Use Cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-use-cases-10

DOTS                                                          Y. Hayashi
Internet-Draft                                                       NTT
Intended status: Informational                                   M. Chen
Expires: 4 October 2022                                           Li. Su
                                                                    CMCC
                                                            2 April 2022

       Use Cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
                 draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-use-cases-10

Abstract

   DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry enriches the base DOTS
   protocols to assist the mitigator in using efficient DDoS attack
   mitigation techniques in a network.  This document presents sample
   use cases for DOTS Telemetry.  It discusses in particular what
   components are deployed in the network, how they cooperate, and what
   information is exchanged to effectively use these techniques.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 October 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Telemetry Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Mitigation Resources Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       3.1.1.  Mitigating Attack Flow of Top-talker
               Preferentially  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       3.1.2.  Optimal DMS Selection for Mitigation  . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.3.  Best-path Selection for Redirection . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.1.4.  Short but Extreme Volumetric Attack Mitigation  . . .  11
       3.1.5.  Selecting Mitigation Technique Based on Attack
               Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.2.  Detailed DDoS Mitigation Report . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     3.3.  Tuning Mitigation Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.3.1.  Supervised Machine Learning of Flow Collector . . . .  21
       3.3.2.  Unsupervised Machine Learning of Flow Collector . . .  24
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   6.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28

1.  Introduction

   Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, such as volumetric
   attacks and resource-consumption attacks, are critical threats to be
   handled by service providers.  When such DDoS attacks occur, service
   providers have to mitigate them immediately to protect or recover
   their services.

   Therefore, for service providers to immediately protect their network
   services from DDoS attacks, DDoS mitigation needs to be highly
   automated.  To that aim, multi-vendor components involved in DDoS
   attack detection and mitigation should cooperate and support standard
   interfaces.

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   DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) is a set of protocols for real-time
   signaling, threat-handling requests, and data filtering between the
   multi-vendor elements [RFC9132][RFC8783].  DOTS Telemetry enriches
   the DOTS protocols with various telemetry attributes allowing optimal
   DDoS attack mitigation [I-D.ietf-dots-telemetry].  This document
   presents sample use cases for DOTS Telemetry, which makes concrete
   overview and purpose described in [I-D.ietf-dots-telemetry]: what
   components are deployed in the network, how they cooperate, and what
   information is exchanged to effectively use attack-mitigation
   techniques.

2.  Terminology

   The readers should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612],
   [RFC8903] and [I-D.ietf-dots-telemetry].

   In addition, this document uses the following terms:

   Top-talker:  A list of attack sources that are involved in an attack
      and which are generating an important part of the attack traffic.

   Supervised Machine Learning:  A machine-learning technique in which
      labeled data is used to train the algorithms (the input and output
      data are known).

   Unsupervised Machine Learning:  A machine learning technique in which
      unlabeled data is used to train the algorithms (the data has no
      historical labels).

3.  Telemetry Use Cases

   This section describes DOTS telemetry use cases that use attributes
   included in DOTS telemetry specifications [I-D.ietf-dots-telemetry].

3.1.  Mitigation Resources Assignment

3.1.1.  Mitigating Attack Flow of Top-talker Preferentially

   Some transit providers have to mitigate such large-scale DDoS attacks
   by using DDoS Mitigation Systems (DMSes) with limited resources,
   which is already deployed in their network.  For example, recent
   reported large DDoS attacks exceeded 1 Tps.

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   The aim of this use case is to enable transit providers to use their
   DMS efficiently under volume-based DDoS attacks whose volume is more
   than the available capacity of the DMS.  To enable this, the attack
   traffic of top-talkers is redirected to the DMS preferentially by
   cooperation among forwarding nodes, flow collectors, and
   orchestrators.

   Figure 1 gives an overview of this use case.  Figure 2 provides an
   example of a DOTS telemetry message body that is used to signal top-
   talkers (2001:db8::2/128 and 2001:db8::3/128).

   (Internet Transit Provider)

                  +-----------+      +--------------+ e.g., SNMP
     e.g., IPFIX +-----------+| DOTS |              |<---
             --->| Flow      ||C<-->S| Orchestrator | e.g., BGP Flowspec
                 | collector |+      |              |--->   (Redirect)
                 +-----------+       +--------------+

                            +-------------+
               e.g., IPFIX +-------------+| e.g., BGP Flowspec
                       <---| Forwarding  ||<---   (Redirect)
                           |    nodes    ||
                           |             ||           DDoS Attack
   [ Target  ]<============|===============================
   [   or    ]             |    ++=========================[top-talker]
   [ Targets ]             |    || ++======================[top-talker]
                           +----|| ||---+
                                || ||
                                || ||
                                |/ |/
                           +----x--x----+
                           | DDoS       | e.g., SNMP
                           | mitigation |<---
                           | system     |
                           +------------+

   * C is for DOTS client functionality
   * S is for DOTS server functionality

   Figure 1: Mitigating DDoS Attack Flow of Top-talkers Preferentially

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   {
     "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
       "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
         {
           "target": {
             "target-prefix": [
               "2001:db8::1/128"
             ]
           },
           "total-attack-traffic-protocol": [
             {
               "protocol": 17,
               "unit": "megabit-ps",
               "mid-percentile-g": "900"
             }
           ],
           "attack-detail": [
             {
               "vendor-id": 32473,
               "attack-id": 77,
               "start-time": "1645057211",
               "attack-severity": "high",
               "top-talker":{
                 "talker": [
                   {
                     "source-prefix": "2001:db8::2/128",
                     "total-attack-traffic": [
                       {
                         "unit": "megabit-ps",
                         "mid-percentile-g": "100"
                       }
                     ]
                   },
                   {
                     "source-prefix": "2001:db8::3/128",
                     "total-attack-traffic": [
                       {
                         "unit": "megabit-ps",
                         "mid-percentile-g": "90"
                       }
                     ]
                   }
                 ]
               }
             }
           ]
         }
       ]

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     }
   }

   Figure 2: An Example of Message Body to Signal Top-Talkers

   The forwarding nodes send traffic statistics to the flow collectors
   using, e.g., IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) [RFC7011].  When DDoS
   attacks occur, the flow collectors identifies the attack traffic and
   send information of the top-talkers to the orchestrator using the
   "target-prefix" and "top-talkers" DOTS telemetry attributes.  The
   orchestrator, then, checks the available capacity of the DMSes by
   using a network management protocol, such as Simple Network
   Management Protocol (SNMP) [RFC3413].  After that, the orchestrator
   orders the forwarding nodes to redirect as much of the top-talker's
   traffic to the DMS as possible by dissemination of Flow
   Specifications relying upon tools, such as Border Gateway Protocol
   Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules (BGP Flowspec) [RFC8955].

   The flow collector implements a DOTS client while the orchestrator
   implements a DOTS server.

3.1.2.  Optimal DMS Selection for Mitigation

   Transit providers can deploy their DMSes in clusters.  Then, they can
   select the DMS to be used to mitigate a DDoS attack under attack
   time.

   The aim of this use case is to enable transit providers to select an
   optimal DMS for mitigation based on the volume of the attack traffic
   and the capacity of a DMS.  Figure 3 gives an overview of this use
   case.  Figure 4 provides an example of a DOTS telemetry message body
   that is used to signal various attack traffic percentiles.

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   (Internet Transit Provider)

                  +-----------+      +--------------+ e.g., SNMP
     e.g., IPFIX +-----------+| DOTS |              |<---
             --->| Flow      ||C<-->S| Orchestrator | e.g., BGP
                 | collector |+      |              |--->   (Redirect)
                 +-----------+       +--------------+

                            +------------+
               e.g., IPFIX +------------+| e.g., BGP
                       <---| Forwarding ||<---   (Redirect)
                           |    nodes   ||
                           |            ||            DDoS Attack
   [Target]                | ++============================
   [Target]                | ||  ++========================
                           +-||--||-----+
                             ||  ||
                       ++====++  ||  (congested DMS)
                       ||        ||  +-----------+
                       ||        |/  |      DMS3 |
                       ||  +-----x------+        |<--- e.g., SNMP
                       |/  |       DMS2 |--------+
                    +--x---------+      |<--- e.g., SNMP
                    |       DMS1 |------+
                    |            |<--- e.g., SNMP
                    +------------+

   * C is for DOTS client functionality
   * S is for DOTS server functionality

   Figure 3: Optimal DMS Selection for Mitigation

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   {
     "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
       "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
         {
           "target": {
             "target-prefix": [
               "2001:db8::1/128"
             ]
           },
           "total-attack-traffic": [
             {
               "unit": "megabit-ps",
               "low-percentile-g": "600",
               "mid-percentile-g": "800",
               "high-percentile-g": "1000",
               "peak-g":"1100",
               "current-g":"700"
             }
           ]
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 4: Example of Message Body with Total Attack Traffic

   The forwarding nodes send traffic statistics to the flow collectors
   using, e.g., IPFIX.  When DDoS attacks occur, the flow collectors
   identify the attack traffic and send information of the attack
   traffic volume to the orchestrator by using the "target-prefix" and
   "total-attack-traffic" DOTS telemetry attributes.  The orchestrator,
   then, checks the available capacity of the DMSes by using a network
   management protocol, such as SNMP.  After that, the orchestrator
   selects an optimal DMS to which each attack traffic should be
   redirected.  For example, a simple DMS selection algorithm is to
   choose a DMS whose available capacity is greater than the "peak-g"
   atribute indicated in the DOTS telemetry message.  The orchestrator
   orders the appropriate forwarding nodes to redirect the attack
   traffic to the optimal DMS relying upon routing policies, such as BGP
   [RFC4271].

   The detailed DMS selection algorithm is out of the scope of this
   document.

   The flow collector implements a DOTS client while the orchestrator
   implements a DOTS server.

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3.1.3.  Best-path Selection for Redirection

   A transit provider network has multiple paths to convey an attack
   traffic to a DMS.  In such a network, the attack traffic can be
   conveyed while avoiding congested links by adequately selecting an
   available path.

   The aim of this use case is to enable transit providers to select an
   optimal path for redirecting attack traffic to a DMS according to the
   bandwidth of the attack traffic and total traffic.  Figure 5 gives an
   overview of this use case.  Figure 6 provides an example of a DOTS
   telemetry message body that is used to signal various attack traffic
   percentiles and total traffic percentiles.

   (Internet Transit Provider)

             +-----------+      +--------------+ DOTS
     e.g.,  +-----------+|      |              |S<---
      IPFIX | Flow      || DOTS | Orchestrator |
         -->| collector ||C<-->S|              | e.g., BGP Flowspec
            |           |+      |              |--->   (Redirect)
            +-----------+       +--------------+

                  DOTS +------------+  DOTS +------------+ e.g., IPFIX
                  --->C| Forwarding |  --->C| Forwarding |--->
   e.g., BGP Flowspec |   node     |       |   node     |
        (Redirect) --->|            |       |            |  DDoS Attack
   [Target]            |       ++====================================
                       +-------||---+       +------------+
                               ||              /
                               ||             / (congested link)
                               ||            /
                       DOTS  +-||----------------+ e.g., BGP Flowspec
                        --->C| ||  Forwarding    |<---   (Redirect)
                             | ++===  node       |
                             +----||-------------+
                                  |/
                               +--x-----------+
                               |     DMS      |
                               +--------------+

   * C is for DOTS client functionality
   * S is for DOTS server functionality

   Figure 5: Best-path Selection for Redirection

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   {
     "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
       "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
         {
           "target": {
             "target-prefix": [
               "2001:db8::1/128"
             ]
           },
           "total-traffic": [
             {
               "unit": "megabit-ps",
               "mid-percentile-g": "1300",
               "peak-g": "800"
              }
           ],
           "total-attack-traffic": [
             {
               "unit": "megabit-ps",
               "low-percentile-g": "600",
               "mid-percentile-g": "800",
               "high-percentile-g": "1000",
               "peak-g": "1100",
               "current-g": "700"
              }
           ]
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 6: An Example of Message Body with Total Attack
                   Traffic and Total Traffic

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   The forwarding nodes send traffic statistics to the flow collectors
   by using, e.g., IPFIX.  When DDoS attacks occur, the flow collectors
   identify attack traffic and send information of the attack traffic
   volume to the orchestrator by using a "target-prefix" and "total-
   attack-traffic" DOTS telemetry attributes.  On the other hands, the
   underlying forwarding nodes send volume of the total traffic passing
   the node to the orchestrator by using "total-traffic" telemetry
   attributes.  The orchestrator then selects an optimal path to which
   each attack-traffic flow should be redirected.  For example, the
   simple algorithm of the selection is to choose a path whose available
   capacity is greater than the "peak-g" attribute that was indicated in
   a DOTS telemetry message.  After that, the orchestrator orders the
   appropriate forwarding nodes to redirect the attack traffic to the
   optimal DMS by dissemination of Flow Specifications relying upon
   tools, such as BGP Flowspec.

   The detailed path selection algorithm is out of the scope of this
   document.

   The flow collector and forwarding nodes implement a DOTS client while
   the orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

3.1.4.  Short but Extreme Volumetric Attack Mitigation

   Short, but extreme volumetric attacks, such as pulse wave DDoS
   attacks, are threats to internet transit provider networks.  The
   feature of the attack is that start from zero and go to maximum
   values in a very short time span, then go back to zero, and back to
   maximum, repeating in continuous cycles at short intervals.  It is
   difficult for them to mitigate an attack by DMS by redirecting attack
   flows because it may cause route flapping in the network.  The
   practical way to mitigate short but extreme volumetric attacks is to
   offload mitigation actions to a forwarding node.

   The aim of this use case is to enable transit providers to mitigate
   short but extreme volumetric attacks.  Furthermore, the aim is to
   estimate the network-access success rate based on the bandwidth of
   attack traffic.  Figure 7 gives an overview of this use case.
   Figure 8 provides an example of a DOTS telemetry message body that is
   used to signal total pipe capacity.  Figure 9 provides an example of
   a DOTS telemetry message body that is used to signal various attack
   traffic percentiles and total traffic percentiles.

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 (Internet Transit Provider)

             +------------+       +----------------+
 e.g.,       | Network    |  DOTS | Administrative |
 Alert ----->| Management |C<--->S| System         | e.g., BGP Flowspec
             | System     |       |                |--->   (Rate-Limit)
             +------------+       +----------------+

               +------------+     +------------+ e.g., BGP Flowspec
               | Forwarding |     | Forwarding |<---  (Rate-Limit X bps)
               |   node     |     |   node     |
         Link1 |            |     |            | DDoS & Normal traffic
 [Target]<------------------------------------================
 Pipe          +------------+     +------------+  Attack Traffic
 Capability                                       Bandwidth
 e.g., X bps                                      e.g., Y bps

                     Network access success rate
                         e.g., X / (X + Y)

 * C is for DOTS client functionality
 * S is for DOTS server functionality

 Figure 7: Short but Extreme Volumetric Attack Mitigation

     {
       "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
         "telemetry": [
           {
             "total-pipe-capacity": [
               {
                 "link-id": "link1",
                 "capacity": "1000",
                 "unit": "megabit-ps"
               }
             ]
           }
         ]
       }
     }
   Figure 8: Example of Message Body with Total Pipe Capacity

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   {
     "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
       "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
         {
           "target": {
             "target-prefix": [
               "2001:db8::1/128"
             ]
           },
           "total-traffic": [
             {
               "unit": "megabit-ps",
               "mid-percentile-g": "800",
               "peak-g": "1300"
              }
           ],
           "total-attack-traffic": [
             {
               "unit": "megabit-ps",
               "low-percentile-g": "200",
               "mid-percentile-g": "400",
               "high-percentile-g": "500",
               "peak-g": "600",
               "current-g": "400"
             }
           ]
          }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 9: Example of Message Body with Total Attack Traffic,
                       and Total Traffic

   When DDoS attacks occur, the network management system receives
   alerts.  Then, it sends the target IP address(es) and volume of the
   DDoS attack traffic to the administrative system by using the
   "target-prefix" and "total-attack-traffic" DOTS telemetry attributes.
   After that, the administrative system orders relevant forwarding
   nodes to carry out rate-limit all traffic destined to the target
   based on the pipe capability by the dissemination of the Flow
   Specifications relying upon tools, such as BGP Flowspec.  In
   addition, the administrative system estimates the network-access
   success rate of the target, which is calculated by (total-pipe-
   capability / (total-pipe-capability + total-attack-traffic)).

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   Note that total pipe capability information can be gatherd by
   telemetry setup in advance (Section 7.2 of
   [I-D.ietf-dots-telemetry]).

   The network management system implements a DOTS client while the
   administrative system implements a DOTS server.

3.1.5.  Selecting Mitigation Technique Based on Attack Type

   Some volumetric attacks, such as amplification attacks, can be
   detected with high accuracy by checking the Layer 3 or Layer 4
   information of attack packets.  These attacks can be detected and
   mitigated through cooperation among forwarding nodes and flow
   collectors by using IPFIX.  It may also be necessary to inspect the
   Layer 7 information of suspecious packets to detect attacks such as
   DNS Water Torture Attacks.  Such an attack traffic should be detected
   and mitigated at a DMS.

   The aim of this use case is to enable transit providers to select a
   mitigation technique based on the type of attack traffic:
   amplification attack or not.  To use such a technique, the attack
   traffic is blocked by forwarding nodes or redirected to a DMS based
   on the attack type through cooperation among forwarding nodes, flow
   collectors, and an orchestrator.

   Figure 10 gives an overview of this use case.  Figure 11 provides an
   example of attack mappings as below are shared by using the DOTS data
   channel in advance.  Figure 12 provides an example of a DOTS
   telemetry message body that is used to signal various attack traffic
   percentiles, total traffic percentiles, total attack connection and
   attack type.

   The example in Figure 11 uses the folding defined in [RFC8792] for
   long lines.

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     (Internet Transit Provider)

              +-----------+ DOTS +--------------+ e.g.,
       e.g., +-----------+|<---->|              | BGP (Redirect)
       IPFIX | Flow      ||C    S| Orchestrator | BGP Flowspec (Drop)
         --->| collector |+      |              |--->
             +-----------+       +--------------+

                         +------------+ e.g., BGP (Redirect)
            e.g., IPFIX +------------+|       BGP Flowspec (Drop)
                    <---| Forwarding ||<---
                        |    nodes   ||              DDoS Attack
                        |     ++=====||================
                        |     ||     ||x<==============[e.g., DNS Amp]
                        |     ||     |+x<==============[e.g., NTP Amp]
                        +-----||-----+
                              ||
                              |/
                        +-----x------+
                        | DDoS       |
                        | mitigation |
                        | system     |
                        +------------+

     * C is for DOTS client functionality
     * S is for DOTS server functionality
     * DNS Amp: DNS Amplification
     * NTP Amp: NTP Amplification

   Figure 10: DDoS Mitigation Based on Attack Type

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   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   {
     "ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping": {
       "vendor": [
         {
           "vendor-id": 32473,
           "vendor-name": "mitigator-c",
           "last-updated": "1629898958",
           "attack-mapping": [
             {
               "attack-id": 77,
               "attack-description":
                  "attack-description": "DNS amplification Attack: \
   This attack is a type of reflection attack in which attackers \
   spoof a target's IP address. The attackers abuse vulnerbilities \
   in DNS servers to turn small queries into larger payloads."
             },
             {
               "attack-id": 92,
               "attack-description":
                  "attack-description":"NTP amplification Attack: \
   This attack is a type of reflection attack in which attackers \
   spoof a target's IP address. The attackers abuse vulnerbilities \
   in NTP servers to turn small queries into larger payloads."
             }
           ]
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 11: Example of Message Body with Attack Mappings

  {
    "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
      "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
        {
          "target": {
            "target-prefix": [
              "2001:db8::1/128"
            ]
          },
          "total-attack-traffic": [
            {
              "unit": "megabit-ps",
              "low-percentile-g": "600",
              "mid-percentile-g": "800",

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              "high-percentile-g": "1000",
              "peak-g": "1100",
              "current-g": "700"
             }
          ],
          "total-attack-traffic-protocol": [
            {
              "protocol": 17,
              "unit": "megabit-ps",
              "mid-percentile-g": "500"
            },
            {
              "protocol": 15,
              "unit": "megabit-ps",
              "mid-percentile-g": "200"
            }
          ],
          "total-attack-connection": [
          {
             "mid-percentile-l": [
              {
                "protocol": 15,
                "connection": 200
              }
             ],
             "high-percentile-l": [
              {
                "protocol": 17,
                "connection": 300
              }
             ]
          }
          ],
          "attack-detail": [
            {
              "vendor-id": 32473,
              "attack-id": 77,
              "start-time": "1641169211",
              "attack-severity": "high"
            },
            {
              "vendor-id": 32473,
              "attack-id": 92,
              "start-time": "1641172809",
              "attack-severity": "high"
            }
          ]
        }

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      ]
    }
  }

  Figure 12: Example of Message Body with Total Attack Traffic,
  Total Attack Traffic Protocol, Total Attack Connection and Attack Type

   Attack mappings are shared by using the DOTS data channel in advance
   (Section 8.1.6 of [I-D.ietf-dots-telemetry]).  The forwarding nodes
   send traffic statistics to the flow collectors by using, e.g., IPFIX.
   When DDoS attacks occur, the flow collectors identify attack traffic
   and send attack type information to the orchestrator by using
   "vendor-id" and "attack-id" telemetry attributes.  The orchestrator,
   then, resolves abused port numbers and orders relevant forwarding
   nodes to block the amplification attack traffic flow by dissemination
   of Flow Specifications, e.g.  [RFC8955].  Also, the orchestrator
   orders relevant forwarding nodes to redirect other traffic than the
   amplification attack traffic by using a routing protocol, such as
   BGP.

   The flow collector implements a DOTS client while the orchestrator
   implements a DOTS server.

3.2.  Detailed DDoS Mitigation Report

   It is possible for the transit provider to add value to the DDoS
   mitigation service by reporting on-going and detailed DDoS
   countermeasure status to the enterprise network.  In addition, it is
   possible for the transit provider to know whether the DDoS counter
   measure is effective or not by receiving reports from the enterprise
   network.

   The aim of this use case is to share the information about on-going
   DDoS counter measure between the transit provider and the enterprise
   network mutually.  Figure 13 gives an overview of this use case.
   Figure 14 provides an example of a DOTS telemetry message body that
   is used to signal total pipe capacity from the enterprise network
   administrator to the orchestrator in the ISP.  Figure 15 provides an
   example of a DOTS telemetry message body that is used to signal
   various total traffic percentiles, total attack traffic percentiles
   and attack detail from the orchestrator to the network.

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     +------------------+       +------------------------+
     | Enterprise       |       |    Upstream            |
     | Network          |       |    Internet Transit    |
     |  +------------+  |       |    Provider            |
     |  | Network    |C |       |   S+--------------+    |
     |  | admini-    |<-----DOTS---->| Orchestrator |    |
     |  | strator    |  |       |    +--------------+    |
     |  +------------+  |       |         C ^            |
     |                  |       |           | DOTS       |
     |                  |       |         S v            |
     |                  |       |    +---------------+ DDoS Attack
     |                  |       |    |      DMS      |+=======
     |                  |       |    +---------------+   |
     |                  |       |           || Clean     |
     |                  |       |           |/ Traffic   |
     |  +---------+     |       |   +---------------+    |
     |  | DDoS    |     |       |   | Forwarding    | Normal Traffic
     |  | Target  |<================| Node          |========
     |  +---------+     | Link1 |   +---------------+    |
     +------------------+       +------------------------+

   * C is for DOTS client functionality
   * S is for DOTS server functionality

   Figure 13: Detailed DDoS Mitigation Report

   {
     "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
       "telemetry": [
         {
           "total-pipe-capacity": [
             {
               "link-id": "link1",
               "capacity": "1000",
               "unit": "megabit-ps"
             }
           ]
         }
       ]
     }
   }
   Figure 14: An Example of Message Body with Total Pipe Capacity

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   {
     "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
       "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
         {
           "tmid": 567,
           "target": {
             "target-prefix": [
               "2001:db8::1/128"
             ]
           },
           "target-protocol": [
             17
           ],
           "total-traffic": [
             {
               "unit": "megabit-ps",
               "mid-percentile-g": "800"
             }
           ],
           "total-attack-traffic": [
             {
               "unit": "megabit-ps",
               "mid-percentile-g": "100"
             }
           ],
           "attack-detail": [
             {
               "vendor-id": 32473,
               "attack-id": 77,
               "start-time": "1644819611",
               "attack-severity": "high"
             }
           ]
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 15: An Example of Message Body with Total Traffic,
        Total Attack Traffic Protocol, and Attack Detail

   The network management system in the enterprise network reports
   limits of incoming traffic volume from the transit provider to the
   orchestrator in the transit provider in advance.  It is reported by
   using "total-pipe-capacity" telemetry attribute in DOTS telemetry
   setup.

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   When DDoS attacks occur, DDoS mitugation orchestration [RFC8903] is
   carried out in the transit provider.  Then, the DDoS mitigation
   systems reports the status of DDoS countermeasures to the
   orchestrator by sending "attack-detail" telemetry attributes.  After
   that, the orchestrator integrates the reports from the DDoS
   mitigation system, while removing duplicate contents, and sends them
   to a network administrator by using DOTS telemetry periodically.

   During the DDoS mitigation, the orchestrator in the transit provider
   retrieves link congestion status from the network manager in the
   enterprise network by using "total-traffic" telemetry attributes.
   Then, the orchestrator checks whether the DDoS countermeasures are
   effective or not by comparing the "total-traffic" and the "total-
   pipe-capacity" attributes.

   The DMS implements a DOTS server while the orchestrator behaves as a
   DOTS client and a server in the transit provider.  In addition, the
   network administrator implements a DOTS client.

3.3.  Tuning Mitigation Resources

3.3.1.  Supervised Machine Learning of Flow Collector

   DDoS detection based on tools, such as IPFIX, is a lighter weight
   method of detecting DDoS attacks than DMSes in internet transit
   provider networks.  On the other hand, DDoS detection based on the
   DMSes is a more accurate method for detecting attack traffic than
   flow monitoring.

   The aim of this use case is to increase flow collector's detection
   accuracy by carrying out supervised machine-learning techniques
   according to attack detail reported by the DMSes.  To use such a
   technique, forwarding nodes, flow collector, and a DMS should
   cooperate.  Figure 16 gives an overview of this use case.  Figure 17
   provides an example of a DOTS telemetry message body that is used to
   signal various total attack traffic percentiles and attack detail.

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                                   +-----------+
                                  +-----------+| DOTS
                      e.g., IPFIX | Flow      ||S<---
                              --->| collector ||
                                  +-----------++

                                   +------------+
                      e.g., IPFIX +------------+|
                              <---| Forwarding ||
                                  |    nodes   ||           DDoS Attack
    [ Target ]                    |   ++==============================
                                  |   || ++===========================
                                  |   || || ++========================
                                  +---||-|| ||-+
                                      || || ||
                                      |/ |/ |/
                            DOTS  +---X--X--X--+
                             --->C| DDoS       |
                                  | mitigation |
                                  | system     |
                                  +------------+

           * C is for DOTS client functionality
           * S is for DOTS server functionality

   Figure 16: Training Supervised Machine Learning of Flow Collectors

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   {
     "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
       "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
         {
           "target": {
             "target-prefix": [
               "2001:db8::1/128"
             ]
           },
           "attack-detail": [
             {
               "vendor-id": 32473,
               "attack-id": 77,
               "start-time": "1634192411",
               "attack-severity": "high",
               "top-talker": {
                 "talker": [
                   {
                     "source-prefix": "2001:db8::2/128"
                   },
                   {
                     "source-prefix": "2001:db8::3/128"
                   }
                 ]
               }
             }
           ]
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 17: An Example of Message Body with Attack Type
                   and top-talkers

   The forwarding nodes send traffic statistics to the flow collectors
   by using, e.g., IPFIX.  When DDoS attacks occur, DDoS mitigation
   orchestration is carried out (as per Section 3.3 of [RFC8903]) and
   the DMS mitigates all attack traffic destined for a target.  The DDoS
   mitigation system reports the "vendor-id", "attack-id", and "top-
   talker" telemetry attributes to a flow collector.

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   After mitigating a DDoS attack, the flow collector attaches outputs
   of the DMS as labels to the statistics of traffic flow of top-
   talkers.  The outputs, for example, are the "attack-id" telemetry
   attributes.  The flow collector, then, carries out supervised machine
   learning to increase its detection accuracy, setting the statistics
   as an explanatory variable and setting the labels as an objective
   variable.

   The DMS implements a DOTS client while the flow collector implements
   a DOTS server.

3.3.2.  Unsupervised Machine Learning of Flow Collector

   DMSes can detect DDoS attack traffic, which means DMSes can also
   identify clean traffic.  The aim of this use case is to carry out
   unsupervised machine-learning for anomaly detection according to
   baseline reported by DMSes.  To use such a technique, forwarding
   nodes, flow collector, and a DMS should cooperate.  Figure 18 gives
   an overview of this use case.  Figure 19 provides an example of a
   DOTS telemetry message body that is used to signal baseline.

                                 +-----------+
                                +-----------+|
                           DOTS | Flow      ||
                           --->S| collector ||
                                +-----------++

                                 +------------+
                                +------------+|
                                | Forwarding ||
                                |    nodes   ||             Traffic
   [ Dst ] <========================++==============================
                                |   ||       ||
                                |   ||       |+
                                +---||-------+
                                    ||
                                    |/
                          DOTS  +---X--------+
                           --->C| DDoS       |
                                | mitigation |
                                | system     |
                                +------------+

         * C is for DOTS client functionality
         * S is for DOTS server functionality

   Figure 18: Training Unsupervised Machine Learning of Flow Collectors

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     {
       "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
         "telemetry": [
           {
             "baseline": [
               {
                 "id": 1,
                 "target-prefix": [
                   "2001:db8:6401::1/128"
                 ],
                 "target-port-range": [
                   {
                     "lower-port": "53"
                   }
                 ],
                 "target-protocol": [
                   17
                 ],
                 "total-traffic-normal": [
                   {
                     "unit": "megabit-ps",
                     "mid-percentile-g": "30",
                     "mid-percentile-g": "50",
                     "high-percentile-g": "60",
                     "peak-g": "70"
                   }
                 ]
               }
             ]
           }
         ]
       }
     }

   Figure 19: An Example of Message Body with Traffic Baseline

   The forwarding nodes carry out mirroring traffic destined IP address.
   The DMS then identifies "clean" traffic and reports the baseline
   attributes to the flow collector by using DOTS telemetry.

   The flow collector, then, carries out unsupervised machine learning
   to be able to carry out anomaly detection.

   The DMS implements a DOTS client while the flow collector implements
   a DOTS server.

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4.  Security Considerations

   DOTS telemetry security considerations are discussed in Section 14 of
   [I-D.ietf-dots-telemetry].  These considerations apply for the
   communication interfaces where DOTS is used.

   Some use cases involve controllers, orchestrators, and programmable
   interfaces.  These interfaces can be misused by misbehaving nodes to
   further exacerbate DDoS attacks.  Section 5 of [RFC7149] discusses
   some generic security considerations to take into account in such
   contexts (e.g., reliable access control).  Specific security measures
   depend on the actual mechanism used to control underlying forwarding
   nodes and other controlled elements.  For example, Section 13 of
   [RFC8955] discusses security considerations that are relevant to BGP
   Flowspec.  IPFIX-specific considerations are discussed in Section 11
   of [RFC7011].

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not require any action from IANA.

6.  Acknowledgement

   The authors would like to thank Mohamed Boucadair and Valery Smyslov
   for their valuable feedback.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dots-telemetry]
              Boucadair, M., Reddy.K, T., Doron, E., Chen, M., and J.
              Shallow, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
              Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-25, 21 March 2022,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-dots-
              telemetry-25.txt>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3413]  Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "Simple Network
              Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications", STD 62,
              RFC 3413, DOI 10.17487/RFC3413, December 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3413>.

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   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC7011]  Claise, B., Ed., Trammell, B., Ed., and P. Aitken,
              "Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)
              Protocol for the Exchange of Flow Information", STD 77,
              RFC 7011, DOI 10.17487/RFC7011, September 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7011>.

   [RFC7149]  Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-Defined
              Networking: A Perspective from within a Service Provider
              Environment", RFC 7149, DOI 10.17487/RFC7149, March 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7149>.

   [RFC8612]  Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open
              Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8612, May 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8612>.

   [RFC8783]  Boucadair, M., Ed. and T. Reddy.K, Ed., "Distributed
              Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data
              Channel Specification", RFC 8783, DOI 10.17487/RFC8783,
              May 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8783>.

   [RFC8792]  Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
              "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
              RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.

   [RFC8903]  Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R., Teague, N., Xia,
              L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use Cases for DDoS Open Threat
              Signaling", RFC 8903, DOI 10.17487/RFC8903, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8903>.

   [RFC8955]  Loibl, C., Hares, S., Raszuk, R., McPherson, D., and M.
              Bacher, "Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules",
              RFC 8955, DOI 10.17487/RFC8955, December 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8955>.

   [RFC9132]  Boucadair, M., Ed., Shallow, J., and T. Reddy.K,
              "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
              (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", RFC 9132,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9132, September 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9132>.

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Authors' Addresses

   Yuhei Hayashi
   NTT
   3-9-11, Midori-cho, Tokyo
   180-8585
   Japan
   Email: yuuhei.hayashi@gmail.com

   Meiling Chen
   CMCC
   32, Xuanwumen West
   BeiJing
   BeiJing, 100053
   China
   Email: chenmeiling@chinamobile.com

   Li Su
   CMCC
   32, Xuanwumen West
   BeiJing, BeiJing
   100053
   China
   Email: suli@chinamobile.com

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