Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Mutual Cryptographic Binding
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From: The IESG <firstname.lastname@example.org> To: IETF-Announce <email@example.com> Cc: RFC Editor <firstname.lastname@example.org>, emu mailing list <email@example.com>, emu chair <firstname.lastname@example.org> Subject: Document Action: 'EAP Mutual Cryptographic Binding' to Informational RFC (draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind-04.txt) The IESG has approved the following document: - 'EAP Mutual Cryptographic Binding' (draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind-04.txt) as Informational RFC This document is the product of the EAP Method Update Working Group. The IESG contact persons are Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell. A URL of this Internet Draft is: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind/
Technical Summary EAP tunneled methods require that EAP peers rely on information from the EAP server. Various security related information is carried inside of the tunnel, and are used by the peers. Methods exist to protect the peers against MITM attacks. The document discusses attacks on the tunneled data, and recommends mutual cryptographic binding to protect both parties. Working Group Summary The docuemnt records the consensus of the WG as developed over the last year. Any controversy about the contents has been resolved by updates to the document, and WG consensus was not rough. Document Quality The document provides a clear description of the attacks and recommended solutions. There are no protocol changes in the document, so no implementations are required. Personnel Alan DeKok is the doc shepherd. Sean Turner is the responsible AD. RFC Editor Note Please make the following modifications in section 3.2.3: OLD: First, the server and peer prove to each other knowledge of the inner MSK. Then, the inner MSK is combined into some outer key material to form the tunnel's keys. NEW: First, the server and peer prove to each other knowledge of the inner MSK. Then, the inner MSK is combined with some outer key material to form the tunnel's EAP keys.