%% You should probably cite draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-12 instead of this revision.
@techreport{ietf-emu-aka-pfs-10,
    number =    {draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-10},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs/10/},
    author =    {Jari Arkko and Karl Norrman and Vesa Torvinen and John Preuß Mattsson},
    title =     {{Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' FS)}},
    pagetotal = 32,
    year =      2023,
    month =     jan,
    day =       26,
    abstract =  {Many different attacks have been reported as part of revelations associated with pervasive surveillance. Some of the reported attacks involved compromising the smart card supply chain, such as attacking SIM card manufacturers and operators in an effort to compromise shared secrets stored on these cards. Since the publication of those reports, manufacturing and provisioning processes have gained much scrutiny and have improved. However, the danger of resourceful attackers for these systems is still a concern. Always assuming breach such as key compromise and minimizing the impact of breach are essential zero-trust principles. This specification updates RFC 9048, the improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3GPP Mobile Network Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA'), with an optional extension. Similarly, this specification also updates the earlier version of the EAP-AKA' specification in RFC 5448. The extension, when negotiated, provides Forward Secrecy for the session key generated as a part of the authentication run in EAP-AKA'. This prevents an attacker who has gained access to the long-term pre-shared secret in a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card from being able to decrypt any past communications. In addition, if the attacker stays merely a passive eavesdropper, the extension prevents attacks against future sessions. This forces attackers to use active attacks instead.},
}