Negative Caching of DNS Resolution Failures
draft-ietf-dnsop-caching-resolution-failures-02

Internet Engineering Task Force                               D. Wessels
Internet-Draft                                                W. Carroll
Updates: 2308 (if approved)                                    M. Thomas
Intended status: Standards Track                                Verisign
Expires: 10 September 2023                                  9 March 2023

              Negative Caching of DNS Resolution Failures
            draft-ietf-dnsop-caching-resolution-failures-02

Abstract

   In the DNS, resolvers employ caching to reduce both latency for end
   users and load on authoritative name servers.  The process of
   resolution may result in one of three types of responses: (1) a
   response containing the requested data; (2) a response indicating the
   requested data does not exist; or (3) a non-response due to a
   resolution failure in which the resolver does not receive any useful
   information regarding the data's existence.  This document concerns
   itself only with the third type.

   RFC 2308 specifies requirements for DNS negative caching.  There,
   caching of type (1) and (2) responses is mandatory and caching of
   type (3) responses is optional.  This document updates RFC 2308 to
   require negative caching for DNS resolution failures.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 September 2023.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Related Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Conditions That Lead To DNS Resolution Failures . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Server Failure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Refused Response Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Timeouts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.4.  Delegation Loops  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.5.  Alias Loops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.6.  DNSSEC Validation Failures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Requirements for Caching Resolution Failures  . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Retries and Timeouts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  Requerying Delegation Information . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   Caching has always been a fundamental component of DNS resolution on
   the Internet.  For example [RFC0882] states:

   "The sheer size of the database and frequency of updates suggest that
   it must be maintained in a distributed manner, with local caching to
   improve performance."

   The early DNS RFCs ([RFC0882], [RFC0883], [RFC1034], and [RFC1035])
   primarily discuss caching in the context of what [RFC2308] calls
   "positive" responses, that is, when the response includes the

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   requested data.  In this case, a TTL is associated with each resource
   record in the response.  Resolvers can cache and reuse the data until
   the TTL expires.

   Section 4.3.4 of [RFC1034] describes negative response caching, but
   notes it is optional and only talks about name errors (NXDOMAIN).
   This is the origin of using the SOA MINIMUM field as a negative
   caching TTL.

   [RFC2308] updated [RFC1034] to specify new requirements for DNS
   negative caching, including making it mandatory for name error
   (NXDOMAIN) and no data responses.  It further specified optional
   negative caching for two DNS resolution failure cases: server failure
   and dead / unreachable servers.

   FOR DISCUSSION: RFC 2308 seems to use RFC 2119 keywords somewhat
   inconsistently when in comes to requirements for negative caching of
   type (1) and (2) responses.  For example:

   *  Abstract: "negative caching should no longer be seen as an
      optional part of..."

   *  Section 5: "A negative answer that resulted from a name error
      (NXDOMAIN) should be cached..."

   *  Section 5: "A negative answer that resulted from a no data error
      (NODATA) should be cached..."

   *  Section 8: "Negative caching in resolvers is no-longer optional,
      if a resolver caches anything it must also cache negative
      answers."

   This document updates [RFC2308] to require negative caching of DNS
   resolution failures, and provides additional examples of resolution
   failures.

1.1.  Motivation

   Operators of DNS services have known for some time that recursive
   resolvers become more aggressive when they experience resolution
   failures.  A number of different anecdotes, experiments, and
   incidents support this claim.

   [The authors vaguely recall stories of a moderately popular DNSBL
   that wanted to shut down, but found that not responding or REFUSED
   caused an overwhelming amount of traffic.  Are there any citable
   references to this happening?]

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   In December 2009, a secondary server for a number of in-addr.arpa
   subdomains saw its traffic suddenly double, and queries of type
   DNSKEY in particular increase by approximately two orders of
   magnitude, coinciding with a DNSSEC key rollover by the zone operator
   [roll-over-and-die].  This predated a signed root zone and an
   operating system vendor was providing non-root trust anchors to the
   recursive resolver, which became out-of-date following the rollover.
   Unable to validate responses for the affected in-addr.arpa zones,
   recursive resolvers aggressively retried their queries.

   In 2016, the internet infrastructure company Dyn experienced a large
   attack that impacted many high-profile customers.  As documented in a
   technical presentation detailing the attack [dyn-attack], Dyn staff
   wrote: "At this point we are now experiencing botnet attack traffic
   and what is best classified as a 'retry storm'.  Looking at certain
   large recursive platforms > 10x normal volume."

   In 2018 the root zone key signing key (KSK) was rolled over
   [root-ksk-roll].  Throughout the rollover period, the root servers
   experienced a significant increase in DNSKEY queries.  Before the
   rollover, a.root-servers.net and j.root-servers.net together received
   about 15 million DNSKEY queries per day.  At the end of the
   revocation period, they received 1.2 billion per day -- an 80x
   increase.  Removal of the revoked key from the zone caused DNSKEY
   queries to drop to post-rollover but pre-revoke levels, indicating
   there is still a population of recursive resolvers using the previous
   root trust anchor and aggressively retrying DNSKEY queries.

   In 2021, Verisign researchers used botnet query traffic to
   demonstrate that certain large, public recursive DNS services exhibit
   very high query rates when all authoritative name servers for a zone
   return REFUSED or SERVFAIL [botnet].  When configured normally, query
   rates for a single botnet domain averaged approximately 50 queries
   per second.  However, when configured to return SERVFAIL, the query
   rate increased to 60,000 per second.  Furthermore, increases were
   also observed at the Root and TLD levels, even though delegations at
   those levels were unchanged and continued operating normally.

   Later that same year, on October 4, Facebook experienced a widespread
   and well-publicized outage [fb-outage].  During the 6-hour outage,
   none of Facebook's authoritative name servers were reachable and did
   not respond to queries.  Recursive name servers attempting to resolve
   Facebook domains experienced timeouts.  During this time query
   traffic on the .COM/.NET infrastructure increased from 7,000 to
   900,000 queries per second [CITATION NEEDED].

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1.2.  Related Work

   [RFC2308] describes negative caching for four types of DNS queries
   and responses: Name errors, no data, server failures, and dead /
   unreachable servers.  It places the strongest requirements on
   negative caching for name errors and no data responses, while server
   failures and dead servers are left as optional.

   [RFC4697] is a Best Current Practice that documents observed
   resolution misbehaviors.  It describes a number of situations that
   can lead to excessive queries from recursive resolvers, including:
   requerying for delegation data, lame servers, responses blocked by
   firewalls, and records with zero TTL.  [RFC4697] makes a number of
   recommendations, varying from "SHOULD" to "MUST."

   An expired Internet Draft describes "The DNS thundering herd problem"
   [thundering-herd] as a situation arising when cached data expires at
   the same time for a large number of users.  Although that document is
   not focused on negative caching, it does describe the benefits of
   combining multiple, identical queries to upstream name servers.  That
   is, when a recursive resolver receives multiple queries for the same
   name, class, and type that cannot be answered from cached data, it
   should combine or join them into a single upstream query, rather than
   emit repeated, identical upstream queries.

   [RFC5452], "Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged
   Answers," includes a section that describes the phenomenon known as
   birthday attacks.  Here, again, the problem arises when a recursive
   resolver emits multiple, identical upstream queries.  Multiple
   outstanding queries makes it easier for an attacker to guess and
   correctly match some of the DNS message parameters, such as the port
   number and ID field.  This situation is only exacerbated in the case
   of timeout-based resolution failures.  DNSSEC, of course, is a
   suitable defense to spoofing attacks.

   [RFC8767] describes "Serving Stale Data to Improve DNS Resiliency."
   This permits a recursive resolver to return possibly stale data when
   it is unable to refresh cached, expired data.  It introduces the idea
   of a failure recheck timer and says: "Attempts to refresh from non-
   responsive or otherwise failing authoritative nameservers are
   recommended to be done no more frequently than every 30 seconds."

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1.3.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   The terms Private Use, Reserved, Unassigned, and Specification
   Required are to be interpreted as defined in [RFC8126].

2.  Conditions That Lead To DNS Resolution Failures

   A DNS resolution failure occurs when none of the servers available to
   a resolver client provide any useful response data for a particular
   query name, type, and class.

   It is common for resolvers to have multiple servers from which to
   choose for a particular query.  For example, in the case of stub-to-
   recursive, the stub resolver may be configured with multiple
   recursive resolver addresses.  In the case of recursive-to-
   authoritative, a given zone usually has more than one name server (NS
   record), each of which can have multiple IP addresses and multiple
   transports.

   Nothing in this document prevents a resolver from retrying a query at
   a different server, or the same server over a different transport.
   In the case of timeouts, a resolver can retry the same server and
   transport a limited number of times.

   If any one of the available servers provides a useful response, then
   it is not considered a resolution failure.  However, if none of the
   servers for a given query tuple <name, type, class> provide a useful
   response, the result is a resolution failure.

   Note that NXDOMAIN and NOERROR/NODATA responses are not conditions
   for resolution failure.  In these cases, the server is providing a
   useful response, either indicating that a name does not exist, or
   that no data of the requested type exists at the name.  These
   negative responses can be cached as described in [RFC2308].

   The remainder of this section describes a number of different
   conditions that can lead to resolution failure.

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2.1.  Server Failure

   Server failure is defined in [RFC1035] as: "The name server was
   unable to process this query due to a problem with the name server."
   A server failure is signaled by setting the RCODE field to SERVFAIL.

   Authoritative servers, and more specifically secondary servers,
   return server failure responses when they don't have any valid data
   for a zone.  That is, a secondary server has been configured to serve
   a particular zone, but is unable to retrieve or refresh the zone data
   from the primary server.

   Recursive servers return server failure in response to a number of
   different conditions, including many described below.

2.2.  Refused Response Code

   A name server returns a message with the RCODE field set to REFUSED
   when it refuses to process the query for policy reasons.

   Authoritative servers generally return REFUSED when processing a
   query for which they are not authoritative.  For example, a server
   that is configured to be authoritative for only the EXAMPLE.NET zone,
   may return REFUSED in response to a query for EXAMPLE.COM.

   Recursive servers generally return REFUSED for query sources that do
   not match configured access control lists.  For example, a server
   that is configured to allow queries from only 2001:DB8:1::/48 may
   return REFUSED in response to a query from 2001:DB8:5::1.

2.3.  Timeouts

   A timeout occurs when a resolver fails to receive any response from a
   server within a reasonable amount of time.  [RFC2308] refers to this
   as a "dead / unreachable server."

   Note that resolver implementations may have two types of timeouts: a
   smaller timeout which might trigger a query retry and a larger
   timeout after which the server is considered unresponsive.

   Timeouts can present a particular problem for negative caching,
   depending on how the resolver handles multiple, outstanding queries
   for the same <query name, type, class> tuple.  For example, consider
   a very popular website in a zone whose name servers are all
   unresponsive.  A recursive resolver might receive tens or hundreds of
   queries per second for the popular website.  If the recursive server
   implementation "joins" these outstanding queries together, then it
   only sends one recursive-to-authoritative query for the numerous

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   pending stub-to-recursive queries.  If, however, the implementation
   does not join outstanding queries together, then it sends one
   recursive-to-authoritative query for each stub-to-recursive query.
   If the incoming query rate is high and the timeout is large, this
   might result in hundreds or thousands of recursive-to-authoritative
   queries while waiting for an authoritative server to time out.

2.4.  Delegation Loops

   A delegation loop, or cycle, can occur when one domain utilizes name
   servers in a second domain, and the second domain uses name servers
   in the first.  For example:

   FOO.EXAMPLE.    NS      NS1.EXAMPLE.COM.
   FOO.EXAMPLE.    NS      NS2.EXAMPLE.COM.

   EXAMPLE.COM.    NS      NS1.FOO.EXAMPLE.
   EXAMPLE.COM.    NS      NS2.FOO.EXAMPLE.

   In this example, no names under FOO.EXAMPLE or EXAMPLE.COM can be
   resolved because of the delegation loop.  Note that delegation loop
   may involve more than two domains.  A resolver that does not detect
   delegation loops may generate DDoS-levels of attack traffic to
   authoritative name servers, as documented in the TsuNAME
   vulnerability [TsuNAME].

2.5.  Alias Loops

   An alias loop, or cycle, can occur when one CNAME or DNAME RR refers
   to a second name, which in turn is specified as an alias for the
   first.  For example:

   APP.FOO.EXAMPLE.        CNAME   APP.EXAMPLE.NET.
   APP.EXAMPLE.NET.        CNAME   APP.FOO.EXAMPLE.

   The need to detect CNAME loops has been known since at least
   [RFC1034] which states in Section 3.6.2:

   "Of course, by the robustness principle, domain software should not
   fail when presented with CNAME chains or loops; CNAME chains should
   be followed and CNAME loops signaled as an error."

2.6.  DNSSEC Validation Failures

   Negative caching of DNSSEC validation errors is described in section
   4.7 of [RFC4035].

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   FOR DISCUSSION: RFC4035 says "resolvers MAY cache data with invalid
   signatures" while in this document all resolution failures MUST be
   negatively cached.  The focus of 4035 seems to be on caching bad
   *data* rather than caching a more general resolution failure (e.g.
   inability to retrieve keys).

3.  Requirements for Caching Resolution Failures

3.1.  Retries and Timeouts

   A resolver MUST NOT retry a given query over a server's transport
   more than twice (i.e., three queries in total) before considering the
   server's transport unresponsive for that query.

   A resolver MAY retry a given query over a different transport to the
   same server if it has reason to believe the transport is available
   for that server.

   This document does not place any requirements on timeout values,
   which may be implementation- or configuration-dependent.  It is
   generally expected that typical timeout values range from 3 to 30
   seconds.

3.2.  Caching

   Resolvers MUST implement a cache for resolution failures.  The
   purpose of this cache is to eliminate repeated upstream queries that
   cannot be resolved.  When an incoming query matches a cached
   resolution failure, the resolver MUST NOT send any corresponding
   outgoing queries until after the cache entries expire.

   Implementation details [requirements?] for such a cache are not
   specified in this document.  The implementation might cache different
   resolution failure conditions differently.  For example, DNSSEC
   validation failures might be cached according to the queried name,
   class, and type, whereas unresponsive servers might be cached only
   according to the server's IP address.

   Resolvers MUST cache resolution failures for at least 5 seconds.  The
   value of 5 seconds is chosen as a reasonable amount of time that an
   end user could be expected to wait.

   Resolvers SHOULD employ an exponential backoff algorithm to increase
   the amount of time for subsequent resolution failures.  For example,
   the initial time for negatively caching a resolution failure is set
   to 5 seconds.  The time is doubled after each retry that results in
   another resolution failure.  Consistent with [RFC2308], resolution
   failures MUST NOT be cached for longer than 5 minutes.

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   Notwithstanding the above, resolvers SHOULD implement measures to
   mitigate resource exhaustion attacks on the failed resolution cache.
   That is, the resolver should limit the amount of memory and/or
   processing time devoted to this cache.

3.3.  Requerying Delegation Information

   Quoting from [RFC4697]:

   There can be times when every name server in a zone's NS RRSet is
   unreachable (e.g., during a network outage), unavailable (e.g., the
   name server process is not running on the server host), or
   misconfigured (e.g., the name server is not authoritative for the
   given zone, also known as "lame").

   This document reiterates the requirement from Section 2.1.1 of
   [RFC4697]:

   An iterative resolver MUST NOT send a query for the NS RRSet of a
   non-responsive zone to any of the name servers for that zone's parent
   zone.  For the purposes of this injunction, a non-responsive zone is
   defined as a zone for which every name server listed in the zone's NS
   RRSet:

   1.  is not authoritative for the zone (i.e., lame), or

   2.  returns a server failure response (RCODE=2), or

   3.  is dead or unreachable according to Section 7.2 of [RFC2308].

   FOR DISCUSSION: the requirement quoted above may be problematic
   today.  e.g., focusing on NS as the query type (a) probably goes
   against qname minimization, and (b) is not the real problem.  Also
   RFC 4697 doesn't place any time restriction (TTL) on this.

4.  IANA Considerations

   None

5.  Security Considerations

   As noted in Section 3.2, an attacker might attempt a resource
   exhaustion attack by sending queries for a large number of names and/
   or types that result in resolution failure.  Resolvers SHOULD
   implement measures to protect themselves and bound the amount of
   memory devoted to caching resolution failures.

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   A cache poisoning attack (see section 2.2 of [RFC7873]) resulting in
   denial of service may be possible because failure messages cannot be
   signed.  An attacker might generate queries and send forged failure
   messages, causing the resolver to cease sending queries to the
   authoritative nameserver (see 2.6 of [RFC4732] for a similar "data
   corruption attack").  However, this would require continued spoofing
   throughout the backoff period and required attacks due to the 5
   minute cache limit.  As in section 4.1.12 of [RFC4686], this attack's
   effects would be "localized and of limited duration."

6.  Privacy Considerations

   This specification has no impact on user privacy.

7.  Acknowledgments

   The authors wish to thank Mukund Sivaraman, Petr Spacek, and other
   members of the DNSOP working group for their feedback and
   contributions.

8.  Change Log

   RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication.

   This section lists substantial changes to the document as it is being
   worked on.

   From -00 to -01:

   *  use phrase "the initial TTL for negatively caching a resolution
      failure" instead of "negative cache TTL"

   *  typos, etc

   From dwmtwc-01 to ietf-00:

   *  Adopted by WG

   From -00 to -01:

   *  Clarify retries and timeouts to apply on a per-query basis.

   *  Say more about the 5 second caching requirement in TTLs section.

   *  Expanded opening paragraphs of section 2, now titled "Conditions
      That Lead To DNS Resolution Failures".

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   *  Text from the former section 3.3 ("Scope") moved to top of section
      2.

   *  Section 3.2 was formerly "TTLs" and is now "Caching".  The draft
      no longer requires e.g. caching by tuples, but now just requires
      caching failures so that repeated queries are not sent out.

   *  State that resolvers should protect themselves from cache resource
      exhaustion attacks.

   From -01 to -02:

   *  Added cache poisoning attack to Security Considerations.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2308]  Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
              NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.

   [RFC4697]  Larson, M. and P. Barber, "Observed DNS Resolution
              Misbehavior", BCP 123, RFC 4697, DOI 10.17487/RFC4697,
              October 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4697>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

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9.2.  Informative References

   [botnet]   Wessels, D. and M. Thomas, "Botnet Traffic Observed at
              Various Levels of the DNS Hierarchy", May 2021,
              <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/38/contributions/841/>.

   [dyn-attack]
              Sullivan, A., "Dyn, DDoS, and DNS", March 2017,
              <https://ccnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/file/field-
              file-attach/2017-04/presentation-oracle-dyn-ddos-dns-
              13mar17-en.pdf>.

   [fb-outage]
              Janardhan, S., "More details about the October 4 outage",
              October 2021, <https://engineering.fb.com/2021/10/05/
              networking-traffic/outage-details/>.

   [RFC0882]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names: Concepts and facilities",
              RFC 882, DOI 10.17487/RFC0882, November 1983,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc882>.

   [RFC0883]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names: Implementation
              specification", RFC 883, DOI 10.17487/RFC0883, November
              1983, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc883>.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.

   [RFC4686]  Fenton, J., "Analysis of Threats Motivating DomainKeys
              Identified Mail (DKIM)", RFC 4686, DOI 10.17487/RFC4686,
              September 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4686>.

   [RFC4732]  Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet
              Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4732, December 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>.

   [RFC5452]  Hubert, A. and R. van Mook, "Measures for Making DNS More
              Resilient against Forged Answers", RFC 5452,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5452, January 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5452>.

   [RFC7873]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and M. Andrews, "Domain Name System (DNS)
              Cookies", RFC 7873, DOI 10.17487/RFC7873, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7873>.

Wessels, et al.         Expires 10 September 2023              [Page 13]
Internet-Draft         Caching Resolution Failures            March 2023

   [RFC8767]  Lawrence, D., Kumari, W., and P. Sood, "Serving Stale Data
              to Improve DNS Resiliency", RFC 8767,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8767, March 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8767>.

   [roll-over-and-die]
              Michaleson, G., Wallström, P., Arends, R., and G. Huston,
              "Roll Over and Die?", February 2010,
              <https://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2010-02/rollover.html>.

   [root-ksk-roll]
              Müller, M., Thomas, M., Wessels, D., Hardaker, W., Chung,
              T., Toorop, W., and R.v. Rijswijk-Deij, "Roll, Roll, Roll
              Your Root: A Comprehensive Analysis of the First Ever
              DNSSEC Root KSK Rollover", October 2019,
              <https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3355369.3355570>.

   [thundering-herd]
              Sivaraman, M. and C. Liu, "The DNS thundering herd problem
              (expired Internet Draft)", June 2020,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-muks-dnsop-dns-
              thundering-herd/>.

   [TsuNAME]  Moura, G. C. M., Castro, S., Heidemann, J., and W.
              Hardaker, "TsuNAME: exploiting misconfiguration and
              vulnerability to DDoS DNS", November 2021,
              <https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3487552.3487824>.

Authors' Addresses

   Duane Wessels
   Verisign
   12061 Bluemont Way
   Reston
   Phone: +1 703 948-3200
   Email: dwessels@verisign.com
   URI:   https://verisign.com

   William Carroll
   Verisign
   12061 Bluemont Way
   Reston
   Phone: +1 703 948-3200
   Email: wicarroll@verisign.com
   URI:   https://verisign.com

Wessels, et al.         Expires 10 September 2023              [Page 14]
Internet-Draft         Caching Resolution Failures            March 2023

   Matthew Thomas
   Verisign
   12061 Bluemont Way
   Reston
   Phone: +1 703 948-3200
   Email: mthomas@verisign.com
   URI:   https://verisign.com

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