Skip to main content

Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)
draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-32

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
Authors Todd Herr , John R. Levine
Last updated 2024-06-25 (Latest revision 2024-05-20)
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Formats
Reviews
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state In WG Last Call
Document shepherd Tim Wicinski
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Consensus boilerplate Yes
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to tjw.ietf@gmail.com
draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-32
DMARC                                                       T. Herr (ed)
Internet-Draft                                                  Valimail
Obsoletes: 7489, 9091 (if approved)                       J. Levine (ed)
Intended status: Standards Track                           Standcore LLC
Expires: 27 December 2024                                   25 June 2024

Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)
                      draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-32

Abstract

   This document describes the Domain-based Message Authentication,
   Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) protocol.

   DMARC permits the owner of an email's Author Domain (#author-domain)
   to enable validation of the domain's use, to indicate the Domain
   Owner's (#domain-owner) or Public Suffix Operator's (#public-suffix-
   operator) message handling preference regarding failed validation,
   and to request reports about the use of the domain name.  Mail
   receiving organizations can use this information when evaluating
   handling choices for incoming mail.

   This document obsoletes RFCs 7489 and 9091.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 December 2024.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  High-Level Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Anti-Phishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.4.  Out of Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Terminology and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.1.  Authenticated Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.2.  Author Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.3.  DMARC Policy Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.4.  Domain Owner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.5.  Domain Owner Assessment Policy  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.6.  Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.7.  Identifier Alignment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.8.  Mail Receiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.9.  Monitoring Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.10. Non-existent Domains  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.2.11. Organizational Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.2.12. Public Suffix Domain (PSD)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.2.13. Public Suffix Operator (PSO)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.2.14. PSO Controlled Domain Names . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.2.15. Report Consumer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Overview and Key Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.1.  DMARC Basics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.2.  Use of RFC5322.From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.3.  Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.4.  Identifier Alignment Explained  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.4.1.  DKIM-Authenticated Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.4.2.  SPF-Authenticated Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.4.3.  Alignment and Extension Technologies  . . . . . . . .  15
     4.5.  DMARC Policy Record Explained . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.6.  DMARC Reporting URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.7.  DMARC Policy Record Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.8.  Formal Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     4.9.  Flow Diagram  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

     4.10. DNS Tree Walk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       4.10.1.  DMARC Policy Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       4.10.2.  Identifier Alignment Evaluation  . . . . . . . . . .  28
   5.  DMARC Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     5.1.  Domain Owner Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       5.1.1.  Publish an SPF Record for an Aligned Domain . . . . .  30
       5.1.2.  Configure Sending System for DKIM Signing Using an
               Aligned Domain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       5.1.3.  Set Up a Mailbox to Receive Aggregate Reports . . . .  31
       5.1.4.  Publish a DMARC Policy Record for the Author Domain and
               Organizational Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       5.1.5.  Collect and Analyze Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       5.1.6.  Remediate Unaligned or Unauthenticated Mail
               Streams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       5.1.7.  Decide Whether to Update Domain Owner Assessment Policy
               to Enforcement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       5.1.8.  A Note on Large, Complex Organizations and
               Decentralized DNS Management  . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     5.2.  PSO Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     5.3.  Mail Receiver Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       5.3.1.  Extract Author Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       5.3.2.  Determine If The DMARC Mechanism Applies  . . . . . .  34
       5.3.3.  Determine If Authenticated Identifiers Exist  . . . .  34
       5.3.4.  Conduct Identifier Alignment Checks If Necessary  . .  34
       5.3.5.  Determine DMARC "Pass" or "Fail"  . . . . . . . . . .  35
       5.3.6.  Apply Policy If Appropriate . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       5.3.7.  Store Results of DMARC Processing . . . . . . . . . .  35
       5.3.8.  Send Aggregate Reports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       5.3.9.  Optionally Send Failure Reports . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     5.4.  Policy Enforcement Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   6.  DMARC Feedback  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   7.  Other Topics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     7.1.  Issues Specific to SPF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     7.2.  DNS Load and Caching  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
     7.3.  Rejecting Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
     7.4.  Interoperability Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     7.5.  Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     8.1.  Authentication-Results Method Registry Update . . . . . .  41
     8.2.  Authentication-Results Result Registry Update . . . . . .  42
     8.3.  Feedback Report Header Fields Registry Update . . . . . .  43
     8.4.  DMARC Tag Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     8.5.  DMARC Report Format Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     8.6.  Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names
           Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
   9.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
     9.1.  Aggregate Report Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
     9.2.  Failure Report Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024                [Page 3]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     10.1.  Authentication Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     10.2.  Attacks on Reporting URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     10.3.  DNS Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     10.4.  Display Name Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     10.5.  Denial of DMARC Processing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     10.6.  External Reporting Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     10.7.  Secure Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     10.8.  Relaxed Alignment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
   11. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
   12. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
   Appendix A.  Technology Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     A.1.  S/MIME  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     A.2.  Method Exclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     A.3.  Sender Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
     A.4.  Domain Existence Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
     A.5.  Organizational Domain Discovery Issues  . . . . . . . . .  57
     A.6.  Removal of the "pct" Tag  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
   Appendix B.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     B.1.  Identifier Alignment Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
       B.1.1.  SPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
       B.1.2.  DKIM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     B.2.  Domain Owner Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       B.2.1.  Entire Domain, Monitoring Mode  . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       B.2.2.  Entire Domain, Monitoring Mode, Per-Message
               Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       B.2.3.  Per-Message Failure Reports Directed to Third
               Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
       B.2.4.  Subdomain, Testing, and Multiple Aggregate Report
               URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     B.3.  Mail Receiver Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       B.3.1.  SMTP Session Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
     B.4.  Organizational and Policy Domain Tree Walk Examples . . .  67
       B.4.1.  Simple Organizational and Policy Example  . . . . . .  68
       B.4.2.  Deep Tree Walk Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
       B.4.3.  Example with a PSD DMARC Policy Record  . . . . . . .  69
     B.5.  Utilization of Aggregate Feedback: Example  . . . . . . .  70
   Appendix C.  Changes from RFC 7489  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
     C.1.  IETF Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
     C.2.  Changes to Terminology and Definitions  . . . . . . . . .  71
       C.2.1.  Terms Added . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
       C.2.2.  Definitions Updated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
     C.3.  Policy Discovery and Organizational Domain
            Determination  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
     C.4.  Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
     C.5.  Tags  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
       C.5.1.  Tags Added: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
       C.5.2.  Tags Removed: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024                [Page 4]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

     C.6.  Expansion of Domain Owner Actions Section . . . . . . . .  73
     C.7.  Report Generator Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
     C.8.  Removal of RFC 7489 Appendix A.5  . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
     C.9.  RFC 7489 Errata Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
     C.10. General Editing and Formatting  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
   Acknowledgements - RFC 7489 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76

1.  Introduction

   RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLISHING:
   The source for this draft is maintained on GitHub at:
   https://github.com/ietf-wg-dmarc/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis
   (https://github.com/ietf-wg-dmarc/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis)

   Abusive email often includes unauthorized and deceptive use of a
   domain name in the "From" header field defined in Section 3.6.2 of
   [RFC5322] and referred to as RFC5322.From.  The domain typically
   belongs to an organization expected to be known to - and presumably
   trusted by - the recipient.  The Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
   [RFC7208] and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [RFC6376] protocols
   provide domain-level authentication but are not directly associated
   with the RFC5322.From domain, also known as the Author Domain
   (#author-domain).  DMARC leverages these two protocols, providing a
   method for Domain Owners to publish a DNS TXT record describing the
   email authentication policies for the Author Domain and to request
   specific handling for messages using that domain that fail validation
   checks.  These DNS records are called DMARC Policy Records (#dmarc-
   policy-record).

   As with SPF and DKIM, DMARC validation results in a verdict of either
   "pass" or "fail".  A DMARC result of "pass" requires not only an SPF
   or DKIM pass verdict for the email message, but also and more
   importantly that the domain associated with the SPF or DKIM pass be
   "aligned" with the Author Domain in one of two modes - "relaxed" or
   "strict".  Domains are said to be in "relaxed alignment" if they have
   the same Organizational Domain (#organizational-domain); a domain's
   Organizational Domain is the domain at the the top of the namespace
   hierarchy for that domain while having the same administrative
   authority as that domain.  On the other hand, domains are in "strict
   alignment" if and only if they are identical.  The choice of required
   alignment mode is left to the Domain Owner (#domain-owner) that
   publishes a DMARC Policy Record.

   A DMARC pass for a message indicates only that the use of the Author
   Domain has been validated for that message as authorized by the
   Domain Owner.  Such authorization does not carry an explicit or

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024                [Page 5]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   implicit value assertion about that message or about the Domain
   Owner, and so a DMARC pass by itself does not guarantee delivery of
   the message to the recipient's Inbox.  Furthermore, a mail-receiving
   organization that performs DMARC validation can choose to honor the
   Domain Owner's requested message handling for validation failures,
   but it is not required to do so; it might choose different actions
   entirely.

   For a mail-receiving organization participating in DMARC, a message
   that passes DMARC validation is part of a message stream reliably
   associated with the Author Domain.  Therefore, reputation assessment
   of that stream by the mail-receiving organization can assume the use
   of that Author Domain is authorized by the Domain Owner.  A message
   that fails this validation is not necessarily associated with the
   Author Domain and should not affect its reputation.

   DMARC, in the associated [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and
   [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting] documents, also specifies a
   reporting framework.  Using it, a mail-receiving organization can
   generate regular reports about messages that use Author Domains for
   which a DMARC Policy Record exists; those reports are sent to the
   address(es) specified by the Domain Owner in the DMARC Policy Record.
   Domain Owners can use these reports, especially the aggregate
   reports, not only to identify sources of mail attempting to
   fraudulently use their domain, but also (and perhaps more
   importantly) to flag and fix gaps in their authentication practices.
   However, as with honoring the Domain Owner's stated mail handling
   preference, a mail-receiving organization supporting DMARC is under
   no obligation to send requested reports, although it is recommended
   that they do send aggregate reports.

   The use of DMARC creates some interoperability challenges that
   require due consideration before deployment, particularly with
   configurations that can cause mail to be rejected.  These are
   discussed in Section 7.

2.  Requirements

   The following sections describe topics that guide the specification
   of DMARC.

2.1.  High-Level Goals

   DMARC has the following high-level goals:

   *  Allow Domain Owners (#domain-owner) and Public Suffix Operators
      (PSOs) (#public-suffix-operator) to validate their email
      authentication deployment.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024                [Page 6]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   *  Allow Domain Owners and PSOs to assert their desired message
      handling for validation failures for messages purporting to have
      authorship within the domain.

   *  Minimize implementation complexity for both senders and receivers,
      as well as the impact on handling and delivery of legitimate
      messages.

   *  Reduce the amount of successfully delivered spoofed emails.

   *  Work at Internet scale.

2.2.  Anti-Phishing

   DMARC is designed to prevent the unauthorized use of the Author
   Domain (#author-domain) of an email message, a technique known as
   "spoofing", particularly in transactional email (official mail about
   business transactions).  One of the primary uses of this kind of
   spoofed mail is phishing (enticing users to provide information by
   pretending to be the legitimate service requesting the information).
   Although DMARC can only be used to combat specific forms of exact-
   domain spoofing directly, the DMARC mechanism has been found to be
   useful in the creation of reliable and defensible message streams.

   DMARC does not attempt to solve all problems with spoofed or
   otherwise fraudulent emails.  In particular, it does not address the
   use of visually similar domain names ("cousin domains") or abuse of
   the RFC5322.From human-readable display-name, as defined in
   Section 3.4 of [RFC5322].

2.3.  Scalability

   Scalability is a significant issue for systems that need to operate
   in an environment as widely deployed as current SMTP email.  For this
   reason, DMARC seeks to avoid the need for third parties or pre-
   sending agreements between senders and receivers.  This preserves the
   positive aspects of the current email infrastructure.

   Although DMARC does not introduce third-party senders (namely
   external agents authorized to send on behalf of an operator) to the
   email-handling flow, it also does not preclude them.  Such third
   parties are free to provide services in conjunction with DMARC.

2.4.  Out of Scope

   Several topics and issues are specifically out of scope of this work.
   These include the following:

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024                [Page 7]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   *  Different treatment of messages that are not authenticated (e.g.,
      those that have no DKIM signature or those sent using an Author
      Domain (#author-domain) for which no DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc-
      policy-record) exists) versus those that fail validation;

   *  Evaluation of anything other than RFC5322.From header field;

   *  Multiple reporting formats;

   *  Publishing policy other than via the DNS;

   *  Reporting or otherwise evaluating other than the last-hop IP
      address;

   *  Attacks in the display-name portions of the RFC5322.From header
      field, also known as "display name" attacks;

   *  Authentication of entities other than domains, since DMARC is
      built upon SPF and DKIM, which authenticate domains; and

   *  Content analysis.

3.  Terminology and Definitions

   This section defines terms used in the rest of the document.

3.1.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] and [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Readers are encouraged to be familiar with the contents of [RFC5598].
   In particular, that document defines various roles in the messaging
   infrastructure that can appear the same or separate in various
   contexts.  For example, a Domain Owner (#domain-owner) could, via the
   messaging security mechanisms on which DMARC is based, delegate the
   ability to send mail as the Domain Owner to a third party with
   another role.  This document does not address the distinctions among
   such roles; the reader is encouraged to become familiar with that
   material before continuing.

3.2.  Definitions

   The following sections define the terms used in this document.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024                [Page 8]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

3.2.1.  Authenticated Identifiers

   Authenticated Identifiers are those domain-level identifiers for
   which authorized use is validated using a supported authentication
   mechanism (#authentication-mechanisms).

3.2.2.  Author Domain

   The domain name of the apparent author as extracted from the
   RFC5322.From header field.

3.2.3.  DMARC Policy Record

   A DNS TXT record published by a Domain Owner (#domain-owner) or
   Public Suffix Operator (PSO) (#public-suffix-operator) to enable
   validation of an Author Domain's (#author-domain) use, to indicate
   the Domain Owner's or PSO's message handling preference regarding
   failed validation, and to request reports about the use of the Author
   Domain.

3.2.4.  Domain Owner

   An entity or organization that has control of a given DNS domain,
   usually by holding its registration.  Domain Owners range from
   complex, globally distributed organizations to service providers
   working on behalf of non-technical clients to individuals responsible
   for maintaining personal domains.  This specification uses this term
   as analogous to an Administrative Management Domain as defined in
   [RFC5598].  It can also refer to delegates, such as Report Consumers
   when those are outside of their immediate management domain.

3.2.5.  Domain Owner Assessment Policy

   The message handling preference expressed in a DMARC Policy Record
   (#dmarc-policy-record) by the Domain Owner (#domain-owner) regarding
   failed validation of the Author Domain (#author-domain) is called the
   "Domain Owner Assessment Policy".  Possible values are described in
   Section 4.7.

3.2.6.  Enforcement

   Enforcement describes a state where the existing Domain Owner
   Assessment Policy (#domain-owner-policy) for an Organizational Domain
   (#organizational-domain) and all subdomains below it is not "p=none".
   This state means that the Organizational Domain and its subdomains
   can only be used as Author Domains (#author-domain) if they are
   properly validated using the DMARC mechanism.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024                [Page 9]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   Historically, Domain Owner Assessment Policies of "p=quarantine" or
   "p=reject" have been higher value signals to Mail Receivers (#mail-
   receiver).  Messages with Author Domains for which such policies
   exist that are not validated using the DMARC mechanism will not reach
   the inbox at Mail Receivers that participate in DMARC and honor the
   Domain Owner's expressed handling preference.

3.2.7.  Identifier Alignment

   DMARC describes the concept of alignment between the Author Domain
   (#author-domain) and an Authenticated Identifier (#authenticated-
   identifiers), and requires such Identifier Alignment between the two
   for a message to achieve a DMARC pass.  DMARC defines two states for
   alignment.

3.2.7.1.  Relaxed Alignment

   When the Author Domain (#author-domain) has the same Organizational
   Domain (#organizational-domain) as an Authenticated Identifier
   (#authenticated-identifier), the two are said to be in relaxed
   alignment.

3.2.7.2.  Strict Alignment

   When the Author Domain (#author-domain) is identical to an
   Authenticated Identifier (#authenticated-identifier), the two are
   said to be in strict alignment.

3.2.8.  Mail Receiver

   The entity or organization that receives and processes email.  Mail
   Receivers operate one or more Internet-facing Mail Transport Agents
   (MTAs).

3.2.9.  Monitoring Mode

   Monitoring Mode describes a state where the existing Domain Owner
   Assessment Policy (#domain-owner-policy) for an Organizational Domain
   (#organizational-domain) and all subdomains below it is "p=none", and
   the Domain Owner (#domain-owner) is receiving aggregate reports for
   the Organizational Domain.  While the use of the Organizational
   Domain and all its subdomains as Author Domains (#author-domain) can
   still be validated by a Mail Receiver (#mail-receiver) deploying the
   DMARC mechanism, the Domain Owner expresses no handling preference
   for messages that fail DMARC validation.  The Domain Owner is,
   however, using the content of the DMARC aggregate reports to make any
   needed adjustments to the authentication practices for its mail
   streams.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 10]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

3.2.10.  Non-existent Domains

   For DMARC purposes, a non-existent domain is consistent with the
   term's meaning as described in [RFC8020].  That is, if the response
   code received for a query for a domain name is NXDOMAIN, then the
   domain name and any possible subdomains do not exist.

3.2.11.  Organizational Domain

   The Organizational Domain for any domain is akin to the ADMD
   described in [RFC5598].  A domain's Organizational Domain is the
   domain at the top of the namespace hierarchy for that domain while
   having the same administrative authority as the domain.  An
   Organizational Domain is determined by applying the algorithm found
   in Section 4.10

3.2.12.  Public Suffix Domain (PSD)

   Some domains allow the registration of subdomains that are "owned" by
   independent organizations.  Real-world examples of these domains are
   ".com", ".org", ".us", and ".co.uk", to name just a few.  These
   domains are called "Public Suffix Domains (PSDs)".  For example,
   "ietf.org" is a registered domain name, and ".org" is its PSD.

3.2.13.  Public Suffix Operator (PSO)

   A Public Suffix Operator is an organization that manages operations
   within a PSD, particularly the DNS records published for names at and
   under that domain name.

3.2.14.  PSO Controlled Domain Names

   PSO-Controlled Domain Names are names in the DNS that are managed by
   a PSO.  PSO-controlled Domain Names may have one label (e.g., ".com")
   or more (e.g., ".co.uk"), depending on the PSD's policy.

3.2.15.  Report Consumer

   A Report Consumer is an operator that receives reports from another
   operator implementing the reporting mechanisms described in the
   documents [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and
   [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting].  Such an operator might be
   receiving reports about messages related to a domain for which it is
   the Domain Owner (#domain-owner) or PSO (#public-suffix-operator) or
   reports about messages related to another operator's domain.  This
   term applies collectively to the system components that receive and
   process these reports and the organizations that operate them.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 11]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

4.  Overview and Key Concepts

   This section provides a general overview of the design and operation
   of the DMARC environment.

4.1.  DMARC Basics

   DMARC permits a Domain Owner (#domain-owner) or PSO (#public-suffix-
   operator) to enable validation of an Author Domain's (#author-domain)
   use in an email message, to indicate the Domain Owner's or PSO's
   message handling preference regarding failed validation, and to
   request reports about use of the Author Domain.  A domain's DMARC
   Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-record) is published in DNS as a TXT
   record at the name created by prepending the label "_dmarc" to the
   domain name and is retrieved through normal DNS queries.

   DMARC's validation mechanism produces a "pass" result if a DMARC
   Policy Record exists for the Author Domain of an email message and
   the Author Domain is aligned (#identifier-alignment) with an
   Authenticated Identifier (#authenticated-identifiers) from that
   message.  When a DMARC Policy Record exists for the Author Domain and
   the DMARC mechanism does not produce a "pass" result, the Mail
   Receiver's (#mail-receiver) handling of that message can be
   influenced by the Domain Owner Assessment Policy (#domain-owner-
   policy) expressed in the DMARC Policy Record.

   It is important to note that the authentication mechanisms employed
   by DMARC only validate the usage of a DNS domain in an email message.
   They do not validate the local-part of any email address identifier
   found in that message, nor do such validations carry an explicit or
   implicit value assertion about that message or about the Domain
   Owner.

   DMARC's reporting component involves the collection of information
   about received messages using the Author Domain for periodic
   aggregate reports to the Domain Owner or PSO.  The parameters and
   format for such reports are discussed in
   [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]

   A Mail Receiver participating in DMARC might also generate per-
   message reports that contain information related to individual
   messages that fail DMARC validation checks.  Per-message failure
   reports are a useful source of information when debugging deployments
   (if messages can be determined to be legitimate even though failing
   validation) or in analyzing attacks.  The capability for such
   services is enabled by DMARC but defined in other referenced material
   such as [RFC6591] and [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting]

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 12]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

4.2.  Use of RFC5322.From

   One of the most obvious points of security scrutiny for DMARC is the
   choice to focus on an identifier, namely the RFC5322.From address,
   which is part of a body of data that has been trivially forged
   throughout the history of email.  This field is the one used by end
   users to identify the source of the message, and so it has always
   been a prime target for abuse through such forgery and other means.
   That said, of all the identifiers that are part of the message
   itself, this is the only one required to be present.  A message
   without a single, properly formed RFC5322.From header field does not
   comply with [RFC5322], and handling such a message is outside of the
   scope of this specification.

4.3.  Authentication Mechanisms

   The following mechanisms for determining Authenticated Identifiers
   (#authenticated-identifiers) are supported in this version of DMARC:

   *  DKIM, [RFC6376], which provides a domain-level identifier in the
      content of the "d=" tag of a validated DKIM-Signature header
      field.

   *  SPF, [RFC7208], which can validate the uses of both the domain
      found in an SMTP [RFC5321] HELO/EHLO command (the HELO identity)
      and the domain found in an SMTP MAIL command (the MAIL FROM
      identity).  DMARC relies solely on SPF validation of the MAIL FROM
      identity.  Section 2.4 of [RFC7208] describes the determination of
      the MAIL FROM identity for cases in which the SMTP MAIL command
      has a null path, i.e., the mailbox composed of the local-part
      "postmaster" and the HELO identity.

4.4.  Identifier Alignment Explained

   DMARC validates the authorized use of the Author Domain (#author-
   domain) by requiring either that it have the same Organizational
   Domain (#organizational-domain) as an Authenticated Identifier
   (#authenticated-identifier) (a condition known as "Relaxed Alignment
   (#relaxed-alignment)") or that it be identical to the Authenticated
   Identifier (a condition known as "Strict Alignment (#strict-
   alignment)").  The choice of relaxed or strict alignment is left to
   the Domain Owner (#domain-owner) and is expressed in the domain's
   DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-record).  In practice, nearly all
   Domain Owners have found relaxed alignment sufficient to meet their
   needs.  Domain name comparisons in this context are case-insensitive,
   per [RFC4343].

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 13]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   The following table is meant to illustrate possible alignment
   conditions.

   +==================+==================+=========================+
   | Authenticated    | Author Domain    | Identifier Alignment    |
   | Identifier       |                  |                         |
   +==================+==================+=========================+
   | foo.example.com  | news.example.com | relaxed; the two have   |
   |                  |                  | the same organizational |
   |                  |                  | domain, example.com     |
   +------------------+------------------+-------------------------+
   | news.example.com | news.example.com | strict; the two are     |
   |                  |                  | identical               |
   +------------------+------------------+-------------------------+
   | foo.example.net  | news.example.com | none; the two do not    |
   |                  |                  | share a common          |
   |                  |                  | organizational domain   |
   +------------------+------------------+-------------------------+

                     Table 1: "Alignment Examples"

   It is important to note that Identifier Alignment cannot occur with a
   message that is not valid per [RFC5322], particularly one with a
   malformed, absent, or repeated RFC5322.From header field, since in
   that case there is no reliable way to determine a DMARC Policy Record
   (#dmarc-policy-record) that applies to the message.  Accordingly,
   DMARC operation is predicated on the input being a valid RFC5322
   message object.  For non-compliant cases, handling is outside of the
   scope of this specification.  Further discussion of this can be found
   in Section 10.5.

4.4.1.  DKIM-Authenticated Identifiers

   DKIM permits a Domain Owner to claim some responsibility for a
   message by associating the domain to the message.  This association
   is done by inserting the domain as the value of the d= tag in a DKIM-
   Signature header field, and the assertion of responsiblity is
   validated through a crytographic signature in the header field.  If
   the cryptographic signature validates, then the signing domain (i.e.,
   the value of the d= tag) is the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier.

   DMARC requires that Identifier Alignment is applied to the DKIM-
   Authenticated Identifier because a message can bear a valid signature
   from any domain, even one used by a bad actor.  Therefore, a DKIM-
   Authenticated Identifier that does not have Identifier Alignment with
   the Author Domain is not enough to validate whether the use of the
   Author Domain has been authorized by its Domain Owner.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 14]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   A single email can contain multiple DKIM signatures, and it is
   considered to produce a DMARC "pass" result if any DKIM-Authenticated
   Identifier aligns with the Author Domain.

4.4.2.  SPF-Authenticated Identifiers

   SPF can validate the uses of both the domain found in an SMTP HELO/
   EHLO command (the HELO identity) and the domain found in an SMTP MAIL
   command (the MAIL FROM identity).  DMARC relies solely on SPF
   validation of the MAIL FROM identity.  Section 2.4 of [RFC7208]
   describes the determination of the MAIL FROM identity for cases in
   which the SMTP MAIL command has a null path, i.e., the mailbox
   composed of the local-part "postmaster" and the HELO identity.  If
   the use of the domain in the MAIL FROM identity is validated by SPF,
   then that domain is the SPF-Authenticated Identifier.

   DMARC requires that Identifier Alignment is applied to the SPF-
   Authenticated Identifier because any Domain Owner, even a bad actor,
   can publish an SPF record for its domain and send email that will
   obtain an SPF pass result.  Therefore, an SPF-Authenticated
   Identifier that does not have Identifier Alignment with the Author
   Domain is not enough to validate whether the use of the Author Domain
   has been authorized by its Domain Owner.

4.4.3.  Alignment and Extension Technologies

   If in the future DMARC is extended to include the use of other
   authentication mechanisms, the extensions MUST allow for the
   assignment of a domain as an Authenticated Identified so that
   alignment with the Author Domain can be validated.

4.5.  DMARC Policy Record Explained

   A Domain Owner (#domain-owner) or PSO (#public-suffix-operator)
   advertises DMARC participation of one or more of its domains by
   publishing DMARC Policy Records (#dmarc-policy-record) that will
   apply to those domains.  In doing so, Domain Owners and PSOs indicate
   their handling preference regarding failed validation for email
   messages using their domain in the RFC5322.From header field as well
   as their desire to receive feedback about such messages in the form
   of aggregate and/or failure reports.

   DMARC Policy Records are stored as DNS TXT records in subdomains
   named "_dmarc".  For example, the Domain Owner of "example.com" would
   publish a DMARC Policy Record at the name "_dmarc.example.com".
   Similarly, a Mail Receiver (#mail-receiver) wishing to find the DMARC
   Policy Record for mail with an Author Domain (#author-domain) of
   "example.com" would issue a TXT query to the DNS for the subdomain of

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 15]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   "_dmarc.example.com".  A Domain Owner or PSO may choose not to
   participate in DMARC validation by Mail Receivers simply by not
   publishing a DMARC Policy Record for its Author Domain(s).

   DMARC Policy Records can also apply to subdomains of the name at
   which they are published in the DNS, if the record is published at an
   Organizational Domain (#organizational-domain) for the subdomains.
   The Domain Owner Assessment Policy (#domain-owner-policy) that
   applies to the subdomains can be identical to the Domain Owner
   Assessment Policy that applies to the Organizational Domain or
   different, depending on the presence or absence of certain values in
   the DMARC Policy Record.  See Section 4.7 for more details.

   DMARC's use of the Domain Name Service is driven by DMARC's use of
   domain names and the nature of the query it performs.  The query
   requirement matches with the DNS for obtaining simple parametric
   information.  It uses an established method of storing the
   information associated with the domain name targeted by a DNS query,
   specifically an isolated TXT record that is restricted to the DMARC
   context.  Using the DNS as the query service has the benefit of
   reusing an extremely well-established operations, administration, and
   management infrastructure, rather than creating a new one.

   Per [RFC1035], a TXT record can comprise several "character-string"
   objects.  Where this is the case, the module performing DMARC
   evaluation MUST concatenate these strings by joining together the
   objects in order and parsing the result as a single string.

   A Domain Owner can choose not to have some underlying authentication
   mechanisms apply to DMARC evaluation of its Author Domain(s).  For
   example, if a Domain Owner only wants to use DKIM as the underlying
   authentication mechanism, then the Domain Owner does not publish an
   SPF record that can produce Identifier Alignment between an SPF-
   Authenticated Identifier and the Author Domain.  Alternatively, if
   the Domain Owner wishes to rely solely on SPF, then it can send email
   messages that have no DKIM-Signature header field that would produce
   Identifier Alignment between a DKIM-Authenicated Identifier and the
   Author Domain.  Neither approach is recommended, however.

   A Mail Receiver implementing the DMARC mechanism gets the Domain
   Owner's or PSO's published Domain Owner Assessment Policy and can use
   it to inform its handling decisions for messages that undergo DMARC
   validation checks and do not produce a result of pass.  Mail handling
   considerations based on Domain Owner Assessment Policy enforcement
   are discussed below in Section 5.4.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 16]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

4.6.  DMARC Reporting URIs

   [RFC3986] defines a generic syntax for identifying a resource.  The
   DMARC mechanism uses this as the format by which a Domain Owner
   (#domain-owner) or PSO (#public-suffix-organization) specifies the
   destination for the two report types that are supported.

   The place such URIs are specified (see Section 4.7) allows a list of
   these to be provided.  The list of URIs is separated by commas (ASCII
   0x2c).  A report SHOULD be sent to each listed URI provided in the
   DMARC Policy Record.

   A formal definition is provided in Section 4.8.

4.7.  DMARC Policy Record Format

   DMARC Policy Records follow the extensible "tag-value" syntax for
   DNS-based key records defined in DKIM [RFC6376].

   Section 8 creates a registry for known DMARC tags and registers the
   initial set defined in this document.  Only tags defined in that
   registry are to be processed; unknown tags MUST be ignored.

   The following tags are valid DMARC tags:

   adkim:  (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "r".)  Indicates whether
      the Domain Owner (#domain-owner) or PSO (#public-suffix-
      organization) requires strict or relaxed DKIM Identifier Alignment
      mode.  See Section 4.4.1 for details.  Valid values are as
      follows:

      r:  relaxed mode
      s:  strict mode

   aspf:  (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "r".)  Indicates whether the
      Domain Owner or PSO requires strict or relaxed SPF Identifier
      Alignment mode.  See Section 4.4.2 for details.  Valid values are
      as follows:

      r:  relaxed mode
      s:  strict mode

   fo:  Failure reporting options (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "0")

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 17]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

      Provides requested options for the generation of failure reports.
      Report generators may choose to adhere to the requested options.
      This tag's content MUST be ignored if a "ruf" tag (below) is not
      also specified.  This tag can include one or more of the values
      shown here; if more than one value is assigned to the tag, the
      list of values should be separated by colons (e.g., fo=0:d).  The
      valid values and their meanings are:

      0:  Generate a DMARC failure report if all underlying
         authentication mechanisms fail to produce an aligned "pass"
         result.
      1:  Generate a DMARC failure report if any underlying
         authentication mechanism produced something other than an
         aligned "pass" result.
      d:  Generate a DKIM failure report if the message had a signature
         that failed evaluation, regardless of its alignment.  DKIM-
         specific reporting is described in [RFC6651].
      s:  Generate an SPF failure report if the message failed SPF
         evaluation, regardless of its alignment.  SPF-specific
         reporting is described in [RFC6652].

   np:  Domain Owner Assessment Policy (#domain-owner-policy) for non-
      existent subdomains of the given Organizational Domain (plain-
      text; OPTIONAL).  Indicates the message handling preference of the
      Domain Owner or PSO for mail using non-existent subdomains of the
      prevailing Organizational Domain and not passing DMARC validation.
      It applies only to non-existent subdomains of the Organizational
      Domain queried and not to either existing subdomains or the domain
      itself.  Its syntax is identical to that of the "p" tag defined
      below.  If the "np" tag is absent, the policy specified by the
      "sp" tag (if the "sp" tag is present) or the policy specified by
      the "p" tag, if the "sp" tag is not present, MUST be applied for
      non-existent subdomains.

   p:  Domain Owner Assessment Policy (#domain-owner-policy) (plain-
      text; RECOMMENDED for DMARC Policy Records).  Indicates the
      message handling preference of the Domain Owner or PSO for mail
      using its domain but not passing DMARC validation.  The policy
      applies to the domain queried and to subdomains, unless the
      subdomain policy is explicitly described using the "sp" or "np"
      tags.  If this tag is not present in an otherwise syntactically
      valid DMARC record, then the record is treated as if it included
      "p=none" (see Section 4.10.1).  This tag is not applicable for
      third-party reporting records (see
      [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and
      [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting]) Possible values are as
      follows:

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 18]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

      none:  The Domain Owner offers no expression of preference.
      quarantine:  The Domain Owner considers such mail to be
         suspicious.  It is possible the mail is valid, although the
         failure creates a significant concern.
      reject:  The Domain Owner considers all such failures to be a
         clear indication that the use of the domain name is not valid.
         See Section 7.3 for some discussion of SMTP rejection methods
         and their implications.

   psd:  A flag indicating whether the domain is a PSD. (plain-text;
      OPTIONAL; default is 'u').  Possible values are:

      y:  PSOs include this tag with a value of 'y' to indicate that the
         domain is a PSD.  If a record containing this tag with a value
         of 'y' is found during policy discovery, this information will
         be used to determine the Organizational Domain and policy
         domain applicable to the message in question.
      n:  The DMARC policy record is published for a domain that is not
         a PSD, but it is the Organizational Domain for itself and its
         subdomains.
      u:  The default indicates that the DMARC policy record is
         published for a domain that is not a PSD, and may or may not be
         an Organizational Domain for itself and its subdomains.  Use
         the mechanism described in Section 4.10 for determining the
         Organizational Domain for this domain.  There is no need to
         explicitly publish psd=u in a DMARC Policy Record.

   rua:  Addresses to which aggregate feedback reports are to be sent
      (comma-separated plain-text list of DMARC Reporting URIs;
      OPTIONAL).  If present, the Domain Owner is requesting Mail
      Receivers to send aggregate feedback reports as defined in
      [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] to the URIs listed.  Any
      valid URI can be specified.  A Mail Receiver MUST implement
      support for a "mailto:" URI, i.e., the ability to send a DMARC
      report via electronic mail.  If the tag is not provided, Mail
      Receivers MUST NOT generate aggregate feedback reports for the
      domain.  URIs not supported by Mail Receivers MUST be ignored.
      [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] also discusses considerations
      that apply when the domain name of a URI differs from the domain
      publishing the DMARC Policy Record.  See Section 10.6 for
      additional considerations.

   ruf:  Addresses to which message-specific failure information is to
      be reported (comma-separated plain-text list of DMARC URIs;
      OPTIONAL).  If present, the Domain Owner is requesting Mail
      Receivers to send detailed failure reports about messages that
      fail the DMARC evaluation in specific ways (see the "fo" tag
      above) to the URIs listed.  Depending on the value of the "fo"

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 19]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

      tag, the format for such reports is described in
      [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting], [RFC6651], or [RFC6652].  Any
      valid URI can be specified.  A Mail Receiver MUST implement
      support for a "mailto:" URI, i.e., the ability to send message-
      specific failure information via electronic mail.  If the tag is
      not provided, Mail Receivers MUST NOT generate failure reports for
      the domain.  URIs not supported by Mail Receivers MUST be ignored.
      [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] discusses considerations that
      apply when the domain name of a URI differs from that of the
      domain advertising the policy.  See Section 10.6 for additional
      considerations.

   sp:  Domain Owner Assessment Policy for all subdomains of the given
      Organizational Domain (plain-text; OPTIONAL).  Indicates the
      message handling preference of the Domain Owner or PSO for mail
      using an existing subdomain of the prevailing Organizational
      Domain for and not passing DMARC validation.  It applies only to
      existing subdomains of the message's Organizational Domain in the
      DNS hierarchy and not to the Organizational Domain itself.  Its
      syntax is identical to that of the "p" tag defined above.  If both
      the "sp" tag is absent, and the "np" tag is either absent or not
      applicable, the policy specified by the "p" tag MUST be applied
      for subdomains.  Note that "sp" will be ignored for DMARC Policy
      Records published on subdomains of Organizational Domains and PSDs
      due to the effect of the DMARC Policy Discovery (#dmarc-policy-
      discovery).

   t:  DMARC policy test mode (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is 'n').
      For the Author Domain to which the DMARC Policy Record applies,
      the "t" tag serves as a signal to the actor performing DMARC
      validation checks as to whether or not the Domain Owner wishes the
      Domain Owner Assessment Policy declared in the "p=", "sp=", and/or
      "np=" tags to actually be applied.  This tag does not affect the
      generation of DMARC reports, and it has no effect on any policy
      (p=, sp=, or np=) that is 'none'.  See Appendix A.6 for further
      discussion of the use of this tag.  Possible values are as
      follows:

      y:  A request that the actor performing the DMARC validation check
         not apply the policy, but instead apply any special handling
         rules it might have in place, such as rewriting the
         RFC5322.From header field.  The Domain Owner is currently
         testing its specified DMARC assessment policy, and has an
         expectation that the policy applied to any failing messages
         will be one level below the specified policy.  That is, if the
         policy is 'quarantine' and the value of the 't' tag is 'y', a
         policy of 'none' will be applied to failing messages; if the
         policy is 'reject' and the value of the 't' tag is 'y', a

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 20]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

         policy of 'quarantine' will be applied to failing messages,
         irrespective of any other special handling rules that might be
         triggered by the 't' tag having a value of 'y'.
      n:  The default is a request to apply the Domain Owner Assessment
         Policy as specified to any message that produces a DMARC "fail"
         result.

   v:  Version (plain-text; REQUIRED).  Identifies the record retrieved
      as a DMARC Policy Record.  It MUST have the value of "DMARC1".
      The value of this tag MUST match precisely; if it does not or it
      is absent, the entire record MUST be ignored.  It MUST be the
      first tag in the list.

   A DMARC Policy Record MUST comply with the formal specification found
   in Section 4.8 in that the "v" tag MUST be present and MUST appear
   first.  Unknown tags MUST be ignored.  Syntax errors in the remainder
   of the record MUST be discarded in favor of default values (if any)
   or ignored outright.

   Note that given the rules of the previous paragraph, the addition of
   a new tag into the registered list of tags does not itself require a
   new version of DMARC to be generated (with a corresponding change to
   the "v" tag's value), but a change to any existing tags does require
   a new version of DMARC.

4.8.  Formal Definition

   The formal definition of the DMARC Policy Record format, using
   [RFC5234] and [RFC7405], is as follows:

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 21]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   dmarc-uri     = URI
                 ; "URI" is imported from [RFC3986];
                 ; commas (ASCII 0x2C) and exclamation
                 ; points (ASCII 0x21) MUST be
                 ; encoded

   dmarc-sep     = *WSP ";" *WSP

   equals        = *WSP "=" *WSP

   dmarc-record  = dmarc-version *(dmarc-sep dmarc-tag) [dmarc-sep] *WSP

   dmarc-tag     = 1*ALPHA equals 1*dmarc-value

   ; any printing characters but semicolon
   dmarc-value   = %x20-3A / %x3C-7E

   dmarc-version = "v" equals %s"DMARC1" ; case sensitive

   ; specialized syntax of DMARC values
   dmarc-request = "none" / "quarantine" / "reject"

   dmarc-yorn    = "y" / "n"

   dmarc-psd     = "y" / "n" / "u"

   dmarc-rors    = "r" / "s"

   dmarc-urilist = dmarc-uri *(*WSP "," *WSP dmarc-uri)

   dmarc-fo      = "0" / "1" / "d" / "s" / "d:s" / "s:d"

   "Keyword" is imported from Section 4.1.2 of [RFC5321].

   In each dmarc-tag, the dmarc-value has a syntax that depends on the
   tag name.  The ABNF rule for each dmarc-value is specified in the
   following table:

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 22]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   +==========+===============+
   | Tag Name | Value Rule    |
   +==========+===============+
   | p        | dmarc-request |
   +----------+---------------+
   | t        | dmarc-yorn    |
   +----------+---------------+
   | psd      | dmarc-psd     |
   +----------+---------------+
   | np       | dmarc-request |
   +----------+---------------+
   | sp       | dmarc-request |
   +----------+---------------+
   | adkim    | dmarc-rors    |
   +----------+---------------+
   | aspf     | dmarc-rors    |
   +----------+---------------+
   | rua      | dmarc-urilist |
   +----------+---------------+
   | ruf      | dmarc-urilist |
   +----------+---------------+
   | fo       | dmarc-fo      |
   +----------+---------------+

     Table 2: "Tag Names and
             Values"

4.9.  Flow Diagram

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 23]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

    +---------------+                             +--------------------+
    | Author Domain |< . . . . . . . . . . . .    | Return-Path Domain |
    +---------------+                        .    +--------------------+
        |                                    .               ^
        V                                    V               .
    +-----------+     +--------+       +----------+          v
    |   MSA     |<***>|  DKIM  |       |   DMARC  |     +----------+
    |  Service  |     | Signer |       | Validator|<***>|    SPF   |
    +-----------+     +--------+       +----------+  *  | Validator|
        |                                    ^       *  +----------+
        |                                    *       *
        V                                    v       *
     +------+        (~~~~~~~~~~~~)      +------+    *  +----------+
     | sMTA |------->( other MTAs )----->| rMTA |    **>|   DKIM   |
     +------+        (~~~~~~~~~~~~)      +------+       | Validator|
                                            |           +----------+
                                            |                ^
                                            V                .
                                     +-----------+           .
                       +---------+   |    MDA    |           v
                       |  User   |<--| Filtering |      +-----------+
                       | Mailbox |   |  Engine   |      |   DKIM    |
                       +---------+   +-----------+      |  Signing  |
                                                        | Domain(s) |
                                                        +-----------+

     MSA = Mail Submission Agent
     MDA = Mail Delivery Agent

   The above diagram shows a simple flow of messages through a DMARC-
   aware system.  Dashed lines (e.g., -->) denote the actual message
   flow, dotted lines (e.g., < . . >) represent DNS queries used to
   retrieve message policy related to the supported message
   authentication schemes, and starred lines (e.g., <**>) indicate data
   exchange between message-handling modules and message authentication
   modules. "sMTA" is the sending MTA, and "rMTA" is the receiving MTA.

   Put simply, when a message reaches a DMARC-aware rMTA, a DNS query
   will be initiated to determine if a DMARC Policy Record exists that
   applies to the Author Domain.  If a DMARC Policy Record is found, the
   rMTA will use the results of SPF and DKIM validation checks to
   determine DMARC validation status.  The DMARC validation status can
   then factor into the message handling decision made by the
   recipient's mail system.

   More details on specific actions for the parties involved can be
   found in Section 5.1 and Section 5.3.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 24]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

4.10.  DNS Tree Walk

   An Organizational Domain (#organizational-domain) serves two
   different purposes, depending on the context:

   *  The Organizational Domain of the Author Domain (#author-domain)
      establishes the DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-record) for
      that domain when no DMARC Policy Record is published specifically
      for the Author Domain. (see Section 4.10.1)

   *  The Organizational Domains of an Authenticated Identifier
      (#authenticated-identifiers) and the Author Domain are used in
      determining Identifier Alignment between the two. (see
      Section 4.10.2).

   [RFC7489] defined an Organizational Domain as "The domain that was
   registered with a domain name registrar."  This update to that
   document offers more flexibility to Domain Owners, especially those
   with large, complex organizations that might want to applying
   decentralized management to their DNS and their DMARC Policy Records.
   Rather than just searching the Public Suffix List to identify an
   Organizational Domain, this update defines a discovery technique
   known colloquially as the "DNS Tree Walk".  The target of any DNS
   Tree Walk is a valid DMARC Policy Record, and its use in determing an
   Organizational Domain allows for publishing DMARC Policy Records at
   multiple points in the namespace.

   This flexibility comes at a possible cost, however.  Since the DNS
   Tree Walk relies on the Mail Receiver making a series of DNS queries,
   the potential exists for an ill-intentioned Domain Owner to send mail
   with Author Domains with tens or even hundreds of labels for the
   purpose of executing a Denial of Service Attack on the Mail Receiver.
   To guard against such abuse of the DNS, a shortcut is built into the
   process so that Author Domains with more than eight labels do not
   result in more than eight DNS queries.  Observed data at the time of
   publication showed that Author Domains with up to seven labels were
   in usage, and so eight was chosen as the query limit to allow for
   some future expansion of the name space that did not require updating
   this document.

   The generic steps for a DNS Tree Walk are as follows:

   1.  Query the DNS for a DMARC Policy Record at the appropriate
       starting point for the Tree Walk.  A possibly empty set of
       records is returned.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 25]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   2.  Records that do not start with a "v=" tag that identifies the
       current version of DMARC are discarded.  If multiple DMARC Policy
       Records are returned, they are all discarded.  If a single record
       remains and it contains a "psd=n" tag, stop.

   3.  Determine the target for additional queries (if needed; see the
       note in Section 4.10.2), using steps 4 through 8 below.

   4.  Break the subject DNS domain name into a set of ordered labels.
       Assign the count of labels to "x", and number the labels from
       right to left; e.g., for "a.mail.example.com", "x" would be
       assigned the value 4, "com" would be label 1, "example" would be
       label 2, "mail" would be label 3, and so forth.

   5.  If x < 8, remove the left-most (highest-numbered) label from the
       subject domain.  If x >= 8, remove the left-most (highest-
       numbered) labels from the subject domain until 7 labels remain.
       The resulting DNS domain name is the new target for the next
       lookup.

   6.  Query the DNS for a DMARC Policy Record at the DNS domain name
       matching this new target.  A possibly empty set of records is
       returned.

   7.  Records that do not start with a "v=" tag that identifies the
       current version of DMARC are discarded.  If multiple DMARC Policy
       Records are returned for a single target, they are all discarded.
       If a single record remains and it contains a "psd=n" or "psd=y"
       tag, stop.

   8.  Determine the target for the next query by removing the left-most
       label from the target of the previous query.  Repeat steps 6, 7,
       and 8 until the process stops or there are no more labels
       remaining.

   To illustrate, for a message with the arbitrary Author Domain of
   "a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.mail.example.com", a full DNS Tree Walk would
   require the following eight queries to potentially locate the DMARC
   Policy Record or Organizational Domain:

   *  _dmarc.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.mail.example.com
   *  _dmarc.g.h.i.j.mail.example.com
   *  _dmarc.h.i.j.mail.example.com
   *  _dmarc.i.j.mail.example.com
   *  _dmarc.j.mail.example.com
   *  _dmarc.mail.example.com
   *  _dmarc.example.com
   *  _dmarc.com

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 26]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

4.10.1.  DMARC Policy Discovery

   The DMARC Policy Record to be applied to an email message will be the
   record found at any of the following locations, listed from highest
   preference to lowest:

   *  The Author Domain
   *  The Organizational Domain of the Author Domain
   *  The Public Suffix Domain of the Author Domain

   Policy discovery starts first with a query for a valid DMARC Policy
   Record at the name created by prepending the label "_dmarc" to the
   Author Domain of the message being evaluated.  If a valid DMARC
   Policy Record is found there, then this is the DMARC Policy Record to
   be applied to the message; however, this does not necessarily mean
   that the Author Domain is the Organizational Domain to be used in
   Identifier Alignment checks.  Whether this is the also the
   Organizational Domain is dependent on the value of the 'psd' tag, if
   present, or some conditions described in Section 4.10.2.

   If no valid DMARC Policy Record is found by the first query, then
   perform a DNS Tree Walk to find the Author Domain's Organizational
   Domain or its Public Suffix Domain.  The starting point for this DNS
   Tree Walk is determined as follows:

   *  If the Author Domain has eight or fewer labels, the starting point
      will be the immediate parent domain of the Author Domain.
   *  Otherwise, the starting point will be the name produced by
      shortening the Author Domain as described starting in step 3 of
      the Section 4.10.

   If the DMARC Policy Record to be applied is that of the Author
   Domain, then the Domain Owner Assessment Policy is taken from the p=
   tag of the record.

   If the DMARC Policy Record to be applied is that of either the
   Organizational Domain or the Public Suffix Domain and the Author
   Domain is a subdomain of that domain, then the Domain Owner
   Assessment Policy is taken from the sp= tag (if any) if the Author
   Domain exists, or the np= tag (if any) if the Author Domain does not
   exist.  In the absence of applicable sp= or np= tags, the p= tag
   policy is used for subdomains.

   If a retrieved DMARC Policy Record does not contain a valid "p" tag,
   or contains an "sp" or "np" tag that is not valid, then:

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 27]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   *  If a "rua" tag is present and contains at least one syntactically
      valid reporting URI, the Mail Receiver MUST act as if a record
      containing "p=none" was retrieved and continue processing;

   *  Otherwise, the Mail Receiver applies no DMARC processing to this
      message.

   If the set produced by the DNS Tree Walk contains no DMARC Policy
   Record (i.e., any indication that there is no such record as opposed
   to a transient DNS error), Mail Receivers MUST NOT apply the DMARC
   mechanism to the message.

   Handling of DNS errors when querying for the DMARC Policy Record is
   left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver.  For example, to ensure
   minimal disruption of mail flow, transient errors could result in
   delivery of the message ("fail open"), or they could result in the
   message being temporarily rejected (i.e., an SMTP 4yx reply), which
   invites the sending MTA to try again after the condition has possibly
   cleared, allowing a definite DMARC conclusion to be reached ("fail
   closed").

   Note: PSD policy is not used for Organizational Domains that have
   published a DMARC Policy Record.  Specifically, this is not a
   mechanism to provide feedback addresses (rua/ruf) when an
   Organizational Domain has declined to do so.

4.10.2.  Identifier Alignment Evaluation

   It may be necessary to perform multiple DNS Tree Walks to determine
   if an Authenticated Identifier and an Author Domain are in alignment,
   meaning that they have either the same Organizational Domain (relaxed
   alignment) or that they're identical (strict alignment).  DNS Tree
   Walks done to discover an Organizational Domain for use in Identifier
   Alignment Evaluation might start at any of the following locations:

   *  The Author Domain of the message being evaluated.
   *  The SPF-Authenticated Identifier if there is an SPF pass result
      for the message being evaluated.
   *  Any DKIM-Authenticated Identifier if one or more DKIM pass results
      exist for the message being evaluated.

   Note: There is no need to perform Tree Walk searches for
   Organizational Domains under any of the following conditions:

   *  The Author Domain and the Authenticated Identifier(s) are all the
      same domain, and there is a DMARC Policy Record published for that
      domain.  In this case, this common domain is treated as the
      Organizational Domain.  For example, if the common domain in

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 28]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

      question is "mail.example.com", and there is a valid DMARC Policy
      Record published at _dmarc.mail.example.com, then mail.example.com
      is the Organizational Domain.
   *  No applicable DMARC Policy Record is discovered for the Author
      Domain.  In this case, the DMARC mechanism does not apply to the
      message in question.
   *  The DMARC Policy record for the Author Domain indicates strict
      alignment.  In this case, a simple string comparison of the Author
      Domain and the Authenticated Identifier(s) is all that is
      required.

   To discover the Organizational Domain for a domain, perform the DNS
   Tree Walk described in Section 4.10 as needed for any of the domains
   in question.

   For each Tree Walk that retrieved valid DMARC Policy Records, select
   the Organizational Domain from the domains for which valid DMARC
   Policy Records were retrieved from the longest to the shortest:

   1.  If a valid DMARC Policy Record contains the psd= tag set to 'n'
       (psd=n), this is the Organizational Domain, and the selection
       process is complete.

   2.  If a valid DMARC Policy Record, other than the one for the domain
       where the tree walk started, contains the psd= tag set to 'y'
       (psd=y), the Organizational Domain is the domain one label below
       this one in the DNS hierarchy, and the selection process is
       complete.  For example, if in the course of a tree walk a DMARC
       record is queried for at first _dmarc.mail.example.com and then
       _dmarc.example.com, and a valid DMARC Policy Record containing
       the psd= tag set to 'y' is found at _dmarc.example.com, then
       "mail.example.com" is the domain one label below "example.com" in
       the DNS hierarchy and is thus the Organizational Domain.

   3.  Otherwise, select the DMARC Policy Record found at the name with
       the fewest number of labels.  This is the Organizational Domain
       and the selection process is complete.

   If this process does not determine the Organizational Domain, then
   the initial target domain is the Organizational Domain.

   For example, given the starting domain "a.mail.example.com", a search
   for the Organizational Domain would require a series of DNS queries
   for DMARC Policy Records starting with "_dmarc.a.mail.example.com"
   and finishing with "_dmarc.com".  If there are DMARC Policy Records
   published at "_dmarc.mail.example.com" and "_dmarc.example.com", but
   not at "_dmarc.a.mail.example.com" or "_dmarc.com", then the
   Organizational Domain for this domain would be "example.com".

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 29]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   As another example, given the starting domain "a.mail.example.com",
   if a search for the Organizational Domain yields a DMARC Policy
   Record at "_dmarc.mail.example.com" with the psd= tag set to 'n',
   then the Organizational Domain for this domain would be
   "mail.example.com".

   As a last example, given the starting domain "a.mail.example.com", if
   a search for the Organizational Domain only yields a DMARC Policy
   Record at "_dmarc.com" and that record contains the tag psd=y, then
   the Organizational Domain for this domain would be "example.com".

5.  DMARC Participation

   This section describes the actions for participating in DMARC for
   each of three unique entities - Domain Owners, PSOs, and Mail
   Receivers.

5.1.  Domain Owner Actions

   A Domain Owner (#domain-owner) wishing to fully participate in DMARC
   will publish a DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-record) to cover
   each Author Domain (#author-domain) and corresponding Organizational
   Domain (#organizational-domain) to which DMARC validation should
   apply, send email that produces at least one, and preferably two,
   Authenticated Identifiers (#authenticated-identifiers) that align
   with the Author Domain, and will receive and monitor the content of
   DMARC aggregate reports.  The following sections describe how to
   achieve this.

5.1.1.  Publish an SPF Record for an Aligned Domain

   To configure SPF for DMARC, the Domain Owner MUST send mail that has
   an RFC5321.MailFrom domain that will produce an SPF-Authenticated
   Identifier (#spf-authenticated-identifier) that aligns with the
   Author Domain.  The SPF record for the RFC5321.MailFrom domain MUST
   be constructed at a minimum to ensure an SPF pass verdict for all
   sources of mail that are authorized to use RFC5321.MailFrom domain,
   and SHOULD be constructed to ensure that only those authorized
   sources can get an SPF pass verdict..

5.1.2.  Configure Sending System for DKIM Signing Using an Aligned
        Domain

   To configure DKIM for DMARC, the Domain Owner MUST send mail that has
   a DKIM-Signing domain (i.e., the d= domain in the DKIM-Signature
   header field) that will produce a DKIM-Aligned Identifier (#dkim-
   authenticated-identifier) that aligns with the Author Domain.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 30]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

5.1.3.  Set Up a Mailbox to Receive Aggregate Reports

   Proper consumption and analysis of DMARC aggregate reports are
   essential to any successful DMARC deployment for a Domain Owner.
   DMARC aggregate reports, which are defined in
   [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting], contain valuable data for the
   Domain Owner, showing sources of mail using the Author Domain.

5.1.4.  Publish a DMARC Policy Record for the Author Domain and
        Organizational Domain

   Once SPF, DKIM, and the aggregate reports mailbox are all in place,
   it's time to publish a DMARC Policy Record.  For best results, Domain
   Owners usually start with "p=none", (see Section 5.1.5) with the rua
   tag containing a URI that references the mailbox created in the
   previous step.  This is commonly referred to as putting the Author
   Domain into Monitoring Mode (#monitoring-mode).  If the
   Organizational Domain is different from the Author Domain, a record
   also needs to be published for the Organizational Domain.

5.1.5.  Collect and Analyze Reports

   The reason for starting at "p=none" is to ensure that nothing's been
   missed in the initial SPF and DKIM deployments.  In all but the most
   trivial setups, a Domain Owner can overlook a server here or be
   unaware of a third party sending agreement there.  Starting at
   "p=none", therefore, takes advantage of DMARC's aggregate reporting
   function, with the Domain Owner using the reports to audit its own
   mail streams' authentication configurations.

   While it is possible for a human to read aggregate reports, they are
   formatted in such a way that it is recommended that they be machine-
   parsed, so setting up a mailbox involves more than just the physical
   creation of that mailbox.  Many third-party services exist that will
   process DMARC aggregate reports or the Domain Owner can create its
   own set of tools.  No matter which method is chosen, the ability to
   consume these reports and parse the data contained in them will go a
   long way to ensuring a successful deployment.

5.1.6.  Remediate Unaligned or Unauthenticated Mail Streams

   DMARC aggregate reports can reveal to the Domain Owner mail streams
   using the Author Domain that should be passing DMARC validation
   checks but are not.  If the reason for the streams not passing is due
   to Authenticated Identifiers being unaligned or missing entirely,
   then the Domain Owner wishing to fully participate in DMARC MUST take
   necessary steps to address these shortcomings.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 31]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

5.1.7.  Decide Whether to Update Domain Owner Assessment Policy to
        Enforcement

   Once the Domain Owner is satisfied that it is properly authenticating
   all of its mail, then it is time to decide if it is appropriate to
   change its Domain Owner Assessment Policy to Enforcement
   (#enforcement).  Depending on its cadence for sending mail, it may
   take many months of consuming DMARC aggregate reports before a Domain
   Owner reaches the point where it is sure that it is properly
   authenticating all of its mail, and the decision on which p= value to
   use will depend on its needs.

   In making this decision it is important to understand the
   interoperability issues involved and problems that can result for
   mailing lists and for delivery of legitimate mail.  Those issues are
   discussed in detail in Section 7.5

5.1.8.  A Note on Large, Complex Organizations and Decentralized DNS
        Management

   Large, complex organizations frequently adopt a decentralized model
   for DNS management, whereby management of a subtree of the name space
   is delegated to a local deparment by the central IT organization.  In
   such situations, the 'psd' tag makes it possible for those local
   departments to declare any arbitrary node in their subtree as an
   Organizational Domain.  This would be accomplished by publishing a
   DMARC Policy Record at that node with the psd tag set to 'n'.  The
   reasons that departments might declare their own Organizational
   Domains include a desire to have different policy settings or
   reporting URIs than the DMARC Policy Record published for the apex
   domain.

   Such configurations would work in theory, and they might involve
   domain names with many labels, reflecting the structure of the
   organization, for example:

   *  Apex domain (DMARC Policy Record published here): example.com
   *  Zone cut domain (DMARC Policy Record with psd=n published here):
      b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com
   *  Author Domain: mail.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com

   However, Domain Owners should be aware that due to the anti-abuse
   protections built into the DNS Tree Walk (#dns-tree-walk), the DMARC
   Policy Record published at the zone cut domain in this example will
   never be discovered.  A Mail Receiver performing a Tree Walk would
   only perform queries for these names:

   *  _dmarc.mail.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 32]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   *  _dmarc.c.d.e.f.g.example.com
   *  _dmarc.d.e.f.g.example.com
   *  _dmarc.e.f.g.example.com
   *  _dmarc.f.g.example.com
   *  _dmarc.g.example.com
   *  _dmarc.example.com
   *  _dmarc.com

   To avoid this circumstance, Domain Owners wishing to have a specific
   DMARC Policy Record applied to a given [Author Domain]{#author-
   domain) longer than eight labels MUST publish a DMARC Policy Record
   at that domain's location in the DNS namespace, as such records are
   always queried for by Mail Receivers that participate in DMARC.  In
   the above example, this would mean publishing a DMARC Policy Record
   at the name _dmarc.mail.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com.

5.2.  PSO Actions

   In addition to the DMARC Domain Owner actions, if a PSO (#public-
   suffix-operator) publishes a DMARC Policy Record it MUST include the
   psd tag (see Section 4.7) with a value of 'y' ("psd=y").

5.3.  Mail Receiver Actions

   Mail Receivers (#mail-receiver) wishing to fully participate in DMARC
   will apply the DMARC mechanism to inbound email messages when a DMARC
   Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-record) exists that applies to the
   Author Domain (#author-domain), and will send aggregate reports to
   Domain Owners that request them.  Mail Receivers might also send
   failure reports to Domain Owners that request them.

   The steps for applying the DMARC mechanism to an email message can
   take place during the SMTP transaction, and should do so if the Mail
   Receiver plans to honor Domain Owner Assessment Policies (#domain-
   owner-policy) that are at the Enforcement (#enforcement) state.

   Many Mail Receivers perform one or both of the underlying
   Authentication Mechanisms (#authentication-mechanisms) on inbound
   messages even in cases where no DMARC Policy Record exists for the
   Author Domain of a given message, or where the Mail Receiver is not
   participating in DMARC.  Nothing in this section is intended to imply
   that the underlying Authentication Mechanisms should only be
   performed by Mail Receivers participating in DMARC.

   The next sections describe the steps for a Mail Receiver wishing to
   fully participate in DMARC.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 33]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

5.3.1.  Extract Author Domain

   Once the email message has been transmitted to the Mail Receiver, the
   Mail Receiver extracts the domain in the RFC5322.From header field as
   the Author Domain.  If the domain is a U-label, the domain MUST be
   converted to an A-label, as described in Section 2.3 of [RFC5890],
   for further processing.

   If zero or more than one domain is extracted, then DMARC validation
   is not possible and the process terminates.  In the case where more
   than one domain is retrieved, the Mail Receiver MAY choose to go
   forward with DMARC validation anyway.  See Section 10.5 for further
   discussion.

5.3.2.  Determine If The DMARC Mechanism Applies

   If precisely one Author Domain exists for the message, then perform
   the step described in [DMARC Policy Discovery] to determine if the
   DMARC mechanism applies.  If a DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-
   record) is not discovered during this step, then the DMARC mechanism
   does not apply and DMARC validation terminates for the message.

5.3.3.  Determine If Authenticated Identifiers Exist

   For each Authentication Mechanism underlying DMARC, perform the
   required check to determine if an Authenticated Identifier
   (#authenticated-identifier) exists for the message if such check has
   not already been performed.  Results from each check must be
   preserved for later use as follows:

   *  For SPF, the results MUST include "pass" or "fail", and if "fail",
      SHOULD include information about the reasons for failure.  The
      results MUST further include the domain name used to complete the
      SPF check.
   *  For DKIM signature validation checks, for each signature checked,
      the results MUST include "pass" or "fail", and if "fail", SHOULD
      include information about the reasons for failure.  The results
      MUST further include the value of the "d=" and "s=" tags from each
      checked DKIM signature.

5.3.4.  Conduct Identifier Alignment Checks If Necessary

   For each Authenticated Identifier found in the message, the Mail
   Receiver checks to see if the Authenticated Identifier is aligned
   (#identifier-alignment-evaluation) with the Author Domain.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 34]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

5.3.5.  Determine DMARC "Pass" or "Fail"

   If one or more of the Authenticated Identifiers align with the Author
   Domain, the message is considered to pass the DMARC mechanism check.

   If no Authenticated Identifiers exist for the domain, or none of the
   Authenticated Identifiers align with the Author Domain, the message
   is considered to fail the DMARC mechanism check.

5.3.6.  Apply Policy If Appropriate

   Email messages that fail the DMARC mechanism check are handled in
   accordance with the Mail Receiver's local policies.  These local
   policies may take into account the Domain Owner Assessment Policy for
   the Author Domain at the Mail Receiver's discretion.

   If one or more DNS queries required to perform DMARC validation on
   the message do not complete due to temporary or permanent DNS errors,
   the message cannot be considered to pass or fail the DMARC mechanism
   check.  In such cases, the Domain Owner Assessment Policy cannot be
   applied to the message, and any other handling decisions for the
   message are left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver.

   See Section 7.3 for further discussion of topics regarding rejecting
   messages.

5.3.7.  Store Results of DMARC Processing

   Results obtained from the application of the DMARC mechanism by the
   Mail Receiver SHOULD be stored for eventual presentation back to the
   Domain Owner in the form of aggregate feedback reports.  Section 4.7
   and [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] discuss aggregate feedback.

5.3.8.  Send Aggregate Reports

   To ensure maximum usefulness for DMARC across the email ecosystem,
   Mail Receivers SHOULD generate and send aggregate reports with a
   frequency of at least once every 24 hours.  Such reports provide
   Domain Owners with insight into all mail streams using Author Domains
   under the Domain Owner's control, and aid the Domain Owner in
   determining whether and when to transition from Monitoring Mode
   (#monitoring-mode) to EnforcementSection 3.2.6.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 35]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

5.3.9.  Optionally Send Failure Reports

   Per-message failure reports can be a useful source of information for
   a Domain Owner, either for debugging deployments or in analyzing
   attacks, and so Mail Receivers MAY choose to send them.  Experience
   has shown, however, that Mail Receivers rightly concerned about
   protecting user privacy have either chosen to heavily redact the
   information in such reports (which can hinder their usefulness) or
   not send them at all.  See [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting] for
   further information.

5.4.  Policy Enforcement Considerations

   The final handling of any message is always a matter of local policy
   and is left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver.

   A DMARC pass for a message indicates only that the use of the Author
   Domain (#author-domain) has been validated for that message as
   authorized by the Domain Owner (#domain-owner).  Such authorization
   does not carry an explicit or implicit value assertion about that
   message or the Domain Owner, and Mail Receivers MAY choose to reject
   or quarantine a message even if it passes the DMARC validation check.
   Mail Receivers are encouraged to maintain anti-abuse technologies to
   combat the possibility of DMARC-enabled criminal campaigns.

   Mail Receivers MAY choose to accept email that fails the DMARC
   validation check even if the published Domain Owner Assessment Policy
   is "reject".  In particular, because of the considerations discussed
   in [RFC7960] and in Section 7.5 of this document, it is important
   that Mail Receivers not reject messages solely because of a published
   policy of "reject", but that they apply other knowledge and analysis
   to avoid situations such as rejection of legitimate messages sent in
   ways that DMARC cannot describe, harm to the operation of mailing
   lists, and similar.

   If a Mail Receiver chooses not to honor the published Domain Owner
   Assessment Policy to improve interoperability among mail systems, it
   may increase the likelihood of accepting abusive mail.  At a minimum,
   Mail Receivers SHOULD add the Authentication-Results header field
   (see [RFC8601]), and it is RECOMMENDED when delivering messages that
   fail the DMARC validation check.

   When Mail Receivers deviate from a published Domain Owner Assessment
   Policy during message processing they SHOULD make available the fact
   of and reason for the deviation to the Domain Owner via feedback
   reporting, specifically using the "PolicyOverride" feature of the
   aggregate report defined in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 36]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   To enable Domain Owners to receive DMARC feedback without impacting
   existing mail processing, discovered policies of "p=none" MUST NOT
   modify existing mail handling processes.

6.  DMARC Feedback

   DMARC Feedback is described in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]

   Operational note for PSD DMARC: For PSOs, feedback for non-existent
   domains is desirable and useful, just as it is for org-level DMARC
   operators.  See Section 9 for discussion of Privacy Considerations
   for PSD DMARC.

7.  Other Topics

   This section discusses some topics regarding choices made in the
   development of DMARC, largely to commit the history to record.

7.1.  Issues Specific to SPF

   Though DMARC does not inherently change the semantics of an SPF
   policy record, historically lax enforcement of such policies has led
   many to publish extremely broad records containing many extensive
   network ranges.  Domain Owners (#domain-owner) are strongly
   encouraged to carefully review their SPF records to understand which
   networks are authorized to send on behalf of the Domain Owner before
   publishing a DMARC Policy Record.  Furthermore, Domain Owners should
   periodically review their SPF records to ensure that the
   authorization conveyed by the records matches the domain's current
   needs.

   Some Mail Receiver architectures might implement SPF in advance of
   any DMARC operations.  This means that a SPF hard fail ("-") prefix
   on a sender's SPF mechanism, such as "-all", could cause a message to
   be rejected early in the SMTP transaction, before any DMARC
   processing takes place, if the message fails SPF authentication
   checks.  Domain Owners choosing to use "-all" to terminate SPF
   records should be aware of this, and should understand that messages
   that might otherwise pass DMARC due to an aligned DKIM-Authenticated
   Identifier (#dkim-authenticated-identifiers) could be rejected solely
   due to an SPF fail.  Domain Owners and Mail Receivers (#mail-
   receiver) can consult the following two documents for more discussion
   of the topic and best practices regarding publishing SPF records and
   when to reject based solely on SPF failure:

   *  M3AAWG Best Practices for Managing SPF Records
      (https://www.m3aawg.org/Managing-SPF-Records)

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 37]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   *  M3AAWG Email Authentication Recommended Best Practices
      (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-
      authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

7.2.  DNS Load and Caching

   DMARC Policy Records (#dmarc-policy-record) are communicated using
   the DNS and therefore inherit a number of considerations related to
   DNS caching.  The inherent conflict between freshness and the impact
   of caching on the reduction of DNS-lookup overhead should be
   considered from the Mail Receiver's (#mail-receiver) point of view.
   If Domain Owners (#domain-owner) or PSOs (#public-suffix-operator)
   publish a DMARC Policy Record with a very short TTL, the injection of
   large volumes of messages could cause Mail Receivers to overwhelm the
   Domain Owner's DNS hosting provider.  Although this is not a concern
   specific to DMARC, the implications of a very short TTL should be
   considered when publishing DMARC Policy Records.

   Conversely, long TTLs will cause records to be cached for long
   periods.  This can cause a critical change to a DMARC Policy Record
   to go unnoticed for the length of the TTL (while waiting for DNS
   caches to expire).  Avoiding this problem can mean shorter TTLs, with
   the potential problems described above.  A balance should be sought
   to maintain responsiveness of DMARC Policy Record changes while
   preserving the benefits of DNS caching.

7.3.  Rejecting Messages

   The DMARC mechanism calls for rejection of a message during the SMTP
   session under certain circumstances.  This is preferable to
   generation of a Delivery Status Notification [RFC3464], since
   fraudulent messages caught and rejected using the DMARC mechanism
   would then result in the annoying generation of such failure reports
   that go back to the RFC5321.MailFrom address.

   This synchronous rejection is typically done in one of two ways:

   *  Full rejection, wherein the SMTP server issues a 5xy reply code as
      an indication to the SMTP client that the transaction failed; the
      SMTP client is then responsible for generating a notification that
      delivery failed (see Section 4.2.5 of [RFC5321]).

   *  A "silent discard", wherein the SMTP server returns a 2xy reply
      code implying to the client that delivery (or, at least, relay)
      was successfully completed, but then simply discarding the message
      with no further action.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 38]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   Each of these has a cost.  For instance, a silent discard can help to
   prevent backscatter, but it also effectively means that the SMTP
   server has to be programmed to give a false result, which can
   confound external debugging efforts.

   Similarly, the text portion of the SMTP reply may be important to
   consider.  For example, when rejecting a message, revealing the
   reason for the rejection might give an attacker enough information to
   bypass those efforts on a later attempt, though it might also assist
   a legitimate client to determine the source of some local issue that
   caused the rejection.

   In the latter case, when doing an SMTP rejection, providing a clear
   hint can be useful in resolving issues.  A Mail Receiver (#mail-
   recevier) might indicate in plain text the reason for the rejection
   by using the word "DMARC" somewhere in the reply text.  For example:

   550 5.7.1 Email rejected per DMARC policy for example.com

   Many systems are able to scan the SMTP reply text to determine the
   nature of the rejection.  Thus, providing a machine-detectable reason
   for rejection allows the problems causing rejections to be properly
   addressed by automated systems.

   If a Mail Receiver elects to defer delivery due to the inability to
   retrieve or apply DMARC policy, this is best done with a 4xy SMTP
   reply code.

7.4.  Interoperability Issues

   DMARC limits which end-to-end scenarios can achieve a "pass" result.

   Because DMARC relies on SPF [RFC7208] and/or DKIM [RFC6376] to
   achieve a "pass", their limitations also apply.

   Issues specific to the use of policy mechanisms alongside DKIM are
   further discussed in [RFC6377], particularly Section 5.2.

   Mail that is sent by authorized, independent third parties might not
   be sent with Identifier Alignment, also preventing a "pass" result.
   A Domain Owner can use DMARC aggregate reports to identify this mail
   and take steps to address authentication shortcomings.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 39]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

7.5.  Interoperability Considerations

   As discussed in "Interoperability Issues between DMARC and Indirect
   Email Flows" [RFC7960], use of p=reject can be incompatible with and
   cause interoperability problems to indirect message flows such as
   "alumni forwarders", role-based email aliases, and mailing lists
   across the Internet.

   A domain that expects to send only targeted messages to account
   holders - a bank, for example - could have account holders using
   addresses such as jones@alumni.example.edu (an address that relays
   the messages to another address with a real mailbox) or
   finance@association.example (a role-based address that does similar
   relaying for the current head of finance at the association).  When
   such mail is delivered to the actual recipient mailbox, it will
   necessarily fail SPF checks, as the incoming IP address will be that
   of example.edu or association.example, and not an address authorized
   for the sending domain.  DKIM signatures will generally remain valid
   in these relay situations.

   |  It is therefore critical that domains that publish p=reject MUST
   |  NOT rely solely on SPF to secure a DMARC pass, and MUST apply
   |  valid DKIM signatures to their messages.

   In the case of domains that have general users who send routine
   email, those that publish a Domain Owner Assessment Policy (#domain-
   owner-policy) of p=reject are likely to create significant
   interoperability issues.  In particular, if users in such domains
   post messages to mailing lists on the Internet, those messages can
   cause operational problems for the mailing lists and for the
   subscribers to those lists, as explained below and in [RFC7960].

   |  It is therefore critical that domains that host users who might
   |  post messages to mailing lists SHOULD NOT publish Domain Owner
   |  Assessment Policies of p=reject.  Any such domains wishing to
   |  publish p=reject SHOULD first take advantage of DMARC aggregate
   |  report data for their domain to determine the possible impact to
   |  their users, first by publishing p=none for at least a month,
   |  followed by publishing p=quarantine for an equally long period of
   |  time, and comparing the message disposition results.  Domains that
   |  choose to publish p=reject SHOULD either implement policies that
   |  their users not post to Internet mailing lists and/or inform their
   |  users that their participation in mailing lists may be hindered.

   As noted in Section 5.4, Mail Receivers (#mail-receivers) need to
   apply more analysis than just DMARC validation in their disposition
   of incoming messages.  An example of the consequences of honoring a
   Domain Owner Assessment Policy of p=reject without further analysis

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 40]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   is that rejecting messages that have been relayed by a mailing list
   can cause the Mail Receiver's users to have their subscriptions to
   that mailing list canceled by the list software's automated handling
   of such rejections - it looks to the list manager as though the
   recipient's email address is no longer working, so the address is
   automatically unsubscribed.

   |  It is therefore critical that Mail Receivers MUST NOT reject
   |  incoming messages solely on the basis of a p=reject policy by the
   |  sending domain.  Mail Receivers must use the DMARC policy as part
   |  of their disposition decision, along with other knowledge and
   |  analysis.

   Failure to understand and abide by these considerations can cause
   legitimate, sometimes important email to be rejected, can cause
   operational damage to mailing lists throughout the Internet, and can
   result in trouble-desk calls and complaints from the Mail Receiver's
   employees, customers, and clients.

   As a final note, one possible mitigation to the problems caused by
   Domain Owners publishing a Domain Owner Assessment Policy of p=reject
   when they should not or Mail Receivers rejecting messages solely on
   the basis of a p=reject policy is the Autheticated Received Chain
   (ARC) protocol described in [RFC8617].  However, as of this writing,
   use of ARC is nascent, as is industry experience with it in
   connection with DMARC.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This section describes actions completed by IANA.

8.1.  Authentication-Results Method Registry Update

   IANA has added the following to the "Email Authentication Methods"
   registry:

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 41]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   +======+===========+======+==========+===============+======+=======+
   |Method| Defined   |ptype | Property | Value         |Status|Version|
   +======+===========+======+==========+===============+======+=======+
   |dmarc | [RFC7489] |header| from     | the domain    |active|1      |
   |      |           |      |          | portion of    |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | the           |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | RFC5322.From  |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | header field  |      |       |
   +------+-----------+------+----------+---------------+------+-------+
   |dmarc | [RFC7489] |policy| dmarc    | Evaluated     |active|1      |
   |      |           |      |          | DMARC policy  |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | applied/to    |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | be applied    |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | after policy  |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | options       |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | including     |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | pct: and sp:  |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | have been     |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | processed.    |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | Must be       |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | none,         |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | quarantine,   |      |       |
   |      |           |      |          | or reject.    |      |       |
   +------+-----------+------+----------+---------------+------+-------+

          Table 3: "Authentication-Results Method Registry Update"

8.2.  Authentication-Results Result Registry Update

   IANA has added the following in the "Email Authentication Result
   Names" registry:

   +================+===========+========================+========+
   | Auth Method(s) | Code      | Specification          | Status |
   +================+===========+========================+========+
   | dmarc          | fail      | [RFC7489] section 11.2 | active |
   +----------------+-----------+------------------------+--------+
   | dmarc          | none      | [RFC7489] section 11.2 | active |
   +----------------+-----------+------------------------+--------+
   | dmarc          | pass      | [RFC7489] section 11.2 | active |
   +----------------+-----------+------------------------+--------+
   | dmarc          | permerror | [RFC7489] section 11.2 | active |
   +----------------+-----------+------------------------+--------+
   | dmarc          | temperror | [RFC7489]              | active |
   +----------------+-----------+------------------------+--------+

       Table 4: "Authentication-Results Result Registry Update"

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 42]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

8.3.  Feedback Report Header Fields Registry Update

   The following has been added to the "Feedback Report Header Fields"
   registry:

   +=========+==============+==========+============+=========+=======+
   |Field    | Description  |Multiple  | Related    |Reference|Status |
   |Name     |              |Apperances| "Feedback- |         |       |
   |         |              |          | Type"      |         |       |
   +=========+==============+==========+============+=========+=======+
   |Identity-| indicates    |No        | auth-      |[RFC7489]|current|
   |Alignment| whether the  |          | failure    |         |       |
   |         | message      |          |            |         |       |
   |         | about which  |          |            |         |       |
   |         | a report is  |          |            |         |       |
   |         | being        |          |            |         |       |
   |         | generated    |          |            |         |       |
   |         | had any      |          |            |         |       |
   |         | identifiers  |          |            |         |       |
   |         | in alignment |          |            |         |       |
   |         | as defined   |          |            |         |       |
   |         | in [RFC7489] |          |            |         |       |
   +---------+--------------+----------+------------+---------+-------+

                 Table 5: "Feedback Report Header Fields"

8.4.  DMARC Tag Registry

   A new registry tree called "Domain-based Message Authentication,
   Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Parameters" has been created.
   Within it, a new sub-registry called the "DMARC Tag Registry" has
   been created.

   Names of DMARC tags are registered with IANA in this new sub-
   registry.  New entries are assigned only for values that have been
   documented in a manner that satisfies the terms of Specification
   Required, per [RFC8126].  Each registration includes the tag name;
   the specification that defines it; a brief description; and its
   status, which is one of "current", "experimental", or "historic".
   The Designated Expert needs to confirm that the provided
   specification adequately describes the new tag and clearly presents
   how it would be used within the DMARC context by Domain Owners and
   Mail Receivers.

   To avoid version compatibility issues, tags added to the DMARC
   specification are to avoid changing the semantics of existing records
   when processed by implementations conforming to prior specifications.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 43]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   The initial set of entries in this registry is as follows:

   +=======+===========+==========+=============================+
   | Tag   | Reference | Status   | Description                 |
   | Name  |           |          |                             |
   +=======+===========+==========+=============================+
   | adkim | RFC 7489  | current  | DKIM alignment mode         |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | aspf  | RFC 7489  | current  | SPF alignment mode          |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | fo    | RFC 7489  | current  | Failure reporting options   |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | np    | RFC 9091  | current  | Requested handling policy   |
   |       |           |          | for non-existent subdomains |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | p     | RFC 7489  | current  | Requested handling policy   |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | pct   | RFC 7489  | historic | Sampling rate               |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | psd   | [this     | current  | Indicates whether policy    |
   |       | document] |          | record is published by a    |
   |       |           |          | Public Suffix Domain        |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | rf    | RFC 7489  | historic | Failure reporting format(s) |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | ri    | RFC 7489  | historic | Aggregate Reporting         |
   |       |           |          | interval                    |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | rua   | RFC 7489  | current  | Reporting URI(s) for        |
   |       |           |          | aggregate data              |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | ruf   | RFC 7489  | current  | Reporting URI(s) for        |
   |       |           |          | failure data                |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | sp    | RFC 7489  | current  | Requested handling policy   |
   |       |           |          | for subdomains              |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | t     | [this     | current  | Test mode for the specified |
   |       | document] |          | policy                      |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+
   | v     | RFC 7489  | current  | Specification version       |
   +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+

                   Table 6: "DMARC Tag Registry"

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 44]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

8.5.  DMARC Report Format Registry

   Also, within "Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and
   Conformance (DMARC) Parameters", a new sub-registry called "DMARC
   Report Format Registry" has been created.

   Names of DMARC failure reporting formats are registered with IANA in
   this registry.  New entries are assigned only for values that satisfy
   the definition of Specification Required, per [RFC8126].  In addition
   to a reference to a permanent specification, each registration
   includes the format name, a brief description, and its status, which
   must be one of "current", "experimental", or "historic".  The
   Designated Expert needs to confirm that the provided specification
   adequately describes the report format and clearly presents how it
   would be used within the DMARC context by Domain Owners and Mail
   Receivers.

   The initial entry in this registry is as follows:

   +========+===========+=========+==================================+
   | Format | Reference | Status  | Description                      |
   | Name   |           |         |                                  |
   +========+===========+=========+==================================+
   | afrf   | RFC 7489  | current | Authentication Failure Reporting |
   |        |           |         | Format (see [RFC6591])           |
   +--------+-----------+---------+----------------------------------+

                 Table 7: "DMARC Report Format Registry"

8.6.  Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names Registry

   Per [RFC8552], please add the following entry to the "Underscored and
   Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry:

   +=========+============+===========+
   | RR Type | _NODE NAME | Reference |
   +=========+============+===========+
   | TXT     | _dmarc     | RFC 7489  |
   +---------+------------+-----------+

        Table 8: "Underscored and
     Globally Scoped DNS Node Names"
                 registry

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 45]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

9.  Privacy Considerations

   This section discusses issues specific to private data that may be
   included if DMARC reports are requested.  Issues associated with
   sending aggregate reports and failure reports are addressed in
   [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and
   [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting] respectively.

9.1.  Aggregate Report Considerations

   Aggregate reports may, particularly for small organizations, provide
   some limited insight into email sending patterns.  As an example, in
   a small organization, an aggregate report from a particular domain
   may be sufficient to make the report receiver aware of sensitive
   personal or business information.  If setting an rua= tag in a DMARC
   Policy Record, the reporting address needs controls appropriate to
   the organizational requirements to mitigate any risk associated with
   receiving and handling reports.

   In the case of rua= requests for multi-organizational PSDs,
   additional information leakage considerations exist.  Multi-
   organizational PSDs that do not mandate DMARC use by registrants risk
   exposure of private data of registrant domains if they include the
   rua= tag in their DMARC Policy Record.

9.2.  Failure Report Considerations

   Failure reports do provide insight into email sending patterns,
   including specific users.  If requesting failure reports, data
   management controls are needed to support appropriate management of
   this information.  The additional detail available through failure
   reports (relative to aggregate reports) can drive a need for
   additional controls.  As an example, a company may be legally
   restricted from receiving data related to a specific subsidiary.
   Before requesting failure reports, any such data spillage risks have
   to be addressed through data management controls or publishing DMARC
   records for relevant subdomains to prevent reporting on data related
   to their emails.

   Due to the nature of the email contents which may be shared through
   Failure Reports, most Mail Receivers refuse to send them out of
   privacy concerns.  Out of band agreements between Report Consumers
   and Mail Receivers may be required to address these concerns.

   DMARC Policy Records for multi-organizational PSDs MUST NOT include
   the ruf= tag.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 46]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

10.  Security Considerations

   This section discusses security issues and possible remediations
   (where available) for DMARC.

10.1.  Authentication Methods

   Security considerations from the authentication methods used by DMARC
   are incorporated here by reference.

   Both of the email authentication methods that underlie DMARC provide
   some assurance that an email was transmitted by an MTA which is
   authorized to do so.  SPF policies map domain names to sets of
   authorized MTAs Section 11.4 of [RFC7208].  Validated DKIM signatures
   indicate that an email was transmitted by an MTA with access to a
   private key that matches the published DKIM key record.

   Whenever mail is sent, there is a risk that an overly permissive
   source may send mail that will receive a DMARC pass result that was
   not, in fact, intended by the Domain Owner.  These results may lead
   to issues when systems interpret DMARC pass results to indicate a
   message is in some way authentic.  They also allow such unauthorized
   senders to evade the Domain Owner's intended message handling for
   DMARC validation failures.

   To avoid this risk one must ensure that no unauthorized source can
   add DKIM signatures to the domain's mail or transmit mail which will
   evaluate as SPF pass.  If, nonetheless, a Domain Owner wishes to
   include a permissive source in a domain's SPF record, the source can
   be excluded from DMARC consideration by using the '?' qualifier on
   the SPF record mechanism associated with that source.

10.2.  Attacks on Reporting URIs

   URIs published in DNS TXT records are well-understood possible
   targets for attack.  Specifications such as [RFC1035] and [RFC2142]
   either expose or cause the exposure of email addresses that could be
   flooded by an attacker, for example.  Records found in the DNS such
   as MX, NS, and others advertise potential attack destinations.
   Common DNS names such as "www" plainly identify the locations at
   which particular services can be found, providing destinations for
   targeted denial-of-service or penetration attacks.  This all means
   that Domain Owners will need to harden these addresses against
   various attacks, including but not limited to:

   *  high-volume denial-of-service attacks;

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 47]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   *  deliberate construction of malformed reports intended to identify
      or exploit parsing or processing vulnerabilities;

   *  deliberate construction of reports containing false claims for the
      Submitter or Reported-Domain fields, including the possibility of
      false data from compromised but known Mail Receivers.

10.3.  DNS Security

   The DMARC mechanism and its underlying Authentication Mechanisms
   (SPF, DKIM) depend on the security of the DNS.  Examples of how
   hostile parties can have an adverse impact on DNS traffic include:

   *  If they can snoop on DNS traffic, they can get an idea of who is
      sending mail.

   *  If they can block outgoing or reply DNS messages, they can prevent
      systems from discovering senders' DMARC policies.

   *  If they can send forged response packets, they can make aligned
      mail appear unaligned or vice-versa.

   None of these threats are unique to DMARC, and they can be addressed
   using a variety of techniques, including, but not limited to:

   *  Signing DNS records with DNSSEC [RFC4033], which enables
      recipients to validate the integrity of DNS data and detect and
      discard forged responses.

   *  DNS over TLS [RFC7858] or DNS over HTTPS [RFC8484] can mitigate
      snooping and forged responses.

10.4.  Display Name Attacks

   A common attack in messaging abuse is the presentation of false
   information in the display-name portion of the RFC5322.From header
   field.  For example, it is possible for the email address in that
   field to be an arbitrary address or domain name while containing a
   well-known name (a person, brand, role, etc.) in the display name,
   intending to fool the end user into believing that the name is used
   legitimately.

   Such attacks, known as display name attacks, are out of scope for
   DMARC.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 48]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

10.5.  Denial of DMARC Processing Attacks

   The declaration in Section 5.3.1 and elsewhere in this document that
   messages that do not contain precisely one RFC5322.From domain are
   outside the scope of this document exposes an attack vector that must
   be taken into consideration.

   Because such messages are outside the scope of this document, an
   attacker can craft messages with multiple RFC5322.From domains,
   including the spoofed domain, in an effort to bypass DMARC validation
   and get the fraudulent message to be displayed by the victim's MUA
   with the spoofed domain successfully shown to the victim.  In those
   cases where such messages are not rejected due to other reasons (for
   example, many such messages would violate RFC5322's requirement that
   there be precisely one From: header field), care must be taken by the
   Mail Receiver to recognize such messages as the threats they might be
   and handle them appropriately.

   The case of a syntactically valid multi-valued RFC5322.From field
   presents a particular challenge.  Experience has shown that most such
   messages are abusive and/or unwanted by their recipients, and given
   this fact, a Mail Receiver may make a negative disposition decision
   for the message prior to and instead of its being subjected to DMARC
   processing.  However, in a case where a Mail Receiver requires that
   the message be subject to DMARC validation, a recommended approach as
   per [RFC7489] is to apply the DMARC mechanism to each domain found in
   the RFC5322.From field as the Author Domain and apply the most strict
   policy selected among the checks that fail.  Such an approach might
   prove useful for a small number of Author Domains, but it is possible
   that applying such logic to messages with a large number of domains
   (where "large" is defined by each Mail Receiver) will expose the Mail
   Receiver to a form of denial of service attack.  Limiting the number
   of Author Domains processed will avoid this risk.  If not all Author
   Domains are processed, then the DMARC evaluation is incomplete.

10.6.  External Reporting Addresses

   To avoid abuse by bad actors, reporting addresses generally have to
   be inside the domains about which reports are requested.  To
   accommodate special cases such as a need to get reports about domains
   that cannot actually receive mail, Section 3 of
   [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] describes a DNS-based mechanism
   for validating approved external reporting.

   The obvious consideration here is an increased DNS load against
   domains that are claimed as external recipients.  Negative caching
   will mitigate this problem, but only to a limited extent, mostly
   dependent on the default TTL in the domain's SOA record.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 49]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   Where possible, external reporting is best achieved by having the
   report be directed to domains that can receive mail and simply having
   it automatically forwarded to the desired external destination.

   Note that the addresses shown in the "ruf" tag receive more
   information that might be considered private data since it is
   possible for actual email content to appear in the failure reports.
   The URIs identified there are thus more attractive targets for
   intrusion attempts than those found in the "rua" tag.  Moreover,
   attacking the DNS of the subject domain to cause failure data to be
   routed fraudulently to an attacker's systems may be an attractive
   prospect.  Deployment of [RFC4033] is advisable if this is a concern.

10.7.  Secure Protocols

   This document encourages the use of secure transport mechanisms to
   prevent the loss of private data to third parties that may be able to
   monitor such transmissions.  Unencrypted mechanisms should be
   avoided.

   In particular, a message that was originally encrypted or otherwise
   secured might appear in a report that is not sent securely, which
   could reveal private information.

10.8.  Relaxed Alignment Considerations

   The DMARC mechanism allows both [DKIM- and SPF-Authenticated
   Identifiers]{#identifier-alignment-explained} to validate authorized
   use of an Author Domain (#author-domain) on behalf of a Domain Owner
   (#domain-owner).  If malicious or unaware users can gain control of
   the SPF record or DKIM selector records for a subdomain of the
   Organizational Domain, the subdomain can be used to generate email
   that achieves a DMARC pass on behalf of the Organizational Domain.

   For example, an attacker who controls the SPF record for
   "evil.example.com" can send mail that produces an SPF-Authenticated
   Identifier of "evil.example.com" with an RFC5322.From header field
   containing "foo@example.com" that can produce a DMARC pass for mail
   using the Organizational Domain ("example.com") as the Author Domain.

   The Organizational Domain Owner should be careful not to delegate
   control of subdomains if this is an issue, and consider using the
   Strict Alignment (#strict-alignment) option if appropriate.

   DMARC evaluation for relaxed alignment is also highly sensitive to
   errors in determining the Organizational Domain if the Author Domain
   does not have a published DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-record).
   If an incorrectly selected Organizational Domain is a parent of the

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 50]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   correct Organizational Domain, then relaxed alignment could
   potentially allow a malicious sender to send mail that achieves a
   DMARC pass verdict.  This potential exists for both the legacy
   [RFC7489] and current methods for determining the organizational
   domain, the latter described in Section 4.10.2.

   This issue is entirely avoided by the use of Strict Alignment and
   publishing explicit DMARC Policy Records for all Author Domains used
   in an organization's email.

   For cases where Strict Alignment is not appropriate, this issue can
   be mitigated by periodically checking the DMARC Policy Records, if
   any, of PSDs (#public-suffix-domain) above the Organizational Domain
   in the DNS tree and (for legacy [RFC7489] checking that appropriate
   PSL entries remain present).  If a PSD publishes a DMARC Policy
   Record without the appropriate psd=y tag, Organizational Domain
   owners can add psd=n to their Organizational Domain's DMARC Policy
   Record so that the PSD's DMARC Policy Record will not be incorrectly
   interpreted to indicate that the PSD is the Organizational Domain.

11.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]
              Brotman, A., "DMARC Aggregate Reporting", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dmarc-aggregate-
              reporting-15, 25 April 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-
              aggregate-reporting-15>.

   [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting]
              Jones, S. M. and A. Vesely, "Domain-based Message
              Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Failure
              Reporting", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              dmarc-failure-reporting-10, 17 March 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-
              failure-reporting-10>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 51]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC4343]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Domain Name System (DNS) Case
              Insensitivity Clarification", RFC 4343,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4343, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4343>.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.

   [RFC5322]  Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322>.

   [RFC5890]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
              Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
              RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890>.

   [RFC6376]  Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed.,
              "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76,
              RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, September 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6376>.

   [RFC6591]  Fontana, H., "Authentication Failure Reporting Using the
              Abuse Reporting Format", RFC 6591, DOI 10.17487/RFC6591,
              April 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6591>.

   [RFC6651]  Kucherawy, M., "Extensions to DomainKeys Identified Mail
              (DKIM) for Failure Reporting", RFC 6651,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6651, June 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6651>.

   [RFC6652]  Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
              Authentication Failure Reporting Using the Abuse Reporting
              Format", RFC 6652, DOI 10.17487/RFC6652, June 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6652>.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 52]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   [RFC7208]  Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for
              Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version 1", RFC 7208,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7208, April 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7208>.

   [RFC7405]  Kyzivat, P., "Case-Sensitive String Support in ABNF",
              RFC 7405, DOI 10.17487/RFC7405, December 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7405>.

   [RFC7489]  Kucherawy, M., Ed. and E. Zwicky, Ed., "Domain-based
              Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
              (DMARC)", RFC 7489, DOI 10.17487/RFC7489, March 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7489>.

   [RFC8552]  Crocker, D., "Scoped Interpretation of DNS Resource
              Records through "Underscored" Naming of Attribute Leaves",
              BCP 222, RFC 8552, DOI 10.17487/RFC8552, March 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8552>.

   [RFC8601]  Kucherawy, M., "Message Header Field for Indicating
              Message Authentication Status", RFC 8601,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8601, May 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8601>.

12.  Informative References

   [RFC2142]  Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and
              Functions", RFC 2142, DOI 10.17487/RFC2142, May 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2142>.

   [RFC2308]  Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
              NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.

   [RFC3464]  Moore, K. and G. Vaudreuil, "An Extensible Message Format
              for Delivery Status Notifications", RFC 3464,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3464, January 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3464>.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.

   [RFC5598]  Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5598, July 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5598>.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 53]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   [RFC6377]  Kucherawy, M., "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) and
              Mailing Lists", BCP 167, RFC 6377, DOI 10.17487/RFC6377,
              September 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6377>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC7960]  Martin, F., Ed., Lear, E., Ed., Draegen, T., Ed., Zwicky,
              E., Ed., and K. Andersen, Ed., "Interoperability Issues
              between Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting,
              and Conformance (DMARC) and Indirect Email Flows",
              RFC 7960, DOI 10.17487/RFC7960, September 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7960>.

   [RFC8020]  Bortzmeyer, S. and S. Huque, "NXDOMAIN: There Really Is
              Nothing Underneath", RFC 8020, DOI 10.17487/RFC8020,
              November 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8020>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

   [RFC8617]  Andersen, K., Long, B., Ed., Blank, S., Ed., and M.
              Kucherawy, Ed., "The Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)
              Protocol", RFC 8617, DOI 10.17487/RFC8617, July 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8617>.

   [RFC9091]  Kitterman, S. and T. Wicinski, Ed., "Experimental Domain-
              Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
              (DMARC) Extension for Public Suffix Domains", RFC 9091,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9091, July 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9091>.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 54]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

Appendix A.  Technology Considerations

   This section documents some design decisions made in the development
   of DMARC.  Specifically addressed here are some suggestions that were
   considered but not included in the design, with explanatory text
   regarding the decision.

A.1.  S/MIME

   S/MIME, or Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions, is a
   standard for encrypting and signing MIME data in a message.  This was
   suggested and considered as a third security protocol for
   authenticating the source of a message.

   DMARC is focused on authentication at the domain level (i.e., the
   Domain Owner taking responsibility for the message), while S/MIME is
   really intended for user-to-user authentication and encryption.  This
   alone appears to make it a bad fit for DMARC's goals.

   S/MIME also suffers from the heavyweight problem of Public Key
   Infrastructure, which means that distribution of keys used to
   validate signatures needs to be incorporated.  In many instances,
   this alone is a showstopper.  There have been consistent promises
   that PKI usability and deployment will improve, but these have yet to
   materialize.  DMARC can revisit this choice after those barriers are
   addressed.

   S/MIME has extensive deployment in specific market segments
   (government, for example) but does not enjoy similar widespread
   deployment over the general Internet, and this shows no signs of
   changing.  DKIM and SPF are both deployed widely over the general
   Internet, and their adoption rates continue to be positive.

   Finally, experiments have shown that including S/MIME support in the
   initial version of DMARC would neither cause nor enable a substantial
   increase in the accuracy of the overall mechanism.

A.2.  Method Exclusion

   It was suggested that DMARC include a mechanism by which a Domain
   Owner could instruct Mail Receivers not to attempt validation by one
   of the supported methods (e.g., "check DKIM, but not SPF").

   Specifically, consider a Domain Owner that has deployed one of the
   technologies and that technology fails for some messages, but such
   failures don't cause enforcement action.  Deploying DMARC would cause
   enforcement action for policies other than "none", which would appear
   to exclude participation by that Domain Owner.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 55]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   The DMARC development team evaluated the idea of policy exception
   mechanisms on several occasions and invariably concluded that there
   was not a strong enough use case to include them.  The target
   audience for DMARC does not appear to have concerns about the failure
   modes of one or the other being a barrier to DMARC's adoption.

   In the scenario described above, the Domain Owner has a few options:

   1.  Tighten up its infrastructure to minimize the failure modes of
       the single deployed technology.

   2.  Deploy the other supported authentication mechanism, to offset
       the failure modes of the first.

   3.  Deploy DMARC in a reporting-only mode.

A.3.  Sender Header Field

   It has been suggested in several message authentication efforts that
   the Sender header field be checked for an identifier of interest, as
   the standards indicate this as the proper way to indicate a re-
   mailing of content such as through a mailing list.  Most recently, it
   was a protocol-level option for DomainKeys, but on evolution to DKIM,
   this property was removed.

   The DMARC development team considered this and decided not to include
   support for doing so for the following reasons:

   1.  The main user protection approach is to be concerned with what
       the user sees when a message is rendered.  There is no consistent
       behavior among MUAs regarding what to do with the content of the
       Sender field, if present.  Accordingly, supporting the checking
       of the Sender identifier would mean applying policy to an
       identifier the end user might never actually see, which can
       create a vector for attack against end users by simply forging a
       Sender field containing some identifier that DMARC will like.

   2.  Although it is certainly true that this is what the Sender field
       is for, its use in this way is also unreliable, making it a poor
       candidate for inclusion in the DMARC evaluation algorithm.

   3.  Allowing multiple ways to discover policy introduces unacceptable
       ambiguity into the DMARC validation algorithm in terms of which
       policy is to be applied and when.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 56]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

A.4.  Domain Existence Test

   The presence of the "np" tag in this specification seemingly implies
   that there would be an agreed-upon standard for determining a
   domain's existence.

   Since the DMARC mechanism is focused on email, one might think that
   the definition of resolvable in [RFC5321] applies.  Using that
   definition, only names that resolve to MX Resource Records (RRs), A
   RRs, or AAAA RRs are deemed to be resolvable and to exist in the DNS.
   This is a common practice among Mail Receivers to determine whether
   or not to accept a mail message before performing other more
   expensive processing.

   The DMARC mechanism makes no such requirement for the existence of
   specific DNS RRs in order for a domain to exist; instead, if any RR
   exists for a domain, then the domain exists.  To use the terminology
   from [RFC2308], an "NXDOMAIN" response (rcode "Name Error") to a DNS
   query means that the domain name does not exist, while a "NODATA"
   response (rcode "NOERROR") means that the given resource record type
   queried for does not exist, but the domain name does.

   Furthermore, in keeping with [RFC8020], if a query for a name returns
   NXDOMAIN, then not only does the name not exist, every name below it
   in the DNS hierarchy also does not exist.

A.5.  Organizational Domain Discovery Issues

   An earlier informational version of the DMARC mechanism [RFC7489]
   noted that the DNS does not provide a method by which the "domain of
   record", or the domain that was actually registered with a domain
   registrar, can be determined given an arbitrary domain name.  That
   version further mentioned suggestions that have been made that
   attempt to glean such information from SOA or NS resource records,
   but these too are not fully reliable, as the partitioning of the DNS
   is not always done at administrative boundaries.

   That previous version posited that one could "climb the tree" to find
   the Organizational Domain, but expressed concern that an attacker
   could exploit this for a denial-of-service attack through sending a
   high number of messages each with a relatively large number of
   nonsense labels, causing a Mail Receiver to perform a large number of
   DNS queries in search of a DMARC Policy Record.  This version defines
   a method for performing a DNS Tree Walk (#dns-tree-walk), and further
   mitigates the risk of the denial-of-service attack by expressly
   limiting the number of DNS queries to execute regardless of the
   number of labels in the domain name.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 57]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   Readers curious about the previous method for Organizational Domain
   Discovery are directed to Section 3.2 of [RFC7489].

A.6.  Removal of the "pct" Tag

   An earlier informational version of the DMARC mechanism [RFC7489]
   included a "pct" tag and specified all integers from 0 to 100
   inclusive as valid values for the tag.  The intent of the tag was to
   provide domain owners with a method to gradually change their
   preferred Domain Owner Assessment Policy (the p= tag) from 'none' to
   'quarantine' or from 'quarantine' to 'reject' by requesting the
   stricter treatment for just a percentage of messages that produced
   DMARC results of "fail".

   Operational experience showed that the pct tag was usually not
   accurately applied, unless the value specified was either "0" or
   "100" (the default), and the inaccuracies with other values varied
   widely from implementation to implementation.  The default value was
   easily implemented, as it required no special processing on the part
   of the Mail Receiver, while the value of "0" took on unintended
   significance as a value used by some intermediaries and mailbox
   providers as an indicator to deviate from standard handling of the
   message, usually by rewriting the RFC5322.From header field in an
   effort to avoid DMARC failures downstream.

   These custom actions when the pct= tag was set to "0" proved valuable
   to the email community.  In particular, header field rewriting by an
   intermediary meant that a Domain Owner's aggregate reports could
   reveal to the Domain Owner how much of its traffic was routing
   through intermediaries that don't rewrite the RFC5322.From header
   field.  It required work on the part of the Domain Owner to compare
   aggregate reports from before and after the p= value was changed and
   pct= was included in the DMARC Policy Record with a value of "0", but
   the data was there.  Consequently, knowing how much mail was subject
   to possible DMARC failure due to a lack of RFC5322.From header field
   rewriting by intermediaries could assist the Domain Owner in choosing
   whether or not to move from Monitoring Mode (#monitoring-mode) to
   Enforcement (#enforcement) Armed with this knowledge, the Domain
   Owner could make an informed decision regarding subjecting its mail
   traffic to possible DMARC failures based on the Domain Owner's
   tolerance for such things.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 58]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   Because of the value provided by "pct=0" to Domain Owners, it was
   logical to keep this functionality in the protocol; at the same time,
   it didn't make sense to support a tag named "pct" that had only two
   valid values.  This version of the DMARC mechanism, therefore,
   introduces the "t" tag as shorthand for "testing", with the valid
   values of "y" and "n", which are meant to be analogous in their
   application by mailbox providers and intermediaries to the "pct" tag
   values "0" and "100", respectively.

Appendix B.  Examples

   This section illustrates both the Domain Owner side and the Mail
   Receiver side of a DMARC exchange.

B.1.  Identifier Alignment Examples

   The following examples illustrate the DMARC mechanism's use of
   Identifier Alignment.  For brevity's sake, only message header fields
   are shown, as message bodies are not considered when conducting DMARC
   checks.

B.1.1.  SPF

   The following SPF examples assume that SPF produces a passing result.
   Alignment cannot exist if SPF does not produce a passing result.

   Example 1: SPF in Strict Alignment:

        MAIL FROM: <sender@example.com>

        From: sender@example.com
        Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
        To: receiver@example.org
        Subject: here's a sample

   In this case, the RFC5321.MailFrom domain and the Author Domain are
   identical.  Thus, the identifiers are in Strict Alignment.

   Example 2: SPF in Relaxed Alignment:

        MAIL FROM: <sender@child.example.com>

        From: sender@example.com
        Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
        To: receiver@example.org
        Subject: here's a sample

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 59]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   In this case, the Author Domain (example.com) is a parent of the
   RFC5321.MailFrom domain.  Thus, the identifiers are in relaxed
   alignment because they both have the same Organizational Domain
   (example.com).

   Example 3: No SPF Identifier Alignment:

        MAIL FROM: <sender@example.net>

        From: sender@child.example.com
        Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
        To: receiver@example.org
        Subject: here's a sample

   In this case, the RFC5321.MailFrom domain that is neither the same
   as, a parent of, nor a child of the Author Domain.  Thus, the
   identifiers are not in alignment.

B.1.2.  DKIM

   The examples below assume that the DKIM signatures pass validation.
   Alignment cannot exist with a DKIM signature that does not validate.

   Example 1: DKIM in Strict Alignment:

        DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=example.com; ...
        From: sender@example.com
        Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
        To: receiver@example.org
        Subject: here's a sample

   In this case, the DKIM "d=" parameter and the Author Domain have
   identical DNS domains.  Thus, the identifiers are in Strict
   Alignment.

   Example 2: DKIM in Relaxed Alignment:

        DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=example.com; ...
        From: sender@child.example.com
        Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
        To: receiver@example.org
        Subject: here's a sample

   In this case, the DKIM signature's "d=" parameter includes a DNS
   domain that is a parent of the Author Domain.  Thus, the identifiers
   are in relaxed alignment, as they have the same Organizational Domain
   (example.com).

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 60]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   Example 3: No DKIM Identifier Alignment:

        DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=example.net; ...
        From: sender@child.example.com
        Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
        To: receiver@example.org
        Subject: here's a sample

   In this case, the DKIM signature's "d=" parameter includes a DNS
   domain that is neither the same as, a parent of, nor a child of the
   Author Domain.  Thus, the identifiers are not in alignment.

B.2.  Domain Owner Example

   A Domain Owner that wants to use DMARC should have already deployed
   and tested SPF and DKIM.  The next step is to publish a DMARC Policy
   Record for the Domain Owner's Organizational Domain.

B.2.1.  Entire Domain, Monitoring Mode

   The Domain Owner for "example.com" has deployed SPF and DKIM on its
   messaging infrastructure.  The Domain Owner wishes to begin using
   DMARC with a policy that will solicit aggregate feedback from Mail
   Receivers without affecting how the messages are processed in order
   to:

   *  Confirm that its legitimate messages are authenticating correctly

   *  Validate that all authorized message sources have implemented
      authentication measures

   *  Determine how many messages from other sources would be affected
      by publishing a Domain Owner Assessment Policy at Enforcement

   The Domain Owner accomplishes this by constructing a DMARC Policy
   Record indicating that:

   *  The version of DMARC being used is "DMARC1" ("v=DMARC1;")

   *  Mail Receivers should not alter how they treat these messages
      because of this DMARC Policy Record ("p=none")

   *  Aggregate feedback reports are sent via email to the address
      "dmarc-feedback@example.com" ("rua=mailto:dmarc-
      feedback@example.com" (mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com"))

   *  All messages from this Organizational Domain are subject to this
      policy (no "t" tag present, so the default of "n" applies).

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 61]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   The DMARC Policy Record might look like this when retrieved using a
   common command-line tool:

     % dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com.
     "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com"

   To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
   creates an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
   (following the conventional zone file format):

     ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain example.com

     _dmarc  IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
                      "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com" )

B.2.2.  Entire Domain, Monitoring Mode, Per-Message Reports

   The Domain Owner from the previous example has used the aggregate
   reporting to discover some messaging systems that had not yet
   implemented DKIM correctly, but they are still seeing periodic
   authentication failures.  To diagnose these intermittent problems,
   they wish to request per-message failure reports when authentication
   failures occur.

   Not all Mail Receivers will honor such a request, but the Domain
   Owner feels that any reports it does receive will be helpful enough
   to justify publishing this record.  The default per-message report
   format ([RFC6591]) meets the Domain Owner's needs in this scenario.

   The Domain Owner accomplishes this by adding the following to its
   DMARC Policy Record from Appendix B.2.1:

   *  Per-message failure reports are sent via email to the address
      "auth-reports@example.com" ("ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com"
      (mailto:auth-reports@example.com"))

   The DMARC Policy Record might look like this when retrieved using a
   common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
   line but is wrapped here for publication):

     % dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com.
     "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com;
      ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com"

   To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
   might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
   (following the conventional zone file format):

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 62]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

     ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain example.com

     _dmarc  IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
                       "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com; "
                       "ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com" )

B.2.3.  Per-Message Failure Reports Directed to Third Party

   The Domain Owner from the previous example is maintaining the same
   policy but now wishes to have a third party serve as a Report
   Consumer.  Again, not all Mail Receivers will honor this request, but
   those that do may implement additional checks to validate that the
   third party wishes to receive the failure reports for this domain.

   The Domain Owner needs to alter its DMARC Policy Record from
   Appendix B.2.2 as follows:

   *  Per-message failure reports are sent via email to the address
      "auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net" ("ruf=mailto:auth-
      reports@thirdparty.example.net" (mailto:auth-
      reports@thirdparty.example.net"))

   The DMARC Policy Record might look like this when retrieved using a
   common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
   line but is wrapped here for publication):

     % dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com.
     "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com;
      ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net"

   To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
   might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
   (following the conventional zone file format):

     ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain example.com

     _dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
                     "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com; "
                     "ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net" )

   Because the address used in the "ruf" tag is outside the
   Organizational Domain in which this record is published, conforming
   Mail Receivers will implement additional checks as described in
   Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].  To pass these
   additional checks, the Report Consumer's Domain Owner will need to
   publish an additional DMARC Policy Record as follows:

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 63]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   *  Given the DMARC Policy Record published by the Domain Owner at
      "_dmarc.example.com", the DNS administrator for the Report
      Consumer will need to publish a TXT resource record at
      "example.com._report._dmarc.thirdparty.example.net" with the value
      "v=DMARC1;".

   The resulting DMARC Policy Record might look like this when retrieved
   using a common command-line tool:

     % dig +short TXT example.com._report._dmarc.thirdparty.example.net
     "v=DMARC1;"

   To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for example.net might
   create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
   (following the conventional zone file format):

     ; zone file for thirdparty.example.net
     ; Accept DMARC failure reports on behalf of example.com

     example.com._report._dmarc   IN   TXT    "v=DMARC1;"

B.2.4.  Subdomain, Testing, and Multiple Aggregate Report URIs

   The Domain Owner has implemented SPF and DKIM in a subdomain used for
   pre-production testing of messaging services.  It now wishes to
   express a handling preference for messages from this subdomain that
   fail DMARC validation to indicate to participating Mail Receivers
   that use of this domain is not valid.

   As a first step, it will express that it considers messages using
   this subdomain that fail DMARC validation to be suspicious.  The goal
   here will be to enable examination of messages sent to mailboxes
   hosted by participating Mail Receivers as a method for
   troubleshooting any existing authentication issues.  Aggregate
   feedback reports will be sent to a mailbox within the Organizational
   Domain, and to a mailbox at a Report Consumer selected and authorized
   to receive them by the Domain Owner.

   The Domain Owner will accomplish this by constructing a DMARC Policy
   Record indicating that:

   *  The version of DMARC being used is "DMARC1" ("v=DMARC1;")

   *  It is applied only to this subdomain (the DMARC Policy Record is
      published at "_dmarc.test.example.com" and not
      "_dmarc.example.com")

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 64]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   *  Mail Receivers are advised that the Domain Owner considers
      messages that fail to authenticate to be suspicious
      ("p=quarantine")

   *  Aggregate feedback reports are sent via email to the addresses
      "dmarc-feedback@example.com" and "example-tld-
      test@thirdparty.example.net" ("rua=mailto:dmarc-
      feedback@example.com (mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com),
      mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net") (mailto:tld-
      test@thirdparty.example.net"))

   *  The Domain Owner desires only that an actor performing a DMARC
      validation check apply any special handling rules it might have in
      place, such as rewriting the RFC53322.From header field; the
      Domain Owner is testing its setup at this point and so does not
      want the handling policy to be applied. ("t=y")

   The DMARC Policy Record might look like this when retrieved using a
   common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
   line but is wrapped here for publication):

     % dig +short TXT _dmarc.test.example.com
     "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com,
      mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net; t=y"

   To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
   might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone
   file:

     ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain test.example.com

     _dmarc IN  TXT  ( "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; "
                       "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com,"
                       "mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net;"
                       "t=y" )

   Once enough time has passed to allow for collecting enough reports to
   give the Domain Owner confidence that all authorized email sent using
   the subdomain is properly authenticating and passing DMARC validation
   checks, then the Domain Owner can update the DMARC Policy Record to
   indicate that it considers validation failures to be a clear
   indication that use of the subdomain is not valid.  It would do this
   by altering the record to advise Mail Receivers of its position on
   such messages ("p=reject") and removing the testing flag ("t=y").

   After alteration, the DMARC Policy Record might look like this when
   retrieved using a common command-line tool (the output shown would
   appear on a single line but is wrapped here for publication):

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 65]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

     % dig +short TXT _dmarc.test.example.com
     "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com,
      mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net"

   To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
   might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone
   file:

     ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain test.example.com

     _dmarc IN  TXT  ( "v=DMARC1; p=reject; "
                       "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com,"
                       "mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net" )

B.3.  Mail Receiver Example

   A Mail Receiver that wants to participate in DMARC should already be
   checking SPF and DKIM, and possess the ability to collect relevant
   information from various email-processing stages to provide feedback
   to Domain Owners (possibly via Report Consumers).

B.3.1.  SMTP Session Example

   An optimal DMARC-enabled Mail Receiver performs validation and
   Identifier Alignment checking during the SMTP [RFC5321] conversation.

   Before returning a final reply to the DATA command, the Mail
   Receiver's MTA has performed:

   1.  An SPF check to determine an SPF-Authenticated Identifier.

   2.  DKIM checks that yield one or more DKIM-Authenticated
       Identifiers.

   3.  A DMARC Policy Record lookup.

   The presence of an Author Domain DMARC Policy Record indicates that
   the Mail Receiver should continue with DMARC-specific processing
   before returning a reply to the DATA command.

   Given a DMARC Policy Record and the set of Authenticated Identifiers,
   the Mail Receiver checks to see if the Authenticated Identifiers
   align with the Author Domain (taking into consideration any strict
   versus relaxed options found in the DMARC Policy Record).

   For example, the following sample data is considered to be from a
   piece of email originating from the Domain Owner of "example.com":

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 66]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

     Author Domain: example.com
     SPF-authenticated Identifier: mail.example.com
     DKIM-authenticated Identifier: example.com
     DMARC Policy Record:
       "v=DMARC1; p=reject; aspf=r;
        rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com"

   In the above sample, the SPF-Authenticated Identifier and the DKIM-
   Authenticated Identifier both align with the Author Domain.  The Mail
   Receiver considers the above email to pass the DMARC check, avoiding
   the "reject" policy that is requested to be applied to email that
   fails the DMARC validation check.

   If no Authenticated Identifiers align with the Author Domain, then
   the Mail Receiver applies the Domain Owner Assessment Policy.
   However, before this action is taken, the Mail Receiver can consult
   external information to override the Domain Owner Assessment Policy.
   For example, if the Mail Receiver knows that this particular email
   came from a known and trusted forwarder (that happens to break both
   SPF and DKIM), then the Mail Receiver may choose to ignore the Domain
   Owner Assessment Policy.

   The Mail Receiver is now ready to reply to the DATA command.  If the
   DMARC check yields that the message is to be rejected, then the Mail
   Receiver replies with a 5xy code to inform the sender of failure.  If
   the DMARC check cannot be resolved due to transient network errors,
   then the Mail Receiver replies with a 4xy code to inform the sender
   as to the need to reattempt delivery later.  If the DMARC check
   yields a passing message, then the Mail Receiver continues with email
   processing, perhaps using the result of the DMARC check as an input
   to additional processing modules such as a domain reputation query.

   Before exiting DMARC-specific processing, the Mail Receiver checks to
   see if the Author Domain DMARC Policy Record requests AFRF-based
   reporting.  If so, then the Mail Receiver can emit an AFRF to the
   reporting address supplied in the DMARC Policy Record.

   At the exit of DMARC-specific processing, the Mail Receiver captures
   (through logging or direct insertion into a data store) the result of
   DMARC processing.  Captured information is used to build feedback for
   Domain Owner consumption.  This is unnecessary if the Domain Owner
   has not requested aggregate reports, i.e., no "rua" tag was found in
   the policy record.

B.4.  Organizational and Policy Domain Tree Walk Examples

   If an Author Domain has no DMARC Policy Record, a Mail Receiver uses
   a tree walk to find the DMARC Policy.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 67]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   If the DMARC Policy Record allows relaxed alignment and the SPF- or
   DKIM-Authenticated Identifiers are different from the Author Domain,
   a Mail Receiver uses a tree walk to discover the respective
   Organizational Domains to determine Identifier Alignment.

B.4.1.  Simple Organizational and Policy Example

   A Mail Receiver receives an email with:

   Author Domain  example.com
   RFC5321.MailFrom domain  example.com
   DKIM signature d=  signing.example.com

   In this example, _dmarc.example.com and _dmarc.signing.example.com
   both have DMARC Policy Records while _dmarc.com does not.  If SPF or
   DKIM yield pass results, they still have to be aligned to support a
   DMARC pass.  Since not all domains are the same, if the alignment is
   relaxed then the tree walk is performed to determine the
   Organizational Domain for each:

   For the Author Domain, query _dmarc.example.com and _dmarc.com;
   example.com is the last element of the DNS tree with a DMARC Policy
   Record, so it is the Organizational Domain for example.com.

   For the RFC5321.MailFrom domain, the Organizational Domain already
   found for example.com is example.com, so SPF is aligned.

   For the DKIM d= domain, query _dmarc.signing.example.com,
   _dmarc.example.com, and _dmarc.com.  Both signing.example.com and
   example.com have DMARC Policy Records, but example.com is the highest
   element in the tree with a DMARC Policy Record (it has the fewest
   labels), so example.com is the Organizational Domain.  Since this is
   also the Organizational Domain for the Author Domain, DKIM is aligned
   for relaxed alignment.

   Since both SPF and DKIM are aligned, they can be used to determine if
   the message has a DMARC pass result.  If the result is not pass, then
   the policy domain's DMARC Policy Record is used to determine the
   appropriate policy.  In this case, since the RFC5322.From domain has
   a DMARC Policy Record, that is the policy domain.

B.4.2.  Deep Tree Walk Example

   A Mail Receiver receives an email with:

   Author Domain  a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com
   RFC5321.MailFrom domain  example.com
   DKIM signature d=  signing.example.com

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 68]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   Both _dmarc.example.com and _dmarc.signing.example.com have DMARC
   Policy Records, while _dmarc.com does not.  If SPF or DKIM yield pass
   results, they still have to be aligned to support a DMARC pass.
   Since not all domains are the same, if the alignment is relaxed then
   the tree walk is performed to determine the Organizational Domain for
   each:

   For the Author Domain, query
   _dmarc.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com, skip to
   _dmarc.g.h.i.j.k.example.com, then query _dmarc.h.i.j.k.example.com,
   _dmarc.i.j.k.example.com, _dmarc.j.k.example.com,
   _dmarc.k.example.com, _dmarc.example.com, and _dmarc.com.  None of
   a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com, g.h.i.j.k.example.com,
   h.i.j.k.example.com, i.j.k.example.com, j.k.example.com, or
   k.example.com have a DMARC Policy Record.

   Since example.com is the last element of the DNS tree with a DMARC
   Policy Record, it is the Organizational Domain for
   a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com.

   For the RFC5321.MailFrom domain, the Organizational domain already
   found for example.com is example.com.  SPF is aligned.

   For the DKIM d= domain, query _dmarc.signing.example.com,
   _dmarc.example.com, and _dmarc.com.  Both signing.example.com and
   example.com have DMARC Policy Records, but example.com is the highest
   element in the tree with a DMARC Policy Record, so example.com is the
   Organizational Domain.  Since this is also the Organizational Domain
   for the Author Domain, DKIM is aligned for relaxed alignment.

   Since both SPF and DKIM are aligned, they can be used to determine if
   the message has a DMARC pass result.  If the results for both are not
   pass, then the policy domain's DMARC Policy Record is used to
   determine the appropriate policy.  In this case, the Author Domain
   does not have a DMARC Policy Record, so the policy domain is the
   highest element in the DNS tree with a DMARC Policy Record,
   example.com.

B.4.3.  Example with a PSD DMARC Policy Record

   In rare cases, a PSD publishes a DMARC Policy Record with a psd tag,
   which the tree walk must take into account.

   A Mail Receiver receives an email with:

   Author Domain  giant.bank.example
   RFC5321.MailFrom domain  mail.giant.bank.example
   DKIM signature d=  mail.mega.bank.example

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 69]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   In this case, _dmarc.bank.example has a DMARC Policy Record which
   includes the psd=y tag, and _dmarc.example does not have a DMARC
   Policy Record.  While _dmarc.giant.bank.example has a DMARC Policy
   Record without a psd tag, _dmarc.mega.bank.example and
   _dmarc.mail.mega.bank.example have no DMARC Policy Records.

   Since the three domains are all different, tree walks find their
   Organizational Domains to see which are aligned.

   For the Author Domain giant.bank.example, the tree walk finds the
   DMARC Policy Record at _dmarc.giant.bank.example, then the DMARC
   Policy Record at _dmarc.bank.example, and stops because of the psd=y
   flag.  The Organizational Domain is giant.bank.example because it is
   the domain directly below the one with psd=y.  Since the
   Organizational Domain has a DMARC Policy Record, it is also the
   policy domain.

   For the RFC5321.MailFrom domain, the tree walk finds no DMARC Policy
   Record at _dmarc.mail.giant.bank.example, the DMARC Policy Record at
   _dmarc.giant.bank.example, then the DMARC Policy Record at
   _dmarc.bank.example, and stops because of the psd=y flag.  Again the
   Organizational Domain is giant.bank.example because it is the domain
   directly below the one with psd=y.  Since this is the same
   Organizational Domain as the Author Domain, SPF is aligned.

   For the DKIM signature domain mail.mega.bank.example, the tree walk
   finds no DMARC Policy Records at _dmarc.mail.mega.bank.example or
   _dmarc.mega.bank.example, then finds the DMARC Policy Record at
   _dmarc.bank.example and stops because of the psd=y flag.  The
   Organizational Domain is mega.bank.example, so DKIM is not aligned.

   Since SPF is aligned, it can be used to determine if the message has
   a DMARC pass result.  If the result is not pass, then the policy
   domain's DMARC Policy Record is used to determine the appropriate
   policy.

B.5.  Utilization of Aggregate Feedback: Example

   Aggregate feedback is consumed by Domain Owners to enable their
   understanding of how a given domain is being processed by the Mail
   Receiver.  Aggregate reporting data on emails that pass all
   underlying authentication checks is used by Domain Owners to validate
   that their authentication practices remain accurate.  For example, if
   a third party is sending on behalf of a Domain Owner, the Domain
   Owner can use aggregate report data to validate ongoing
   authentication practices of the third party.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 70]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   Data on email that only partially passes underlying authentication
   checks provides visibility into problems that need to be addressed by
   the Domain Owner.  For example, if either SPF or DKIM fails to
   produce an Authenticated Identifier, the Domain Owner is provided
   with enough information to either directly correct the problem or
   understand where authentication-breaking changes are being introduced
   in the email transmission path.  If authentication-breaking changes
   due to email transmission path cannot be directly corrected, then the
   Domain Owner at least maintains an understanding of the effect of
   DMARC-based policies upon the Domain Owner's email.

   Data on email that fails all underlying authentication checks
   provides baseline visibility on how the Domain Owner's domain is
   being received at the Mail Receiver.  Based on this visibility, the
   Domain Owner can begin deployment of authentication technologies
   across uncovered email sources, if the mail that is failing the
   checks was generated by or on behalf of the Domain Owner.  Data
   regarding failing authentication checks can also allow the Domain
   Owner to come to an understanding of how its domain is being misused.

Appendix C.  Changes from RFC 7489

   This document is intended to render obsolete [RFC7489].  As one might
   guess, that means there are significant differences between RFC 7489
   and this document.  This section will summarize those changes.

C.1.  IETF Category

   RFC 7489 was not an Internet Standards Track specification; it was
   instead published in the Informational Category.  This document, by
   contrast, is intended to be Internet Standards Track.

C.2.  Changes to Terminology and Definitions

   The following changes were made to the Terminology and Definitions
   section.

C.2.1.  Terms Added

   These terms were added:

   *  Domain Owner Assessment Policy
   *  Enforcement
   *  Monitoring Mode
   *  Non-existent Domains
   *  Public Suffix Domain (PSD)
   *  Public Suffix Operator (PSO)
   *  PSO Controlled Domain Names

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 71]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

C.2.2.  Definitions Updated

   These definitions were updated:

   *  Organizational Domain
   *  Report Receiver (renamed to Report Consumer)

C.3.  Policy Discovery and Organizational Domain Determination

   The algorithms for DMARC policy discovery and for determining the
   Organizational Domain have been changed.  Specifically, reliance on
   the Public Suffix List (PSL) has been replaced by a technique called
   a "DNS Tree Walk", and the methodology for the DNS Tree Walk is
   explained in detail in this document.

   The DNS Tree Walk also incorporates PSD policy discovery, which was
   introduced in [RFC9091].  [RFC9091] was an Experimental RFC, and the
   results of that experiment were that the RFC was not implemented as
   written.  Instead, this document redefines the algorithm for PSD
   policy discovery, and thus obsoletes [RFC9091].

C.4.  Reporting

   Discussion of both aggregate and failure reporting have been moved to
   separate documents dedicated to the topics.

   In addition, the ability to specify a maximum report size in the
   DMARC URI has been removed.

C.5.  Tags

   Several tags have been added to the "DMARC Policy Record Format"
   section of this document since RFC 7489 was published, and at the
   same time, several others were removed.

C.5.1.  Tags Added:

   *  np - Policy for non-existent domains (Imported from [RFC9091])
   *  psd - Flag indicating whether a domain is a Public Suffix Domain
   *  t - Replacement for some pct tag functionality.  See Appendix A.6
      for further discussion

C.5.2.  Tags Removed:

   *  pct - Tag requesting application of DMARC policy to only a
      percentage of messages
   *  rf - Tag specifying requested format of failure reports
   *  ri - Tag specifying requested interval between aggregate reports

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 72]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

C.6.  Expansion of Domain Owner Actions Section

   This section has been expanded upon from RFC 7489.

   RFC 7489 had just two paragraphs in its Domain Owner Actions section,
   and while the content of those paragraphs was correct, it was
   minimalist in its approach to providing guidance to domain owners on
   just how to implement DMARC.

   This document provides much more detail and explanatory text to a
   Domain Owner, focusing not just on what to do to implement DMARC, but
   also on the reasons for each step and the repercussions of each
   decision.

   In particular, this document makes explicit that domains for general-
   purpose email SHOULD NOT deploy a DMARC policy of p=reject.  See
   Section 7.5 for further discussion of this topic.

C.7.  Report Generator Recommendations

   In the cases where a DMARC Policy Record specifies multiple
   destinations for either aggregate reports or failure reports, RFC
   7489 stated:

  Receivers **MAY** impose a limit on the number of URIs to which they
  will send reports but **MUST** support the ability to send to at least
  two.

   This document in Section 4.6 says:

    A report **SHOULD** be sent to each listed URI provided in the DMARC
    record.

C.8.  Removal of RFC 7489 Appendix A.5

   One of the appendices in RFC 7489, specifically Appendix A.5, has
   been removed from the text with this update.  The appendix was titled
   "Issues with ADSP in Operation" and it contained a list of issues
   associated with ADSP that influenced the direction of DMARC.  The
   ADSP protocol was moved to "Historic" status in 2013 and working
   group consensus was that such a discussion of ADSP's influence on
   DMARC was no longer relevant.

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 73]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

C.9.  RFC 7489 Errata Summary

   Remove this before final submission: (https://www.rfc-
   editor.org/styleguide/part2/#ref_errata (https://www.rfc-
   editor.org/styleguide/part2/#ref_errata) says errata in the Reported
   state should not be referenced; they are not considered stable.)

   This document and its companion documents
   ([I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and
   [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting]) address the following errata
   filed against [RFC7489] since that document's publication in March,
   2015.  More details on each of these can be found at https://www.rfc-
   editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=7489 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/
   errata_search.php?rfc=7489)

   [Err5365] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5365, RFC 7489, Section 7.2.1.1
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5365 (https://www.rfc-
   editor.org/errata/eid5365):  To be addressed in
      [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

   [Err5371] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5371, RFC 7489, Section 7.2.1.1
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5371 (https://www.rfc-
   editor.org/errata/eid5371):  To be addressed in
      [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

   [Err5440] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5440, RFC 7489, Section 7.1
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5440 (https://www.rfc-
   editor.org/errata/eid5440):  To be addressed in
      [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

   [Err5440] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5440, RFC 7489, Sections B.2.1,
   B.2.3, and B.2.4 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5440
   (https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5440):  Addressed both in this
      document and in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

   [Err6439] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 6439, RFC 7489, Section 7.1
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6439 (https://www.rfc-
   editor.org/errata/eid6439):  To be addressed in
      [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

   [Err6485] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 6485, RFC 7489, Section 7.2.1.1
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6485 (https://www.rfc-
   editor.org/errata/eid6485):  To be addressed in
      [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

   [Err7835] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 7835, RFC 7489, Section 6.6.3
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7835 (https://www.rfc-
   editor.org/errata/eid7835):  This erratum is in reference to the

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 74]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

      description of the process documented in RFC 7489 for the
      applicable DMARC policy for an email message.  The process for
      doing this has drastically changed in DMARCbis, and so the text
      identified in this erratum no longer exists.

   [Err5151] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5151, RFC 7489, Section 1
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5151 (https://www.rfc-
   editor.org/errata/eid5151):  This erratum is in reference to the
      Introduction section of RFC 7489.  That section has been
      substantially rewritten in DMARCbis, and the text at issue for
      this erratum no longer exists.

C.10.  General Editing and Formatting

   A great deal of the content from RFC 7489 was preserved in this
   document, but much of it was subject to either minor editing, re-
   ordering of sections, and/or both.

Acknowledgements

   This reworking of the DMARC mechanism specified in [RFC7489] is the
   result of contributions from many participants in the IETF Working
   Group dedicated to this effort.  Although the contributors are too
   numerous to mention, significant contributions were made by Kurt
   Andersen, Laura Atkins, Seth Blank, Alex Brotman, Dave Crocker,
   Douglas E.  Foster, Ned Freed, Mike Hammer, Steven M.  Jones, Scott
   Kitterman, Murray S.  Kucherawy, Barry Leiba, Alessandro Vesely, and
   Tim Wicinski.

   The authors and contributors also recognize that this document would
   not have been possible without the work done by those who had a hand
   in producing [RFC7489].  The Acknowledgements section from that
   document is preserved in full below.

Acknowledgements - RFC 7489

   DMARC and the draft version of this document submitted to the
   Independent Submission Editor were the result of lengthy efforts by
   an informal industry consortium: DMARC.org (see https://dmarc.org
   (https://dmarc.org)).  Participating companies included Agari,
   American Greetings, AOL, Bank of America, Cloudmark, Comcast,
   Facebook, Fidelity Investments, Google, JPMorgan Chase & Company,
   LinkedIn, Microsoft, Netease, PayPal, ReturnPath, The Trusted Domain
   Project, and Yahoo!.  Although the contributors and supporters are
   too numerous to mention, notable individual contributions were made
   by J.  Trent Adams, Michael Adkins, Monica Chew, Dave Crocker, Tim
   Draegen, Steve Jones, Franck Martin, Brett McDowell, and Paul Midgen.
   The contributors would also like to recognize the invaluable input

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 75]
Internet-Draft                  DMARCbis                       June 2024

   and guidance that was provided early on by J.D.  Falk.

   Additional contributions within the IETF context were made by Kurt
   Andersen, Michael Jack Assels, Les Barstow, Anne Bennett, Jim Fenton,
   J.  Gomez, Mike Jones, Scott Kitterman, Eliot Lear, John Levine, S.
   Moonesamy, Rolf Sonneveld, Henry Timmes, and Stephen J.  Turnbull.

Authors' Addresses

   Todd M. Herr
   Valimail
   Email: todd.herr@valimail.com

   John Levine
   Standcore LLC
   Email: standards@standore.com

Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 27 December 2024               [Page 76]