or a document from
any other source with similar assurances of stability and
availability. An entry MAY specify a reference of the form "Same as
(other key name)" if it uses the same presentation and wire formats
as an existing key.
This arrangement supports the development of new parameters while
ensuring that zone files can be made interoperable.
5.2.2. Initial Contents
The "DELEG Delegation Information" registry should be populated with
the following initial registrations:
Number: 1
Name: server-ip4
Meaning: A set of IPv4 addresses of nameservers
Reference: {{actions}} of this document
Change Controller: IETF
Number: 2
Name: server-ip6
Meaning: A set of IPv6 addresses of nameservers
Reference: {{actions}} of this document
Change Controller: IETF
Number: 3
Name: server-name
Meaning: The fully-qualified domain name of a nameserver
Reference: {{actions}} of this document
Change Controller: IETF
Number: 4
Name: include-name
Meaning: The fully-qualified domain of a DELEGI record
Reference: {{actions}} of this document
Change Controller: IETF
The registration for number 0 is reserved.
The registration for numbers 65280-65535 is reserved for private use.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
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[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034>.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4034>.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4035>.
[RFC6672] Rose, S. and W. Wijngaards, "DNAME Redirection in the
DNS", RFC 6672, DOI 10.17487/RFC6672, June 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6672>.
[RFC6840] Weiler, S., Ed. and D. Blacka, Ed., "Clarifications and
Implementation Notes for DNS Security (DNSSEC)", RFC 6840,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6840, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6840>.
[RFC6891] Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms
for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6891, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6891>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.
[RFC8914] Kumari, W., Hunt, E., Arends, R., Hardaker, W., and D.
Lawrence, "Extended DNS Errors", RFC 8914,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8914, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8914>.
6.2. Informative References
[BCP219] Best Current Practice 219,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp219>.
At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following:
Hoffman, P. and K. Fujiwara, "DNS Terminology", BCP 219,
RFC 9499, DOI 10.17487/RFC9499, March 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9499>.
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[I-D.tapril-ns2]
April, T., "Parameterized Nameserver Delegation with NS2
and NS2T", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-tapril-
ns2-01, 13 July 2020,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tapril-
ns2-01>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4001] Daniele, M., Haberman, B., Routhier, S., and J.
Schoenwaelder, "Textual Conventions for Internet Network
Addresses", RFC 4001, DOI 10.17487/RFC4001, February 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4001>.
[RFC5952] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
Address Text Representation", RFC 5952,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5952>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9460] Schwartz, B., Bishop, M., and E. Nygren, "Service Binding
and Parameter Specification via the DNS (SVCB and HTTPS
Resource Records)", RFC 9460, DOI 10.17487/RFC9460,
November 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9460>.
Appendix A. Examples
The following example shows an excerpt from a signed root zone. It
shows the delegation point for "example." and "test."
The "example." delegation has DELEG and NS records. The "test."
delegation has DELEG but no NS records.
TODO: Examples of using server-ip4 and server-ip6. Also, examples
that show DELEGI records in ns2.example.net and ns3.example.org.
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example. 300 IN DELEG server-name=a.example.
example. 300 IN DELEG include-name=ns2.example.net.
example. 300 IN DELEG include-name=ns3.example.org.
example. 300 IN RRSIG DELEG 13 4 300 20250214164848 (
20250207134348 21261 . HyDHYVT5KcqWc7J..= )
example. 300 IN NS a.example.
example. 300 IN NS b.example.net.
example. 300 IN NS c.example.org.
example. 300 IN DS 65163 13 2 5F86F2F3AE2B02...
example. 300 IN RRSIG DS 13 4 300 20250214164848 (
20250207134348 21261 . O0k558jHhyrC21J..= )
example. 300 IN NSEC a.example. NS DS RRSIG NSEC DELEG
example. 300 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 4 300 20250214164848 (
20250207134348 21261 . 1Kl8vab96gG21Aa..= )
a.example. 300 IN A 192.0.2.1
a.example. 300 IN AAAA 2001:DB8::1
The "test." delegation point has a DELEG record and no NS record.
test. 300 IN DELEG include-name=ns2.example.net
test. 300 IN RRSIG DELEG 13 4 300 20250214164848 (
20250207134348 21261 . 98Aac9f7A1Ac26Q..= )
test. 300 IN NSEC a.test. RRSIG NSEC DELEG
test. 300 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 4 300 20250214164848 (
20250207134348 21261 . kj7YY5tr9h7UqlK..= )
A.1. Responses
The following sections show referral examples:
A.2. DO bit clear, DE bit clear
A.2.1. Query for foo.example
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;; Header: QR RCODE=0
;;
;; Question
foo.example. IN MX
;; Answer
;; (empty)
;; Authority
example. 300 IN NS a.example.
example. 300 IN NS b.example.net.
example. 300 IN NS c.example.org.
;; Additional
a.example. 300 IN A 192.0.2.1
a.example. 300 IN AAAA 2001:DB8::1
A.2.2. Query for foo.test
;; Header: QR AA RCODE=3
;;
;; Question
foo.test. IN MX
;; Answer
;; (empty)
;; Authority
. 300 IN SOA ...
;; Additional
;; OPT with Extended DNS Error: New Delegation Only
A.3. DO bit set, DE bit clear
A.3.1. Query for foo.example
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;; Header: QR DO RCODE=0
;;
;; Question
foo.example. IN MX
;; Answer
;; (empty)
;; Authority
example. 300 IN NS a.example.
example. 300 IN NS b.example.net.
example. 300 IN NS c.example.org.
example. 300 IN DS 65163 13 2 5F86F2F3AE2B02...
example. 300 IN RRSIG DS 13 4 300 20250214164848 (
20250207134348 21261 . O0k558jHhyrC21J..= )
;; Additional
a.example. 300 IN A 192.0.2.1
a.example. 300 IN AAAA 2001:DB8::1
A.3.2. Query for foo.test
;; Header: QR DO AA RCODE=3
;;
;; Question
foo.test. IN MX
;; Answer
;; (empty)
;; Authority
. 300 IN SOA ...
. 300 IN RRSIG SOA ...
. 300 IN NSEC aaa NS SOA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY ZONEMD
. 300 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 4 300
test. 300 IN NSEC a.test. RRSIG NSEC DELEG
test. 300 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 4 300 20250214164848 (
20250207134348 21261 . aBFYask;djf7UqlK..= )
;; Additional
;; OPT with Extended DNS Error: New Delegation Only
A.4. DO bit clear, DE bit set
A.4.1. Query for foo.example
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;; Header: QR DE RCODE=0
;;
;; Question
foo.example. IN MX
;; Answer
;; (empty)
;; Authority
example. 300 IN DELEG server-name=a.example.
example. 300 IN DELEG include-name=ns2.example.net.
example. 300 IN DELEG include-name=ns3.example.org.
;; Additional
;; (empty)
A.4.2. Query for foo.test
;; Header: QR AA RCODE=0
;;
;; Question
foo.test. IN MX
;; Answer
;; (empty)
;; Authority
test. 300 IN DELEG include-name=ns2.example.net
;; Additional
;; (empty)
A.5. DO bit set, DE bit set
A.5.1. Query for foo.example
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;; Header: QR DO DE RCODE=0
;;
;; Question
foo.example. IN MX
;; Answer
;; (empty)
;; Authority
example. 300 IN DELEG server-name=a.example.
example. 300 IN DELEG include-name=ns2.example.net.
example. 300 IN DELEG include-name=ns3.example.org.
example. 300 IN RRSIG DELEG 13 4 300 20250214164848 (
20250207134348 21261 . HyDHYVT5KcqWc7J..= )
example. 300 IN DS 65163 13 2 5F86F2F3AE2B02...
example. 300 IN RRSIG DS 13 4 300 20250214164848 (
20250207134348 21261 . O0k558jHhyrC21J..= )
;; Additional
a.example. 300 IN A 192.0.2.1
a.example. 300 IN AAAA 2001:DB8::1
A.5.2. Query for foo.test
;; Header: QR DO DE AA RCODE=0
;;
;; Question
foo.test. IN MX
;; Answer
;; (empty)
;; Authority
test. 300 IN DELEG include-name=ns2.example.net.
test. 300 IN RRSIG DELEG 13 4 300 20250214164848 (
20250207134348 21261 . 98Aac9f7A1Ac26Q..= )
test. 300 IN NSEC a.test. RRSIG NSEC DELEG
test. 300 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 4 300 20250214164848 (
20250207134348 21261 . kj7YY5tr9h7UqlK..= )
;; Additional
;; (empty)
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Appendix B. Acknowledgments {:unnumbered}
This document is heavily based on past work done by Tim April in
[I-D.tapril-ns2] and thus extends the thanks to the people helping on
this which are: John Levine, Erik Nygren, Jon Reed, Ben Kaduk,
Mashooq Muhaimen, Jason Moreau, Jerrod Wiesman, Billy Tiemann, Gordon
Marx and Brian Wellington.
Work on DELEG protocol has started at IETF 118 hackaton. Hackaton
participants: Christian Elmerot, David Blacka, David Lawrence, Edward
Lewis, Erik Nygren, George Michaelson, Jan Včelák, Klaus Darilion,
Libor Peltan, Manu Bretelle, Peter van Dijk, Petr Špaček, Philip
Homburg, Ralf Weber, Roy Arends, Shane Kerr, Shumon Huque, Vandan
Adhvaryu, Vladimír Čunát.
Other people joined the effort after the initial hackaton: Ben
Schwartz, Bob Halley, Paul Hoffman, ...
Appendix C. TODO
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE THIS SECTION PRIOR TO PUBLICATION.
* Write a security considerations section
* Change the parameters form temporary to permanent once IANA
assigned. Temporary use:
- DELEG QType code is 65432
- DELEG EDNS Flag Bit is 3
- DELEG DNSKEY Flag Bit is 0
Authors' Addresses
Tim April
Google, LLC
Email: ietf@tapril.net
Petr Špaček
ISC
Email: pspacek@isc.org
Ralf Weber
Akamai Technologies
Email: rweber@akamai.com
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David C Lawrence
Salesforce
Email: tale@dd.org
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