A Sentinel for Detecting Trusted Keys in DNSSEC
draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel-00
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DNSOP G. Huston
Internet-Draft J. Damas
Intended status: Standards Track APNIC
Expires: June 14, 2018 W. Kumari
Google
December 11, 2017
A Sentinel for Detecting Trusted Keys in DNSSEC
draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel-00.txt
Abstract
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin
authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital
signatures. These digital signatures can be verified by building a
chain of trust starting from a trust anchor and proceeding down to a
particular node in the DNS. This document specifies a mechanism that
will allow an end user to determine the trusted key state of the
resolvers that handle the user's DNS queries.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 14, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
Huston, et al. Expires June 14, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft DNSSEC Trusted Key Sentinel December 2017
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Sentinel Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Sentinel Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Sentinel Test Result Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], [RFC4034] and
[RFC4035] were developed to provide origin authentication and
integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures.
DNSSEC uses Key Tags to efficiently match signatures to the keys from
which they are generated. The Key Tag is a 16-bit value computed
from the RDATA portion of a DNSKEY RR using a formula not unlike a
ones-complement checksum. RRSIG RRs contain a Key Tag field whose
value is equal to the Key Tag of the DNSKEY RR that validates the
signature.
This document specifies how validating resolvers can respond to
certain queries in a manner that allows a querier to deduce whether a
particular key has been loaded into that resolver's trusted key
store. In particular, this response mechanism can be used to
determine whether a certain Root Zone KSK is ready to be used as a
trusted key within the context of a key roll by this resolver.
This new mechanism is OPTIONAL to implement and use, although for
reasons of supporting broad-based measurement techniques, it is
strongly preferred if configurations of DNSSEC-validating resolvers
enabled this mechanism by default, allowing for local configuration
directives to disable this mechanism if desired.
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1.1. Terminology
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