Technical Summary
EAP tunneled methods require that EAP peers rely on information from
the EAP server. Various security related information is carried
inside of the tunnel, and are used by the peers. Methods exist to
protect the peers against MITM attacks. The document discusses
attacks on the tunneled data, and recommends mutual cryptographic
binding to protect both parties.
Working Group Summary
The docuemnt records the consensus of the WG as developed over the
last year. Any controversy about the contents has been resolved by
updates to the document, and WG consensus was not rough.
Document Quality
The document provides a clear description of the attacks and
recommended solutions. There are no protocol changes in the
document, so no implementations are required.
Personnel
Alan DeKok is the doc shepherd.
Sean Turner is the responsible AD.
RFC Editor Note
Please make the following modifications in section 3.2.3:
OLD:
First, the server and peer prove to each other knowledge of
the inner MSK. Then, the inner MSK is combined into some outer key
material to form the tunnel's keys.
NEW:
First, the server and peer prove to each other knowledge of
the inner MSK. Then, the inner MSK is combined with some outer key
material to form the tunnel's EAP keys.