The EDNS Key Tag Option
draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-key-tag-01

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dnsop WG)
Last updated 2016-06-30 (latest revision 2016-03-09)
Replaces draft-wessels-edns-key-tag
Stream IETF
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Internet Engineering Task Force                               D. Wessels
Internet-Draft                                                  Verisign
Intended status: Standards Track                               W. Kumari
Expires: September 10, 2016                                       Google
                                                           March 9, 2016

                        The EDNS Key Tag Option
                    draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-key-tag-01

Abstract

   The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin
   authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital
   signatures.  These digital signatures can be verified by building a
   chain-of-trust starting from a trust anchor and proceeding down to a
   particular node in the DNS.  This document specifies a way for
   validating end-system resolvers to signal to a server which keys are
   referenced in their chain-of-trust.  The extensions allow zone
   administrators to monitor the progress of rollovers in a DNSSEC-
   signed zone.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Option Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  Use By Queriers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     5.1.  Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       5.1.1.  Validating Stub Resolvers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       5.1.2.  Non-validating Stub Resolvers  . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.2.  Recursive Resolvers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       5.2.1.  Validating Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       5.2.2.  Non-validating Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Use By Responders  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   9.  Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   10. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Appendix A.  Changes / Author Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

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1.  Introduction

   The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], [RFC4034] and
   [RFC4035] were developed to provide origin authentication and
   integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures.
   DNSSEC uses Key Tags to efficiently match signatures to the keys from
   which they are generated.  The Key Tag is a 16-bit value computed
   from the RDATA portion of a DNSKEY RR using a formula not unlike a
   ones-complement checksum.  RRSIG RRs contain a Key Tag field whose
   value is equal to the Key Tag of the DNSKEY RR that validates the
   signature.

   Likewise, Delegation Signer (DS) RRs also contain a Key Tag field
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