Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements
draft-ietf-drip-reqs-02
The information below is for an old version of the document.
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| Authors | Stuart W. Card , Adam Wiethuechter , Robert Moskowitz , Andrei Gurtov | ||
| Last updated | 2020-07-13 | ||
| Replaces | draft-card-drip-reqs | ||
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draft-ietf-drip-reqs-02
DRIP S. Card, Ed.
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 14 January 2021 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
A. Gurtov
Linköping University
13 July 2020
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements
draft-ietf-drip-reqs-02
Abstract
This document defines the requirements for Drone Remote
Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group protocols to support
Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID)
for security, safety and other purposes. Complementing external
technical standards as regulator-accepted means of compliance with
UAS RID regulations, DRIP will:
facilitate use of existing Internet resources to support UAS RID
and to enable enhanced related services;
enable online and offline verification that UAS RID information is
trustworthy.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 January 2021.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Overall Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. DRIP Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. UAS RID Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3. DRIP Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4. Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5. Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. Privacy and Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction (Informative)
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1.1. Overall Context
Many considerations (especially safety and security) dictate that UAS
be remotely identifiable. Any Observer with responsibilities
involving aircraft inherently must classify Unmanned Aircraft (UA)
situationally according to basic considerations, as illustrated
notionally in Figure 1 below. An Observer who classifies an UAS: as
Taskable, can ask it to do something useful; as Low Concern, can
reasonably assume it is not malicious, and would cooperate with
requests to modify its flight plans for safety reasons; as High
Concern or Unidentified, is worth focused surveillance.
xxxxxxx +--------------+
x x No | |
x ID? x+---->| UNIDENTIFIED |
x x | |
xxxxxxx +--------------+
+
| Yes
v
xxxxxxx
x x
+---------+x TYPE? x+----------+
| x x |
| xxxxxxx |
| + |
v v v
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
| | | | | |
| TASKABLE | | LOW CONCERN | | HIGH CONCERN |
| | | | | |
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
Figure 1: "Notional UAS Classification">
Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are mandating Unmanned
Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID). The
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has published
[Delegated] and [Implementing] Regulations. The United States (US)
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published a Notice of
Proposed Rule Making [NPRM] and has described the key role that UAS
RID plays in UAS Traffic Management (UTM [CONOPS] especially
Section 2.6). CAAs currently (2020) promulgate performance-based
regulations that do not specify techniques, but rather cite industry
consensus technical standards as acceptable means of compliance.
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ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee
F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed ASTM
F3411-19 [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and
Tracking. It defines two means of UAS RID:
Network RID defines a set of information for UAS to make available
globally indirectly via the Internet, through servers that can be
queried by Observers.
Broadcast RID defines a set of messages for Unmanned Aircraft (UA)
to transmit locally directly one-way over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, to
be received in real time by local Observers.
The same information must be provided via both means. The
presentation may differ, as Network RID defines a data dictionary,
whereas Broadcast RID defines message formats (which carry items from
that same data dictionary). The frequency with which it is sent may
differ, as Network RID can accomodate Observer queries asynchronous
to UAS updates (which generally need be send only when information,
such as position, changes), whereas Broadcast RID depends upon
Observers receiving UA messages at the time they are transmitted.
Network RID depends upon Internet connectivity in several segments
from the UAS to each Observer. Broadcast RID should need Internet
(or other Wide Area Network) connectivity only for UAS registry
information lookup using the directly locally received UAS Identifier
(UAS ID) as a key.
[F3411-19] specifies three UAS ID types:
TYPE-1 A static, manufacturer assigned, hardware serial number per
ANSI/CTA-2063-A "Small Unmanned Aerial System Serial Numbers"
[CTA2063A].
TYPE-2 A CAA assigned (presumably static) ID.
TYPE-3 A UTM system assigned UUID [RFC4122], which can but need not
be dynamic.
The EU allows only Type 1; the US allows Types 1 and 3, but requires
Type 3 IDs (if used) each to be used only once (for a single UAS
flight, which in the context of UTM is called an "operation").
[F3411-19] Broadcast RID transmits all information as cleartext
(ASCII or binary), so static IDs enable trivial correlation of
patterns of use, unacceptable in many applications, e.g., package
delivery routes of competitors.
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[WG105] addreses a "different scope than Direct Remote
Identification... latter being primarily meant for security
purposes... rather than for safety purposes (e.g. hazards
deconfliction..." Aviation community standards set a higher bar for
safety than for security. It "leaves the opportunity for those
manufacturers who would prefer to merge both functions to do so...
The purpose of the e-Identification function is to transmit, towards
the U-space infrastructure and/or other UA, a set of information for
safety (traffic management) purposes..." In addition to RID's
Broadcast and Network one-way to Observers), it will use V2V to other
UA (also perhaps to and/or from some manned aircraft).
1.2. Intended Use
An ID is not an end in itself; it exists to enable lookups and
provision of services complementing mere identification.
Minimal specified information must be made available to the public;
access to other data, e.g., UAS operator Personally Identifiable
Information (PII), must be limited to strongly authenticated
personnel, properly authorized per policy. The balance between
privacy and transparency remains a subject for public debate and
regulatory action; DRIP can only offer tools to expand the achievable
trade space and enable trade-offs within that space. [F3411-19]
specifies only how to get the UAS ID to the Observer; how the
Observer can perform these lookups, and how the registries first can
be populated with information, is unspecified.
Using UAS RID to facilitate vehicular (V2X) communications and
applications such as Detect And Avoid (DAA, which would impose
tighter latency bounds than RID itself) is an obvious possibility,
explicitly contemplated in the FAA NPRM. However, applications of
RID beyond RID itself have been omitted from [F3411-19]; DAA has been
explicitly declared out of scope in ASTM working group discussions,
based on a distinction between RID as a security standard vs DAA as a
safety application. Although dynamic establishment of secure
communications between the Observer and the UAS pilot seems to have
been contemplated by the FAA UAS ID and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC) in their [Recommendations], it is not addressed in
any of the subsequent proposed regulations or technical
specifications.
The need for near-universal deployment of UAS RID is pressing. This
implies the need to support use by Observers of already ubiquitous
mobile devices (typically smartphones and tablets). Anticipating
likely CAA requirements to support legacy devices, especially in
light of [Recommendations], [F3411-19] specifies that any UAS sending
Broadcast RID over Bluetooth must do so over Bluetooth 4, regardless
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of whether it also does so over newer versions; as UAS sender devices
and Observer receiver devices are unpaired, this implies extremely
short "advertisement" (beacon) frames.
UA onboard RID devices are severely constrained in Cost, Size, Weight
and Power ($SWaP). Cost is a significant impediment to the necessary
near-universal adoption of UAS send and Observer receive RID
capabilities. $SWaP is a burden not only on the designers of new UA
for production and sale, but also on owners of existing UA that must
be retrofit. Radio Controlled (RC) aircraft modelers, "hams" who use
licensed amateur radio frequencies to control UAS, drone hobbyists
and others who custom build UAS all need means of participating in
UAS RID sensitive to both generic $SWaP and application-specific
considerations.
To accommodate the most severely constrained cases, all these
conspire to motivate system design decisions, especially for the
Broadcast RID data link, which complicate the protocol design
problem: one-way links; extremely short packets; and Internet-
disconnected operation of UA onboard devices. Internet-disconnected
operation of Observer devices has been deemed by ASTM F38.02 too
infrequent to address, but for some users is important and presents
further challenges.
Despite work by regulators and Standards Development Organizations
(SDOs), there are substantial gaps in UAS standards generally and UAS
RID specifically. [Roadmap] catalogs UAS related standards, ongoing
standardization activities and gaps (as of early 2020); Section 7.8
catalogs those related specifically to UAS RID.
Given not only packet payload length and bandwidth, but also
processing and storage within the $SWaP constraints of very small
(e.g. consumer toy) UA, heavyweight cryptographic security protocols
are infeasible, yet trustworthiness of UAS RID information is
essential. Under [F3411-19], even the most basic datum, the UAS ID
string (typically number) itself can be merely an unsubstantiated
claim. Observer devices being ubiquitous, thus popular targets for
malware or other compromise, cannot be generally trusted (although
the user of each device is compelled to trust that device, to some
extent); a "fair witness" functionality (inspired by [Stranger]) is
desirable.
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1.3. DRIP Scope
DRIP's initial goal is to make RID immediately actionable, in both
Internet and local-only connected scenarios (especially emergencies),
in severely constrained UAS environments, balancing legitimate (e.g.,
public safety) authorities' Need To Know trustworthy information with
UAS operators' privacy. By "immediately actionable" is meant
information of sufficient precision, accuracy, timeliness, etc. for
an Observer to use it as the basis for immediate decisive action,
whether that be to trigger a defensive counter-UAS system, to attempt
to initiate communications with the UAS operator, to accept the
presence of the UAS in the airspace where/when observed as not
requiring further action, or whatever, with potentially severe
consequences of any action or inaction chosen based on that
information. Potential follow-on goals may extend beyond providing
timely and trustworthy identification data, to using it to enable
identity-oriented networking of UAS.
DRIP (originally Trustworthy Multipurpose Remote Identification, TM-
RID) potentially could be applied to verifiably identify other types
of registered things reported to be in specified physical locations,
but the urgent motivation and clear initial focus is UAS. Existing
Internet resources (protocol standards, services, infrastructure, and
business models) should be leveraged. A natural Internet based
architecture for UAS RID conforming to proposed regulations and
external technical standards is described in a companion architecture
document [drip-architecture] and elaborated in other DRIP documents;
this document describes only relevant requirements and defines
terminology for the set of DRIP documents.
2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Definitions
This section defines a set of terms expected to be used in DRIP
documents. This list is meant to be the DRIP terminology reference.
Some of the terms listed below are not used in this document.
[RFC4949] provides a glossary of Internet security terms that should
be used where applicable. In the UAS community, the plural form of
acronyms generally is the same as the singular form, e.g. Unmanned
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Aircraft System (singular) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (plural) are
both represented as UAS. On this and other terminological issues, to
encourage comprehension necessary for adoption of DRIP by the
intended user community, that community's norms are respected herein,
and definitions are quoted in cases where they have been found in
that community's documents.
$SWaP
Cost, Size, Weight and Power.
AAA
Attestation, Authentication, Authorization, Access Control,
Accounting, Attribution, Audit, or any subset thereof (uses differ
by application, author and context).
ABDAA
AirBorne DAA. Accomplished using systems onboard the aircraft
involved. Also known as "self-separation".
ADS-B
Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast. "ADS-B Out"
equipment obtains aircraft position from other on-board systems
(typically GNSS) and periodically broadcasts it to "ADS-B In"
equipped entities, including other aircraft, ground stations and
satellite based monitoring systems.
AGL
Above Ground Level. Relative altitude, above the variously
defined local ground level, typically of an UA, measured in feet
or meters.
ATC
Air Traffic Control. Explicit flight direction to pilots from
ground controllers. Contrast with ATM.
ATM
Air Traffic Management. A broader functional and geographic scope
and/or a higher layer of abstraction than ATC. "The dynamic,
integrated management of air traffic and airspace including air
traffic services, airspace management and air traffic flow
management - safely, economically and efficiently - through the
provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration
with all parties and involving airborne and ground-based
functions." [ICAOATM]
Authentication Message
F3411 Message Type 2. Provides framing for authentication data,
only.
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Basic ID Message
F3411 Message Type 0. Provides UA Type, UAS ID Type and UAS ID,
only.
BLOS
Beyond Line Of Sight (LOS). Term to be avoided due to ambiguity.
See LOS.
BVLOS
Beyond Visual Line Of Sight (V-LOS). See V-LOS.
CAA
Civil Aviation Authority. Two examples are the United States
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Union
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
C2
Command and Control. A set of organizational and technical
attributes and processes that employs human, physical, and
information resources to solve problems and accomplish missions.
Previously primarily used in military contexts. In the UAS
context, typically refers to the link between GCS and UA over
which the former controls the latter.
DAA
Detect And Avoid, formerly Sense And Avoid (SAA). A means of
keeping aircraft "well clear" of each other for safety.
Direct RID
Direct Remote Identification. Per [Delegated], "a system that
ensures the local broadcast of information about a UA in
operation, including the marking of the UA, so that this
information can be obtained without physical access to the UA".
Requirement could be met with ASTM Broadcast RID: Basic ID message
with UAS ID Type 1; Location/Vector message; Operator ID message;
System Message. Corresponds roughly to the Broadcast RID portion
of FAA NPRM Standard RID.
E2E
End to End.
EUROCAE
European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment. Aviation SDO,
originally European, now with broader membership. Cooperates
extensively with RTCA.
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GBDAA
Ground Based DAA. Accomplished with the aid of ground based
functions.
GCS
Ground Control Station. The part of the UAS that the remote pilot
uses to exercise C2 over the UA, whether by remotely exercising UA
flight controls to fly the UA, by setting GPS waypoints, or
otherwise directing its flight.
GNSS
Global Navigation Satellite System. Satellite based timing and/or
positioning with global coverage, often used to support
navigation.
GPS
Global Positioning System. A specific GNSS, but in this context,
the term is typically misused in place of the more generic term
GNSS.
GRAIN
Global Resilient Aviation Interoperable Network. Putative ICAO
managed IPv6 overlay internetwork per IATF.
IATF
International Aviation Trust Framework. ICAO effort to develop a
resilient and secure by design framework for networking in support
of all aspects of aviation.
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organization. A United Nations
specialized agency that develops and harmonizes international
standards relating to aviation.
LAANC
Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability. Supports
ATC authorization requirements for UAS operations: remote pilots
can apply to receive a near real-time authorization for operations
under 400 feet in controlled airspace near airports. US partial
stopgap until UTM comes.
Limited RID
Per the FAA NPRM, a mode of operation that must use Network RID,
must not use Broadcast RID, and must provide pilot/GCS location
only (not UA location). This mode is only allowed for UA that
neither require (due to e.g. size) nor are equipped for Standard
RID, operated within V-LOS and within 400 feet of the pilot, below
400 feet AGL, etc.
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Location/Vector Message
F3411 Message Type 1. Provides UA location, altitude, heading and
speed, only.
LOS
Line Of Sight. An adjectival phrase describing any information
transfer that travels in a nearly straight line (e.g.
electromagnetic energy, whether in the visual light, RF or other
frequency range) and is subject to blockage. A term to be avoided
due to ambiguity, in this context, between RF-LOS and V-LOS.
MSL
Mean Sea Level. Relative altitude, above the variously defined
mean sea level, typically of an UA (but in FAA NPRM also for a
GCS), measured in or meters.
Net-RID DP
Network RID Display Provider. Logical entity that aggregates data
from Net-RID SPs as needed in response to user queries regarding
UAS operating within specified airspace volumes, to enable display
by a user application on a user device. Potentially could provide
not only information sent via UAS RID but also information
retrieved from UAS RID registries, or information beyond UAS RID,
regarding subscribed USS. Under the FAA NPRM, not recognized as a
distinct entity, but a service provided by USS, including Public
Safety USS that may exist primarily for this purpose rather than
to manage any subscribed UAS.
Net-RID SP
Network RID Service Provider. Logical entity that collects RID
messages from UAS and responds to NetRID-DP queries for
information on UAS of which it is aware. Under the FAA NPRM, the
USS to which the UAS is subscribed ("Remote ID USS").
Network Identification Service
EU regulatory requirement for Network RID. Requirement could be
met with ASTM Network RID: Basic ID message with UAS ID Type 1;
Location/Vector message; Operator ID message; System Message.
Corresponds roughly to the Network RID portion of FAA NPRM
Standard RID.
Observer
An entity (typically but not necessarily an individual human) who
has directly or indirectly observed an UA and wishes to know
something about it, starting with its ID. An observer typically
is on the ground and local (within VLOS of an observed UA), but
could be remote (observing via Network RID or other surveillance),
operating another UA, aboard another aircraft , etc.
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Operation
A flight, or series of flights of the same mission, by the same
UAS, in the same airspace volume, separated by at most brief
ground intervals.
Operator
"A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to
engage in an aircraft operation." [ICAOUTM]
Operator ID Message
F3411 Message Type 5. Provides CAA issued Operator ID, only.
Operator ID is distinct from UAS ID.
PIC
Pilot In Command. "The pilot designated by the operator, or in
the case of general aviation, the owner, as being in command and
charged with the safe conduct of a flight." [ICAOATM]
PII
Personally Identifiable Information. In this context, typically
of the UAS operator, Pilot In Command (PIC) or remote pilot, but
possibly of an observer or other party.
Remote Pilot
A pilot using a GCS to exercise proximate control of an UA.
Either the PIC or under the supervision of the PIC.
RF-LOS
RF LOS. Typically used in describing operation of a direct radio
link between a GCS and the UA under its control, potentially
subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other
vehicles, but less so than V-LOS.
RTCA
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. US aviation SDO.
Cooperates extensively with EUROCAE.
Self-ID Message
F3411 Message Type 3. Provides a 1 byte descriptor and 23 byte
ASCII free text field, only. Expected to be used to provide
context on the operation, e.g. mission intent.
Standard RID
Per the FAA NPRM, a mode of operation that must use both Network
RID (if Internet connectivity is available at the time in the
operating area) and Broadcast RID (always and everywhere), and
must provide both pilot/GCS location and UA location. This mode
is required for UAS that exceed the allowed envelope (e.g. size,
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range) of Limited RID and for all UAS equipped for Standard RID
(even if operated within parameters that would otherwise permit
Limited RID). The Broadcast RID portion corresponds roughly to EU
Direct RID; the Network RID portion corresponds roughly to EU
Network Identification Service.
SDO
Standards Development Organization. ASTM, IETF, et al.
SDSP
Supplemental Data Service Provider. An entity that participates
in the UTM system, but provides services beyond those specified as
basic UTM system functions. E.g., provides weather data.
System Message
F3411 Message Type 4. Provides general UAS information, including
remote pilot location, multiple UA group operational area, etc.
U-space
EU concept and emerging framework for integration of UAS into all
classes of airspace, specifically including high density urban
areas, sharing airspace with manned aircraft.
UA
Unmanned Aircraft. An aircraft which is intended to operate with
no pilot on board. In popular parlance, "drone".
UAS
Unmanned Aircraft System. Composed of UA, all required on-board
subsystems, payload, control station, other required off-board
subsystems, any required launch and recovery equipment, all
required crew members, and C2 links between UA and control
station.
UAS ID
UAS identifier. Although called "UAS ID", unique to the UA:
neither to the operator (as previous registration numbers have
been assigned), nor to the combination of GCS and UA that comprise
the UAS. Per [F3411-19]: maximum length of 20 bytes; see
Section 1.1, Paragraph 7 for currently defined values.
UAS ID Type
Identifier type index. Per [F3411-19], 4 bits, values 0-3 already
specified.
UAS RID
UAS Remote Identification. System for identifying UA during
flight by other parties.
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UAS RID Verification Service
System component designed to handle the authentication
requirements of RID by offloading verification to a web hosted
service.
USS
UAS Service Supplier. "A USS is an entity that assists UAS
Operators with meeting UTM operational requirements that enable
safe and efficient use of airspace" and "... provide services to
support the UAS community, to connect Operators and other entities
to enable information flow across the USS Network, and to promote
shared situational awareness among UTM participants" per [CONOPS].
UTM
UAS Traffic Management. Per ICAO, "A specific aspect of air
traffic management which manages UAS operations safely,
economically and efficiently through the provision of facilities
and a seamless set of services in collaboration with all parties
and involving airborne and ground-based functions." In the US,
per FAA, a "traffic management" ecosystem for "uncontrolled" low
altitude UAS operations, separate from, but complementary to, the
FAA's ATC system for "controlled" operations of manned aircraft.
V-LOS
Visual LOS. Typically used in describing operation of an UA by a
"remote" pilot who can clearly directly (without video cameras or
any other aids other than glasses or under some rules binoculars)
see the UA and its immediate flight environment. Potentially
subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other
vehicles, more so than RF-LOS.
3. UAS RID Problem Space
UA may be fixed wing Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL), rotary wing
(e.g., helicopter) Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL), or hybrid.
They may be single engine or multi engine. The most common today are
multicopters: rotary wing, multi engine. The explosion in UAS was
enabled by hobbyist development, for multicopters, of advanced flight
stability algorithms, enabling even inexperienced pilots to take off,
fly to a location of interest, hover, and return to the take-off
location or land at a distance. UAS can be remotely piloted by a
human (e.g., with a joystick) or programmed to proceed from Global
Positioning System (GPS) waypoint to waypoint in a weak form of
autonomy; stronger autonomy is coming. UA are "low observable": they
typically have a small radar cross section; they make noise quite
noticeable at short range but difficult to detect at distances they
can quickly close (500 meters in under 17 seconds at 60 knots); they
typically fly at low altitudes (for the small UAS to which RID
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applies in the US, under 400 feet AGL); they are highly maneuverable
so can fly under trees and between buildings.
UA can carry payloads including sensors, cyber and kinetic weapons,
or can be used themselves as weapons by flying them into targets.
They can be flown by clueless, careless or criminal operators. Thus
the most basic function of UAS RID is "Identification Friend or Foe"
(IFF) to mitigate the significant threat they present. Numerous
other applications can be enabled or facilitated by RID: consider the
importance of identifiers in many Internet protocols and services.
Network RID from the UA itself (rather than from its GCS) and
Broadcast RID require one or more wireless data links from the UA,
but such communications are challenging due to $SWaP constraints and
low altitude flight amidst structures and foliage over terrain.
Disambiguation of multiple UA flying in close proximity may be very
challenging, even if each is reporting its identity, position and
velocity as accurately as it can.
3.1. Network RID
Network RID has several variants. The UA may have persistent onboard
Internet connectivity, in which case it can consistently source RID
information directly over the Internet. The UA may have intermittent
onboard Internet connectivity, in which case the GCS must source RID
information whenever the UA itself is offline. The UA may not have
Internet connectivity of its own, but have instead some other form of
communications to another node that can relay RID information to the
Internet; this would typically be the GCS (which to perform its
function must know where the UA is).
The UA may have no means of sourcing RID information, in which case
the GCS must source it; this is typical under FAA NPRM Limited RID
proposed rules, which require providing the location of the GCS (not
that of the UA). In the extreme case, this could be the pilot using
a web browser/application to designate, to an UAS Service Supplier
(USS) or other UTM entity, a time-bounded airspace volume in which an
operation will be conducted; this may impede disambiguation of ID if
multiple UAS operate in the same or overlapping spatio-temporal
volumes.
In most cases in the near term, if the RID information is fed to the
Internet directly by the UA or GCS, the first hop data links will be
cellular Long Term Evolution (LTE) or Wi-Fi, but provided the data
link can support at least UDP/IP and ideally also TCP/IP, its type is
generally immaterial to the higher layer protocols. An UAS as the
ultimate source of Network RID information feeds an USS acting as a
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Network RID Service Provider (Net-RID SP), which essentially proxies
for that and other sources; an observer or other ultimate consumer of
Network RID information obtains it from a Network RID Display
Provider (Net-RID DP), which aggregates information from multiple
Net-RID SPs to offer coverage of an airspace volume of interest.
Network RID Service and Display providers are expected to be
implemented as servers in well-connected infrastructure, accessible
via typical means such as web APIs/browsers.
Network RID is the more flexible and less constrained of the defined
UAS RID means, but is only partially specified in [F3411-19]. It is
presumed that IETF efforts supporting Broadcast RID (see next
section) can be easily generalized for Network RID.
3.2. Broadcast RID
[F3411-19] specifies three Broadcast RID data links: Bluetooth 4.X;
Bluetooth 5.X Long Range; and Wi-Fi with Neighbor Awareness
Networking (NAN). For compliance with [F3411-19], an UA must
broadcast (using advertisement mechanisms where no other option
supports broadcast) on at least one of these; if broadcasting on
Bluetooth 5.x, it is also required concurrently to do so on 4.x
(referred to in [F3411-19] as Bluetooth Legacy).
The selection of the Broadcast media was driven by research into what
is commonly available on 'ground' units (smartphones and tablets) and
what was found as prevalent or 'affordable' in UA. Further, there
must be an Application Programming Interface (API) for the observer's
receiving application to have access to these messages. As yet only
Bluetooth 4.X support is readily available, thus the current focus is
on working within the 26 byte limit of the Bluetooth 4.X "Broadcast
Frame" transmitted on beacon channels. After nominal overheads, this
limits the UAS ID string to a maximum length of 20 bytes, and
precludes the same frame carrying position, velocity and other
information that should be bound to the UAS ID, much less strong
authentication data. This requires segmentation ("paging") of longer
messages or message bundles ("Message Pack"), and/or correlation of
short messages (anticipated by ASTM to be done on the basis of
Bluetooth 4 MAC address, which is weak and unverifiable).
3.3. DRIP Focus
DRIP will focus on making information obtained via UAS RID
immediately usable:
1. by making it trustworthy (despite the severe constraints of
Broadcast RID);
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2. by enabling verification that an UAS is registered, and if so, in
which registry (for classification of trusted operators on the
basis of known registry vetting, even by observers lacking
Internet connectivity at observation time);
3. by facilitating independent reports of UA's aeronautical data
(location, velocity, etc.) to confirm or refute the operator
self-reports upon which UAS RID and UTM tracking are based;
4. by enabling instant establishment, by authorized parties, of
secure communications with the remote pilot.
Any UA can assert any ID using the [F3411-19] required Basic ID
message, which lacks any provisions for verification. The Position/
Vector message likewise lacks provisions for verification, and does
not contain the ID, so must be correlated somehow with a Basic ID
message: the developers of [F3411-19] have suggested using the MAC
addresses, but these may be randomized by the operating system stack
to avoid the adversarial correlation problems of static identifiers.
The [F3411-19] optional Authentication Message specifies framing for
authentication data, but does not specify any authentication method,
and the maximum length of the specified framing is too short for
conventional digital signatures and far too short for conventional
certificates. The one-way nature of Broadcast RID precludes
challenge-response security protocols (e.g., observers sending nonces
to UA, to be returned in signed messages). An observer would be
seriously challenged to validate the asserted UAS ID or any other
information about the UAS or its operator looked up therefrom.
Further, [F3411-19] provides very limited choices for an observer to
communicate with the pilot, e.g., to request further information on
the UAS operation or exit from an airspace volume in an emergency.
The System Message provides the location of the pilot/GCS, so an
observer could physically go to the asserted GCS location to look for
the remote pilot. An observer with Internet connectivity could look
up operator PII in a registry, then call a phone number in hopes
someone who can immediately influence the UAS operation will answer
promptly during that operation.
Thus complementing [F3411-19] with protocols enabling strong
authentication, preserving operator privacy while enabling immediate
use of information by authorized parties, is critical to achieve
widespread adoption of a RID system supporting safe and secure
operation of UAS.
4. Requirements
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4.1. General
GEN-1 Provable Ownership: DRIP MUST enable verification that the
UAS ID asserted in the Basic ID message is that of the actual
current sender of the message (i.e. the message is not a
replay attack or other spoof, authenticating e.g. by
verifying an asymmetric cryptographic signature using a
sender provided public key from which the asserted ID can be
at least partially derived), even on an observer device
lacking Internet connectivity at the time of observation.
GEN-2 Provable Binding: DRIP MUST enable binding all other F3411
messages from the same actual current sender to the UAS ID
asserted in the Basic ID message.
GEN-3 Provable Registration: DRIP MUST enable verification that the
UAS ID is in a registry and identification of which one, even
on an observer device lacking Internet connectivity at the
time of observation; with UAS ID Type 3, the same sender may
have multiple IDs, potentially in different registries, but
each ID must clearly indicate in which registry it can be
found.
GEN-4 Readability: DRIP MUST enable information (regulation
required elements, whether sent via UAS RID or looked up in
registries) to be read and utilized by both humans and
software.
GEN-5 Gateway: DRIP MUST enable Broadcast RID -> Network RID
application layer gateways to stamp messages with precise
date/time received and receiver location, then relay them to
a network service (e.g. SDSP or distributed ledger), to
support three objectives: mark up a RID message with where
and when it was actually received (which may agree or
disagree with the self-report in the set of messages); defend
against reply attacks; and support optional SDSP services
such as multilateration (to complement UAS position self-
reports with independent measurements).
GEN-6 Finger (placeholder name): DRIP MUST enable dynamically
establishing, with AAA, per policy, E2E strongly encrypted
communications with the UAS RID sender and entities looked up
from the UAS ID, including at least the remote pilot and USS.
GEN-7 QoS: DRIP MUST enable policy based specification of
performance and reliability parameters, such as maximum
message transmission intervals and delivery latencies.
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GEN-8 Mobility: DRIP MUST support physical and logical mobility of
UA, GCS and Observers. DRIP SHOULD support mobility of
essentially all participating nodes (UA, GCS, Observers, Net-
RID SP, Net-RID DP, Private Registry, SDSP).
GEN-9 Multihoming: DRIP MUST support multihoming of UA and GCS, for
make-before-break smooth handoff and resiliency against path/
link failure. DRIP SHOULD support multihoming of essentially
all participating nodes.
GEN-10 Multicast: DRIP SHOULD support multicast for efficient and
flexible publish-subscribe notifications, e.g., of UAS
reporting positions in designated sensitive airspace volumes.
GEN-11 Management: DRIP SHOULD support monitoring of the health and
coverage of Broadcast and Network RID services.
4.2. Identifier
ID-1 Length: The DRIP (UAS) entity [remote] identifier must be no
longer than 20 bytes (per [F3411-19] to fit in a Bluetooth 4
advertisement payload).
ID-2 Registry ID: The DRIP identifier MUST be sufficient to identify
a registry in which the (UAS) entity identified therewith is
listed.
ID-3 Entity ID: The DRIP identifier MUST be sufficient to enable
lookup of other data associated with the (UAS) entity
identified therewith in that registry.
ID-4 Uniqueness: The DRIP identifier MUST be unique within a to-be-
defined scope.
ID-5 Non-spoofability: The DRIP identifier MUST be non-spoofable
within the context of Remote ID broadcast messages (some
collection of messages provides proof of UA ownership of ID).
ID-6 Unlinkability: A DRIP UAS ID MUST NOT facilitate adversarial
correlation over multiple UAS operations; this may be
accomplished e.g. by limiting each identifier to a single use,
but if so, the UAS ID MUST support well-defined scalable timely
registration methods.
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Note that Registry ID and Entity ID are requirements on a single DRIP
entity Identifier, not separate (types of) ID. In the most common
use case, the Entity will be the UA, and the DRIP Identifier will be
the UAS ID; however, other entities may also benefit from having DRIP
identifiers, so the Entity type is not prescribed here.
Whether a UAS ID is generated by the operator, GCS, UA, USS or
registry, or some collaboration thereamong, is unspecified; however,
there must be agreement on the UAS ID among these entities.
4.3. Privacy
PRIV-1 Confidential Handling: DRIP MUST enable confidential handling
of private information (i.e., any and all information
designated by neither cognizant authority nor the information
owner as public, e.g., personal data).
PRIV-2 Encrypted Transport: DRIP MUST enable selective strong
encryption of private data in motion in such a manner that
only authorized actors can recover it. If transport is via
IP, then encryption MUST be end-to-end, at or above the IP
layer. DRIP MUST NOT encrypt safety critical data to be
transmitted over Broadcast RID unless also concurrently
sending that data via Network RID and obtaining frequent
confirmations of receipt.
PRIV-3 Encrypted Storage: DRIP SHOULD facilitate selective strong
encryption of private data at rest in such a manner that only
authorized actors can recover it.
How information is stored on end systems is out of scope for DRIP.
Encouraging privacy best practices, including end system storage
encryption, by facilitating it with protocol design reflecting such
considerations, is in scope.
4.4. Registries
REG-1 Public Lookup: DRIP MUST enable lookup, from the UAS ID, of
information designated by cognizant authority as public, and
MUST NOT restrict access to this information based on identity
of the party submitting the query.
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REG-2 Private Lookup: DRIP MUST enable lookup of private information
(i.e., any and all information in a registry, associated with
the UAS ID, that is designated by neither cognizant authority
nor the information owner as public), and MUST, per policy,
enforce AAA, including restriction of access to this
information based on identity of the party submitting the
query.
REG-3 Provisioning: DRIP MUST enable provisioning registries with
static information on the UAS and its operator, dynamic
information on its current operation within the UTM (including
means by which the USS under which the UAS is operating may be
contacted for further, typically even more dynamic,
information), and Internet direct contact information for
services related to the foregoing.
REG-4 AAA Policy: DRIP MUST enable closing the AAA-policy registry
loop by governing AAA per registered policies and
administering policies only via AAA.
5. Discussion and Limitations
This document is largely based on the process of one SDO, ASTM.
Therefore, it is tailored to specific needs and data formats of this
standard. Other organizations, for example in EU, do not necessary
follow the same architecture. IETF traditionally operates assuming
the source material for the standardization process is publicly
available. However, ASTM standards require a fee for download.
Therefore a double-liaison program at IETF might need to be
activated, providing free access to ASTM specifications for
contributors to IETF documents.
The need for drone ID and operator privacy is an open discussion
topic. For instance, in the ground vehicular domain each car carries
a publicly visible plate number. In some countries, for nominal cost
or even for free, anyone can resolve the identity and contact
information of the owner. Civil commercial aviation and maritime
industries also have a tradition of broadcasting plane or ship ID,
coordinates and even flight plans in plain text. Community networks
such as OpenSky and Flightradar use this open information through
ADS-B to deploy public services of flight tracking. Many researchers
also use these data to perform optimization of routes and airport
operations. Such ID information should be integrity protected, but
not necessarily confidential.
In civil aviation, aircraft identity is broadcast by a device known
as transponder. It transmits a four-digit squawk code, which is
assigned by a traffic controller to an airplane after approving a
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flight plan. There are several reserved codes such as 7600 which
indicate radio communication failure. The codes are unique in each
traffic area and can be re-assigned when entering another control
area. The code is transmitted in plain text by the transponder and
also used for collision avoidance by a system known as Traffic alert
and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). The system could be used for
UAS as well initially, but the code space is quite limited and likely
to be exhausted soon. The number of UAS far exceeds the number of
civil airplanes in operation.
The ADS-B system is utilized in civil aviation for each "ADS-B Out"
equipped airplane to broadcast its ID, coordinates and altitude for
other airplanes and ground control stations. If this system is
adopted for drone IDs, it has additional benefit with backward
compatibility with civil aviation infrastructure; then, pilots and
dispatchers will be able to see UA on their control screens and take
those into account. If not, a gateway translation system between the
proposed drone ID and civil aviation system should be implemented.
Again, system saturation due to large numbers of UAS is a concern.
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth are two wireless technologies currently
recommended by ASTM specifications due to their widespread use and
broadcast nature. However, those have limited range (max 100s of
meters) and may not reliably deliver UAS ID at high altitude or
distance. Therefore, a study should be made of alternative
technologies from the telecom domain (WiMax, 5G) or sensor networks
(Sigfox, LORA). Such transmission technologies can impose additional
restrictions on packet sizes and frequency of transmissions, but
could provide better energy efficiency and range. In civil aviation,
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) is used to transmit
command and control between the pilots and ATC. It could be
considered for UAS as well due to long range and proven use despite
its lack of security [cpdlc].
L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) is being
standardized by ICAO and IETF for use in future civil aviation
[I-D.maeurer-raw-ldacs]. It provides secure communication,
positioning and control for aircraft using a dedicated radio band.
It should be analyzed as a potential provider for UAS RID as well.
This will bring the benefit of a global integrated system creating a
global airspace use awareness.
6. IANA Considerations
This document does not make any IANA request.
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7. Security Considerations
DRIP is all about safety and security, so content pertaining to such
is not limited to this section. Potential vulnerabilities of DRIP
include but are not limited to:
* Sybil attacks
* Confusion created by many spoofed unsigned messages
* Processing overload induced by attempting to verify many spoofed
signed messages (where verification will fail but still consume
cycles)
* Malicious or malfunctioning registries
* Interception of (e.g. Man In The Middle attacks on) registration
messages
8. Privacy and Transparency Considerations
Privacy is closely related to but not synonomous with security, and
conflicts with transparency. Privacy and transparency are important
for legal reasons including regulatory consistency. [EU2018]
[EU2018]states "harmonised and interoperable national registration
systems... should comply with the applicable Union and national law
on privacy and processing of personal data, and the information
stored in those registration systems should be easily accessible."
Privacy and transparency (where essential to security or safety) are
also ethical and moral imperatives. Even in cases where old
practices (e.g. automobile registration plates) could be imitated,
when new applications involving PII (such as UAS RID) are addressed
and newer technologies could enable improving privacy, such
opportunities should not be squandered. Thus is is recommended that
all DRIP documents give due regard to [RFC6973] and more broadly
[RFC8280].
DRIP information falls into two classes: that which, to achieve the
purpose, must be published openly as cleartext, for the benefit of
any Observer (e.g. the basic UAS ID itself); and that which must be
protected (e.g., PII of pilots) but made available to properly
authorized parties (e.g., public safety personnel who urgently need
to contact pilots in emergencies). This classification must be made
explicit and reflected with markings, design, etc. Classifying the
information will be addressed primarily in external standards; herein
it will be regarded as a matter for CAA, registry and operator
policies, for which enforcement mechanisms will be defined within the
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scope of DRIP WG and offered. Details of the protection mechanisms
will be provided in other DRIP documents. Mitigation of adversarial
correlation will also be addressed.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References
[CONOPS] FAA Office of NextGen, "UTM Concept of Operations v2.0",
March 2020.
[cpdlc] Gurtov, A., Polishchuk, T., and M. Wernberg, "Controller-
Pilot Data Link Communication Security", MDPI
Sensors 18(5), 1636, 2018,
<https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/18/5/1636>.
[crowd-sourced-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Zhao, S., and
H. Birkholz, "Crowd Sourced Remote ID", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-drip-crowd-sourced-rid-04,
20 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-
drip-crowd-sourced-rid-04>.
[CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
September 2019.
[Delegated]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on
unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators
of unmanned aircraft systems", March 2019.
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[drip-architecture]
Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., Zhao, S., and
A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-arch-02, 23 June 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-drip-arch-02>.
[drip-auth]
Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP
Authentication Formats", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth-01, 10 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth-
01>.
[drip-identity-claims]
Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP
Identity Claims", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims-00, 23 March 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wiethuechter-drip-
identity-claims-00>.
[drip-secure-nrid-c2]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"Secure UAS Network RID and C2 Transport", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-drip-secure-
nrid-c2-00, 6 April 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-moskowitz-drip-secure-nrid-c2-00>.
[drip-uas-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-02, 28 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-
02>.
[EU2018] European Parliament and Council, "2015/0277 (COD) PE-CONS
2/18", February 2018.
[F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking",
December 2019.
[hhit-registries]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HIT Registries", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-02, 9 March
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hhit-registries-02>.
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[hierarchical-hit]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-05, 13 May
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hierarchical-hit-05>.
[I-D.maeurer-raw-ldacs]
Maeurer, N., Graeupl, T., and C. Schmitt, "L-band Digital
Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-04, 2
July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-04>.
[ICAOATM] International Civil Aviation Organization, "Doc 4444:
Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Air Traffic
Management", November 2016.
[ICAOUTM] International Civil Aviation Organization, "Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM) - A Common
Framework with Core Principles for Global Harmonization,
Edition 2", November 2019.
[Implementing]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on
the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned
aircraft", May 2019.
[new-hip-crypto]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "New
Cryptographic Algorithms for HIP", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04, 23
January 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04>.
[new-orchid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "Using
cSHAKE in ORCHIDs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-moskowitz-orchid-cshake-01, 21 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-orchid-
cshake-01>.
[NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019.
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[Recommendations]
FAA UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking
Committee, "UAS ID and Tracking ARC Recommendations Final
Report", September 2017.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC8280] ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights
Protocol Considerations", RFC 8280, DOI 10.17487/RFC8280,
October 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8280>.
[Roadmap] American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Standardization Collaborative (UASSC),
"Standardization Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
draft v2.0", April 2020.
[Stranger] Heinlein, R.A., "Stranger in a Strange Land", June 1961.
[WG105] European Parliament and Council, "EUROCAE WG-105 draft
Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Electronic
Identification"", June 2020.
Acknowledgments
The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM
[F3411-19] and IETF DRIP efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in
balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the
necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID. IETF
volunteers who have contributed to this draft include Amelia
Andersdotter, Mohamed Boucadair, Toerless Eckert, Susan Hares, Mika
Järvenpää, Daniel Migault, Saulo Da Silva and Shuai
Zhao.
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Internet-Draft DRIP Reqs July 2020
Authors' Addresses
Stuart W. Card (editor)
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com
Adam Wiethuechter
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com
Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI 48237
United States of America
Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
Andrei Gurtov
Linköping University
IDA
SE-58183 Linköping
Sweden
Email: gurtov@acm.org
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