Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Mutual Cryptographic Binding
draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind-04

[Ballot comment]

3.2.3: this confused me "First, the server and peer
prove to each other knowledge of the inner MSK.  Then, the
inner MSK is combined into some outer key material to form
the tunnel's keys."  Reading that, the implication would
be that I form a tunnel, then inside the tunnel do EAP
resulting in the inner MSK, and after that I "form the
tunnel's keys" which seems impossible as I've used the
tunnel already so how can I "form" its keys? Do you
mean "confirm" instead? (And a nit: "combined into"
seems odd, "combined with" would be clearer for me.)

IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

IANA has reviewed draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind-04, which is currently in Last Call, and has the following comments:

IANA notes that this document does not contain a standard IANA Considerations section. After examining the draft, IANA understands that, upon approval of this document, there are no IANA Actions that need completion.

If this assessment is not accurate, please respond as soon as possible.

The following Last Call announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC:
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (EAP Mutual Cryptographic Binding) to Informational RFC


The IESG has received a request from the EAP Method Update WG (emu) to
consider the following document:
- 'EAP Mutual Cryptographic Binding'
  as Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-07-25. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  As the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) evolves, EAP peers
  rely increasingly on information received from the EAP server.  EAP
  extensions such as channel binding or network posture information are
  often carried in tunnel methods; peers are likely to rely on this
  information.  RFC 3748 is a facility that protects tunnel methods
  against man-in-the-middle attacks.  However, cryptographic binding
  focuses on protecting the server rather than the peer.  This memo
  explores attacks possible when the peer is not protected from man-in-
  the-middle attacks and recommends mutual cryptographic binding, a new
  form of cryptographic binding that protects both peer and server
  along with other mitigations.




The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,
Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)?

Informational.

Why is this the proper type of RFC?

It explores attacks on EAP tunneled methods, and makes
recommendations for how these attacks can be mitigated. It does not
provide a protocol.

Is this type of RFC indicated in the title page header?

Yes.


(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent
examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections:


Technical Summary:

EAP tunneled methods require that EAP peers rely on information from
the EAP server. Various security related information is carried
inside of the tunnel, and are used by the peers. Methods exist to
protect the peers against MITM attacks. The document discusses
attacks on the tunneled data, and recommends mutual cryptographic
binding to protect both parties.

Working Group Summary:

The docuemnt records the consensus of the WG as developed over the
last year. Any controversy about the contents has been resolved by
updates to the document, and WG consensus was not rough.

Document Quality:

The document provides a clear description of the attacks and
recommended solutions. There are no protocol changes in the
document, so no implementations are required.

Personnel:

The Document Shepherd is Alan DeKok.

The Responsible Area Director is Sean Turner.

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by
the Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not ready
for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to
the IESG.

I have reviewed each iteration of the document as it progressed
through the working group. The document accurately reflects the
consensus of the working group and is ready for publication.q

(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or
breadth of the reviews that have been performed?

No. The document has had a number of reviews from knowledgable
participants in the working group.

(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from
broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,
DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that
took place.

The document is focussed on security. Many secdir members have
reviewed the document.

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document
Shepherd has with this document that the Responsible Area Director
and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is
uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns
whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has
discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to
advance the document, detail those concerns here.

There are no concerns that the IESG should be aware of.

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR
disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP
78 and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why?

Yes.

(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document? If
so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR
disclosures.

No IPR disclosures have been filed in relation to this document.

(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others
being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it?

The WG consensus is strong, across a number of individuals.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

No appeals have been threatened. No extreme discontent has been
indicated.

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this
document. (See http://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the
Internet-Drafts Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this
check needs to be thorough.

** The document seems to lack an IANA Considerations section. (See
Section
2.2 of http://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist for how to handle the case
when there are no actions for IANA.)

No IANA considerations is necessary for this document.

== Missing Reference: 'RFC 3748' is mentioned on line 18, but not defined

== Outdated reference: draft-ietf-emu-chbind has been published as RFC
6677

== Outdated reference: A later version (-06) exists of
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tunnel-method-05

== Outdated reference: draft-ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req has been published as
RFC 6678

== Outdated reference: A later version (-09) exists of
draft-ietf-nea-pt-eap-08

These references can be updated as part of the RFC editor process.

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review
criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

No formal reviews are necessary for this document.

(13) Have all references within this document been identified as
either normative or informative?

Yes. The only normative references are 2119 and 3748 (EAP).
All other references are informative.

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready
for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such
normative references exist, what is the plan for their completion?

No.

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC
3967)? If so, list these downward references to support the Area
Director in the Last Call procedure.

No.

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any
existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed
in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are
not listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to
the part of the document where the relationship of this document to
the other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the
document, explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

Publication of this document will not change the status of any RFCs.

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA
considerations section, especially with regard to its consistency with
the body of the document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that
the document makes are associated with the appropriate reservations in
IANA registries. Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been
clearly identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include
a detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry,
that allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and
a reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC
5226).

This document has no IANA considerations.

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for
future allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would
find useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

This document has no IANA registries.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document
Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal
language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

This document requires no automated validation.