Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding in DNSSEC
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-06

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Last updated 2012-05-01
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DNS Extensions Working Group                                  S. Crocker
Internet-Draft                                             Shinkuro Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                                 S. Rose
Expires: November 2, 2012                                           NIST
                                                             May 1, 2012

       Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding in DNSSEC
                draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-06

Abstract

   The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin
   authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital
   signatures.  These digital signatures can be generated using
   different algorithms.  This draft sets out to specify a way for
   validating end-system resolvers to signal to a server which
   cryptographic algorithms and hash algorithms they support.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 2, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal

Crocker & Rose          Expires November 2, 2012                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft              Algorithm-Signal                    May 2012

   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

   2.  Signaling DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU), DS Hash
       Understood (DHU) and NSEC3 Hash Understood (N3U) Using EDNS . . 3

   3.  Client Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     3.1.  Stub Resolvers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
       3.1.1.  Validating Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
       3.1.2.  Non-Validating Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     3.2.  Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
       3.2.1.  Validating Recursive Resolvers  . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
       3.2.2.  Non-validating Recursive Resolvers  . . . . . . . . . . 6

   4.  Intermediate System Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

   5.  Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

   6.  Traffic Analysis Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

   9.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Crocker & Rose          Expires November 2, 2012                [Page 2]
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1.  Introduction

   The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], [RFC4034] and
   [RFC4035] were developed to provide origin authentication and
   integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures.  Each
   digital signature RR (RRSIG) contains an algorithm code number.
   These algorithm codes tells validators which cryptographic algorithm
   was used to generate the digital signature.

   Likewise, Delegation Signer (DS) RR's and NSEC3 RR's use a hashed
   value as part of their RDATA and, like digital signature algorithms,
   these hash algorithms have code numbers.  All three algorithm codes
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