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Recursive to Authoritative DNS with Unauthenticated Encryption

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (dprive WG)
Authors Paul E. Hoffman , Peter van Dijk
Last updated 2021-04-01
Replaces draft-pp-recursive-authoritative-opportunistic
Replaced by draft-ietf-dprive-unauth-to-authoritative
Stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Intended RFC status (None)
Expired & archived
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state Replaced by draft-ietf-dprive-unauth-to-authoritative
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at:


This document describes a use case and a method for a DNS recursive resolver to use unauthenticated encryption when communicating with authoritative servers. The motivating use case for this method is that more encryption on the Internet is better, and some resolver operators believe that unauthenticated encryption is better than no encryption at all. The method described here is optional for both the recursive resolver and the authoritative server. This method supports unauthenticated encryption using the same mechanism for discovery of encryption support for the server as [I-D.rescorla-dprive-adox-latest]. NOTE: The file name for this draft, draft-ietf-dprive-opportunistic- adotq, is now incorrect. This draft only covers unauthenticated encryption, not opportunistic encryption.


Paul E. Hoffman
Peter van Dijk

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)