EAP Mutual Cryptographic Binding
draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind-02

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Last updated 2013-02-25
Replaces draft-hartman-emu-mutual-crypto-bind
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Network Working Group                                         S. Hartman
Internet-Draft                                              M. Wasserman
Intended status: Informational                         Painless Security
Expires: August 29, 2013                                        D. Zhang
                                                                  Huawei
                                                       February 25, 2013

                    EAP Mutual Cryptographic Binding
                   draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind-02.txt

Abstract

   As the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) evolves, EAP peers
   rely increasingly on information received from the EAP server.  EAP
   extensions such as channel binding or network posture information are
   often carried in tunnel methods; peers are likely to rely on this
   information.  [RFC 3748] is a facility that protects tunnel methods
   against man-in-the-middle attacks.  However, cryptographic binding
   focuses on protecting the server rather than the peer.  This memo
   explores attacks possible when the peer is not protected from man-in-
   the-middle attacks and recommends mutual cryptographic binding, a new
   form of cryptographic binding that protects both peer and server
   along with other mitigations.

Hartman, et al.          Expires August 29, 2013                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            Mutual Crypto Binding            February 2013

Keywords for Requirement Levels

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 29, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Hartman, et al.          Expires August 29, 2013                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft            Mutual Crypto Binding            February 2013

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  An Example Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  The Server insertion Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.1.  Conditions for the Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.2.  Mitigation Strategies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.2.1.  Server Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.2.2.  Server Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.2.3.  Existing Cryptographic Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       3.2.4.  IntroducingEMSK-based Cryptographic Binding  . . . . . 14
       3.2.5.  Mix Key into Long-Term Credentials . . . . . . . . . . 15
     3.3.  Intended Intermediates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   4.  Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.1.  Mutual Cryptographic Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.2.  State Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.3.  Certificate Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     4.4.  Inner Mixing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   5.  Survey of Tunnel Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     5.1.  Tunneled Eap Method (TEAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     5.2.  Flexible Authentication through Secure Tunneling (FAST)  . 19
     5.3.  Tunneled Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS) . . . . . . . 19
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