Multi Signer DNSSEC models
draft-ietf-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec-04

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dnsop WG)
Authors Shumon Huque  , Pallavi Aras  , John Dickinson  , Jan Včelák  , David Blacka 
Last updated 2020-04-09 (latest revision 2020-03-08)
Replaces draft-huque-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Informational
Formats pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex
Reviews
Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Benno Overeinder
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2019-12-24)
IESG IESG state Approved-announcement to be sent
Consensus Boilerplate Yes
Telechat date
Responsible AD Warren Kumari
Send notices to Benno Overeinder <benno@NLnetLabs.nl>
IANA IANA review state IANA OK - No Actions Needed
Internet Engineering Task Force                                 S. Huque
Internet-Draft                                                   P. Aras
Intended status: Informational                                Salesforce
Expires: September 9, 2020                                  J. Dickinson
                                                                 Sinodun
                                                               J. Vcelak
                                                                     NS1
                                                               D. Blacka
                                                                Verisign
                                                           March 8, 2020

                       Multi Signer DNSSEC models
               draft-ietf-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec-04

Abstract

   Many enterprises today employ the service of multiple DNS providers
   to distribute their authoritative DNS service.  Deploying DNSSEC in
   such an environment may present some challenges depending on the
   configuration and feature set in use.  In particular, when each DNS
   provider independently signs zone data with their own keys,
   additional key management mechanisms are necessitated.  This document
   presents deployment models that accommodate this scenario and
   describe these key management requirements.  These models do not
   require any changes to the behavior of validating resolvers, nor do
   they impose the new key management requirements on authoritative
   servers not involved in multi signer configurations.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2020.

Huque, et al.           Expires September 9, 2020               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         Multi Signer DNSSEC models             March 2020

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Deployment Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Multiple Signer models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       2.1.1.  Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider  . . . .   4
       2.1.2.  Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider  . . . . . .   4
   3.  Validating Resolver Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Signing Algorithm Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Authenticated Denial Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Single Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Mixing Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Key Rollover Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider  . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider  . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Using Combined Signing Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Use of CDS and CDNSKEY  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  Key Management Mechanism Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   10. DNS Response Size Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction and Motivation

   RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLISHING:
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