Client Subnet in DNS Queries
draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-client-subnet-07
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 7871.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Carlo Contavalli , Wilmer van der Gaast , David C Lawrence , Warren "Ace" Kumari | ||
| Last updated | 2016-03-30 (Latest revision 2016-03-21) | ||
| Replaces | draft-vandergaast-edns-client-subnet | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews |
GENART Telechat review
(of
-06)
by Russ Housley
Ready w/issues
GENART Last Call review
(of
-04)
by Russ Housley
Almost ready
|
||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Suzanne Woolf | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2015-12-30 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC Ed Queue | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Joel Jaeggli | ||
| Send notices to | "Suzanne Woolf" <suzworldwide@gmail.com> | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
| IANA action state | Waiting on Authors | ||
| RFC Editor | RFC Editor state | EDIT | |
| Details |
draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-client-subnet-07
dnsop C. Contavalli
Internet-Draft W. van der Gaast
Intended status: Informational Google
Expires: September 22, 2016 D. Lawrence
Akamai Technologies
W. Kumari
Google
March 21, 2016
Client Subnet in DNS Queries
draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-client-subnet-07
Abstract
This document describes an EDNS0 extension that is in active use to
carry information about the network that originated a DNS query, and
the network for which the subsequent response can be cached. Since
it has some known operational and privacy shortcomings, a revision
will be worked through the IETF for improvement.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Privacy Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Option Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Originating the Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1.1. Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1.2. Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1.3. Forwarding Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.2. Generating a Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2.1. Authoritative Nameserver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2.2. Intermediate Nameserver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3. Handling ECS Responses and Caching . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.3.1. Caching the Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.3.2. Answering from Cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.4. Delegations and Negative Answers . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.5. Transitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. DNSSEC Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. NAT Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.1. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.2. Birthday Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.3. Cache Pollution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12. Sending the Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
12.1. Probing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
12.2. Whitelist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
13. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
14. Contributing Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A.1. -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.2. -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
A.3. -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
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1. Introduction
Many Authoritative Nameservers today return different responses based
on the perceived topological location of the user. These servers use
the IP address of the incoming query to identify that location.
Since most queries come from intermediate Recursive Resolvers, the
source address is that of the Recursive Resolver rather than of the
query originator.
Traditionally, and probably still in the majority of instances,
Recursive Resolvers are reasonably close in the topological sense to
the Stub Resolvers or Forwarding Resolvers that are the source of
queries. For these resolvers, using their own IP address is
sufficient for Authoritative Nameservers that tailor responses based
upon location of the querier.
Increasingly, though, a class of Recursive Resolvers has arisen that
handle query sources that are often not topologically close. The
motivation for having such Centralized Resolvers varies but is
usually because of some enhanced experience, such as greater cache
security or applying policies regarding where users may connect.
(Although political censorship usually comes to mind here, the same
actions may be used by a parent when setting controls on where a
minor may connect.) Similarly, many ISPs and other organizations use
a Centralized Resolver infrastructure that can be distant from the
clients the resolvers serve. These cases all lead to less than
desirable responses from topology-sensitive Authoritative
Nameservers.
This document defines an EDNS0 [RFC6891] option to convey network
information that is relevant to the DNS message. It will carry
sufficient network information about the originator for the
Authoritative Nameserver to tailor responses. It will also provide
for the Authoritative Nameserver to indicate the scope of network
addresses for which the tailored answer is intended. This EDNS0
option is intended for those Recursive Resolvers and Authoritative
Nameservers that would benefit from the extension and not for general
purpose deployment. It is completely optional and can safely be
ignored by servers that choose not to implement it or enable it.
This document also includes guidelines on how to best cache those
results and provides recommendations on when this protocol extension
should be used.
At least a dozen different client and server implementations have
been written based on earlier versions of this specification. The
protocol is in active production use today. While the
implementations interoperate, there is varying behavior around edge
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cases that were poorly specified. Known incompatibilities are
described in this document, and the authors believe that it is better
to describe the system as it is working today, even if not everyone
agrees with the details of the original specification (
[I-D.vandergaast-edns-client-subnet]). The alternative is an
undocumented and proprietary system.
A revised proposal to improve upon the minor flaws in this protocol
will be forthcoming to the IETF.
2. Privacy Note
If we were just beginning to design this mechanism, and not
documenting existing protocol, it is unlikely that we would have done
things exactly this way.
The IETF is actively working on enhancing DNS privacy
[DPRIVE_Working_Group], and the re-injection of metadata has been
identified as a problematic design pattern
[I-D.hardie-privsec-metadata-insertion]
As noted above, however, this document primarily describes existing
behavior of a deployed method, to further the understanding of the
Internet community.
We recommend that the feature be turned off by default in all
nameserver software, and that operators only enable it explicitly in
those circumstances where it provides a clear benefit for their
clients. We also encourage the deployment of means to allow users to
make use of the opt-out provided. Finally, we recommend that others
avoid techniques that may introduce additional metadata in future
work, as it may damage user trust.
Regrettably, support for the opt-out provisions of this specification
are currently limited. Only one stub resolver, getdns, is known to
be able to originate queries with anonymity requested, and as yet no
applications are known to be able to indicate that user preference to
the stub resolver.
3. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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4. Terminology
ECS: EDNS Client Subnet.
Client: A Stub Resolver, Forwarding Resolver, or Recursive Resolver.
A client to a Recursive Resolver or a Forwarding Resolver.
Server: A Forwarding Resolver, Recursive Resolver or Authoritative
Nameserver.
Stub Resolver: A simple DNS protocol implementation on the client
side as described in [RFC1034] section 5.3.1. A client to a
Recursive Resolver or a Forwarding Resolver.
Authoritative Nameserver: A nameserver that has authority over one
or more DNS zones. These are normally not contacted by Stub
Resolver or end user clients directly but by Recursive Resolvers.
Described in [RFC1035] Section 6.
Recursive Resolver: A nameserver that is responsible for resolving
domain names for clients by following the domain's delegation
chain. Recursive Resolvers frequently use caches to be able to
respond to client queries quickly. Described in [RFC1035]
Section 7.
Forwarding Resolver: A nameserver that does not do iterative
resolution itself, but instead passes that responsibility to
another Recursive Resolver, called a "Forwarder" in [RFC2308]
section 1.
Intermediate Nameserver: Any nameserver in between the Stub Resolver
and the Authoritative Nameserver, such as a Recursive Resolver or
a Forwarding Resolver.
Centralized Resolvers: Intermediate Nameservers that serve a
topologically diverse network address space.
Tailored Response: A response from a nameserver that is customized
for the node that sent the query, often based on performance (i.e.
lowest latency, least number of hops, topological distance, ...).
Topologically Close: Refers to two hosts being close in terms of
number of hops or time it takes for a packet to travel from one
host to the other. The concept of topological distance is only
loosely related to the concept of geographical distance: two
geographically close hosts can still be very distant from a
topological perspective, and two geographically distant hosts can
be quite close on the network.
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For a more comprehensive treatment of these DNS terms, please see
[RFC7719].
5. Overview
The general idea of this document is to provide an EDNS0 option to
allow Recursive Resolvers, if they are willing, to forward details
about the origin network from which a query is coming when talking to
other Nameservers.
The format of the edns-client-subnet (ECS) EDNS0 option is described
in Section 6, and is meant to be added in queries sent by
Intermediate Nameservers in a way transparent to Stub Resolvers and
end users, as described in Section 7.1. ECS is only defined for the
Internet (IN) DNS class.
As described in Section 7.2, an Authoritative Nameserver could use
ECS as a hint to the network location of the end user and provide a
better answer. Its response would also contain an ECS option,
clearly indicating that the server made use of this information, and
that the answer is tied to the network of the client.
As described in Section 7.3, Intermediate Nameservers would use this
information to cache the response.
Some Intermediate Nameservers may also have to be able to forward ECS
queries they receive. This is described in Section 7.5.
The mechanisms provided by ECS raise various security related
concerns related to cache growth, the ability to spoof EDNS0 options,
and privacy. Section 11 explores various mitigation techniques.
The expectation, however, is that this option will primarily be used
between Recursive Resolvers and Authoritative Nameservers that are
sensitive to network location issues. Most Recursive Resolvers,
Authoritative Nameservers and Stub Resolvers will never need to know
about this option, and will continue working as they had been.
Failure to support this option or its improper handling will, at
worst, cause suboptimal identification of client network location,
which is a common occurrence in current content delivery network
(CDN) setups.
Section 7.1 also provides a mechanism for Stub Resolvers to signal
Recursive Resolvers that they do not want ECS treatment for specific
queries.
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Additionally, operators of Intermediate Nameservers with ECS enabled
are allowed to choose how many bits of the address of received
queries to forward, or to reduce the number of bits forwarded for
queries already including an ECS option.
6. Option Format
This protocol uses an EDNS0 [RFC6891]) option to include client
address information in DNS messages. The option is structured as
follows:
+0 (MSB) +1 (LSB)
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
0: | OPTION-CODE |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
2: | OPTION-LENGTH |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
4: | FAMILY |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
6: | SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH | SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
8: | ADDRESS... /
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
o (Defined in [RFC6891]) OPTION-CODE, 2 octets, for ECS is 8 (0x00
0x08).
o (Defined in [RFC6891]) OPTION-LENGTH, 2 octets, contains the
length of the payload (everything after OPTION-LENGTH) in octets.
o FAMILY, 2 octets, indicates the family of the address contained in
the option, using address family codes as assigned by IANA in
Address Family Numbers [Address_Family_Numbers].
The format of the address part depends on the value of FAMILY. This
document only defines the format for FAMILY 1 (IP version 4) and 2
(IP version 6), which are as follows:
o SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH, an unsigned octet representing the leftmost
number of significant bits of ADDRESS to be used for the lookup.
In responses, it mirrors the same value as in the queries.
o SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH, an unsigned octet representing the leftmost
number of significant bits of ADDRESS that the response covers.
In queries, it MUST be set to 0.
o ADDRESS, variable number of octets, contains either an IPv4 or
IPv6 address, depending on FAMILY, which MUST be truncated to the
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number of bits indicated by the SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH field,
padding with 0 bits to pad to the end of the last octet needed.
o A server receiving an ECS option that uses either too few or too
many ADDRESS octets, or that has non-zero ADDRESS bits set beyond
SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH, SHOULD return FORMERR to reject the packet,
as a signal to the developer of the software making the request to
fix their implementation.
All fields are in network byte order ("big-endian", per [RFC1700],
Data Notation).
7. Protocol Description
7.1. Originating the Option
The ECS option should generally be added by Recursive Resolvers when
querying Authoritative Nameservers, as described in Section 12. The
option can also be initialized by a Stub Resolver or Forwarding
Resolver.
7.1.1. Recursive Resolvers
The setup of the ECS option in a Recursive Resolver depends on the
client query that triggered the resolution process.
In the usual case, where no ECS option was present in the client
query, the Recursive Resolver initializes the option by setting the
FAMILY of the client's address. It then uses the value of its
maximum cacheable prefix length to set SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH. For
privacy reasons, and because the whole IP address is rarely required
to determine a tailored response, this length SHOULD be shorter than
the full address, as described in Section 11.
If the triggering query included an ECS option itself, it MUST be
examined for its SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH. The Recursive Resolver's
outgoing query MUST then set SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH to the shorter of
the incoming query's SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH or the server's maximum
cacheable prefix length.
Finally, in both cases, SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH is set to 0 and the
ADDRESS is then added up to the SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH number of bits,
with trailing 0 bits added, if needed, to fill the final octet. The
total number of octets used MUST only be enough to cover SOURCE
PREFIX-LENGTH bits, rather than the full width that would normally be
used by addresses in FAMILY.
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FAMILY and ADDRESS information MAY be used from the ECS option in the
incoming query. Passing the existing address data is supportive of
the Recursive Resolver being used as the target of a Forwarding
Resolver, but could possibly run into policy problems with regard to
usage agreements between the Recursive Resolver and Authoritative
Nameserver. See Section 12.2 for more discussion on this point. If
the Recursive Resolver will not forward the FAMILY and ADDRESS data
from the incoming ECS option, it SHOULD return a REFUSED response.
Subsequent queries to refresh the data MUST, if unrestricted by an
incoming SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH, specify the longest SOURCE PREFIX-
LENGTH that the Recursive Resolver is willing to cache, even if a
previous response indicated that a shorter prefix length was
sufficient.
7.1.2. Stub Resolvers
A Stub Resolver MAY generate DNS queries with an ECS option that sets
SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH to limit how network information should be
revealed. An Intermediate Nameserver that receives such a query MUST
NOT make queries that include more bits of client address than in the
originating query.
A SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH of 0 means the Recursive Resolver MUST NOT add
address information of the client to its queries. The subsequent
Recursive Resolver query to the Authoritative Nameserver will then
either not include an ECS option or MAY optionally include its own
address information, which is what the Authoritative Nameserver will
almost certainly use to generate any Tailored Response in lieu of an
option. This allows the answer to be handled by the same caching
mechanism as other queries, with an explicit indicator of the
applicable scope. Subsequent Stub Resolver queries for /0 can then
be answered from this cached response.
A Stub Resolver MUST set SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH to 0. It MAY include
FAMILY and ADDRESS data, but should be prepared to handle a REFUSED
response if the Intermediate Nameserver that it queries has a policy
that denies forwarding of the ADDRESS. If there is no ADDRESS set,
i.e. SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH is set to 0, then FAMILY MUST be set to 0.
7.1.3. Forwarding Resolvers
Forwarding Resolvers essentially appear to be Stub Resolvers to
whatever Recursive Resolver is ultimately handling the query, but
look like a Recursive Resolver to their client. A Forwarding
Resolver using this option MUST prepare it as described above in
Section 7.1.1, Recursive Resolvers. In particular, a Forwarding
Resolver that implements this protocol MUST honor SOURCE PREFIX-
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LENGTH restrictions indicated in the incoming query from its client.
See also Section 7.5.
Since the Recursive Resolver it contacts will treat the Forwarding
Resolver like a Stub Resolver, the Recursive Resolver's policies
regarding incoming ADDRESS information will apply in the same way.
If the Forwarding Resolver receives a REFUSED response when it sends
a query which includes a non-zero ADDRESS, it MUST retry with FAMILY
set to 0 and no ADDRESS.
7.2. Generating a Response
7.2.1. Authoritative Nameserver
When a query containing an ECS option is received, an Authoritative
Nameserver supporting ECS MAY use the address information specified
in the option in order to generate a tailored response.
Authoritative Nameservers that have not implemented or enabled
support for the ECS option ought to safely ignore it within incoming
queries, per [RFC6891] section 6.1.2. Such a server MUST NOT include
an ECS option within replies, to indicate lack of support for it.
Implementers of Intermediate Nameservers should be aware, however,
that some nameservers incorrectly echo back unknown EDNS0 options.
In this protocol that should be mostly harmless, as SCOPE PREFIX-
LENGTH should come back as 0, thus marking the response as covering
all networks.
A query with a wrongly formatted option (e.g., an unknown FAMILY)
MUST be rejected and a FORMERR response MUST be returned to the
sender, as described by [RFC6891], Transport Considerations.
An Authoritative Nameserver that implements this protocol and
receives an ECS option MUST include an ECS option in its response to
indicate that it SHOULD be cached accordingly, regardless of whether
the client information was needed to formulate an answer. (Note that
the [RFC6891] requirement to reserve space for the OPT record could
mean that the answer section of the response will be truncated and
fallback to TCP indicated accordingly.) If an ECS option was not
included in a query, one MUST NOT be included in the response even if
the server is providing a Tailored Response -- presumably based on
the address from which it received the query.
The FAMILY, SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH and ADDRESS in the response MUST
match those in the query, unless the query specified only the SOURCE
PREFIX-LENGTH for privacy (and thus with FAMILY set to 0 and no
ADDRESS). Echoing back these values helps to mitigate certain attack
vectors, as described in Section 11.
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The SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH in the response indicates the network for
which the answer is intended.
A SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH value longer than the SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH
indicates that the provided prefix length was not specific enough to
select the most appropriate Tailored Response. Future queries for
the name within the specified network SHOULD use the longer SCOPE
PREFIX-LENGTH. Factors affecting whether the Recursive Resolver
would use the longer length include the amount of privacy masking the
operator wants to provide their users, and the additional resource
implications for the cache.
Conversely, a shorter SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH indicates that more bits
than necessary were provided, and the answer is suitable for a
broader range of addresses. This could be as short as 0, to indicate
that the answer is suitable for all addresses in FAMILY.
As the logical topology of any part of the network with regard to the
tailored response can vary, an Authoritative Nameserver may return
different values of SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH for different networks.
Since some queries can result in multiple RRsets being added to the
response, there is an unfortunate ambiguity from the original
specification as to how SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH would apply to each
individual RRset. For example, multiple types in response to an ANY
metaquery could all have different applicable SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH
values, but this protocol only has the ability to signal one. The
response SHOULD therefore include the longest relevant PREFIX-LENGTH
of any RRset in the answer, which could have the unfortunate side-
effect of redundantly caching some data that could be cached more
broadly. For the specific case of a CNAME chain, the Authoritative
Nameserver SHOULD only place the initial CNAME record in the Answer
section, to have it cached unambiguously appropriately. Most modern
Recursive Resolvers restart the query with the canonical name, so the
remainder of the chain is typically ignored anyway. For message-
focused resolvers, rather than RRset-focused ones, this will mean
caching the entire CNAME chain at the longest PREFIX-LENGTH of any
RRset in the chain.
The specific logic that an Authoritative Nameserver uses to choose a
tailored response is not in the scope of this document. Implementers
are encouraged, however, to consider carefully their selection of
SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH for the response in the event that the best
tailored response cannot be determined, and what the implications
would be over the life of the TTL.
Authoritative Nameservers might have situations where one Tailored
Response is appropriate for a relatively broad address range, such as
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an IPv4 /20, except for some exceptions, such as a few /24 ranges
within that /20. Because it can't be guaranteed that queries for all
longer prefix lengths would arrive before one that would be answered
by the shorter prefix length, an Authoritative Nameserver MUST NOT
overlap prefixes.
When the Authoritative Nameserver has a longer prefix length Tailored
Response within a shorter prefix length Tailored Response, then
implementations can either:
1. Deaggregate the shorter prefix response into multiple longer
prefix responses, or,
2. Alert the operator that the order of queries will determine which
answers get cached, and either warn and continue or treat this as
an error and refuse to load the configuration.
This choice should be documented for the operator, for example in the
user manual.
When deaggregating to correct the overlap, prefix lengths should be
optimized to use the minimum necessary to cover the address space, in
order to reduce the overhead that results from having multipe copies
of the same answer. As a trivial example, if the Tailored Response
for 1.2.0/20 is A but there is one exception of 1.2.3/24 for B, then
the Authoritative Nameserver would need to provide Tailored Responses
for 1.2.0/23, 1.2.2/24, 1.2.4/22, and 1.2.8/21 all pointing to A, and
1.2.3/24 to B.
7.2.2. Intermediate Nameserver
When an Intermediate Nameserver uses ECS, whether it passes an ECS
option in its own response to its client is predicated on whether the
client originally included the option. Because a client that did not
use an ECS option might not be able to understand it, the server MUST
NOT provide one in its response. If the client query did include the
option, the server MUST include one in its response, especially as it
could be talking to a Forwarding Resolver which would need the
information for its own caching.
If an Intermediate Nameserver receives a response which has a longer
SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH than the SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH that it provided in
its query, it SHOULD still provide the result as the answer to the
triggering client request even if the client is in a different
address range. The Intermediate Nameserver MAY instead opt to retry
with a longer SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH to get a better reply before
responding to its client, as long as it does not exceed a SOURCE
PREFIX-LENGTH specified in the query that triggered resolution, but
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this obviously has implications for the latency of the overall
lookup.
The logic for using the cache to determine whether the Intermediate
Nameserver already knows the response to provide to its client is
covered in the next section.
7.3. Handling ECS Responses and Caching
When an Intermediate Nameserver receives a response containing an ECS
option and without the TC bit set, it SHOULD cache the result based
on the data in the option. If the TC bit was set, the Intermediate
Resolver SHOULD retry the query over TCP to get the complete answer
section for caching.
If the FAMILY, SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH, and SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH bits of
ADDRESS in the response don't match the non-zero fields in the
corresponding query, the full response MUST be dropped, as described
in Section 11. In a response to a query which specified only the
SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH for privacy masking, the FAMILY and ADDRESS
fields MUST contain the appropriate non-zero information that the
Authoritative Nameserver used to generate the answer, so that it can
be cached accordingly.
If no ECS option is contained in the response, the Intermediate
Nameserver SHOULD treat this as being equivalent to having received a
SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH of 0, which is an answer suitable for all client
addresses. See further discussion on the security implications of
this in Section 11.
If a REFUSED response is received from an Authoritative Nameserver,
an ECS-aware resolver MUST retry the query without ECS to distinguish
the response from one where the Authoritative Nameserver is not
responsible for the name, which is a common convention for the
REFUSED status. Similarly, a client of a Recursive Resolver SHOULD
retry for REFUSED because it is not sufficiently clear whether the
REFUSED was because of the ECS option or some other reason.
7.3.1. Caching the Response
In the cache, all resource records in the answer section MUST be to
the network specified in the response. The appropriate prefix length
depends on the relationship between SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH, SCOPE
PREFIX-LENGTH, and the maximum cacheable prefix length configured for
the cache.
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If SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH is not longer than SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH store
SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH bits of ADDRESS and mark the response as valid
for all addresses that fall within that range.
Similarly, if SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH is the maximum configured for the
cache, store SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH bits of ADDRESS and mark the
response as valid for all addresses that fall within that range.
If SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH is shorter than the configured maximum and
SCOPE PREFiX-LENGTH is longer than SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH, store SOURCE
PREFIX-LENGTH bits of ADDRESS and mark the response as only valid to
answer client queries that specify exactly the same SOURCE PREFIX-
LENGTH in their own ECS option.
DNSKEY and DS records are the one exception to the above rules for
records in the answer section. These records SHOULD always be cached
at /0. See Section 9 for more.
Note that the additional and authority sections from a DNS response
message are specifically excluded here. Any records from these
sections MUST NOT be tied to a network. See more at Section 7.4.
Records that are cached as /0 because of a query's SOURCE PREFIX-
LENGTH of 0 MUST be distinguished from those that are cached as /0
because of a response's SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH of 0. The former should
only be used for other /0 queries that the Intermediate Resolver
receives, but the latter is suitable as a response for all networks.
Although omitting network-specific caching will significantly
simplify an implementation, the resulting drop in cache hits is very
likely to defeat most latency benefits provided by ECS. Therefore,
implementing full caching support as described in this section is
strongly RECOMMENDED.
Enabling support for ECS in an Intermediate Nameserver will
significantly increase the size of the cache, reduce the number of
results that can be served from cache, and increase the load on the
server. Implementing the mitigation techniques described in
Section 11 is strongly recommended. For cache size issues,
implementers should consider data storage formats that allow the same
answer data to be shared among multiple prefixes.
7.3.2. Answering from Cache
Cache lookups are first done as usual for a DNS query, using the
query tuple of <name, type, class>. Then the appropriate RRset MUST
be chosen based on longest prefix matching. The client address to
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use for comparison will depend on whether the Intermediate Nameserver
received an ECS option in its client query.
o If no ECS option was provided, the client's address is used.
o If there was an ECS option specifying SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH but no
ADDRESS, the client's address is used but SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH is
initially ignored. If no covering entry is found and SOURCE
PREFIX-LENGTH is shorter than the configured maximum length
allowed for the cache, repeat the cache lookup for an entry that
exactly matches SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH. These special entries,
which do not cover longer prefix lengths, occur as described in
the previous section.
o If there was an ECS option with an ADDRESS, the ADDRESS from it
MAY be used if local policy allows. Policy can vary depending on
the agreements the operator of the Intermediate Nameserver has
with Authoritative Nameserver operators; see Section 12.2. If
policy does not allow, a REFUSED response SHOULD be sent. See
Section 7.5 for more.
If a matching network is found and the relevant data is unexpired,
the response is generated as per Section 7.2.
If no matching network is found, the Intermediate Nameserver MUST
perform resolution as usual. This is necessary to avoid Tailored
Responses in the cache from being returned to the wrong clients, and
to avoid a single query coming from a client on a different network
from polluting the cache with a Tailored Response for all the users
of that resolver.
7.4. Delegations and Negative Answers
The prohibition against tying ECS data to records from the Authority
and Additional section left an unfortunate ambiguity in the original
specification, primarily with regard to negative answers. The
expectation of the original authors was that ECS would only really be
used for address requests and the positive result in the response's
answer section, the use case that was driving the definition of the
protocol.
For negative answers, some independent implementations of both
resolvers and authorities did not see the section restriction as
necessarily meaning that a given name and type must only have either
positive ECS-tagged answers or a negative answer. They support being
able to tell one part of the network that the data does not exist,
while telling another part of the network that it does.
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Several other implementations, however, do not support being able to
mix positive and negative answers, and thus interoperability is a
problem. It is recommended that no specific behavior regarding
negative answers be relied upon.
This issue is expected to be revisited in a future revision of the
protocol, possibly blessing the mixing of positive and negative
answers. There are implications for cache data structures that
developers should consider when writing new ECS code.
The delegations case is a bit easier to tease out. In operational
practice, if an authoritative server is using address information to
provide customized delegations, it is the resolver that will be using
the answer for its next iterative query. Addresses in the Additional
section SHOULD therefore ignore ECS data, and the Authoritative
Nameserver SHOULD return a zero SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH on delegations.
A recursive resolver SHOULD treat a non-zero SCOPE PREFIX LENGTH in a
delegation as though it were zero.
7.5. Transitivity
Generally, ECS options will only be present in DNS messages between a
Recursive Resolver and an Authoritative Nameserver, i.e., one hop.
In certain configurations however, for example multi-tier nameserver
setups, it may be necessary to implement transitive behavior on
Intermediate Nameservers.
Any Intermediate Nameserver that forwards ECS options received from
its clients MUST fully implement the caching behavior described in
Section 7.3.
An Intermediate Nameserver MAY forward ECS options with address
information. This information MAY match the source IP address of the
incoming query, and MAY have more or fewer address bits than the
Nameserver would normally include in a locally originated ECS option.
If an Intermediate Nameserver receives a query with SOURCE PREFIX-
LENGTH set to 0 it MUST forward the query as-is and MUST NOT replace
it with more accurate address information.
If for any reason the Intermediate Nameserver does not want to use
the information in an ECS option it receives (too little address
information, network address from a range not authorized to use the
server, private/unroutable address space, etc), it SHOULD drop the
query and return a REFUSED response. Note again that a query MUST
NOT be refused solely because it provides 0 address bits.
Be aware that at least one major existing implementation does not
return REFUSED and instead just processes the query as though the
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problematic information were not present. This can lead to anomalous
situations, such as a response from the Intermediate Nameserver that
indicates it is tailored for one network (the one passed in the
original query, since ADDRESS must match) when actually it is for
another network (the one which contains the address that the
Intermediate Nameserver saw as making the query).
8. IANA Considerations
IANA has already assigned option code 8 in the "DNS EDNS0 Option
Codes (OPT)" registry to ECS.
The IANA is requested to update the reference ("draft-vandergaast-
edns-client-subnet") to refer to this RFC when published.
9. DNSSEC Considerations
The presence or absence of an [RFC6891] EDNS0 OPT resource record
containing an ECS option in a DNS query does not change the usage of
the resource records and mechanisms used to provide data origin
authentication and data integrity to the DNS, as described in
[RFC4033], [RFC4034] and [RFC4035]. OPT records are not signed.
Use of this option, however, does imply increased DNS traffic between
any given Recursive Resolver and Authoritative Nameserver, which
could be another barrier to further DNSSEC adoption in this area.
It is expected that in a signed zone using ECS all signatures will
use the same DNSKEY record independent of the Tailored Response that
should be cached per network. Trying to establish a network-specific
chain of trust from a non-ECS-enabled zone into an ECS-enabled zone,
which tecnically feasbile, has no apparent benefits. Therefore,
while RRSIGs are obviously tied to the same network as the Tailored
Response that they cover, DNSKEY and DS records SHOULD be invariant
for all clients.
NSEC and NSEC3 are explicitly not addressed in this specification per
the discussion about negative answers in Section 7.4.
10. NAT Considerations
Special awareness of ECS in devices that perform Network Address
Translation (NAT) as described in [RFC2663] is not required; queries
can be passed through as-is. The client's network address SHOULD NOT
be added, and existing ECS options, if present, SHOULD NOT be
modified by NAT devices.
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In large-scale global networks behind a NAT device (but for example
with Centralized Resolver infrastructure), an internal Intermediate
Nameserver might have detailed network layout information, and may
know which external subnets are used for egress traffic by each
internal network. In such cases, the Intermediate Nameserver MAY use
that information when originating ECS options.
In other cases, if a Recursive Resolver knows it is sited behind a
NAT device, it SHOULD NOT originate ECS options with their external
IP address, and instead rely on downstream Intermediate Nameservers
to do so. It MAY, however, choose to include the option with their
internal address for the purposes of signaling its own limit for
SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH.
Full treatment of special network addresses is beyond the scope of
this document; handling them will likely differ according to the
operational environments of each service provider. As a general
guideline, if an Authoritative Nameserver on the publicly routed
Internet receives a query that specifies an ADDRESS in [RFC1918] or
[RFC4193] private address space, it SHOULD ignore ADDRESS and look up
its answer based on the address of the Recursive Resolver. In the
response it SHOULD set SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH to cover all of the
relevant private space. For example, a query for ADDRESS 10.1.2.0
with a SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH of 24 would get a returned SCOPE PREFIX-
LENGTH of 8. The Intermediate Nameserver MAY elect to cache the
answer under one entry for special-purpose addresses [RFC6890]; see
Section 11.3.
11. Security Considerations
11.1. Privacy
With the ECS option, the network address of the client that initiated
the resolution becomes visible to all servers involved in the
resolution process. Additionally, it will be visible from any
network traversed by the DNS packets.
To protect users' privacy, Recursive Resolvers are strongly
encouraged to conceal part of the IP address of the user by
truncating IPv4 addresses to 24 bits. 56 bits are recommended for
IPv6, based on [RFC6177].
ISPs should have more detailed knowledge of their own networks. That
is, they might know that all 24-bit prefixes in a /20 are in the same
area. In those cases, for optimal cache utilization and improved
privacy, the ISP's Recursive Resolver SHOULD truncate IP addresses in
this /20 to just 20 bits, instead of 24 as recommended above.
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Users who wish their full IP address to be hidden need to configure
their client software, if possible, to include an ECS option
specifying the wildcard address (i.e. SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH of 0).
As described in previous sections, this option will be forwarded
across all the Recursive Resolvers supporting ECS, which MUST NOT
modify it to include the network address of the client.
Note that even without an ECS option, any server queried directly by
the user will be able to see the full client IP address. Recursive
Resolvers or Authoritative Nameservers MAY use the source IP address
of queries to return a cached entry or to generate a Tailored
Response that best matches the query.
11.2. Birthday Attacks
ECS adds information to the DNS query tupe (q-tuple). This allows an
attacker to send a caching Intermediate Nameserver multiple queries
with spoofed IP addresses either in the ECS option or as the source
IP. These queries will trigger multiple outgoing queries with the
same name, type and class, just different address information in the
ECS option.
With multiple queries for the same name in flight, the attacker has a
higher chance of success to send a matching response with the SCOPE
PREFIX-LENGTH set to 0 to get it cached for all hosts.
To counter this, the ECS option in a response packet MUST contain the
full FAMILY, ADDRESS and SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH fields from the
corresponding query. Intermediate Nameservers processing a response
MUST verify that these match, and SHOULD discard the entire response
if they do not.
That requirement to discard is "SHOULD" instead of "MUST" because it
stands in opposition to the instruction in Section 7.3 which states
that a response lacking an ECS option should be treated as though it
had one of SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH of 0. If that is always true, then an
attacker does not need to worry about matching the original ECS
option data and just needs to flood back responses that have no ECS
option at all.
This type of attack could be detected in ongoing operations by
marking whether the responding nameserver had previously been sending
ECS option, and/or by taking note of an incoming flood of bogus
responses and flagging the relevant query for re-resolution. This is
more complex than existing nameserver responses to spoof floods, and
would also need to be sensitive to a nameserver legitimately stopping
ECS replies even though it had previously given them.
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11.3. Cache Pollution
It is simple for an arbitrary resolver or client to provide false
information in the ECS option, or to send UDP packets with forged
source IP addresses.
This could be used to:
o pollute the cache of intermediate resolvers, by filling it with
results that will rarely (if ever) be used.
o reverse engineer the algorithms (or data) used by the
Authoritative Nameserver to calculate Tailored Responses.
o mount a denial-of-service attack against an Intermediate
Nameserver, by forcing it to perform many more recursive queries
than it would normally do, due to how caching is handled for
queries containing the ECS option.
Even without malicious intent, Centralized Resolvers providing
answers to clients in multiple networks will need to cache different
responses for different networks, putting more memory pressure on the
cache.
To mitigate those problems:
o Recursive Resolvers implementing ECS should only enable it in
deployments where it is expected to bring clear advantages to the
end users, such as when expecting clients from a variety of
networks or from a wide geographical area. Due to the high cache
pressure introduced by ECS, the feature SHOULD be disabled in all
default configurations.
o Recursive Resolvers SHOULD limit the number of networks and
answers they keep in the cache for any given query.
o Recursive Resolvers SHOULD limit the number of total different
networks that they keep in cache.
o Recursive Resolvers MUST NOT send an ECS option with a SOURCE
PREFIX-LENGTH providing more bits in the ADDRESS than they are
willing to cache responses for.
o Recursive Resolvers should implement algorithms to improve the
cache hit rate, given the size constraints indicated above.
Recursive Resolvers MAY, for example, decide to discard more
specific cache entries first.
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o Authoritative Nameservers and Recursive Resolvers should discard
ECS options that are either obviously forged or otherwise known to
be wrong. They SHOULD at least treat unroutable addresses, such
as some of the address blocks defined in [RFC6890], as equivalent
to the Recursive Resolver's own identity. They SHOULD ignore and
never forward ECS options specifying other routable addresses that
are known not to be served by the query source.
o The ECS option is just a hint to Authoritative Nameservers for
customizing results. They can decide to ignore the content of the
ECS option based on black or white lists, rate limiting
mechanisms, or any other logic implemented in the software.
12. Sending the Option
When implementing a Recursive Resolver, there are two strategies on
deciding when to include an ECS option in a query. At this stage,
it's not clear which strategy is best.
12.1. Probing
A Recursive Resolver can send the ECS option with every outgoing
query. However, it is RECOMMENDED that Resolvers remember which
Authoritative Nameservers did not return the option with their
response, and omit client address information from subsequent queries
to those Nameservers.
Additionally, Recursive Resolvers SHOULD be configured to never send
the option when querying root, top-level, and effective top-level
(ie, ("public suffix") [Public_Suffix_List] domain servers. These
domains are delegation-centric and are very unlikely to generate
different responses based on the address of the client.
When probing, it is important that several things are probed: support
for ECS, support for EDNS0, support for EDNS0 options, or possibly an
unreachable Nameserver. Various implementations are known to drop
DNS packets with OPT RRs (with or without options), thus several
probes are required to discover what is supported.
Probing, if implemented, MUST be repeated periodically, e.g., daily.
If an Authoritative Nameserver indicates ECS support for one zone, it
is to be expected that the Nameserver supports ECS for all of its
zones. Likewise, an Authoritative Nameserver that uses ECS
information for one of its zones, MUST indicate support for the
option in all of its responses to ECS queries. If the option is
supported but not actually used for generating a response, its SCOPE
PREFIX-LENGTH MUST be set to 0.
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12.2. Whitelist
As described previously, it is expected that only a few Recursive
Resolvers will need to use ECS, and that it will generally be enabled
only if it offers a clear benefit to the users.
To avoid the complexity of implementing a probing and detection
mechanism (and the possible query loss/delay that may come with it),
an implementation could use a whitelist of Authoritative Nameservers
to send the option to, likely specified by their domain name.
Implementations MAY also allow additionally configuring this based on
other criteria, such as zone or query type. As of the time of this
writing, at least one implementation makes use of a whitelist.
An advantage of using a whitelist is that partial client address
information is only disclosed to Nameservers that are known to use
the information, improving privacy.
A drawback is scalability. The operator needs to track which
Authoritative Nameservers support ECS, making it harder for new
Authoritative Nameservers to start using the option.
Similarly, Authoritative Nameservers can also use whitelists to limit
the feature to only certain clients. For example, a CDN that does
not want all of their mapping trivially walked might require a legal
agreement with the Recursive Resolver operator, to clearly describe
the acceptable use of the feature.
The maintenance of access control mechanisms is out of scope for this
protocol definition.
13. Example
1. A stub resolver, SR, with IP address 192.0.2.37, tries to
resolve www.example.com by forwarding the query to the Recursive
Resolver, RNS, asking for recursion.
2. RNS, supporting ECS, looks up www.example.com in its cache. An
entry is found neither for www.example.com, nor for example.com.
3. RNS builds a query to send to the root and .com servers. The
implementation of RNS provides facilities so an administrator
can configure it not to forward ECS in certain cases. In
particular, RNS is configured to not include an ECS option when
talking to TLD or root nameservers, as described in Section 7.1.
Thus, no ECS option is added, and resolution is performed as
usual.
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4. RNS now knows the next server to query: the Authoritative
Nameserver, ANS, responsible for example.com.
5. RNS prepares a new query for www.example.com, including an ECS
option with:
* OPTION-CODE, set to 8.
* OPTION-LENGTH, set to 0x00 0x07 for the following fixed 4
octets plus the 3 octets that will be used for ADDRESS.
* FAMILY, set to 0x00 0x01 as IP is an IPv4 address.
* SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH, set to 0x18, as RNS is configured to
conceal the last 8 bits of every IPv4 address.
* SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH, set to 0x00, as specified by this
document for all queries.
* ADDRESS, set to 0xC0 0x00 0x02, providing only the first 24
bits of the IPv4 address.
6. The query is sent. ANS understands and uses ECS. It parses the
ECS option, and generates a Tailored Response.
7. Due its internal implementation, ANS finds a response that is
tailored for the whole /16 of the client that performed the
query.
8. ANS adds an ECS option in the response, containing:
* OPTION-CODE, set to 8.
* OPTION-LENGTH, set to 0x00 0x07.
* FAMILY, set to 0x00 0x01.
* SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH, set to 0x18, copied from the query.
* SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH, set to 0x10, indicating a /16 network.
* ADDRESS, set to 0xC0 0x00 0x02, copied from the query.
9. RNS receives the response containing an ECS option. It verifies
that FAMILY, SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH, and ADDRESS match the query.
If not, the message is discarded.
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10. The response is interpreted as usual. Since the response
contains an ECS option, the ADDRESS, SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH, and
FAMILY in the response are used to cache the entry.
11. RNS sends a response to stub resolver SR, without including an
ECS option.
12. RNS receives another query to resolve www.example.com. This
time, a response is cached. The response, however, is tied to a
particular network. If the address of the client matches any
network in the cache, then the response is returned from the
cache. Otherwise, another query is performed. If multiple
results match, the one with the longest SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH is
chosen, as per common best-network match algorithms.
14. Contributing Authors
The below individuals contributed significantly to the document. The
RFC Editor prefers a maximum of 5 names on the front page, and so we
have listed additional authors in this section
Edward Lewis
ICANN
12025 Waterfront Drive, Suite 300
Los Angeles CA 90094-2536
USA
Email: edward.lewis@icann.org
Sean Leach
Fastly
POBox 78266
San Francisco CA 94107
Jason Moreau
Akamai Technologies
8 Cambridge Ctr
Cambridge MA 02142-1413
USA
15. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Darryl Rodden for his work as a co-author
on previous versions, and the following people for reviewing early
drafts of this document and for providing useful feedback: Paul S.
R. Chisholm, B. Narendran, Leonidas Kontothanassis, David Presotto,
Philip Rowlands, Chris Morrow, Kara Moscoe, Alex Nizhner, Warren
Kumari, and Richard Rabbat from Google; Terry Farmer, Mark Teodoro,
Edward Lewis, and Eric Burger from Neustar; David Ulevitch and
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Matthew Dempsky from OpenDNS; Patrick W. Gilmore and Steve Hill from
Akamai; Colm MacCarthaigh and Richard Sheehan from Amazon; Tatuya
Jinmei from Infoblox; Andrew Sullivan from Dyn; John Dickinson from
Sinodun; Mark Delany from Apple; Yuri Schaeffer from NLnet Labs;
Duane Wessels from from Verisign; Antonio Querubin; Daniel Kahn
Gillmor from the ACLU; Evan Hunt and Mukund Sivaraman from the
Internet Software Consortium; Russ Housley from Vigilsec; Stephen
Farrell from Trinity College Dublin; Alissa Cooper from Cisco;
Suzanne Woolf; and all of the other people that replied to our emails
on various mailing lists.
16. References
16.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC1700] Reynolds, J. and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", RFC 1700,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1700, October 1994,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1700>.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.
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[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC6177] Narten, T., Huston, G., and L. Roberts, "IPv6 Address
Assignment to End Sites", BCP 157, RFC 6177, DOI 10.17487/
RFC6177, March 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6177>.
[RFC6890] Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., Bonica, R., Ed., and B. Haberman,
"Special-Purpose IP Address Registries", BCP 153, RFC
6890, DOI 10.17487/RFC6890, April 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6890>.
[RFC6891] Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms
for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891, DOI 10.17487/
RFC6891, April 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891>.
16.2. Informative References
[Address_Family_Numbers]
"Address Family Numbers",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers/
address-family-numbers.xhtml>.
[DPRIVE_Working_Group]
"DPRIVE Working Group",
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dprive/charter/>.
[I-D.hardie-privsec-metadata-insertion]
Hardie, T., "Design considerations for Metadata
Insertion", draft-hardie-privsec-metadata-insertion-02
(work in progress), March 2016.
[I-D.vandergaast-edns-client-subnet]
Contavalli, C., Gaast, W., Leach, S., and E. Lewis,
"Client Subnet in DNS Requests", draft-vandergaast-edns-
client-subnet-02 (work in progress), July 2013.
[Public_Suffix_List]
"Public Suffix List", <https://publicsuffix.org/>.
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Internet-Draft Client Subnet in DNS Queries March 2016
[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.
[RFC2663] Srisuresh, P. and M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address
Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations", RFC
2663, DOI 10.17487/RFC2663, August 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2663>.
[RFC7719] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", RFC 7719, DOI 10.17487/RFC7719, December
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7719>.
Appendix A. Document History
[RFC Editor: Please delete this section before publication.]
-06 to -07:
o Minor comments from Suzanne, Mukund, Jinmei and from the IESG on
the dnsop list.
o Incorporated feedback from conference call with Mukund and Evan,
notably clarifying what prefix length to associate with answers in
the cache, how and why to deaggregate, and some DNSSEC stuff.
-05 to -06:
o Integrated David Lawrence comments.
o Ran spellcheck again. One ady I';; laern to tyoe/
-04 to -05:
o Moved comment about retrying for REFUSED to section on "Handling
ECS Responses". (Jinmei)
o Clarify that a new proposal for an improved ECS protool is
expected.
o "Forwarders" had been used as though they were the source of a
forwarded query rather than the targeted of one; clarified and
defined as "Forwarding Resolver". (Jinmei)
o "representing the leftmost significant bits" => "representing the
leftmost number of significant bits". (Jinmei)
o Minor other clarifying text. (Jinmei)
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o Jinmei's affiliation.
o Minor wording clarifications. (David Kahn Gillmor)
o Russ Housely's GenART review.
-03 to -04:
o Privacy note per Ted Hardie's suggestion.
o MUST use minimum octet length to cover PREFIX bits.
o Expose note about documenting deployed, if flawed, protocol.
-02 to -03:
o Some cleanup of the whitelist text.
-01 to -02 (IETF)
o Clean up the open issues, mostly by saying that they were out of
scope for this document.
o How in the world did no reviewers note that "Queries" had been
spelled as "Querys" in the title? (Aaron Falk did.)
-00 to -01 (IETF)
o Note ambiguity with multiple RRsets appearing in reply, eg, for an
ANY query or CNAME chain. (Duane Wessels)
o Open issue questioning the guidance about resolvers behind a NAT.
How do they know they are? What real requirement is this
imposing? (Duane Wessels)
o Some other wording changes based on Duane's review of an earlier
draft.
-IND to -00 (IETF)
o <David> Made the document describe how things are actually
implmented now. This makes the document be more of a "this is how
we are doing things, this provides information on that". There
may be a future document that describes additional funcationality.
o NETMASK was not a good desription, changed to PREFIX-LENGTH
(Jinmei, others). Stole most of the definition for prefix length
from RFC4291.
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o Fixed the "SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH set to 0" definition to include
IPv6 (Tatuya Jinmei)
o Comment that ECS cannot be used to hand NXDOMAIN to some clients
and not others, primarily because of interoperability issues.
(Tatuya Jinmei)
o Added text explaining that implmentations need to document thier
behavior with overlapping networks.
o Soften "optimized reply" language. (Andrew Sullivan).
o Fixed some of legacy IPv4 cruft (things like 0.0.0.0/0)
o Some more grammar / working cleanups.
o Replaced a whole heap of occurances of "edns-client-subnet" with
"ECS" for readability. (John Dickinson)
o More clearly describe the process from the point of view of each
type of nameserver. (John Dickinson)
o Birthday attack still possible if attacker floods with ECS-less
responses. (Yuri Schaeffer)
o Added some open issues directly to the text.
A.1. -00
o Document moved to experimental track, added experiment description
in header with details in a new section.
o Specifically note that ECS applies to the answer section only.
o Warn that caching based on ECS is optional but very important for
performance reasons.
o Updated NAT section.
o Added recommendation to not use the default /24 recommendation for
the source prefix-length field if more detailed information about
the network is available.
o Rewritten problem statement to be more clear about the goal of ECS
and the fact that it's entirely optional.
o Wire format changed to include the original address and prefix
length in responses in defence against birthday attacks.
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o Security considerations now includes a section about birthday
attacks.
o Renamed edns-client-ip in ECS, following suggestions on the
mailing list.
o Clarified behavior of resolvers when presented with an invalid ECS
option.
o Fully take multi-tier DNS setups in mind and be more clear about
where the option should be originated.
o A note on Authoritative Nameservers receiving queries that specify
private address space.
o A note to always ask for the longest acceptable SOURCE prefix
length, even if a prior answer indicated that a shorter prefix
length was suitable.
o Marked up a few more references.
o Added a few definitions in the Terminology section, and a few more
aesthetic changes in the rest of the document.
A.2. -01
o Document version number reset from -02 to -00 due to the rename of
base document.
o Clarified example (dealing with TLDs, and various minor errors).
o Referencing RFC5035 instead of RFC1918.
o Added a section on probing (and how it should be done) vs.
whitelisting.
o Moved description on how to forward ECS option in dedicated
section.
o Queries with wrongly formatted ECS options should now be rejected
with FORMERR.
o Added an "Overview" section, providing an introduction to the
document.
o Intermediate Nameservers can now remove an ECS option, or reduce
the SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH to increase privacy.
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o Added a reference to DoS attacks in the Security section.
o Don't use "network range", as it seems to have different meaning
in other contexts, and turned out to be confusing.
o Use shorter and longer prefix lengths, rather than higher or
lower. Add a better explanation in the format section.
o Minor corrections in various other sections.
A.3. -02
o Added IANA-assigned option code.
Authors' Addresses
Carlo Contavalli
Google
1600 Amphitheater Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
US
Email: ccontavalli@google.com
Wilmer van der Gaast
Google
Belgrave House, 76 Buckingham Palace Road
London SW1W 9TQ
UK
Email: wilmer@google.com
David C Lawrence
Akamai Technologies
8 Cambridge Center
Cambridge, MA 02142
US
Email: tale@akamai.com
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Warren Kumari
Google
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
US
Email: warren@kumari.net
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