Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-12
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (emu WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | John Preuß Mattsson , Mohit Sethi | ||
| Last updated | 2020-11-15 (Latest revision 2020-11-02) | ||
| Replaces | draft-mattsson-eap-tls13 | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | plain text xml htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
| Reviews |
SECDIR Last Call review
(of
-11)
Has Nits
|
||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Joseph A. Salowey | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2020-05-17 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
(None)
Has enough positions to pass. |
||
| Responsible AD | Roman Danyliw | ||
| Send notices to | Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed |
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-12
Network Working Group J. Mattsson
Internet-Draft M. Sethi
Updates: 5216 (if approved) Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track November 2, 2020
Expires: May 6, 2021
Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-12
Abstract
This document specifies the use of EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 while
remaining backwards compatible with existing implementations of EAP-
TLS. TLS 1.3 provides significantly improved security, privacy, and
reduced latency when compared to earlier versions of TLS. EAP-TLS
with TLS 1.3 further improves security and privacy by mandating use
of privacy and revocation checking. This document also provides
guidance on authorization and resumption for EAP-TLS in general
(regardless of the underlying TLS version used). This document
updates RFC 5216.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Ticket Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.3. Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.4. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.5. No Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.6. Hello Retry Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.7. Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.8. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.9. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2. Identity Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3. Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4. Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements . . . . 16
2.5. EAP State Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3. Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol . . . . . . . . 18
4. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2. Peer and Server Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3. Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.4. Certificate Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.5. Packet Modification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.6. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.7. Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.9. Pervasive Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.10. Discovered Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Updated references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
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1. Introduction
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748],
provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication
methods. EAP-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) [RFC5216] specifies
an EAP authentication method with certificate-based mutual
authentication utilizing the TLS handshake protocol for cryptographic
algorithms and protocol version negotiation, mutual authentication,
and establishment of shared secret keying material. EAP-TLS is
widely supported for authentication and and key establishment in IEEE
802.11 [IEEE-802.11] (Wi-Fi) and IEEE 802.1AE [IEEE-802.1AE] (MACsec)
networks using IEEE 802.1X [IEEE-802.1X] and it's the default
mechanism for certificate based authentication in 3GPP 5G [TS.33.501]
and MulteFire [MulteFire] networks. Many other EAP methods such as
EAP-FAST [RFC4851], EAP-TTLS [RFC5281], TEAP [RFC7170], and PEAP
[PEAP] depend on TLS and EAP-TLS.
EAP-TLS [RFC5216] references TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and TLS 1.1 [RFC4346],
but can also work with TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]. TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are
formally deprecated and prohibited to negotiate and use
[I-D.ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate]. Weaknesses found in TLS 1.2,
as well as new requirements for security, privacy, and reduced
latency has led to the specification of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], which
obsoletes TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]. TLS 1.3 is in large parts a complete
remodeling of the TLS handshake protocol including a different
message flow, different handshake messages, different key schedule,
different cipher suites, different resumption, different privacy
protection, and record padding. This means that significant parts of
the normative text in the previous EAP-TLS specification [RFC5216]
are not applicable to EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 (or higher). Therefore,
aspects such as resumption, privacy handling, and key derivation need
to be appropriately addressed for EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 (or higher).
This document defines how to use EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 (or higher) and
does not change how EAP-TLS is used with older versions of TLS. We
do however provide additional guidance on authorization and
resumption for EAP-TLS in general (regardless of the underlying TLS
version used). While this document updates EAP-TLS [RFC5216], it
remains backwards compatible with it and existing implementations of
EAP-TLS. This document only describes differences compared to
[RFC5216].
In addition to the improved security and privacy offered by TLS 1.3,
there are other significant benefits of using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3.
Privacy is mandatory and achieved without any additional round-trips,
revocation checking is mandatory and simplified with OCSP stapling,
and TLS 1.3 introduces more possibilities to reduce fragmentation
when compared to earlier versions of TLS.
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1.1. Requirements and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts used
in EAP-TLS [RFC5216] and TLS [RFC8446]. The term EAP-TLS peer is
used for the entity acting as EAP peer and TLS client. The term EAP-
TLS server is used for the entity acting as EAP server and TLS
server.
2. Protocol Overview
2.1. Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation
This section updates Section 2.1 of [RFC5216].
TLS 1.3 changes both the message flow and the handshake messages
compared to earlier versions of TLS. Therefore, much of Section 2.1
of [RFC5216] does not apply for TLS 1.3 (or higher).
After receiving an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS as
described in [RFC5216] the conversation will continue with the TLS
handshake protocol encapsulated in the data fields of EAP-Response
and EAP-Request packets. When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3
or higher, the formatting and processing of the TLS handshake SHALL
be done as specified in that version of TLS. This document only
lists additional and different requirements, restrictions, and
processing compared to [RFC8446] and [RFC5216].
2.1.1. Mutual Authentication
This section updates Section 2.1.1 of [RFC5216].
The EAP-TLS server MUST authenticate with a certificate and SHOULD
require the EAP-TLS peer to authenticate with a certificate.
Certificates can be of any type supported by TLS including raw public
keys. Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication SHALL NOT be used except
for resumption. SessionID is deprecated in TLS 1.3 and the EAP-TLS
server SHALL ignore the legacy_session_id field if TLS 1.3 is
negotiated. TLS 1.3 introduced early application data which is not
used in EAP-TLS. A EAP-TLS server which receives an "early_data"
extension MUST ignore the extension or respond with a
HelloRetryRequest as described in Section 4.2.10 of [RFC8446].
Resumption is handled as described in Section 2.1.3. The EAP-TLS
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server commits to not send any more handshake messages by sending a
Commitment Message (an encrypted TLS record with the application data
0x00), see Section 2.5. After the EAP-TLS server has recieved a EAP-
Response to the EAP-Request containing the Commitment Message, the
EAP-TLS server sends EAP-Success.
In the case where EAP-TLS with mutual authentication is successful
(and neither HelloRetryRequest nor Post-Handshake messages are sent)
the conversation will appear as shown in Figure 1.
EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (Privacy-Friendly) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS CertificateRequest,
TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished,
<-------- Commitment Message)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished) -------->
<-------- EAP-Success
Figure 1: EAP-TLS mutual authentication
2.1.2. Ticket Establishment
This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216].
To enable resumption when using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3, the EAP-TLS
server MUST send a NewSessionTicket message (containing a PSK and
other parameters) in the initial authentication. The
NewSessionTicket is sent after the EAP-TLS server has received the
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Finished message in the initial authentication. The NewSessionTicket
message MUST NOT include an "early_data" extension.
In the case where EAP-TLS with mutual authentication and ticket
establishment is successful, the conversation will appear as shown in
Figure 2.
EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (Privacy-Friendly) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS CertificateRequest,
TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
<-------- TLS Finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS NewSessionTicket,
<-------- Commitment Message)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -------->
<-------- EAP-Success
Figure 2: EAP-TLS ticket establishment
2.1.3. Resumption
This section updates Section 2.1.2 of [RFC5216].
TLS 1.3 replaces the session resumption mechanisms in earlier
versions of TLS with a new PSK exchange. When EAP-TLS is used with
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TLS version 1.3 or higher, EAP-TLS SHALL use a resumption mechanism
compatible with that version of TLS.
For TLS 1.3, resumption is described in Section 2.2 of [RFC8446]. If
the client has received a NewSessionTicket message from the EAP-TLS
server, the client can use the PSK identity received in the ticket to
negotiate the use of the associated PSK. If the EAP-TLS server
accepts it, then the security context of the new connection is tied
to the original connection and the key derived from the initial
handshake is used to bootstrap the cryptographic state instead of a
full handshake. It is left up to the EAP-TLS peer whether to use
resumption, but it is RECOMMENDED that the EAP-TLS server accept
resumption as long as the ticket is valid. However, the EAP-TLS
server MAY choose to require a full authentication. EAP-TLS peers
and EAP-TLS servers SHOULD follow the client tracking preventions in
Appendix C.4 of [RFC8446].
It is RECOMMENDED to use a NAIs with the same realm in the resumption
and the original full authentication. This requirement allows EAP
packets to be routable to the same destination as the original full
authentication. If this recommendation is not followed, resumption
is likely to be impossible. When NAI reuse can be done without
privacy implications, it is RECOMMENDED to use the same anonymous NAI
in the resumption, as was used in the original full authentication.
E.g. the NAI @realm can safely be reused, while the NAI
ZmxleG8=@realm cannot. The TLS PSK identity is typically derived by
the TLS implementation and may be an opaque blob without a routable
realm. The TLS PSK identity is therefore in general unsuitable for
deriving a NAI to use in the Identity Response.
A subsequent authentication using resumption, where both sides
authenticate successfully (without the issuance of more resumption
tickets) is shown in Figure 3.
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EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (Privacy-Friendly) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS Finished,
<-------- Commitment Message)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Finished) -------->
<-------- EAP-Success
Figure 3: EAP-TLS resumption
As specified in Section 2.2 of [RFC8446], the EAP-TLS peer SHOULD
supply a "key_share" extension when attempting resumption, which
allows the EAP-TLS server to potentially decline resumption and fall
back to a full handshake. If the EAP-TLS peer did not supply a
"key_share" extension when attempting resumption, the EAP-TLS server
needs to reject the ClientHello and the EAP-TLS peer needs to restart
a full handshake. The message flow in this case is given by Figure 4
followed by Figure 1.
Also during resumption, the EAP-TLS server can respond with a Hello
Retry Request (see Section 2.1.6) or issue a new ticket (see
Section 2.1.2)
2.1.4. Termination
This section updates Section 2.1.3 of [RFC5216].
TLS 1.3 changes both the message flow and the handshake messages
compared to earlier versions of TLS. Therefore, some normative text
in Section 2.1.3 of [RFC5216] does not apply for TLS 1.3 or higher.
The two paragraphs below replaces the corresponding paragraphs in
Section 2.1.3 of [RFC5216] when EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3 or
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higher. The other paragraphs in Section 2.1.3 of [RFC5216] still
apply with the exception that SessionID is deprecated.
If the EAP-TLS peer authenticates successfully, the EAP-TLS server
MUST send an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS containing
TLS records conforming to the version of TLS used. The message
flow ends with the EAP-TLS server sending an EAP-Success message.
If the EAP-TLS server authenticates successfully, the EAP-TLS peer
MUST send an EAP-Response message with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS containing
TLS records conforming to the version of TLS used.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 illustrate message flows in several cases where
the EAP-TLS peer or EAP-TLS server sends a TLS fatal alert message.
TLS warning alerts generally mean that the connection can continue
normally and does not change the message flow. Note that the party
receiving a TLS warning alert may choose to terminate the connection
by sending a TLS fatal alert, which may add an extra round-trip, see
[RFC8446].
In the case where the EAP-TLS server rejects the ClientHello with a
fatal error, the conversation will appear as shown in Figure 4. The
EAP-TLS server can also partly reject the ClientHello with a
HelloRetryRequest, see Section 2.1.6.
EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (Privacy-Friendly) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Fatal Alert)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -------->
<-------- EAP-Failure
Figure 4: EAP-TLS server rejection of ClientHello
In the case where EAP-TLS server authentication is unsuccessful, the
conversation will appear as shown in Figure 5.
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EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (Privacy-Friendly) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS CertificateRequest,
TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished,
<-------- Commitment Message)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Fatal Alert)
-------->
<-------- EAP-Failure
Figure 5: EAP-TLS unsuccessful EAP-TLS server authentication
In the case where the EAP-TLS server authenticates to the EAP-TLS
peer successfully, but the EAP-TLS peer fails to authenticate to the
EAP-TLS server, the conversation will appear as shown in Figure 6.
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EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (Privacy-Friendly) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS CertificateRequest,
TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished,
<-------- Commitment Message)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Fatal Alert)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -------->
<-------- EAP-Failure
Figure 6: EAP-TLS unsuccessful client authentication
2.1.5. No Peer Authentication
This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216].
In the case where EAP-TLS is used without peer authentication (e.g.,
emergency services, as described in [RFC7406]) the conversation will
appear as shown in Figure 7.
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EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (Privacy-Friendly) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished,
<-------- Commitment Message)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Finished) -------->
<-------- EAP-Success
Figure 7: EAP-TLS without peer authentication
2.1.6. Hello Retry Request
This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216].
As defined in TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], EAP-TLS servers can send a
HelloRetryRequest message in response to a ClientHello if the EAP-TLS
server finds an acceptable set of parameters but the initial
ClientHello does not contain all the needed information to continue
the handshake. One use case is if the EAP-TLS server does not
support the groups in the "key_share" extension, but supports one of
the groups in the "supported_groups" extension. In this case the
client should send a new ClientHello with a "key_share" that the EAP-
TLS server supports.
The case of a successful EAP-TLS mutual authentication after the EAP-
TLS server has sent a HelloRetryRequest message is shown in Figure 8.
Note the extra round-trip as a result of the HelloRetryRequest.
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EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (Privacy-Friendly) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS HelloRetryRequest)
<--------
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished,
<-------- Commitment Message)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished) -------->
<-------- EAP-Success
Figure 8: EAP-TLS with Hello Retry Request
2.1.7. Identity
This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216].
It is RECOMMENDED to use anonymous NAIs [RFC7542] in the Identity
Response as such identities are routable and privacy-friendly. While
opaque blobs are allowed by [RFC3748], such identities are NOT
RECOMMENDED as they are not routable and should only be considered in
local deployments where the EAP-TLS peer, EAP authenticator, and EAP-
TLS server all belong to the same network. Many client certificates
contains an identity such as an email address, which is already in
NAI format. When the client certificate contains a NAI as subject
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name or alternative subject name, an anonymous NAI SHOULD be derived
from the NAI in the certificate, see Section 2.1.8. More details on
identities are described in Sections 2.1.3, 2.1.8, 2.2, and 5.8.
2.1.8. Privacy
This section updates Section 2.1.4 of [RFC5216].
TLS 1.3 significantly improves privacy when compared to earlier
versions of TLS by forbidding cipher suites without confidentiality
and encrypting large parts of the TLS handshake including the
certificate messages.
EAP-TLS peer and server implementations supporting TLS 1.3 or higher
MUST support anonymous NAIs (Network Access Identifiers) (Section 2.4
in [RFC7542]) and a client supporting TLS 1.3 MUST NOT send its
username in cleartext in the Identity Response. Following [RFC7542],
it is RECOMMENDED to omit the username (i.e. the NAI is @realm), but
other constructions such as a fixed username (e.g. anonymous@realm)
or an encrypted username (e.g. YmVuZGVy@realm) are allowed. Note
that the NAI MUST be a UTF-8 string as defined by the grammar in
Section 2.2 of [RFC7542].
As the certificate messages in TLS 1.3 are encrypted, there is no
need to send an empty certificate_list and perform a second handshake
for privacy (as needed by EAP-TLS with earlier versions of TLS).
When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3 or higher the EAP-TLS peer
and EAP-TLS server SHALL follow the processing specified by the used
version of TLS. For TLS 1.3 this means that the EAP-TLS peer only
sends an empty certificate_list if it does not have an appropriate
certificate to send, and the EAP-TLS server MAY treat an empty
certificate_list as a terminal condition.
EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 is always used with privacy. This does not add
any extra round-trips and the message flow with privacy is just the
normal message flow as shown in Figure 1.
2.1.9. Fragmentation
This section updates Section 2.1.5 of [RFC5216].
Including ContentType and ProtocolVersion a single TLS record may be
up to 16387 octets in length. EAP-TLS fragmentation support is
provided through addition of a flags octet within the EAP-Response
and EAP-Request packets, as well as a TLS Message Length field of
four octets. Implementations MUST NOT set the L bit in unfragmented
messages, but MUST accept unfragmented messages with and without the
L bit set.
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Some EAP implementations and access networks may limit the number of
EAP packet exchanges that can be handled. To avoid fragmentation, it
is RECOMMENDED to keep the sizes of EAP-TLS peer, EAP-TLS server, and
trust anchor certificates small and the length of the certificate
chains short. In addition, it is RECOMMENDED to use mechanisms that
reduce the sizes of Certificate messages. For a detailed discussion
on reducing message sizes to prevent fragmentation, see
[I-D.ietf-emu-eaptlscert].
2.2. Identity Verification
This section updates Section 2.2 of [RFC5216].
The identity provided in the EAP-Response/Identity is not
authenticated by EAP-TLS. Unauthenticated information SHALL NOT be
used for accounting purposes or to give authorization. The
authenticator and the EAP-TLS server MAY examine the identity
presented in EAP-Response/Identity for purposes such as routing and
EAP method selection. EAP-TLS servers MAY reject conversations if
the identity does not match their policy. Note that this also
applies to resumption, see Sections 2.1.3, 5.6, and 5.7.
2.3. Key Hierarchy
This section updates Section 2.3 of [RFC5216].
TLS 1.3 replaces the TLS pseudorandom function (PRF) used in earlier
versions of TLS with HKDF and completely changes the Key Schedule.
The key hierarchies shown in Section 2.3 of [RFC5216] are therefore
not correct when EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3 or higher. For
TLS 1.3 the key schedule is described in Section 7.1 of [RFC8446].
When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3 or higher the Key_Material,
IV, and Method-Id SHALL be derived from the exporter_master_secret
using the TLS exporter interface [RFC5705] (for TLS 1.3 this is
defined in Section 7.5 of [RFC8446]).
Type-Code = 0x0D
Key_Material = TLS-Exporter("EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_Key_Material",
Type-Code, 128)
IV = TLS-Exporter("EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_IV",
Type-Code, 64)
Method-Id = TLS-Exporter("EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_Method-Id",
Type-Code, 64)
Session-Id = Type-Code || Method-Id
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All other parameters such as MSK and EMSK are derived in the same
manner as with EAP-TLS [RFC5216], Section 2.3. The definitions are
repeated below for simplicity:
MSK = Key_Material(0, 63)
EMSK = Key_Material(64, 127)
Enc-RECV-Key = MSK(0, 31)
Enc-SEND-Key = MSK(32, 63)
RECV-IV = IV(0, 31)
SEND-IV = IV(32, 63)
The use of these keys is specific to the lower layer, as described
[RFC5247].
Note that the key derivation MUST use the length values given above.
While in TLS 1.2 and earlier it was possible to truncate the output
by requesting less data from the TLS-Exporter function, this practice
is not possible with TLS 1.3. If an implementation intends to use
only a part of the output of the TLS-Exporter function, then it MUST
ask for the full output and then only use the desired part. Failure
to do so will result in incorrect values being calculated for the
above keying material.
By using the TLS exporter, EAP-TLS can use any TLS 1.3 implementation
without having to extract the Master Secret, ClientHello.random, and
ServerHello.random in a non-standard way.
2.4. Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements
This section updates Section 2.4 of [RFC5216].
TLS 1.3 cipher suites are defined differently than in earlier
versions of TLS (see Section B.4 of [RFC8446]), and the cipher suites
discussed in Section 2.4 of [RFC5216] can therefore not be used when
EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3 or higher.
When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3 or higher, the EAP-TLS
peers and EAP-TLS servers MUST comply with the compliance
requirements (mandatory-to-implement cipher suites, signature
algorithms, key exchange algorithms, extensions, etc.) for the TLS
version used. For TLS 1.3 the compliance requirements are defined in
Section 9 of [RFC8446].
While EAP-TLS does not protect any application data except for the
Commitment Message, the negotiated cipher suites and algorithms MAY
be used to secure data as done in other TLS-based EAP methods.
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2.5. EAP State Machines
This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216].
TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] introduces Post-Handshake messages. These Post-
Handshake messages use the handshake content type and can be sent
after the main handshake. One such Post-Handshake message is
NewSessionTicket. The NewSessionTicket can be used for resumption.
After sending TLS Finished, the EAP-TLS server may send any number of
Post-Handshake messages in separate EAP-Requests. To decrease the
uncertainty for the EAP-TLS peer, the following procedure MUST be
followed:
When an EAP-TLS server has sent its last handshake message (Finished
or a Post-Handshake), it commits to not sending any more handshake
messages by sending a Commitment Message. The Commitment Message is
an encrypted TLS record with application data 0x00 (i.e. a TLS record
with TLSPlaintext.type = application_data, TLSPlaintext.length = 1,
and TLSPlaintext.fragment = 0x00). Note that the length of the
plaintext is greater than the corresponding TLSPlaintext.length due
to the inclusion of TLSInnerPlaintext.type and any padding supplied
by the sender. EAP-TLS server implementations MUST set
TLSPlaintext.fragment to 0x00, but EAP-TLS peer implementations MUST
accept any application data as a Commitment Message from the EAP-TLS
server to not send any more handshake messages. The Commitment
Message may be sent in the same EAP-Request as the last handshake
record or in a separate EAP-Request. Sending the Commitment Message
in a separate EAP-Request adds an additional round-trip, but may be
necessary in TLS implementations that only implement a subset of TLS
1.3. In the case where the EAP-TLS server sends the Commitment
Message in a separate EAP-Request, the conversation will appear as
shown in Figure 9. After sending the Commitment Message, the EAP-TLS
server may only send an EAP-Success, an EAP-Failure, or an EAP-
Request with a TLS Alert Message.
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EAP-TLS Peer EAP-TLS Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (Privacy-Friendly) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS CertificateRequest,
TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
<-------- TLS Finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- Commitment Message)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -------->
<-------- EAP-Success
Figure 9: Commit in separate EAP-Request
3. Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol
No updates to Section 3 of [RFC5216].
4. IANA considerations
This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the EAP-
TLS 1.3 protocol in accordance with [RFC8126].
This memo requires IANA to add the following labels to the TLS
Exporter Label Registry defined by [RFC5705]. These labels are used
in derivation of Key_Material, IV and Method-Id as defined in
Section 2.3:
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o "EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_Key_Material"
o "EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_IV"
o "EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_Method-Id"
5. Security Considerations
5.1. Security Claims
Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 does not change the security claims for
EAP-TLS as given in Section 5.1 of [RFC5216]. However, it
strengthens several of the claims as described in the following
updates to the notes given in Section 5.1 of [RFC5216].
[1] Mutual authentication: By mandating revocation checking of
certificates, the authentication in EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 is stronger
as authentication with revoked certificates will always fail.
[2] Confidentiality: The TLS 1.3 handshake offers much better
confidentiality than earlier versions of TLS by mandating cipher
suites with confidentiality and encrypting certificates and some of
the extensions, see [RFC8446]. When using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3, the
use of privacy is mandatory and does not cause any additional round-
trips.
[3] Key strength: TLS 1.3 forbids all algorithms with known
weaknesses including 3DES, CBC mode, RC4, SHA-1, and MD5. TLS 1.3
only supports cryptographic algorithms offering at least 112-bit
security, see [RFC8446].
[4] Cryptographic Negotiation: TLS 1.3 increases the number of
cryptographic parameters that are negotiated in the handshake. When
EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3, EAP-TLS inherits the cryptographic
negotiation of AEAD algorithm, HKDF hash algorithm, key exchange
groups, and signature algorithm, see Section 4.1.1 of [RFC8446].
5.2. Peer and Server Identities
No updates to section 5.2 of [RFC5216].
5.3. Certificate Validation
No updates to section 5.3 of [RFC5216].
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5.4. Certificate Revocation
This section updates Section 5.4 of [RFC5216].
While certificates may have long validity periods, there are a number
of reasons (e.g. key compromise, CA compromise, privilege withdrawn,
etc.) why EAP-TLS peer, EAP-TLS server, or sub-CA certificates have
to be revoked before their expiry date. Revocation of the EAP-TLS
server's certificate is complicated by the fact that the EAP-TLS peer
may not have Internet connectivity until authentication completes.
When EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3, the revocation status of all the
certificates in the certificate chains MUST be checked.
EAP-TLS servers supporting TLS 1.3 MUST implement Certificate Status
Requests (OCSP stapling) as specified in [RFC6066] and
Section 4.4.2.1 of [RFC8446]. It is RECOMMENDED that EAP-TLS peers
and EAP-TLS servers use OCSP stapling for verifying the status of the
EAP-TLS server's certificate chain. When an EAP-TLS peer uses
Certificate Status Requests to check the revocation status of the
EAP-TLSserver's certificate chain it MUST treat a CertificateEntry
(except the trust anchor) without a valid CertificateStatus extension
as invalid and abort the handshake with an appropriate alert. The
OCSP status handling in TLS 1.3 is different from earlier versions of
TLS, see Section 4.4.2.1 of [RFC8446]. In TLS 1.3 the OCSP
information is carried in the CertificateEntry containing the
associated certificate instead of a separate CertificateStatus
message as in [RFC4366]. This enables sending OCSP information for
all certificates in the certificate chain.
To enable revocation checking in situations where EAP-TLS peers do
not implement or use OCSP stapling, and where network connectivity is
not available prior to authentication completion, EAP--TLS peer
implementations MUST also support checking for certificate revocation
after authentication completes and network connectivity is available,
and they SHOULD utilize this capability by default.
5.5. Packet Modification Attacks
No updates to Section 5.5 of [RFC5216].
5.6. Authorization
This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216]. The guidance in
this section is relevant for EAP-TLS in general (regardless of the
underlying TLS version used).
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EAP-TLS is typically encapsulated in other protocols, such as PPP
[RFC1661], RADIUS [RFC2865], Diameter [RFC6733], or PANA [RFC5191].
The encapsulating protocols can also provide additional, non-EAP
information to an EAP-TLS server. This information can include, but
is not limited to, information about the authenticator, information
about the EAP-TLS peer, or information about the protocol layers
above or below EAP (MAC addresses, IP addresses, port numbers, WiFi
SSID, etc.). EAP-TLS Servers implementing EAP-TLS inside those
protocols can make policy decisions and enforce authorization based
on a combination of information from the EAP-TLS exchange and non-EAP
information.
As noted in Section 2.2, the identity presented in EAP-Response/
Identity is not authenticated by EAP-TLS and is therefore trivial for
an attacker to forge, modify, or replay. Authorization and
accounting MUST be based on authenticated information such as
information in the certificate or the PSK identity and cached data
provisioned for resumption as described in Section 5.7. Note that
the requirements for Network Access Identifiers (NAIs) specified in
Section 4 of [RFC7542] still apply and MUST be followed.
EAP-TLS servers MAY reject conversations based on non-EAP information
provided by the encapsulating protocol, for example, if the MAC
address of the authenticator does not match the expected policy.
5.7. Resumption
This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216]. The guidance in
this section is relevant for EAP-TLS in general (regardless of the
underlying TLS version used).
There are a number of security issues related to resumption that are
not described in [RFC5216]. The problems, guidelines, and
requirements in this section therefore applies to all version of TLS.
When resumption occurs, it is based on cached information at the TLS
layer. To perform resumption in a secure way, the EAP-TLS peer and
EAP-TLS server need to be able to securely retrieve authorization
information such as certificate chains from the initial full
handshake. We use the term "cached data" to describe such
information. Authorization during resumption MUST be based on such
cached data. The EAP-TLS peer and EAP-TLS server MAY perform fresh
revocation checks on the cached certificate data. Any security
policies for authorization MUST be followed also for resumption. The
certificates may have been revoked since the initial full handshake
and the authorizations of the other party may have been reduced. If
the cached revocation is not sufficiently current, the EAP-TLS peer
or EAP-TLS server MAY force a full TLS handshake.
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There are two ways to retrieve the cached data from the original full
handshake. The first method is that the EAP-TLS server and client
cache the information locally. The cached information is identified
by an identifier. For TLS versions before 1.3, the identifier can be
the session ID, for TLS 1.3, the identifier is the PSK identity. The
second method for retrieving cached information is via [RFC5077] or
[RFC8446], where the EAP-TLS server avoids storing information
locally and instead encapsulates the information into a ticket or PSK
which is sent to the client for storage. This ticket or PSK is
encrypted using a key that only the EAP-TLS server knows. Note that
the client still needs to cache the original handshake information
locally and will use the session ID or PSK identity to lookup this
information during resumption. However, the EAP-TLS server is able
to decrypt the ticket or PSK to obtain the original handshake
information.
If the EAP-TLS server or EAP client do not apply any authorization
policies, they MAY allow resumption where no cached data is
available. In all other cases, they MUST cache data during the
initial full authentication to enable resumption. The cached data
MUST be sufficient to make authorization decisions during resumption.
If cached data cannot be retrieved in a secure way, resumption MUST
NOT be done.
The above requirements also apply if the EAP-TLS server expects some
system to perform accounting for the session. Since accounting must
be tied to an authenticated identity, and resumption does not supply
such an identity, accounting is impossible without access to cached
data. Therefore systems which expect to perform accounting for the
session SHOULD cache an identifier which can be used in subsequent
accounting.
As suggested in [RFC8446], EAP-TLS peers MUST NOT store resumption
PSKs or tickets (and associated cached data) for longer than 7 days,
regardless of the PSK or ticket lifetime. The EAP-TLS peer MAY
delete them earlier based on local policy. The cached data MAY also
be removed on the EAP-TLS server or EAP-TLS peer if any certificate
in the certificate chain has been revoked or has expired. In all
such cases, resumption results in a full TLS handshake instead.
Information from the EAP-TLS exchange (e.g. the identity provided in
EAP-Response/Identity) as well as non-EAP information (e.g. IP
addresses) may change between the initial full handshake and
resumption. This change creates a "time-of-check time-of-use"
(TOCTOU) security vulnerability. A malicious or compromised user
could supply one set of data during the initial authentication, and a
different set of data during resumption, potentially allowing them to
obtain access that they should not have.
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If any authorization, accounting, or policy decisions were made with
information that have changed between the initial full handshake and
resumption, and if change may lead to a different decision, such
decisions MUST be reevaluated. It is RECOMMENDED that authorization,
accounting, and policy decisions are reevaluated based on the
information given in the resumption. EAP-TLS servers MAY reject
resumption where the information supplied during resumption does not
match the information supplied during the original authentication.
Where a good decision is unclear, EAP-TLS servers SHOULD reject the
resumption.
Section 4.2.11, 8.1, and 8.2 of [RFC8446] provides security
considerations for resumption.
5.8. Privacy Considerations
This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216].
TLS 1.3 offers much better privacy than earlier versions of TLS as
discussed in Section 2.1.8. In this section, we only discuss the
privacy properties of EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3. For privacy properties
of TLS 1.3 itself, see [RFC8446].
EAP-TLS sends the standard TLS 1.3 handshake messages encapsulated in
EAP packets. Additionally, the EAP-TLS peer sends an identity in the
first EAP-Response. The other fields in the EAP-TLS Request and the
EAP-TLS Response packets do not contain any cleartext privacy
sensitive information.
Tracking of users by eavesdropping on identity responses or
certificates is a well-known problem in many EAP methods. When EAP-
TLS is used with TLS 1.3, all certificates are encrypted, and the
username part of the identity response is always confidentiality
protected (e.g. using anonymous NAIs). However, as with other EAP
methods, even when privacy-friendly identifiers or EAP tunneling is
used, the domain name (i.e. the realm) in the NAI is still typically
visible. How much privacy sensitive information the domain name
leaks is highly dependent on how many other users are using the same
domain name in the particular access network. If all EAP-TLS peers
have the same domain, no additional information is leaked. If a
domain name is used by a small subset of the EAP-TLS peers, it may
aid an attacker in tracking or identifying the user.
Without padding, information about the size of the client certificate
is leaked from the size of the EAP-TLS packets. The EAP-TLS packets
sizes may therefore leak information that can be used to track or
identify the user. If all client certificates have the same length,
no information is leaked. EAP-TLS peers SHOULD use record padding,
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see Section 5.4 of [RFC8446] to reduce information leakage of
certificate sizes.
If anonymous NAIs are not used, the privacy-friendly identifiers need
to be generated with care. The identities MUST be generated in a
cryptographically secure way so that that it is computationally
infeasible for an attacker to differentiate two identities belonging
to the same user from two identities belonging to different users in
the same realm. This can be achieved, for instance, by using random
or pseudo-random usernames such as random byte strings or ciphertexts
and only using the pseudo-random usernames a single time. Note that
the privacy-friendly usernames also MUST NOT include substrings that
can be used to relate the identity to a specific user. Similarly,
privacy-friendly username SHOULD NOT be formed by a fixed mapping
that stays the same across multiple different authentications.
An EAP-TLS peer with a policy allowing communication with EAP-TLS
servers supporting only TLS 1.2 without privacy and with a static RSA
key exchange is vulnerable to disclosure of the EAP-TLS peer
username. An active attacker can in this case make the EAP-TLS peer
believe that an EAP-TLS server supporting TLS 1.3 only supports TLS
1.2 without privacy. The attacker can simply impersonate the EAP-TLS
server and negotiate TLS 1.2 with static RSA key exchange and send an
TLS alert message when the EAP-TLS peer tries to use privacy by
sending an empty certificate message. Since the attacker
(impersonating the EAP-TLS server) does not provide a proof-of-
possession of the private key until the Finished message when a
static RSA key exchange is used, an EAP-TLS peer may inadvertently
disclose its identity (username) to an attacker. Therefore, it is
RECOMMENDED for EAP-TLS peers to not use EAP-TLS with TLS 1.2 and
static RSA based cipher suites without privacy. This implies that an
EAP-TLS peer SHOULD NOT continue the handshake if a TLS 1.2 EAP-TLS
server responds to an empty certificate message with a TLS alert
message.
5.9. Pervasive Monitoring
This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216].
Pervasive monitoring refers to widespread surveillance of users. In
the context EAP-TLS, pervasive monitoring attacks can target EAP-TLS
peer devices for tracking them (and their users) as and when they
join a network. By encrypting more information and by mandating the
use of privacy, TLS 1.3 offers much better protection against
pervasive monitoring. In addition to the privacy attacks discussed
above, surveillance on a large scale may enable tracking of a user
over a wider geographical area and across different access networks.
Using information from EAP-TLS together with information gathered
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from other protocols increases the risk of identifying individual
users.
5.10. Discovered Vulnerabilities
This is a new section when compared to [RFC5216].
Over the years, there have been several serious attacks on earlier
versions of Transport Layer Security (TLS), including attacks on its
most commonly used ciphers and modes of operation. [RFC7457]
summarizes the attacks that were known at the time of publishing and
[RFC7525] provides recommendations for improving the security of
deployed services that use TLS. However, many of the attacks are
less serious for EAP-TLS as EAP-TLS only uses the TLS handshake and
does not protect any application data. EAP-TLS implementations MUST
mitigate known attacks. EAP-TLS implementations need to monitor and
follow new EAP and TLS related security guidance and requirements
such as [RFC8447], [I-D.ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate],
[I-D.ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate].
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5216>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
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[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC7542] DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7542>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
6.2. Informative references
[I-D.ietf-emu-eaptlscert]
Sethi, M., Mattsson, J., and S. Turner, "Handling Large
Certificates and Long Certificate Chains in TLS-based EAP
Methods", draft-ietf-emu-eaptlscert-06 (work in progress),
October 2020.
[I-D.ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate]
Velvindron, L., Moriarty, K., and A. Ghedini, "Deprecating
MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2", draft-ietf-
tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04 (work in progress), October
2020.
[I-D.ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate]
Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and
TLSv1.1", draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-08 (work in
progress), October 2020.
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[IEEE-802.11]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
Standard for Information technology--Telecommunications
and information exchange between systems Local and
metropolitan area networks--Specific requirements - Part
11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
Layer (PHY) Specifications", IEEE Std 802.11-2016
(Revision of IEEE Std 802.11-2012) , December 2016.
[IEEE-802.1AE]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks -- Media
Access Control (MAC) Security", IEEE Standard
802.1AE-2018 , December 2018.
[IEEE-802.1X]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks -- Port-
Based Network Access Control", IEEE Standard 802.1X-2010 ,
February 2010.
[MulteFire]
MulteFire, "MulteFire Release 1.1 specification", 2019.
[PEAP] Microsoft Corporation, "[MS-PEAP]: Protected Extensible
Authentication Protocol (PEAP)", 2018.
[RFC1661] Simpson, W., Ed., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)",
STD 51, RFC 1661, DOI 10.17487/RFC1661, July 1994,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1661>.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2560>.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2865>.
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Internet-Draft EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 November 2020
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3280, April 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3280>.
[RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4282, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4282>.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.
[RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 4366, DOI 10.17487/RFC4366, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4366>.
[RFC4851] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, "The
Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible
Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)", RFC 4851,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4851, May 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4851>.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
[RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Ed., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H.,
and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, DOI 10.17487/RFC5191,
May 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5191>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
RFC 5247, DOI 10.17487/RFC5247, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5247>.
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[RFC5281] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5281, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5281>.
[RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
Ed., "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6733, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6733>.
[RFC7170] Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna,
"Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version
1", RFC 7170, DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7170>.
[RFC7406] Schulzrinne, H., McCann, S., Bajko, G., Tschofenig, H.,
and D. Kroeselberg, "Extensions to the Emergency Services
Architecture for Dealing With Unauthenticated and
Unauthorized Devices", RFC 7406, DOI 10.17487/RFC7406,
December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7406>.
[RFC7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing
Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, DOI 10.17487/RFC7457,
February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7457>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC8447] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>.
[TS.33.501]
3GPP, "Security architecture and procedures for 5G
System", 3GPP TS 33.501 16.4.0, September 2020.
Appendix A. Updated references
All the following references in [RFC5216] are updated as specified
below when EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3 or higher.
All references to [RFC2560] are updated with [RFC6960].
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Internet-Draft EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 November 2020
All references to [RFC3280] are updated with [RFC5280].
All references to [RFC4282] are updated with [RFC7542].
Acknowledgments
The authors want to thank Bernard Aboba, Jari Arkko, Alan DeKok, Ari
Keraenen, Jouni Malinen, Oleg Pekar, Eric Rescorla, Jim Schaad, Terry
Burton, Vesa Torvinen, and Hannes Tschofenig for comments and
suggestions on the draft.
Contributors
Alan DeKok, FreeRADIUS
Authors' Addresses
John Preuss Mattsson
Ericsson
Stockholm 164 40
Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
Mohit Sethi
Ericsson
Jorvas 02420
Finland
Email: mohit@piuha.net
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