Storage of DiffieHellman Keys in the Domain Name System (DNS)
draftietfdnssecdhk03
The information below is for an old version of the document that is already published as an RFC.
Document  Type 
This is an older version of an InternetDraft that was ultimately published as RFC 2539.



Author  Donald E. Eastlake 3rd  
Last updated  20130302 (Latest revision 19981124)  
RFC stream  Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)  
Intended RFC status  Proposed Standard  
Formats  
Additional resources  Mailing list discussion  
Stream  WG state  (None)  
Document shepherd  (None)  
IESG  IESG state  Became RFC 2539 (Proposed Standard)  
Consensus boilerplate  Unknown  
Telechat date  (None)  
Responsible AD  (None)  
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draftietfdnssecdhk03
INTERNETDRAFT DiffieHellman Keys in the DNS November 1998 Expires May 1999 Storage of DiffieHellman Keys in the Domain Name System (DNS)           Donald E. Eastlake 3rd Status of This Document This draft, file name draftietfdnssecdhk03.txt, is intended to be become a Proposed Standard RFC. Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent to the DNS security mailing list <dnssecurity@tis.com> or to the author. This document is an InternetDraft. InternetDrafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as InternetDrafts. InternetDrafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months. InternetDrafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is not appropriate to use Internet Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as a ``working draft'' or ``work in progress.'' To view the entire list of current InternetDrafts, please check the "1idabstracts.txt" listing contained in the InternetDrafts Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Northern Europe), ftp.nis.garr.it (Southern Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). [Changes from previous draft: add IANA considerations section, update author info, update file name and dates, add specific well known groups] Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 1] INTERNETDRAFT DiffieHellman Keys in the DNS Abstract A standard method for storing DiffieHellman keys in the Domain Name System is described which utilizes DNS KEY resource records. Acknowledgements Part of the format for DiffieHellman keys and the description thereof was taken from an Internet draft by: Ashar Aziz <ashar.aziz@eng.sun.com> Tom Markson <markson@incog.com> Hemma Prafullchandra <hemma@eng.sun.com> In addition, the following person provided useful comments that have been incorporated: Ran Atkinson <rja@inet.org> Thomas Narten <narten@raleigh.ibm.com> Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 2] INTERNETDRAFT DiffieHellman Keys in the DNS Table of Contents Status of This Document....................................1 Abstract...................................................2 Acknowledgements...........................................2 Table of Contents..........................................3 1. Introduction............................................4 1.1 About This Document....................................4 1.2 About DiffieHellman...................................4 2. DiffieHellman KEY Resource Records.....................5 3. Performance Considerations..............................6 4. IANA Considerations.....................................6 5. Security Considerations.................................6 References.................................................7 Author's Address...........................................7 Expiration and File Name...................................7 Appendix A: Well known prime/generator pairs...............8 A.1. WellKnown Group 1: A 768 bit prime..................8 A.2. WellKnown Group 2: A 1024 bit prime.................8 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 3] INTERNETDRAFT DiffieHellman Keys in the DNS 1. Introduction The Domain Name System (DNS) is the current global hierarchical replicated distributed database system for Internet addressing, mail proxy, and similar information. The DNS has been extended to include digital signatures and cryptographic keys as described in [draft ietfdnssecsecext2*.txt]. Thus the DNS can now be used for secure key distribution. 1.1 About This Document This document describes how to store DiffieHellman keys in the DNS. Familiarity with the DiffieHellman key exchange algorithm is assumed [Schneier]. 1.2 About DiffieHellman DiffieHellman requires two parties to interact to derive keying information which can then be used for authentication. Since DNS SIG RRs are primarily used as stored authenticators of zone information for many different resolvers, no DiffieHellman algorithm SIG RR is defined. For example, assume that two parties have local secrets "i" and "j". Assume they each respectively calculate X and Y as follows: X = g**i ( mod p ) Y = g**j ( mod p ) They exchange these quantities and then each calculates a Z as follows: Zi = Y**i ( mod p ) Zj = X**j ( mod p ) Zi and Zj will both be equal to g**(ij)(mod p) and will be a shared secret between the two parties that an adversary who does not know i or j will not be able to learn from the exchanged messages (unless the adversary can derive i or j by performing a discrete logarithm mod p which is hard for strong p and g). The private key for each party is their secret i (or j). The public key is the pair p and g, which must be the same for the parties, and their individual X (or Y). Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 4] INTERNETDRAFT DiffieHellman Keys in the DNS 2. DiffieHellman KEY Resource Records DiffieHellman keys are stored in the DNS as KEY RRs using algorithm number 2. The structure of the RDATA portion of this RR is as shown below. The first 4 octets, including the flags, protocol, and algorithm fields are common to all KEY RRs as described in [draft ietfdnssecsecext2*.txt]. The remainder, from prime length through public value is the "public key" part of the KEY RR. The period of key validity is not in the KEY RR but is indicated by the SIG RR(s) which signs and authenticates the KEY RR(s) at that domain name. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++  KEY flags  protocol  algorithm=2  +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++  prime length (or flag)  prime (p) (or special) / +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ / prime (p) (variable length)  generator length  +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++  generator (g) (variable length)  +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++  public value length  public value (variable length)/ +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ / public value (g^i mod p) (variable length)  +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Prime length is length of the DiffieHellman prime (p) in bytes if it is 16 or greater. Prime contains the binary representation of the DiffieHellman prime with most significant byte first (i.e., in network order). If "prime length" field is 1 or 2, then the "prime" field is actually an unsigned index into a table of 65,536 prime/generator pairs and the generator length SHOULD be zero. See Appedix A for defined table entries and Section 4 for information on allocating additional table entries. The meaning of a zero or 3 through 15 value for "prime length" is reserved. Generator length is the length of the generator (g) in bytes. Generator is the binary representation of generator with most significant byte first. PublicValueLen is the Length of the Public Value (g**i (mod p)) in bytes. PublicValue is the binary representation of the DH public value with most significant byte first. The corresponding algorithm=2 SIG resource record is not used so no format for it is defined. Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 5] INTERNETDRAFT DiffieHellman Keys in the DNS 3. Performance Considerations Current DNS implementations are optimized for small transfers, typically less than 512 bytes including overhead. While larger transfers will perform correctly and work is underway to make larger transfers more efficient, it is still advisable to make reasonable efforts to minimize the size of KEY RR sets stored within the DNS consistent with adequate security. Keep in mind that in a secure zone, an authenticating SIG RR will also be returned. 4. IANA Considerations Assignment of meaning to Prime Lengths of 0 and 3 through 15 requires an IETF consensus. Well known prime/generator pairs number 0x0000 through 0x07FF can only be assigned by an IETF standards action and this Proposed Standard assigns 0x0001 through 0x0002. Pairs number 0s0800 through 0xBFFF can be assigned based on RFC documentation. Pairs number 0xC000 through 0xFFFF are available for private use and are not centrally coordinated. Use of such private pairs outside of a closed environment may result in conflicts. 5. Security Considerations Many of the general security consideration in [draftietfdnssec secext2*] apply. Keys retrieved from the DNS should not be trusted unless (1) they have been securely obtained from a secure resolver or independently verified by the user and (2) this secure resolver and secure obtainment or independent verification conform to security policies acceptable to the user. As with all cryptographic algorithms, evaluating the necessary strength of the key is important and dependent on local policy. In addition, the usual DiffieHellman key strength considerations apply. (p1)/2 should also be prime, g should be primitive mod p, p should be "large", etc. [Schneier] Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 6] INTERNETDRAFT DiffieHellman Keys in the DNS References [RFC 1034]  P. Mockapetris, "Domain names  concepts and facilities", 11/01/1987. [RFC 1035]  P. Mockapetris, "Domain names  implementation and specification", 11/01/1987. [draftietfdnssecsecext2*.txt]  Domain Name System Security Extensions, D. Eastlake. [Schneier]  Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C", 1996, John Wiley and Sons Author's Address Donald E. Eastlake 3rd IBM 318 Acton Street Carlisle, MA 01741 USA Telephone: +19782874877 +19147847913 FAX: +19783717148 EMail: dee3@us.ibm.com Expiration and File Name This draft expires in April 1999. Its file name is draftietfdnssecdhk03.txt. Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 7] INTERNETDRAFT DiffieHellman Keys in the DNS Appendix A: Well known prime/generator pairs These numbers are copied from the IPSEC effort where the derivation of these values is more fully explained and additional information is available. Richard Schroeppel performed all the mathematical and computational work for this appendix. A.1. WellKnown Group 1: A 768 bit prime The prime is 2^768  2^704  1 + 2^64 * { [2^638 pi] + 149686 }. Its decimal value is 155251809230070893513091813125848175563133404943451431320235 119490296623994910210725866945387659164244291000768028886422 915080371891804634263272761303128298374438082089019628850917 0691316593175367469551763119843371637221007210577919 Prime modulus: Length (32 bit words): 24, Data (hex): FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A63A3620 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF Generator: Length (32 bit words): 1, Data (hex): 2 A.2. WellKnown Group 2: A 1024 bit prime The prime is 2^1024  2^960  1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }. Its decimal value is 179769313486231590770839156793787453197860296048756011706444 423684197180216158519368947833795864925541502180565485980503 646440548199239100050792877003355816639229553136239076508735 759914822574862575007425302077447712589550957937778424442426 617334727629299387668709205606050270810842907692932019128194 467627007 Prime modulus: Length (32 bit words): 32, Data (hex): FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF Generator: Length (32 bit words): 1, Data (hex): 2 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 8]