Interoperable Domain Name System (DNS) Server Cookies
draft-ietf-dnsop-server-cookies-02
DNSOP Working Group O. Sury
Internet-Draft Internet Systems Consortium
Updates: 7873 (if approved) W. Toorop
Intended status: Standards Track NLnet Labs
Expires: May 21, 2020 D. Eastlake 3rd
Futurewei Technologies
M. Andrews
Internet Systems Consortium
November 18, 2019
Interoperable Domain Name System (DNS) Server Cookies
draft-ietf-dnsop-server-cookies-02
Abstract
DNS cookies, as specified in RFC 7873, are a lightweight DNS
transaction security mechanism that provides limited protection to
DNS servers and clients against a variety of denial-of-service and
amplification, forgery, or cache poisoning attacks by off-path
attackers.
This document provides precise directions for creating Server Cookies
so that an anycast server set including diverse implementations will
interoperate with standard clients.
This document updates [RFC7873]
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 21, 2020.
Sury, et al. Expires May 21, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft server-cookies November 2019
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Contents of this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Changes to [RFC7873] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Constructing a Client Cookie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Constructing a Server Cookie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. The Version Sub-Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. The Reserved Sub-Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. The Timestamp Sub-Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. The Hash Sub-Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Updating the Server Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Cookie Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix B. Test vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B.1. Learning a new Server Cookie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B.2. The same client learning a renewed (fresh) Server Cookie 12
B.3. Another client learning a renewed Server Cookie . . . . . 13
B.4. IPv6 query with rolled over secret . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
DNS cookies, as specified in [RFC7873], are a lightweight DNS
transaction security mechanism that provides limited protection to
DNS servers and clients against a variety of denial-of-service and
amplification, forgery, or cache poisoning attacks by off-path
Sury, et al. Expires May 21, 2020 [Page 2]
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