DDoS Open Threat Signaling Requirements
draft-ietf-dots-requirements-00

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Last updated 2015-10-19
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DOTS                                                        A. Mortensen
Internet-Draft                                      Arbor Networks, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                              R. Moskowitz
Expires: April 21, 2016                                   HTT Consulting
                                                                T. Reddy
                                                     Cisco Systems, Inc.
                                                        October 19, 2015

                DDoS Open Threat Signaling Requirements
                    draft-ietf-dots-requirements-00

Abstract

   This document defines the requirements for the DDoS Open Threat
   Signaling (DOTS) protocols coordinating attack response against
   Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  General Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Operational requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Data channel requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.4.  Data model requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   3.  Congestion Control Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  00 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  Initial revision  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Overview

   Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to plague
   networks around the globe, from Tier-1 service providers on down to
   enterprises and small businesses.  Attack scale and frequency
   similarly have continued to increase, thanks to software
   vulnerabilities leading to reflection and amplification attacks.
   Once staggering attack traffic volume is now the norm, and the impact
   of larger-scale attacks attract the attention of international press
   agencies.

   The higher profile and greater impact of contemporary DDoS attacks
   has led to increased focus on coordinated attack response.  Many
   institutions and enterprises lack the resources or expertise to
   operate on-premise attack prevention solutions themselves, or simply
   find themselves constrained by local bandwidth limitations.  To
   address such gaps, security service providers have begun to offer on-
   demand traffic scrubbing services.  Each service offers its own
   interface for subscribers to request attack mitigation, tying
   subscribers to proprietary implementations while also limiting the
   subset of network elements capable of participating in the attack
   response.  As a result of incompatibility across services, attack

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