Enhancing Security in EAP-AKA' with Hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptography
draft-ietf-emu-hybrid-pqc-eapaka-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(emu WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Aritra Banerjee , Tirumaleswar Reddy.K | ||
| Last updated | 2026-08-30 (Latest revision 2026-02-26) | ||
| Replaces | draft-ar-emu-hybrid-pqc-eapaka | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Waiting for WG Chair Go-Ahead | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' FS) is specified in [RFC9678], providing updates to [RFC9048] with an optional extension that offers ephemeral key exchange using the traditional Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) key agreement algorithm for achieving perfect forward secrecy (PFS). However, it is susceptible to future threats from Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers, which could potentially compromise a traditional ephemeral public key. If the adversary has also obtained knowledge of the long-term key and ephemeral public key, it could compromise session keys generated as part of the authentication run in EAP-AKA'. This draft aims to enhance the security of EAP-AKA' FS protocol by leveraging PQ/T Hybrid [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology] algorithms to make it quantum-safe.
Authors
Aritra Banerjee
Tirumaleswar Reddy.K
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)