DNS Privacy Considerations
draft-ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-07

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dprive WG)
Author Tim Wicinski 
Last updated 2020-10-08 (latest revision 2020-09-23)
Replaces draft-bortzmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Informational
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Reviews
Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Brian Haberman
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2020-02-04)
IESG IESG state IESG Evaluation::AD Followup
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Telechat date
Has a DISCUSS. Has enough positions to pass once DISCUSS positions are resolved.
Responsible AD √Čric Vyncke
Send notices to Brian Haberman <brian@innovationslab.net>, dns-privacy@ietf.org
IANA IANA review state Version Changed - Review Needed
dprive                                                  T. Wicinski, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                           October 7, 2020
Obsoletes: 7626 (if approved)
Intended status: Informational
Expires: April 10, 2021

                       DNS Privacy Considerations
                    draft-ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-07

Abstract

   This document describes the privacy issues associated with the use of
   the DNS by Internet users.  It is intended to be an analysis of the
   present situation and does not prescribe solutions.  This document
   obsoletes RFC 7626.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 10, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Wicinski                 Expires April 10, 2021                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         DNS Privacy Considerations           October 2020

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Risks in the DNS Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  The Public Nature of DNS Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Data in the DNS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.2.1.  Data in the DNS Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Cache Snooping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Risks On the Wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Unencrypted Transports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Encrypted Transports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Risks in the Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  In the Recursive Resolvers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       6.1.1.  Resolver Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       6.1.2.  Active Attacks on Resolver Configuration  . . . . . .  14
       6.1.3.  Blocking of User Selected DNS Resolution Services . .  14
       6.1.4.  Encrypted Transports and Recursive Resolvers  . . . .  15
     6.2.  In the Authoritative Name Servers . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Other risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.1.  Re-identification and Other Inferences  . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.2.  More Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  Actual "Attacks"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  Legalities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   12. Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     14.3.  URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   Appendix A.  Updates since RFC7626  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Appendix B.  Changelog  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29

1.  Introduction

   This document is an analysis of the DNS privacy issues, in the spirit
   of Section 8 of [RFC6973].

   The Domain Name System (DNS) is specified in [RFC1034], [RFC1035],
   and many later RFCs, which have never been consolidated.  It is one
   of the most important infrastructure components of the Internet and
   often ignored or misunderstood by Internet users (and even by many
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