DNS privacy considerations
draft-ietf-dprive-problem-statement-00

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dprive WG)
Author St├ęphane Bortzmeyer 
Last updated 2014-10-26
Replaces draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy
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Intended RFC status Informational
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Network Working Group                                      S. Bortzmeyer
Internet-Draft                                                     AFNIC
Intended status: Informational                          October 26, 2014
Expires: April 29, 2015

                       DNS privacy considerations
                 draft-ietf-dprive-problem-statement-00

Abstract

   This document describes the privacy issues associated with the use of
   the DNS by Internet users.  It is intended to be mostly an analysis
   of the present situation, in the spirit of section 8 of [RFC6973] and
   it does not prescribe solutions.

   Discussions of the document should take place on the DPRIVE working
   group mailing list [dprive].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Bortzmeyer               Expires April 29, 2015                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 DNS privacy                  October 2014

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  The alleged public nature of DNS data . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Data in the DNS request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Cache snooping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  On the wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.5.  In the servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.5.1.  In the resolvers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.5.2.  In the authoritative name servers . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.5.3.  Rogue servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   3.  Actual "attacks"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Legalities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   The Domain Name System is specified in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035].  It
   is one of the most important infrastructure components of the
   Internet and one of the most often ignored or misunderstood.  Almost
   every activity on the Internet starts with a DNS query (and often
   several).  Its use has many privacy implications and we try to give
   here a comprehensive and accurate list.

   Let us begin with a simplified reminder of how the DNS works.  A
   client, the stub resolver, issues a DNS query to a server, the
   resolver (also called caching resolver or full resolver or recursive
   name server).  Let's use the query "What are the AAAA records for
   www.example.com?" as an example.  AAAA is the qtype (Query type), and
   www.example.com is the qname (Query Name).  The resolver will first
   query the root nameservers.  In most cases, the root nameservers will
   send a referral.  In this example, the referral will be to .com
   nameservers.  The .com nameserver, in turn, will refer to the
   example.com nameservers.  The example.com nameserver will then return
   the answer.  The root name servers, the name servers of .com and
   those of example.com are called authoritative name servers.  It is
   important, when analyzing the privacy issues, to remember that the
   question asked to all these name servers is always the original
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