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Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version 1
draft-ietf-emu-rfc7170bis-19

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (emu WG)
Author Alan DeKok
Last updated 2024-06-21 (Latest revision 2024-06-07)
Replaces draft-dekok-emu-rfc7170bis
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Details
draft-ietf-emu-rfc7170bis-19
EMU working group                                          A. DeKok (Ed)
Internet-Draft                                               7 June 2024
Obsoletes: 7170 (if approved)                                           
Updates: 9427 (if approved)                                             
Intended status: Standards Track                                        
Expires: 9 December 2024

       Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version 1
                      draft-ietf-emu-rfc7170bis-19

Abstract

   This document defines the Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol
   (TEAP) version 1.  TEAP is a tunnel-based EAP method that enables
   secure communication between a peer and a server by using the
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to establish a mutually
   authenticated tunnel.  Within the tunnel, TLV objects are used to
   convey authentication-related data between the EAP peer and the EAP
   server.  This document obsoletes RFC 7170 and updates RFC 9427 by
   moving all TEAP specifications from those documents to this one.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-rfc7170bis/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the EMU Working Group
   mailing list (mailto:emu@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/emu/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/emu-wg/rfc7170bis.git.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 December 2024.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.1.  Specification Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.1.  Architectural Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Protocol-Layering Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.3.  Outer TLVs versus Inner TLVs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   3.  TEAP Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.1.  Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.2.  TEAP Authentication Phase 1: Tunnel Establishment . . . .  11
     3.3.  Server Certificate Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.4.  Server Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       3.4.1.  Client Certificates sent during Phase 1 . . . . . . .  14
     3.5.  Resumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.5.1.  TLS Session Resumption Using Server State . . . . . .  15
       3.5.2.  TLS Session Resumption Using Client State . . . . . .  15
     3.6.  TEAP Authentication Phase 2: Tunneled Authentication  . .  16
       3.6.1.  Inner EAP Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       3.6.2.  Inner Password Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.6.3.  EAP-MSCHAPv2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       3.6.4.  Limitations on inner methods  . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       3.6.5.  Protected Termination and Acknowledged Result
               Indication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     3.7.  Determining Peer-Id and Server-Id . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     3.8.  TEAP Session Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23

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     3.9.  Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       3.9.1.  Outer-Layer Errors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       3.9.2.  TLS Layer Errors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       3.9.3.  Phase 2 Errors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     3.10. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     3.11. Services Requested by the Peer  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       3.11.1.  Certificate Provisioning within the Tunnel . . . . .  27
       3.11.2.  Certificate Content and Uses . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       3.11.3.  Server Unauthenticated Provisioning Mode . . . . . .  29
       3.11.4.  Channel Binding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   4.  Message Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     4.1.  TEAP Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     4.2.  TEAP TLV Format and Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       4.2.1.  General TLV Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       4.2.2.  Authority-ID TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       4.2.3.  Identity-Type TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       4.2.4.  Result TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
       4.2.5.  NAK TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
       4.2.6.  Error TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
       4.2.7.  Channel-Binding TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       4.2.8.  Vendor-Specific TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       4.2.9.  Request-Action TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
       4.2.10. EAP-Payload TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       4.2.11. Intermediate-Result TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       4.2.12. PAC TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       4.2.13. Crypto-Binding TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       4.2.14. Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
       4.2.15. Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
       4.2.16. PKCS#7 TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
       4.2.17. PKCS#10 TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
       4.2.18. Trusted-Server-Root TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
       4.2.19. CSR-Attributes TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
       4.2.20. Identity-Hint TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     4.3.  TLV Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       4.3.1.  Outer TLVs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       4.3.2.  Inner TLVs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
   5.  Cryptographic Calculations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
     5.1.  TEAP Authentication Phase 1: Key Derivations  . . . . . .  63
     5.2.  Intermediate Compound Key Derivations . . . . . . . . . .  64
     5.3.  Computing the Compound MAC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
     5.4.  EAP Master Session Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     6.1.  TEAP TLV Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     6.2.  TEAP Error TLV (value 5) Error Codes  . . . . . . . . . .  70
     6.3.  TLS Exporter Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
     6.4.  Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) Parameters . . . . . .  70
     6.5.  Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Registry . . . .  70
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70

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     7.1.  Mutual Authentication and Integrity Protection  . . . . .  71
     7.2.  Method Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
     7.3.  Separation of Phase 1 and Phase 2 Servers . . . . . . . .  71
     7.4.  Mitigation of Known Vulnerabilities and Protocol
           Deficiencies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
       7.4.1.  User Identity Protection and Verification . . . . . .  73
     7.5.  Dictionary Attack Resistance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
       7.5.1.  Protection against On-Path Attacks  . . . . . . . . .  74
     7.6.  Protecting against Forged Cleartext EAP Packets . . . . .  75
     7.7.  Use of Clear-text Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
     7.8.  Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
   9.  Changes from RFC 7170 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
   Appendix A Evaluation against Tunnel-Based EAP Method
           Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
     A.1.  Requirement 4.1.1: RFC Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
     A.2.  Requirement 4.2.1: TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . .  79
     A.3.  Requirement 4.2.1.1.1: Cipher Suite Negotiation . . . . .  79
     A.4.  Requirement 4.2.1.1.2: Tunnel Data Protection
            Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
     A.5.  Requirement 4.2.1.1.3: Tunnel Authentication and Key
            Establishment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
     A.6.  Requirement 4.2.1.2: Tunnel Replay Protection . . . . . .  79
     A.7.  Requirement 4.2.1.3: TLS Extensions . . . . . . . . . . .  79
     A.8.  Requirement 4.2.1.4: Peer Identity Privacy  . . . . . . .  79
     A.9.  Requirement 4.2.1.5: Session Resumption . . . . . . . . .  79
     A.10.  Requirement 4.2.2: Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
     A.11.  Requirement 4.2.3: Protection of Data External to
            Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
     A.12.  Requirement 4.3.1: Extensible Attribute Types  . . . . .  80
     A.13.  Requirement 4.3.2: Request/Challenge Response
            Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
     A.14.  Requirement 4.3.3: Indicating Criticality of
            Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
     A.15.  Requirement 4.3.4: Vendor-Specific Support . . . . . . .  80
     A.16.  Requirement 4.3.5: Result Indication . . . . . . . . . .  80
     A.17.  Requirement 4.3.6: Internationalization of Display
            Strings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
     A.18.  Requirement 4.4: EAP Channel-Binding Requirements  . . .  81
     A.19.  Requirement 4.5.1.1: Confidentiality and Integrity . . .  81
     A.20.  Requirement 4.5.1.2: Authentication of Server  . . . . .  81
     A.21.  Requirement 4.5.1.3: Server Certificate Revocation
            Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
     A.22.  Requirement 4.5.2: Internationalization  . . . . . . . .  81
     A.23.  Requirement 4.5.3: Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
     A.24.  Requirement 4.5.4: Password Change . . . . . . . . . . .  81
     A.25.  Requirement 4.6.1: Method Negotiation  . . . . . . . . .  81
     A.26.  Requirement 4.6.2: Chained Methods . . . . . . . . . . .  82

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     A.27.  Requirement 4.6.3: Cryptographic Binding with the TLS
            Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
     A.28.  Requirement 4.6.4: Peer-Initiated EAP Authentication . .  82
     A.29.  Requirement 4.6.5: Method Metadata . . . . . . . . . . .  82
   Appendix B.  Major Differences from EAP-FAST  . . . . . . . . . .  82
   Appendix C.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
     C.1.  Successful Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
     C.2.  Failed Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
     C.3.  Full TLS Handshake Using Certificate-Based Cipher
            Suite  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
     C.4.  Client Authentication during Phase 1 with Identity
            Privacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
     C.5.  Fragmentation and Reassembly  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     C.6.  Sequence of EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91
     C.7.  Failed Crypto-Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  93
     C.8.  Sequence of EAP Method with Vendor-Specific TLV
            Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  94
     C.9.  Peer Requests Inner Method after Server Sends Result
            TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  96
     C.10.  Channel Binding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  98
     C.11.  PKCS Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  99
     C.12.  Failure Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
     C.13.  Client certificate in Phase 1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
   References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
     Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
     Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
   Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

1.  Introduction

   A tunnel-based Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method is an
   EAP method that establishes a secure tunnel and executes other EAP
   methods under the protection of that secure tunnel.  A tunnel-based
   EAP method can be used in any lower-layer protocol that supports EAP
   authentication.  There are several existing tunnel-based EAP methods
   that use Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8446] to establish the
   secure tunnel.  EAP methods supporting this include Protected EAP
   (PEAP) [PEAP], EAP Tunneled Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS)
   [RFC5281], and EAP Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling (EAP-
   FAST) [RFC4851].  However, they all are either vendor-specific or
   informational, and the industry calls for a Standards Track tunnel-
   based EAP method.  [RFC6678] outlines the list of requirements for a
   standard tunnel-based EAP method.

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   This document describes the Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol
   (TEAP) version 1, which is based on EAP-FAST [RFC4851].  The changes
   from EAP-FAST to TEAP are largely minor, in order to meet the
   requirements outlined in [RFC6678] for a standard tunnel-based EAP
   method.

   This specification describes TEAPv1, and defines cryptographic
   derivations for use with TLS 1.2.  When TLS 1.3 is used, the
   definitions of cryptographic derivations in [RFC9427] MUST be used
   instead of the ones given here.

   Note that while it is technically possible to use TEAPv1 with TLS 1.0
   and TLS 1.1, those protocols have been deprecated in [RFC8996].  As
   such, the definitions given here are only applicable for TLS 1.2, and
   for TLS 1.3.

1.1.  Specification Requirements

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.2.  Terminology

   Much of the terminology in this document comes from [RFC3748].
   Additional terms are defined below:

   Type-Length-Value (TLV)

      The TEAP protocol utilizes objects in TLV format.  The TLV format
      is defined in Section 4.2.

   Inner Method

      An authentication method which is sent as application data inside
      of a TLS exchange which is carried over TEAP.  The inner method
      can be an EAP authentication method, a username / password
      authentication, or a vendor-specific authentication method.  Where
      the TLS connection is authenticated, the inner method could also
      be a Public Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) exchange.

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2.  Protocol Overview

   TEAP authentication occurs in two phases after the initial EAP
   Identity request/response exchange.  In the first phase, TEAP employs
   the TLS [RFC8446] handshake to provide an authenticated key exchange
   and to establish a protected tunnel.  Once the tunnel is established,
   the second phase begins with the peer and server engaging in further
   conversations to establish the required authentication and
   authorization policies.  TEAP makes use of TLV objects to carry out
   the inner authentication, results, and other information, such as
   channel-binding information.

   As discussed in [RFC9190] Section 2.1.7 and [RFC9427] Section 3.1,
   the outer EAP Identity SHOULD be an anonymous Network Access
   Identifier (NAI) as described in [RFC7542], Section 2.4.  While
   [RFC3748] Section 5.1 places no limits on the contents of the
   Identity field, [RFC7542] Section 2.6 states that Identities which do
   not follow the NAI format cannot be transported in an Authentication,
   Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) proxy network.  As such,
   Identities in non-NAI form are likely to not work outside of limited
   and local networks.

   Any inner identities (EAP or otherwise) SHOULD also follow the
   recommendations of [RFC9427], Section 3.1 about inner identities.

   [RFC7170] defined a Protected Access Credential (PAC) to mirror EAP-
   FAST [RFC4851].  However, implementation experience and analysis
   determined that the PAC was not necessary.  Instead, TEAP performs
   session resumption using the NewSessionTicket message as defined in
   [RFC9190] Section 2.1.2 and Section 2.1.3.  As such, the PAC has been
   deprecated.

   The TEAP conversation is used to establish or resume an existing
   session to typically establish network connectivity between a peer
   and the network.  Upon successful execution of TEAP, the EAP peer and
   EAP server both derive strong session key material (Master Session
   Key [RFC3748]) that can then be communicated to the network access
   server (NAS) for use in establishing a link-layer security
   association.

2.1.  Architectural Model

   The network architectural model for TEAP usage is shown below:

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    +----------+      +----------+      +----------+      +----------+
    |          |      |          |      |          |      |  Inner   |
    |   Peer   |<---->|  Authen- |<---->|   TEAP   |<---->|  Method  |
    |          |      |  ticator |      |  server  |      |  server  |
    |          |      |          |      |          |      |          |
    +----------+      +----------+      +----------+      +----------+

                     Figure 1: TEAP Architectural Model

   The Peer and Authenticator are defined in Section 1.2 of [RFC3748].
   The TEAP server is the "backend authentication server" defined in
   Section 1.2 of [RFC3748].  The "Inner Method server" is usually part
   of the TEAP server, and handles the application data (inner methods,
   EAP, passwords, etc.) inside of the TLS tunnel.

   The entities depicted above are logical entities and may or may not
   correspond to separate network components.  For example, the TEAP
   server and Inner Method server might be a single entity; the
   authenticator and TEAP server might be a single entity; or the
   functions of the authenticator, TEAP server, and Inner Method server
   might be combined into a single physical device.  For example,
   typical IEEE 802.11 deployments place the authenticator in an access
   point (AP) while a RADIUS server may provide the TEAP and inner
   method server components.  The above diagram illustrates the division
   of labor among entities in a general manner and shows how a
   distributed system might be constructed; however, actual systems
   might be realized more simply.  The security considerations in
   Section 7.3 provide an additional discussion of the implications of
   separating the TEAP server from the Inner Method server.

2.2.  Protocol-Layering Model

   TEAP packets are encapsulated within EAP; EAP in turn requires a
   transport protocol.  TEAP packets encapsulate TLS, which is then used
   to encapsulate user authentication information.  Thus, TEAP messaging
   can be described using a layered model, where each layer encapsulates
   the layer above it.  The following diagram clarifies the relationship
   between protocols:

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    +------------------------------------------+
    | Inner EAP Method | Other TLV information |
    |------------------------------------------|
    |         TLV Encapsulation (TLVs)         |
    |------------------------------------------+---------------------+
    |                      TLS                 | Optional Outer TLVs |
    |----------------------------------------------------------------|
    |                            TEAP                                |
    |----------------------------------------------------------------|
    |                            EAP                                 |
    |----------------------------------------------------------------|
    |     Carrier Protocol (EAP over LAN, RADIUS, Diameter, etc.)    |
    +----------------------------------------------------------------+

                     Figure 2: Protocol-Layering Model

   The TLV layer is a payload with TLV objects as defined in
   Section 4.2.  The TLV objects are used to carry arbitrary parameters
   between an EAP peer and an EAP server.  All data exchanges in the
   TEAP protected tunnel are encapsulated in a TLV layer.

   Methods for encapsulating EAP within carrier protocols are already
   defined.  For example, IEEE 802.1X [IEEE.802-1X.2020] may be used to
   transport EAP between the peer and the authenticator; RADIUS
   [RFC3579] or Diameter [RFC4072] may be used to transport EAP between
   the authenticator and the EAP server.

2.3.  Outer TLVs versus Inner TLVs

   TEAP packets may include TLVs both inside and outside the TLS tunnel
   defined as follows:

   Outer TLVs

      This term is used to refer to optional TLVs outside the TLS
      tunnel, which are only allowed in the first two messages in the
      TEAP protocol.  That is the first EAP-server-to-peer message and
      first peer-to-EAP-server message.  If the message is fragmented,
      the whole set of fragments is counted as one message.

   Inner TLVs

      This term is used to refer to TLVs sent within the TLS tunnel.  In
      TEAP Phase 1, Outer TLVs are used to help establish the TLS
      tunnel, but no Inner TLVs are used.  In Phase 2 of TEAP, TLS
      records may encapsulate zero or more Inner TLVs, but no Outer TLVs
      are used.

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3.  TEAP Protocol

   The operation of the protocol, including Phase 1 and Phase 2, is the
   topic of this section.  The format of TEAP messages is given in
   Section 4, and the cryptographic calculations are given in Section 5.

3.1.  Version Negotiation

   TEAP packets contain a 3-bit Version field, following the TLS Flags
   field, which enables future TEAP implementations to be backward
   compatible with previous versions of the protocol.  This
   specification documents the TEAP version 1 protocol; implementations
   of this specification MUST use a Version field set to 1.

   Version negotiation proceeds as follows:

   1.  In the first EAP-Request sent with EAP type=TEAP, the EAP server
       MUST set the Version field to the highest version it supports.

   2.  If the EAP peer supports this version of the protocol, it
       responds with an EAP-Response of EAP type=TEAP, including the
       version number proposed by the TEAP server.

   3.  If the TEAP peer does not support the proposed version but
       supports a lower version, it responds with an EAP-Response of EAP
       type=TEAP and sets the Version field to its highest supported
       version.

   4.  If the TEAP peer only supports versions higher than the version
       proposed by the TEAP server, then use of TEAP will not be
       possible.  In this case, the TEAP peer sends back an EAP-Nak
       either to negotiate a different EAP type or to indicate no other
       EAP types are available.

   5.  If the TEAP server does not support the version number proposed
       by the TEAP peer, it MUST either terminate the conversation with
       an EAP Failure or negotiate a new EAP type.

   6.  If the TEAP server does support the version proposed by the TEAP
       peer, then the conversation continues using the version proposed
       by the TEAP peer.

   The version negotiation procedure guarantees that the TEAP peer and
   server will agree to the latest version supported by both parties.
   If version negotiation fails, then use of TEAP will not be possible,
   and another mutually acceptable EAP method will need to be negotiated
   if authentication is to proceed.

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   The TEAP version is not protected by TLS and hence can be modified in
   transit.  In order to detect a bid-down attack on the TEAP version,
   the peers MUST exchange the TEAP version number received during
   version negotiation using the Crypto-Binding TLV described in
   Section 4.2.13.  The receiver of the Crypto-Binding TLV MUST verify
   that the version received in the Crypto-Binding TLV matches the
   version sent by the receiver in the TEAP version negotiation.

   Intermediate results are signaled via the Intermediate-Result TLV.
   However, the Crypto-Binding TLV MUST be validated before any
   Intermediate-Result TLV or Result TLV is examined.  If the Crypto-
   Binding TLV fails to be validated for any reason, then it is a fatal
   error and is handled as described in Section 3.9.3.

   The true success or failure of TEAP is conveyed by the Result TLV,
   with value Success or Failure.  However, as EAP terminates with
   either a cleartext EAP Success or Failure, a peer will also receive a
   cleartext EAP Success or Failure.  The received cleartext EAP Success
   or Failure MUST match that received in the Result TLV; the peer
   SHOULD silently discard those cleartext EAP Success or Failure
   messages which do not coincide with the status sent in the protected
   Result TLV.

3.2.  TEAP Authentication Phase 1: Tunnel Establishment

   TEAP relies on the TLS handshake [RFC8446] to establish an
   authenticated and protected tunnel.  The TLS version offered by the
   peer and server MUST be TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] or later.  This
   version of the TEAP implementation MUST support the following TLS
   cipher suites:

   *  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

   *  TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

   Other cipher suites MAY be supported.  Implementations MUST implement
   the recommended cipher suites in [RFC9325] Section 4.2 for TLS 1.2,
   and in [RFC9325] Section 4.3 for TLS 1.3.

   It is REQUIRED that anonymous cipher suites such as
   TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA [RFC5246] only be used in the case
   when the inner method provides mutual authentication, key generation,
   and resistance to on-path and dictionary attacks.  TLS cipher suites
   that do not provide confidentiality MUST NOT be used.  During the
   TEAP Phase 1, the TEAP endpoints MAY negotiate TLS compression.
   During TLS tunnel establishment, TLS extensions MAY be used.  For
   instance, the Certificate Status Request extension [RFC6066] and the
   Multiple Certificate Status Request extension [RFC6961] can be used

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   to leverage a certificate-status protocol such as Online Certificate
   Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC6960] to check the validity of server
   certificates.  TLS renegotiation indications defined in RFC 5746
   [RFC5746] MUST be supported.

   Use of TLS-PSK is NOT RECOMMENDED.  TEAP has not been designed to
   work with TLS-PSK, and no use-cases, security analyses, or
   implementations have been done.  TLS-PSK may work (or not) with TEAP,
   depending on the status of a particular implementation, and it is
   therefore not useful to deploy it.

   The EAP server initiates the TEAP conversation with an EAP request
   containing a TEAP/Start packet.  This packet includes a set Start (S)
   bit, the TEAP version as specified in Section 3.1, and an authority
   identity TLV.  The TLS payload in the initial packet is empty.  The
   authority identity TLV (Authority-ID TLV) is used to provide the peer
   a hint of the server's identity that may be useful in helping the
   peer select the appropriate credential to use.  Assuming that the
   peer supports TEAP, the conversation continues with the peer sending
   an EAP-Response packet with EAP type of TEAP with the Start (S) bit
   clear and the version as specified in Section 3.1.  This message
   encapsulates one or more TLS handshake messages.  If the TEAP version
   negotiation is successful, then the TEAP conversation continues until
   the EAP server and EAP peer are ready to enter Phase 2.  When the
   full TLS handshake is performed, then the first payload of TEAP Phase
   2 MAY be sent along with a server-finished handshake message to
   reduce the number of round trips.

   TEAP implementations MUST support mutual peer authentication during
   tunnel establishment using the TLS cipher suites specified in this
   section.  The TEAP peer does not need to authenticate as part of the
   TLS exchange but can alternatively be authenticated through
   additional exchanges carried out in Phase 2.

   The TEAP tunnel protects peer identity information exchanged during
   Phase 2 from disclosure outside the tunnel.  Implementations that
   wish to provide identity privacy for the peer identity need to
   carefully consider what information is disclosed outside the tunnel
   prior to Phase 2.  TEAP implementations SHOULD support the immediate
   renegotiation of a TLS session to initiate a new handshake message
   exchange under the protection of the current cipher suite.  This
   allows support for protection of the peer's identity when using TLS
   client authentication.  An example of the exchanges using TLS
   renegotiation to protect privacy is shown in Appendix C.

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3.3.  Server Certificate Requirements

   Server Certificates MUST include a subjectAltName extension, with the
   dnsName attribute containing an FQDN string.  Server certificates MAY
   also include a SubjectDN containing a single element, "CN="
   containing the FQDN of the server.  However, this use of SubjectDN is
   deprecated for TEAP, and is forbidden in [RFC9525] Section 2.

   The KeyUsage extension MAY be included, but are not required.

   The ExtendedKeyUsage extensions defined in [RFC5280] MAY also be
   included, but their use is discouraged.  Systems SHOULD use a private
   Certification Authority (CA) for EAP in preference to public CAs.
   The most commonly used public CAs are focussed on the web, and those
   certificates are not always suitable for use with EAP.  In contrast,
   private CAs can be designed for any purposes, and can be restricted
   to an enterprise or an other organization.

3.4.  Server Certificate Validation

   As part of the TLS negotiation, the server usually presents a
   certificate to the peer.  In most cases the certificate needs to be
   validated, but there are a number of situations where the EAP peer
   need not do certificate validation:

   *  when the peer has the Server's End Entity (EE) certificate pinned
      or loaded directly into it's trusted anchor information [RFC4949];

   *  when the peer is requesting server unauthenticated provisioning;

   *  when the peer is certain that it will be using an authenticated
      inner method.

   In some cases such as onboarding (or "bootstrapping"), the
   certificate validation may be delayed.  However, once the onboarding
   has taken place, the validation steps described below MUST still be
   performed.

   In all other cases, the EAP peer MUST validate the server
   certificate.  This validation is done in the same manner as is done
   for EAP-TLS, which is discussed in [RFC9190] Section 5.3 and in
   [RFC5216] Section 5.3.  Further guidance on server identity
   validation can be found in [RFC9525] Section 6..

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   Where the EAP peer has an NAI, EAP peers MUST use the realm to
   perform the DNS-ID validation as per [RFC9525] Section 6, The realm
   is used both to construct the list of reference identifiers as
   defined in [RFC9525] Section 6.2.1, and as the "source domain" field
   of that same section.

   When performing server certificate validation, implementations MUST
   also support the rules in [RFC5280] for validating certificates
   against a known trust anchor.  In addition, implementations MUST
   support matching the realm portion of the peer's NAI against a
   SubjectAltName of type dnsName within the server certificate.
   However, in certain deployments, this comparison might not be
   appropriate or enabled.

   In most situations, the EAP peer will have no network access during
   the authentication process.  It will therefore have no way of
   correlating the server identity given in the certificate presented by
   the EAP server with a hostname, as is done with other protocols such
   as HTTPS.  Therefore, if the EAP peer has no preconfigured trust
   anchor, it will have few, if any ways of validating the servers
   certificate.

3.4.1.  Client Certificates sent during Phase 1

   Note that since TLS client certificates are sent in the clear with
   TLS 1.2, if identity protection is required, then it is possible for
   the TLS authentication to be renegotiated after the first server
   authentication.  To accomplish this, the server will typically not
   request a certificate in the server_hello; then, after the
   server_finished message is sent and before TEAP Phase 2, the server
   MAY send a TLS hello_request.  This allows the peer to perform client
   authentication by sending a client_hello if it wants to or send a
   no_renegotiation alert to the server indicating that it wants to
   continue with TEAP Phase 2 instead.  Assuming that the peer permits
   renegotiation by sending a client_hello, then the server will respond
   with server_hello, certificate, and certificate_request messages.
   The peer replies with certificate, client_key_exchange, and
   certificate_verify messages.  Since this renegotiation occurs within
   the encrypted TLS channel, it does not reveal client certificate
   details.  It is possible to perform certificate authentication using
   EAP (for example, EAP-TLS) within the TLS session in TEAP Phase 2
   instead of using TLS handshake renegotiation.

   When TLS 1.3 or later is used, it is RECOMMENDED that client
   certificates are sent in Phase 1, instead of via Phase 2 and EAP-TLS.
   Doing so will reduce the number of round trips.  Further discussion
   of this issue is given below in Section 3.6.4

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3.5.  Resumption

   For resumption, [RFC9190] Section 5.7 discusses EAP-TLS resumption
   for all versions of TLS, and is incorporated herein by reference.
   [RFC9427] Section 4 is also incorporated by reference, as it provides
   generic discussion of resumption for TLS-based EAP methods when TLS
   1.3 is used.

   This document only describes TEAP issues when resumption is used for
   TLS versions of 1.2 and earlier.  It also describes resumption issues
   which are specific to TEAP for TLS 1.3.

   If the server agrees to resume the session, Phase 2 is bypassed
   entirely.  If the server does not agree to resume the session, then
   the server rejects the resumption as per [RFC9190] Section 5.7.  It
   then continues with a full handshake.  After the full TLS handshake
   has completed, both EAP server and peer MUST proceed with Phase 2.

   All TEAP implementations MUST support resumption.  Using resumption
   can significantly improve the scalability and stability of
   authentication systems.  For example, some environments such as
   universities may have users re-authenticating multiple times a day,
   if not hourly.  Failure to implement resumption would increase the
   load on the user database by orders of magnitude, leading to
   unnecessary cost.

   The following sections describe how a TEAP session can be resumed
   based on server-side or client-side state.

3.5.1.  TLS Session Resumption Using Server State

   TEAP session resumption is achieved in the same manner TLS achieves
   session resumption.  To support session resumption, the server and
   peer cache the Session ID, master secret, and cipher suite.  The peer
   attempts to resume a session by including a valid Session ID from a
   previous TLS handshake in its ClientHello message.  If the server
   finds a match for the Session ID and is willing to establish a new
   connection using the specified session state, the server will respond
   with the same Session ID and proceed with the TEAP Phase 1 tunnel
   establishment based on a TLS abbreviated handshake.

3.5.2.  TLS Session Resumption Using Client State

   TEAP supports the resumption of sessions based on state being stored
   on the client side using the TLS SessionTicket extension techniques
   described in [RFC5077] and [RFC9190].

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3.6.  TEAP Authentication Phase 2: Tunneled Authentication

   The second portion of the TEAP authentication occurs immediately
   after successful completion of Phase 1.  Phase 2 occurs even if both
   peer and authenticator are authenticated in the Phase 1 TLS
   negotiation.  Phase 2 MUST NOT occur if the Phase 1 TLS handshake
   fails, as that will compromise the security as the tunnel has not
   been established successfully.  Phase 2 consists of a series of
   requests and responses encapsulated in TLV objects defined in
   Section 4.2.  Phase 2 MUST always end with a Crypto-Binding TLV
   exchange described in Section 4.2.13 and a protected termination
   exchange described in Section 3.6.5.

   If the peer is not authenticated in Phase 1, the TEAP peer SHOULD
   send one or more Identity-Hint TLVs (Section 4.2.20 as soon as the
   TLS connection has been established.  This information lets the TEAP
   server choose an authentication type which is appropriate for that
   identity.  When the TEAP peer does not provide an Identity-Hint TLV,
   the TEAP server does not know which inner method is supported by the
   peer.  It must necessarily choose an inner method, and propose it to
   the peer, which may reject that inner method.  The result will be
   that the peer fails to authenticate, and fails to obtain network
   access.

   The TLV exchange includes the execution of zero or more inner methods
   within the protected tunnel as described in Section 3.6.1 and
   Section 3.6.2.  A server MAY proceed directly to the protected
   termination exchange, without performing any inner authentication if
   it does not wish to request further authentication from the peer.  A
   server MAY request one or more authentications within the protected
   tunnel.  After completion of each inner method, the server decides
   whether or not to begin another inner method, or to send a Result
   TLV.

   Implementations MUST support at least two sequential inner methods,
   which allows both Machine and User authentication to be performed.
   Implementations SHOULD also limit the number of sequential inner
   authentications, as there is no reason to perform a large number of
   inner authentications in one TEAP conversation.

   Implementations wishing to use their own proprietary authentication
   method, may substitute the EAP-Payload or Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV
   for the Vendor-Specific TLV which carries another authentication
   method.  Any vendor-specific authentication method MUST support
   calculation of the Crypto-Binding TLV, and MUST use Intermediate-
   Result TLV and Result TLV as is done with other authentication
   methods.

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   Implementations SHOULD support both EAP and basic password for inner
   methods.  Implementations which support multiple types of inner
   method MUST support all of those methods in any order or combination.
   That is, it is explicitly permitted to "mix and match" inner methods.

   However, the peer and server MUST NOT assume that either will skip
   inner methods or other TLV exchanges, as the other peer might have a
   different security policy.  The peer may have roamed to a network
   that requires conformance with a different authentication policy, or
   the peer may request the server take additional action (e.g., channel
   binding) through the use of the Request-Action TLV as defined in
   Section 4.2.9.

   The completion of each inner method is signaled by an Intermediate-
   Result TLV.  Where the Intermediate-Result TLV indicates failure, an
   Error TLV SHOULD also be included, using the most descriptive error
   code possible.  The Intermediate-Result TLV may be accompanied by
   another TLV indicating that the server wishes to perform a subsequent
   authentication.  When the authentication sequence completes, the
   server MUST send a Result TLV indicating success or failure instead
   of a TLV which carries an inner method.

3.6.1.  Inner EAP Authentication

   EAP [RFC3748] prohibits use of multiple authentication methods within
   a single EAP conversation in order to limit vulnerabilities to on-
   path attacks.  TEAP addresses on-path attacks through support for
   cryptographic protection of the inner EAP exchange and cryptographic
   binding of the inner EAP method(s) to the protected tunnel.  Inner
   methods are executed serially in a sequence.  This version of TEAP
   does not support initiating multiple inner methods simultaneously in
   parallel.  The inner methods need not be distinct.  For example, EAP-
   TLS ([RFC5216] and [RFC9190]) could be run twice as an inner method,
   first using machine credentials followed by a second instance using
   user credentials.

   When EAP is used as an inner method, the EAP messages are carried
   within EAP-Payload TLVs defined in Section 4.2.10.  Note that in this
   use-case, TEAP is simply a carrier for EAP, much as RADIUS is a
   carrier for EAP.  The full EAP state machine is run as normal, and is
   carried over the EAP-Payload TLV.  Each distinct EAP authentication
   MUST be managed as a separate EAP state machine.

   A TEAP server therefore MUST begin an EAP authentication with an EAP-
   Request/Identity (carried in an EAP-Payload TLV).  However, a TEAP
   server MUST NOT finish the EAP conversation with an EAP Success or
   EAP Failure packet, the Intermediate-Result TLV is used instead.

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   Upon completion of each EAP authentication in the tunnel, the server
   MUST send an Intermediate-Result TLV indicating the result of that
   authentication.  When the result indicates, success it MUST be
   accompanied by a Crypto-Binding TLV.  The peer MUST respond to the
   Intermediate-Result TLV indicating its own result and similarly on
   success MUST accompany the TLV with it's own Crypto-Binding TLV.  The
   Crypto-Binding TLV is further discussed in Section 4.2.13 and
   Section 5.3.  The Intermediate-Result TLVs can be included with other
   TLVs which indicate a subsequent authentication, or with the Result
   TLV used in the protected termination exchange.

   If both peer and server indicate success, then the authentication is
   considered successful.  If either indicates failure, then the
   authentication is considered failed.  The result of failure of an EAP
   authentication does not always imply a failure of the overall
   authentication.  If one inner method fails, the server may attempt to
   authenticate the peer with a different method (EAP or password).

   If a particular inner method succeeds, the server MUST NOT attempt a
   subsequent inner method for the same Identity-Type.  For example, if
   a user is authenticated via an inner method of EAP-TLS, there is no
   benefit to also requesting additional authentication via a different
   inner method.

3.6.2.  Inner Password Authentication

   The authentication server initiates password authentication by
   sending a Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV defined in Section 4.2.14.  If
   the peer wishes to participate in password authentication, then it
   responds with a Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV as defined in
   Section 4.2.15 that contains the username and password.  If it does
   not wish to perform password authentication, then it responds with a
   NAK TLV indicating the rejection of the Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV.

   The basic password authentication defined here is similar in
   functionality to that used by EAP-TTLS ([RFC5281]) with inner
   password authentication.  It shares a similar security and risk
   analysis.

   Multiple round trips of password authentication requests and
   responses MAY be used to support some "housekeeping" functions such
   as a password or pin change before a user is considered to be
   authenticated.  Multiple rounds MAY also be used to communicate a
   user's password, and separately a one-time password such as Time-
   Based One-Time Passwords (TOTP) [RFC6238].

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   Implementations MUST limit the number of rounds trips for password
   authentication.  It is reasonable to use one or two round trips.
   Further round trips are likely to be problematic, and SHOULD be
   avoided.

   The first Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV received in a session MUST
   include a prompt, which the peer displays to the user.  Subsequent
   authentication rounds SHOULD include a prompt, but it is not always
   necessary.

   When the peer first receives a Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV, it should
   allow the user to enter both a Username and a Password, which are
   then placed in the Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV.  If the peer
   receives subsequent Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLVs in the same
   authentication session, it MUST NOT prompt for a Username, and
   instead allow the user to enter only a password.  The peer MUST copy
   the Username used in the first Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV into all
   subsequent Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLVs.

   Servers MUST track the Username across multiple password rounds, and
   reject authentication if the identity changes from one Basic-
   Password-Auth-Resp TLV to the next.  There is no reason for a user
   (or machine) to change identities in the middle of authentication.

   Upon reception of a Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV in the tunnel, the
   server MUST send an Intermediate-Result TLV indicating the result.
   The peer MUST respond to the Intermediate-Result TLV indicating its
   result.  If the result indicates success, the Intermediate-Result TLV
   MUST be accompanied by a Crypto-Binding TLV.  The Crypto-Binding TLV
   is further discussed in Section 4.2.13 and Section 5.3.

   The Intermediate-Result TLVs can be included with other TLVs which
   indicate a subsequent authentication, or with the Result TLV used in
   the protected termination exchange.

   The use of EAP-FAST-GTC as defined in [RFC5421] is NOT RECOMMENDED
   with TEAPv1 because EAP-FAST-GTC is not compliant with EAP-GTC
   defined in [RFC3748].  Implementations should instead make use of the
   password authentication TLVs defined in this specification.

3.6.3.  EAP-MSCHAPv2

   If using EAP-MSCHAPv2 [KAMATH] as an inner EAP method, the EAP-FAST-
   MSCHAPv2 variant defined in Section 3.2.3 of [RFC5422] MUST be used,
   instead of the derivation defined in [MSCHAP].

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   The difference between EAP-MSCHAPv2 and EAP-FAST-MSCHAPv2 is that the
   first and the second 16 octets of EAP-MSCHAPv2 MSK are swapped when
   it is used as the Inner Method Session Keys (IMSK) for TEAP.

3.6.4.  Limitations on inner methods

   Tunneled EAP methods such as (PEAP) [PEAP], EAP-TTLS [RFC5281], and
   EAP-FAST [RFC4851] MUST NOT be used for inner EAP authentication.
   There is no reason to have multiple layers of TLS to protect a
   password exchange.

   The EAP methods defined in [RFC3748] Section 5 such as MD5-Challenge,
   One-Time Password (OTP), and Generic Token Card (GTC) do not derive
   an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK), and are vulnerable to on-path
   attacks.  The construction of the OTP and GTC methods makes this
   attack less relevant, as the information being sent is a one-time
   token.  However, MD5-Challenge has no such safety, and TEAP
   implementations MUST NOT permit the use of MD5-Challenge or other
   inner methods which fail to perform crypto-binding of the inner
   method to the TLS session.

   Similarly, EAP-OTP and EAP-GTC MUST NOT be used for inner EAP
   authentication.  They offer no benefit over the basic password
   authentication defined in Section 3.6.2.

   Implementations SHOULD limit the permitted inner EAP methods to a
   small set such as EAP-TLS, EAP-MSCHAPv2, and perhaps EAP-pwd.  There
   are few reasons for allowing all possible EAP methods to be used in
   Phase 2.  The above EAP methods are widely implemented, and known to
   be widely used.

   Other EAP methods such as EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA, or EAP-AKA' are less
   commonly used within a TEAP tunnel.  The main reason to use an EAP
   method inside of a TLS-based EAP method such as TEAP is for privacy.
   Many legacy EAP methods may leak information about user identity, and
   those leaks are prevented by running the method inside of a protected
   TLS tunnel.

   Implementations MUST NOT permit resumption for the inner EAP methods
   such as EAP-TLS.  If the user or machine needs to be authenticated,
   it should use a method which provides full authentication.  If the
   user or machine needs to do resumption, it can perform a full
   authentication once, and then rely on the outer TLS session for
   resumption.  This restriction applies also to all TLS-based EAP
   methods which can tunnel other EAP methods.  As a result, this
   document updates [RFC9427].

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   EAP-TLS is permitted in Phase 2 for two use-cases.  The first is when
   TLS 1.2 is used, as the client certificate is not protected as with
   TLS 1.3.  It is therefore RECOMMENDED that when TLS 1.3 is used, the
   client certificate is sent in Phase 1, instead of doing EAP-TLS in
   Phase 2.

   The second use-case for EAP-TLS in Phase 2 is where both the user and
   machine use client certificates for authentication.  Since TLS only
   permits one client certificate to be presented, only one certificate
   can be used in Phase 1.  The second certificate is then presented via
   EAP-TLS in Phase 2.

   For basic password authentication, it is RECOMMENDED that this method
   be only used for the exchange of one-time passwords.  The existence
   of password-based EAP methods such as EAP-pwd ([RFC5931] and
   [RFC8146]) makes most clear-text password exchanges unnecessary.  The
   updates to EAP-pwd in [RFC8146] permit it to be used with databases
   which store passwords in "salted" form, which greatly increases
   security.

   Where the inner method does not provide an MSK or EMSK, the Crypto-
   Binding TLV offers little protection, as it cannot tie the inner EMSK
   to the TLS session via the TLS-PRF.  As a result, the TEAP session
   will be vulnerable to on-path active attacks.  Implementations and
   deployments SHOULD adopt various mitigation strategies described in
   [RFC7029] Section 3.2.

3.6.5.  Protected Termination and Acknowledged Result Indication

   A successful TEAP Phase 2 conversation MUST always end in a
   successful Crypto-Binding TLV and Result TLV exchange.  A TEAP server
   may initiate the Crypto-Binding TLV and Result TLV exchange without
   initiating any inner methods in TEAP Phase 2.  After the final Result
   TLV exchange, the TLS tunnel is terminated, and a cleartext EAP
   Success or EAP Failure is sent by the server.  Peers implementing
   TEAP MUST NOT accept a cleartext EAP Success or failure packet prior
   to the peer and server reaching synchronized protected result
   indication.

   The Crypto-Binding TLV exchange is used to prove that both the peer
   and server participated in the tunnel establishment and sequence of
   authentications.  It also provides verification of the TEAP type,
   version negotiated, and Outer TLVs exchanged before the TLS tunnel
   establishment.  Except as noted below, the Crypto-Binding TLV MUST be
   exchanged and verified before the final Result TLV exchange,
   regardless of whether or not there is an inner method.  The Crypto-
   Binding TLV and Intermediate-Result TLV MUST be included to perform
   cryptographic binding after each successful authentication in a

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   sequence of one or more inner methods.  The server may send the final
   Result TLV along with an Intermediate-Result TLV and a Crypto-Binding
   TLV to indicate its intention to end the conversation.  If the peer
   requires nothing more from the server, it will respond with a Result
   TLV indicating success accompanied by a Crypto-Binding TLV and
   Intermediate-Result TLV if necessary.  The server then tears down the
   tunnel and sends a cleartext EAP Success or EAP Failure.

   If the peer receives a Result TLV indicating success from the server,
   but its authentication policies are not satisfied (for example, it
   requires a particular authentication mechanism to be run), it may
   request further action from the server using the Request-Action TLV.
   The Request-Action TLV is sent with a Status field indicating what
   EAP Success/Failure result the peer would expect if the requested
   action is not granted.  The value of the Action field indicates what
   the peer would like to do next.  The format and values for the
   Request-Action TLV are defined in Section 4.2.9.

   Upon receiving the Request-Action TLV, the server may process the
   request or ignore it, based on its policy.  If the server ignores the
   request, it proceeds with termination of the tunnel and sends the
   cleartext EAP Success or Failure message based on the Status field of
   the peer's Request-Action TLV.  If the server honors and processes
   the request, it continues with the requested action.  The
   conversation completes with a Result TLV exchange.  The Result TLV
   may be included with the TLV that completes the requested action.

   Error handling for Phase 2 is discussed in Section 3.9.3.

3.7.  Determining Peer-Id and Server-Id

   The Peer-Id and Server-Id [RFC5247] may be determined based on the
   types of credentials used during either the TEAP tunnel creation or
   authentication.  In the case of multiple peer authentications, all
   authenticated peer identities and their corresponding identity types
   (Section 4.2.3) need to be exported.  In the case of multiple server
   authentications, all authenticated server identities need to be
   exported.

   When X.509 certificates are used for peer authentication, the Peer-Id
   is determined by the subject and subjectAltName fields in the peer
   certificate.  As noted in [RFC5280]:

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   The subject field identifies the entity associated with the public
   key stored in the subject public key field.  The subject name MAY
   be carried in the subject field and/or the subjectAltName
   extension. . . . If subject naming information is present only in
   the subjectAltName extension (e.g., a key bound only to an email
   address or URI), then the subject name MUST be an empty sequence
   and the subjectAltName extension MUST be critical.

   Where it is non-empty, the subject field MUST contain an X.500
   distinguished name (DN).

   If an inner EAP authentication method is run, then the Peer-Id is
   obtained from that inner EAP authentication method.

   When the server uses an X.509 certificate to establish the TLS
   tunnel, the Server-Id is determined in a similar fashion as stated
   above for the Peer-Id, e.g., the subject and subjectAltName fields in
   the server certificate define the Server-Id.

3.8.  TEAP Session Identifier

   For TLS 1.2 and earlier, the EAP session identifier [RFC5247] is
   constructed using the tls-unique from the Phase 1 outer tunnel at the
   beginning of Phase 2 as defined by Section 3.1 of [RFC5929].  The
   Session-Id is defined as follows:

      Session-Id = teap_type | tls-unique

      where | denotes concatenation, and teap_type is the EAP Type
      assigned to TEAP

      tls-unique = tls-unique from the Phase 1 outer tunnel at the
      beginning of Phase 2 as defined by Section 3.1 of [RFC5929]

   The Session-Id derivation for TLS 1.3 is given in [RFC9427]
   Section 2.1

3.9.  Error Handling

   TEAP uses the error-handling rules summarized below:

   1.  Errors in the outer EAP packet layer are handled as defined in
       Section 3.9.1.

   2.  Errors in the TLS layer are communicated via TLS alert messages
       in both phases of TEAP.

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   3.  The Intermediate-Result TLVs carry success or failure indications
       of the individual inner methods in TEAP Phase 2.  Errors within
       an EAP conversation in Phase 2 are expected to be handled by the
       individual EAP authentication methods.

   4.  Violations of the Inner TLV rules are handled using Result TLVs
       together with Error TLVs.

   5.  Tunnel-compromised errors (errors caused by a failed or missing
       Crypto-Binding) are handled using Result TLVs and Error TLVs.

3.9.1.  Outer-Layer Errors

   Errors on the TEAP outer-packet layer are handled in the following
   ways:

   1.  If Outer TLVs are invalid or contain unknown values, they will be
       ignored.

   2.  The entire TEAP packet will be ignored if other fields (version,
       length, flags, etc.) are inconsistent with this specification.

3.9.2.  TLS Layer Errors

   If the TEAP server detects an error at any point in the TLS handshake
   or the TLS layer, the server SHOULD send a TEAP request encapsulating
   a TLS record containing the appropriate TLS alert message rather than
   immediately terminating the TEAP exchange so as to allow the peer to
   inform the user of the cause of the failure.  The TEAP peer MUST send
   a TEAP response to an alert message.  The EAP-Response packet sent by
   the peer SHOULD contain a TEAP response with a zero-length message.
   The server MUST terminate the TEAP exchange with an EAP Failure
   packet, no matter what the client says.

   If the TEAP peer detects an error at any point in the TLS layer, the
   TEAP peer SHOULD send a TEAP response encapsulating a TLS record
   containing the appropriate TLS alert message, and which contains a
   zero-length message.  The server then MUST terminate the conversation
   with an EAP failure, as discussed in the previous paragraph.

   While TLS 1.3 ([RFC8446]) allows for the TLS conversation to be
   restarted, it is not clear when that would be useful (or used) for
   TEAP.  Fatal TLS errors will cause the TLS conversation to fail.
   Non-fatal TLS errors can likely be ignored entirely.  As a result,
   TEAP implementations MUST NOT permit TLS restarts.

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3.9.3.  Phase 2 Errors

   There are a large number of situations where errors can occur during
   Phase 2 processing.  This section describes both those errors, and
   the recommended processing of them.

   When the server receives a Result TLV with a fatal Error TLV from the
   peer, it MUST terminate the TLS tunnel and reply with an EAP Failure.

   When the peer receives a Result TLV with a fatal Error TLV from the
   server, it MUST respond with a Result TLV indicating failure.  The
   server MUST discard any data it receives from the peer, and reply
   with an EAP Failure.  The final message from the peer is required by
   the EAP state machine, and serves only to allow the server to reply
   to the peer with the EAP Failure.

   The following items describe specific errors and processing in more
   detail.

   Fatal Error processing a TLV

      Any time the peer or the server finds a fatal error outside of the
      TLS layer during Phase 2 TLV processing, it MUST send a Result TLV
      of failure and an Error TLV using the most descriptive error code
      possible.

   Fatal Error during TLV Exchanges

      For errors involving the processing of the sequence of exchanges,
      such as a violation of TLV rules (e.g., multiple EAP-Payload
      TLVs), the error code is Unexpected TLVs Exchanged.

   Fatal Error due to tunnel compromise

      For errors involving a tunnel compromise such as when the Crypto-
      Binding TLV fails validation, the error code is Tunnel Compromise
      Error.

   Non-Fatal Error due to inner method

      If there is a non-fatal error while running the inner method, the
      receiving side SHOULD NOT silently drop the inner method exchange.
      Instead, it SHOULD reply with an Error TLV containing using the
      most descriptive error code possible.

      If there is no error code which matches the particular issue, then
      the value Inner Method Error (1001) SHOULD be used.  This response
      is a positive indication that there was an error processing the

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      current inner method.  The side receiving a non-fatal Error TLV
      MAY decide to start a new and different inner method instead or,
      send back a Result TLV to terminate the TEAP authentication
      session.

3.10.  Fragmentation

   Fragmentation of EAP packets is discussed in [RFC5216] Section 2.1.5.
   There is no special handling of fragments for TEAP.

3.11.  Services Requested by the Peer

   Several TEAP operations, including server unauthenticated
   provisioning, certificate provisioning, and channel binding, depend
   on the peer trusting the TEAP server.  If the peer trusts the
   provided server certificate, then the server is authenticated.

   Typically, this authentication process involves the peer validating
   the certificate to a trust anchor by verifying that the server
   presenting the certificate holds the private key, and confirming that
   the entity named by the certificate is the intended server.  Server
   authentication also occurs when the procedures in Section 3.2 are
   used to resume a session where the peer and server were previously
   mutually authenticated.  Alternatively, the server is deemed to be
   authenticated if an inner EAP method provides mutual authentication
   along with a Master Session Key (MSK) and/or Extended Master Session
   Key (EMSK).  The inner method MUST also provide for cryptographic
   binding via the Compound Message Authentication Code (MAC), as
   discussed in Section 4.2.13.  This issue is further described in
   Section 3.11.3.

   TEAP peers MUST track whether or not server authentication has taken
   place.  When the server cannot be authenticated, the peer MUST NOT
   request any services such as certificate provisioning ({#cert-
   provisioning}) from it.

   Unless the peer requests server unauthenticated provisioning, it MUST
   authenticate the server, and fail the current authentication session
   fails if the server cannot be authenticated.

   An additional complication arises when an inner method authenticates
   multiple parties such as authenticating both the peer machine and the
   peer user to the EAP server.  Depending on how authentication is
   achieved, only some of these parties may have confidence in it.  For
   example, if a strong shared secret is used to mutually authenticate
   the user and the EAP server, the machine may not have confidence that
   the EAP server is the authenticated party if the machine cannot trust
   the user not to disclose the shared secret to an attacker.  In these

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   cases, the parties who participate in the authentication need to be
   considered when evaluating whether the peer should request these
   services, or whether the server should provide them.

   The server MUST also authenticate the peer before providing these
   services.  The alternative is to send provisioning data to
   unauthenticated and potentially malicious peers, which can have
   negative impacts on security.

   When a device is provisioned via TEAP, any subsequent authorization
   MUST be done on the authenticated credentials.  That is, there may be
   no credentials (or anonymous credentials) passed in Phase 1, but
   there will be credentials passed or provisioned in Phase 2.  If later
   authorizations are done on the Phase 1 identity, then a device could
   obtain the wrong authorization.  If instead authorization is done on
   the authenticated credentials, then the device will obtain the
   correct kind of network access.

   The correct authorization must also be applied to any resumption, as
   noted in [RFC9190] Section 5.7.  However, as it is possible in TEAP
   for the credentials to change, the new credentials MUST be associated
   with the session ticket.  If this association cannot be done, then
   the server MUST invalidate any session tickets for the current
   session.  This invalidation will force a full re-authentication on
   any subsequent connection, at which point the correct authorization
   will be associated with any session ticket.

   Note that the act of re-provisioning a device is essentially
   indistinguishable from any initial provisioning.  The device
   authenticates, and obtains new credentials via the standard
   provisioning mechanisms.  The only caveat is that the device SHOULD
   NOT discard the old credentials unless either they are known to have
   expired, or the new credentials have been verified to work.

3.11.1.  Certificate Provisioning within the Tunnel

   Provisioning of a peer's certificate is supported in TEAP by
   performing the Simple PKI Request/Response from [RFC5272] using
   PKCS#10 and PKCS#7 TLVs, respectively.  A peer sends the Simple PKI
   Request using a PKCS#10 CertificateRequest [RFC2986] encoded into the
   body of a PKCS#10 TLV (see Section 4.2.17).  The TEAP server issues a
   Simple PKI Response using a PKCS#7 [RFC2315] unsigned (i.e.
   degenerate) "Certificates Only" message encoded into the body of a
   PKCS#7 TLV (see Section 4.2.16), only after an inner method has run
   and provided an identity proof on the peer prior to a certificate is
   being issued.

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   In order to provide linking identity and proof-of-possession by
   including information specific to the current authenticated TLS
   session within the signed certification request, the peer generating
   the request SHOULD obtain the tls-unique value from the TLS subsystem
   as defined in "Channel Bindings for TLS" [RFC5929].  The TEAP peer
   operations between obtaining the tls-unique value through generation
   of the Certification Signing Request (CSR) that contains the current
   tls-unique value and the subsequent verification of this value by the
   TEAP server are the "phases of the application protocol during which
   application-layer authentication occurs" that are protected by the
   synchronization interoperability mechanism described in the
   interoperability note in "Channel Bindings for TLS" ([RFC5929],
   Section 3.1).  When performing renegotiation, TLS
   "secure_renegotiation" [RFC5746] MUST be used.

   The tls-unique value is base-64-encoded as specified in Section 4 of
   [RFC4648], and the resulting string is placed in the certification
   request challengePassword field ([RFC2985], Section 5.4.1).  The
   challengePassword field is limited to 255 octets (Section 7.4.9 of
   [RFC5246] indicates that no existing cipher suite would result in an
   issue with this limitation).  If tls-unique information is not
   embedded within the certification request, the challengePassword
   field MUST be empty to indicate that the peer did not include the
   optional channel-binding information (any value submitted is verified
   by the server as tls-unique information).

   The server SHOULD verify the tls-unique information.  This ensures
   that the signed certificate request is being presented by an
   authenticated TEAP peer which is in possession of the private key.

   The Simple PKI Request/Response generation and processing rules of
   [RFC5272] SHALL apply to TEAP, with the exception of error
   conditions.  In the event of an error, the TEAP server SHOULD respond
   with an Error TLV using the most descriptive error code possible; it
   MAY ignore the PKCS#10 request that generated the error.

3.11.2.  Certificate Content and Uses

   It is not enough to verify that the CSR provided by the peer to the
   authenticator is from an authenticated user.  The CSR itself should
   also be examined by the authenticator or Certification Authority (CA)
   before any certificate is issued.

   The format of a CSR is complex, and contains a substantial amount of
   information.  That information could be incorrect, such as a user
   claiming a wrong physical address, email address, etc.  It is
   RECOMMENDED that systems provisioning these certificates validate
   that the CSR both contains the expected data, and also that is does

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   not contain unexpected data.  For example, a CA could refuse to issue
   the certificate if the CSR contained unknown fields, or if a known
   field contained an unexpected or invalid value.  The CA can modify or
   refuse a particular CSR to address these deficiencies for any
   reasons, including local site policy.  We note that the "A" in "CA"
   means for "Authority", while the "R" in "CSR" means "Request".  There
   is no requirement for a CA to sign any and all CSRs which are
   presented to it.

   Once an EAP peer receives the signed certificate, the peer could
   potentially be (ab) used for in TLS contexts other than TEAP.  For
   example, the certificate could be used with EAP-TLS, or even with
   HTTPS.  It is NOT RECOMMENDED to use certificates provisioned via
   TEAP for any non-TEAP protocol.  One method of enforcing this
   restriction is to have different CAs (or different intermediate CAs)
   which issue certificates for different uses.  For example, TLS-based
   EAP methods could share one CA, and even use different intermediary
   CAs for different TLS-based EAP methods.  HTTPS servers could use an
   entirely different CA.  The different protocols could then be
   configured to validate client certificates only from their preferred
   CA, which would prevent peers from using certificates outside of the
   intended use-case.

   Another method of limiting the uses of a certificate is to provision
   it with an appropriate value for the Extended Key Usage field
   [RFC7299].  For example, the id-kp-eapOverLAN [RFC4334] value could
   be used to indicate that this certificate is intended for use only
   with EAP.

   It is difficult to give more detailed recommendations than the above.
   Each CA or organization may have its own local policy as to what is
   permitted or forbidden in a certificate.  All we can do in this
   document is to highlight the issues, and make the reader aware that
   they have to be addressed.

3.11.3.  Server Unauthenticated Provisioning Mode

   In Server Unauthenticated Provisioning Mode, an unauthenticated
   tunnel is established in Phase 1, and the peer and server negotiate
   an inner method or methods in Phase 2.  This inner method MUST
   support mutual authentication, provide key derivation, and be
   resistant to attacks such as on-path and dictionary attacks.  In most
   cases, this inner method will be an EAP authentication method.
   Example inner methods which satisfy these criteria include EAP-pwd
   [RFC5931] and EAP-EKE [RFC6124], but not EAP-FAST-MSCHAPv2.

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   This provisioning mode enables the bootstrapping of peers when the
   peer lacks the ability to authenticate the server during Phase 1.
   This includes both cases in which the cipher suite negotiated does
   not provide authentication and in which the cipher suite negotiated
   provides the authentication but the peer is unable to validate the
   identity of the server for some reason.

   Upon successful completion of the inner method in Phase 2, the peer
   and server exchange a Crypto-Binding TLV to bind the inner method
   with the outer tunnel and ensure that an on-path attack has not been
   attempted.

   Support for the Server Unauthenticated Provisioning Mode is optional.
   The cipher suite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA is RECOMMENDED when
   using Server Unauthenticated Provisioning Mode, but other anonymous
   cipher suites MAY be supported as long as the TLS pre-master secret
   is generated from contribution from both peers.

   When a strong inner method is not used with Server Unauthenticated
   Provisioning Mode, it is possible for an attacker to perform an on-
   path attack.  In effect, Server Unauthenticated Provisioning Mode has
   similar security issues as just running the inner method in the open,
   without the protection of TLS.  All of the information in the tunnel
   should be assumed to be visible to, and modifiable by, an attacker.

   Implementations SHOULD exchange minimal data in Server
   Unauthenticated Provisioning Mode.  Instead, they should use that
   mode to set up a secure / authenticated tunnel, and then use that
   tunnel to perform any needed data exchange.

   It is RECOMMENDED that client implementations and deployments
   authenticate TEAP servers if at all possible.  Authenticating the
   server means that a client can be provisioned securely with no chance
   of an attacker eaves-dropping on the connection.

   Note that server Unauthenticated Provisioning can only use anonymous
   cipher suites in TLS 1.2 and earlier.  These cipher suites have been
   deprecated in TLS 1.3 ([RFC8446] Section C.5).  For TLS 1.3, the
   server MUST provide a certificate, and the peer performs server
   unauthenticated provisioning by not validating the certificate chain
   or any of its contents.

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3.11.4.  Channel Binding

   [RFC6677] defines channel bindings for EAP which solve the "lying
   NAS" and the "lying provider" problems, using a process in which the
   EAP peer gives information about the characteristics of the service
   provided by the authenticator to the Authentication, Authorization,
   and Accounting (AAA) server protected within the EAP authentication
   method.  This allows the server to verify the authenticator is
   providing information to the peer that is consistent with the
   information received from this authenticator as well as the
   information stored about this authenticator.

   TEAP supports EAP channel binding using the Channel-Binding TLV
   defined in Section 4.2.7.  If the TEAP server wants to request the
   channel-binding information from the peer, it sends an empty Channel-
   Binding TLV to indicate the request.  The peer responds to the
   request by sending a Channel-Binding TLV containing a channel-binding
   message as defined in [RFC6677].  The server validates the channel-
   binding message and sends back a Channel-Binding TLV with a result
   code.  If the server did not initiate the channel-binding request and
   the peer still wants to send the channel-binding information to the
   server, it can do that by using the Request-Action TLV along with the
   Channel-Binding TLV.  The peer MUST only send channel-binding
   information after it has successfully authenticated the server and
   established the protected tunnel.

4.  Message Formats

   The following sections describe the message formats used in TEAP.
   The fields are transmitted from left to right in network byte order.

4.1.  TEAP Message Format

   A summary of the TEAP Request/Response packet format is shown below.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Code      |   Identifier  |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |   Flags | Ver |        Message Length         :
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   :         Message Length        |         Outer TLV Length
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   :     Outer TLV Length          |         TLS Data...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |       Outer TLVs...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

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   Code

      The Code field is one octet in length and is defined as follows:

         1 Request

         2 Response

   Identifier

      The Identifier field is one octet and aids in matching responses
      with requests.  The Identifier field MUST be changed on each
      Request packet.  The Identifier field in the Response packet MUST
      match the Identifier field from the corresponding request.

   Length

      The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
      packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, Flags, Ver,
      Message Length, TLS Data, and Outer TLVs fields.  Octets outside
      the range of the Length field should be treated as Data Link Layer
      padding and should be ignored on reception.

   Type

      55 for TEAP

   Flags

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          0 1 2 3 4
         +-+-+-+-+-+
         |L M S O R|
         +-+-+-+-+-+

      L  Length included; set to indicate the presence of the four-octet
         Message Length field.  It MUST be present for the first
         fragment of a fragmented message.  It MUST NOT be present for
         any other message.

      M  More fragments; set on all but the last fragment.

      S  TEAP start; set in a TEAP Start message sent from the server to
         the peer.

      O  Outer TLV length included; set to indicate the presence of the
         four-octet Outer TLV Length field.  It MUST be present only in
         the initial request and response messages.  If the initial
         message is fragmented, then it MUST be present only on the
         first fragment.

      R  Reserved (MUST be zero and ignored upon receipt)

   Ver

      This field contains the version of the protocol.  This document
      describes version 1 (001 in binary) of TEAP.

   Message Length

      The Message Length field is four octets and is present only if the
      L bit is set.  This field provides the total length of the message
      that may be fragmented over the data fields of multiple packets.

   Outer TLV Length

      The Outer TLV Length field is four octets and is present only if
      the O bit is set.  This field provides the total length of the
      Outer TLVs if present.

   TLS Data

      When the TLS Data field is present, it consists of an encapsulated
      TLS packet in TLS record format.  A TEAP packet with Flags and
      Version fields, but with zero length TLS Data field, is used to
      indicate TEAP acknowledgment for either a fragmented message, a
      TLS Alert message, or a TLS Finished message.

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   Outer TLVs

      The Outer TLVs consist of the optional data used to help establish
      the TLS tunnel in TLV format.  They are only allowed in the first
      two messages in the TEAP protocol.  That is the first EAP-server-
      to-peer message and first peer-to-EAP-server message.  The start
      of the Outer TLVs can be derived from the EAP Length field and
      Outer TLV Length field.

4.2.  TEAP TLV Format and Support

   The TLVs defined here are TLV objects.  The TLV objects could be used
   to carry arbitrary parameters between an EAP peer and EAP server
   within the protected TLS tunnel.

   The EAP peer may not necessarily implement all the TLVs supported by
   the EAP server.  To allow for interoperability, TLVs are designed to
   allow an EAP server to discover if a TLV is supported by the EAP peer
   using the NAK TLV.  The mandatory bit in a TLV indicates whether
   support of the TLV is required.  If the peer or server does not
   support a TLV marked mandatory, then it MUST send a NAK TLV in the
   response, and all the other TLVs in the message MUST be ignored.  If
   an EAP peer or server finds an unsupported TLV that is marked as
   optional, it can ignore the unsupported TLV.  It MUST only send a NAK
   TLV for a TLV which is marked mandatory but is not understood, and
   MUST NOT otherwise send a NAK TLV.  If all TLVs in a message are
   marked optional and none are understood by the peer, then a Result
   TLV SHOULD be sent to the other side in order to continue the
   conversation.  It is also possible to send a NAK TLV when all TLVs in
   a message are marked optional.

   Note that a peer or server may support a TLV with the mandatory bit
   set but may not understand the contents.  The appropriate response to
   a supported TLV with content that is not understood is defined by the
   individual TLV specification.

   EAP implementations compliant with this specification MUST support
   TLV exchanges as well as the processing of mandatory/optional
   settings on the TLV.  Implementations conforming to this
   specification MUST support the following TLVs:

   *  Authority-ID TLV

   *  Identity-Type TLV

   *  Result TLV

   *  NAK TLV

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   *  Error TLV

   *  Request-Action TLV

   *  EAP-Payload TLV

   *  Intermediate-Result TLV

   *  Crypto-Binding TLV

   *  Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV

   *  Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV

4.2.1.  General TLV Format

   TLVs are defined as described below.  The fields are transmitted from
   left to right.

   If a peer or server receives a TLV which is not of the correct
   format, the TLV MUST be discarded.  It is generally useful to log an
   error or debugging message which indicates which TLV had an issue,
   and what the problem is.  However, TLVs which are malformed are
   invalid, and cannot be used.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|            TLV Type       |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                              Value...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      0 Optional TLV

      1 Mandatory TLV

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

   A 14-bit field, denoting the TLV type.  Allocated types include:

      0 Unassigned

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      1 Authority-ID TLV (Section 4.2.2)

      2 Identity-Type TLV (Section 4.2.3)

      3 Result TLV (Section 4.2.4)

      4 NAK TLV (Section 4.2.5)

      5 Error TLV (Section 4.2.6)

      6 Channel-Binding TLV (Section 4.2.7)

      7 Vendor-Specific TLV (Section 4.2.8)

      8 Request-Action TLV (Section 4.2.9)

      9 EAP-Payload TLV (Section 4.2.10)

      10 Intermediate-Result TLV (Section 4.2.11)

      11 PAC TLV (DEPRECATED)

      12 Crypto-Binding TLV (Section 4.2.13)

      13 Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV (Section 4.2.14)

      14 Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV (Section 4.2.15)

      15 PKCS#7 TLV (Section 4.2.16)

      16 PKCS#10 TLV (Section 4.2.17)

      17 Trusted-Server-Root TLV (Section 4.2.18)

      18 CSR-Attributes TLV (Section 4.2.19)

      19 Identity-Hint TLV (Section 4.2.20)

   Length

      The length of the Value field in octets.

   Value

      The value of the TLV.

4.2.2.  Authority-ID TLV

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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                              ID...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      0 - Optional TLV

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      1 - Authority-ID

   Length

      The Length field is two octets and contains the length of the ID
      field in octets.

   ID

      Hint of the identity of the server to help the peer to match the
      credentials available for the server.  It should be unique across
      the deployment.

4.2.3.  Identity-Type TLV

   The Identity-Type TLV allows an EAP server to send a hint to help the
   EAP peer select the right type of identity, for example, user or
   machine.  TEAPv1 implementations MUST support this TLV.  Only one
   Identity-Type TLV SHOULD be present in the TEAP request or response
   packet.  The Identity-Type TLV request MUST come with an EAP-Payload
   TLV or Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV.  If the EAP peer does have an
   identity corresponding to the identity type requested, then the peer
   SHOULD respond with an Identity-Type TLV with the requested type.  If
   the Identity-Type field does not contain one of the known values or
   if the EAP peer does not have an identity corresponding to the
   identity type requested, then the peer SHOULD respond with an
   Identity-Type TLV with the one of available identity types.  If the
   server receives an identity type in the response that does not match
   the requested type, then the peer does not possess the requested
   credential type, and the server SHOULD proceed with authentication

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   for the credential type proposed by the peer, proceed with requesting
   another credential type, or simply apply the network policy based on
   the configured policy, e.g., sending Result TLV with Failure.

   The Identity-Type TLV is defined as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |         Identity-Type         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      Mandatory, set to one (1)

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      2 - Identity-Type TLV

   Length

      2

   Identity-Type

      The Identity-Type field is two octets.  Values include:

         1 User

         2 Machine

4.2.4.  Result TLV

   The Result TLV provides support for acknowledged success and failure
   messages for protected termination within TEAP.  If the Status field
   does not contain one of the known values, then the peer or EAP server
   MUST treat this as a fatal error of Unexpected TLVs Exchanged.  The
   behavior of the Result TLV is further discussed in Section 3.6.5 and
   Section 3.9.3.  A Result TLV indicating failure MUST NOT be
   accompanied by the following TLVs: NAK, EAP-Payload TLV, or Crypto-
   Binding TLV.  The Result TLV is defined as follows:

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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |             Status            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      Mandatory, set to one (1)

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      3 - Result TLV

   Length

      2

   Status

      The Status field is two octets.  Values include:

         1 Success

         2 Failure

4.2.5.  NAK TLV

   The NAK TLV allows a peer to detect TLVs that are not supported by
   the other peer.  A TEAP packet can contain 0 or more NAK TLVs.  A NAK
   TLV should not be accompanied by other TLVs.  A NAK TLV MUST NOT be
   sent in response to a message containing a Result TLV, instead a
   Result TLV of failure should be sent indicating failure and an Error
   TLV of Unexpected TLVs Exchanged.  The NAK TLV is defined as follows:

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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          Vendor-Id                            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            NAK-Type           |           TLVs...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      Mandatory, set to one (1)

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      4 - NAK TLV

   Length

      >=6

   Vendor-Id

      The Vendor-Id field is four octets and contains the Vendor-Id of
      the TLV that was not supported.  The high-order octet is 0, and
      the low-order three octets are the Structure of Management
      Information (SMI) Network Management Private Enterprise Number of
      the Vendor in network byte order.  The Vendor-Id field MUST be
      zero for TLVs that are not Vendor-Specific TLVs.

   NAK-Type

      The NAK-Type field is two octets.  The field contains the type of
      the TLV that was not supported.  A TLV of this type MUST have been
      included in the previous packet.

   TLVs

      This field contains a list of zero or more TLVs, each of which
      MUST NOT have the mandatory bit set.  These optional TLVs are for
      future extensibility to communicate why the offending TLV was
      determined to be unsupported.

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4.2.6.  Error TLV

   The Error TLV allows an EAP peer or server to indicate errors to the
   other party.  A TEAP packet can contain 0 or more Error TLVs.  The
   Error-Code field describes the type of error.  Error codes 1-999
   represent successful outcomes (informative messages), 1000-1999
   represent warnings, and 2000-2999 represent fatal errors.  A fatal
   Error TLV MUST be accompanied by a Result TLV indicating failure, and
   the conversation is terminated as described in Section 3.9.3.

   Many of the error codes below refer to errors in inner method
   processing that may be retrieved if made available by the inner
   method.  Implementations MUST take care that error messages do not
   reveal too much information to an attacker.  For example, the usage
   of error message 1031 (User account credentials incorrect) is NOT
   RECOMMENDED, because it allows an attacker to determine valid
   usernames by differentiating this response from other responses.  It
   should only be used for troubleshooting purposes.

   The Error TLV is defined as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Error-Code                          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      Mandatory, set to one (1)

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      5 - Error TLV

   Length

      4

   Error-Code

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      The Error-Code field is four octets.  Currently defined values for
      Error-Code include:

         1 User account expires soon

         2 User account credential expires soon

         3 User account authorizations change soon

         4 Clock skew detected

         5 Contact administrator

         6 User account credentials change required

         1001 Inner Method Error

         1002 Unspecified authentication infrastructure problem

         1003 Unspecified authentication failure

         1004 Unspecified authorization failure

         1005 User account credentials unavailable

         1006 User account expired

         1007 User account locked: try again later

         1008 User account locked: admin intervention required

         1009 Authentication infrastructure unavailable

         1010 Authentication infrastructure not trusted

         1011 Clock skew too great

         1012 Invalid inner realm

         1013 Token out of sync: administrator intervention required

         1014 Token out of sync: PIN change required

         1015 Token revoked

         1016 Tokens exhausted

         1017 Challenge expired

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         1018 Challenge algorithm mismatch

         1019 Client certificate not supplied

         1020 Client certificate rejected

         1021 Realm mismatch between inner and outer identity

         1022 Unsupported Algorithm In Certificate Signing Request

         1023 Unsupported Extension In Certificate Signing Request

         1024 Bad Identity In Certificate Signing Request

         1025 Bad Certificate Signing Request

         1026 Internal CA Error

         1027 General PKI Error

         1028 Inner method's channel-binding data required but not
         supplied

         1029 Inner method's channel-binding data did not include
         required information

         1030 Inner method's channel binding failed

         1031 User account credentials incorrect [USAGE NOT RECOMMENDED]

         1032 Inner method not supported

         2001 Tunnel Compromise Error

         2002 Unexpected TLVs Exchanged

4.2.7.  Channel-Binding TLV

   The Channel-Binding TLV provides a mechanism for carrying channel-
   binding data from the peer to the EAP server and a channel-binding
   response from the EAP server to the peer as described in [RFC6677].
   TEAPv1 implementations MAY support this TLV, which cannot be
   responded to with a NAK TLV.  If the Channel-Binding data field does
   not contain one of the known values or if the EAP server does not
   support this TLV, then the server MUST ignore the value.  The
   Channel-Binding TLV is defined as follows:

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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Data ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      0 - Optional TLV

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      6 - Channel-Binding TLV

   Length

      variable

   Data

      The data field contains a channel-binding message as defined in
      Section 5.3 of [RFC6677].

4.2.8.  Vendor-Specific TLV

   The Vendor-Specific TLV is available to allow vendors to support
   their own extended attributes not suitable for general usage.  A
   Vendor-Specific TLV attribute can contain one or more TLVs, referred
   to as Vendor TLVs.  The TLV type of a particular Vendor TLV is
   defined by the vendor.  All the Vendor TLVs inside a single Vendor-
   Specific TLV belong to the same vendor.  There can be multiple
   Vendor-Specific TLVs from different vendors in the same message.
   Error handling in the Vendor TLV could use the vendor's own specific
   error-handling mechanism or use the standard TEAP error codes
   defined.

   Vendor TLVs may be optional or mandatory.  Vendor TLVs sent with
   Result TLVs MUST be marked as optional.  If the Vendor-Specific TLV
   is marked as mandatory, then it is expected that the receiving side
   needs to recognize the vendor ID, parse all Vendor TLVs within, and
   deal with error handling within the Vendor-Specific TLV as defined by
   the vendor.

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   Where a Vendor-Specific TLV carries an authentication protocol in the
   inner method, it MUST define values for MSK and EMSK.  Where these
   values cannot be derived from cryptographic primitives, they MUST be
   set to zero, as happens when Basic-Password-Auth-Req is used.

   The Vendor-Specific TLV is defined as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          Vendor-Id                            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         Vendor TLVs....
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      0 or 1

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      7 - Vendor-Specific TLV

   Length

      4 + cumulative length of all included Vendor TLVs

   Vendor-Id

      The Vendor-Id field is four octets and contains the Vendor-Id of
      the TLV.  The high-order octet is 0, and the low-order 3 octets
      are the SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Number of the
      Vendor in network byte order.

   Vendor TLVs

      This field is of indefinite length.  It contains Vendor-Specific
      TLVs, in a format defined by the vendor.

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4.2.9.  Request-Action TLV

   The Request-Action TLV MAY be sent at any time.  The Request-Action
   TLV allows the peer or server to request that other side negotiates
   additional inner methods or process TLVs which are passed inside of
   the Request-Action TLV.

   The receiving side MUST process this TLV.  The processing for the TLV
   is as follows:

      The receiving entity MAY choose to process any of the TLVs that
      are included in the message.

      If the receiving entity chooses NOT to process any TLV in the
      list, then it sends back a Result TLV with the same code in the
      Status field of the Request-Action TLV.

      If multiple Request-Action TLVs are in the request, the session
      can continue if any of the TLVs in any Request-Action TLV are
      processed.

      If multiple Request-Action TLVs are in the request and none of
      them is processed, then the most fatal status should be used in
      the Result TLV returned.  If a status code in the Request-Action
      TLV is not understood by the receiving entity, then it SHOULD be
      treated as a fatal error.  Otherwise, the receiving entity MAY
      send a Request-Action TLV containing an Error TLV of value 2002
      (Unexpected TLVs Exchanged).

      After processing the TLVs or inner method in the request, another
      round of Result TLV exchange MUST occur to synchronize the final
      status on both sides.

   The peer or the server MAY send multiple Request-Action TLVs to the
   other side.  Two Request-Action TLVs MUST NOT occur in the same TEAP
   packet if they have the same Status value.  The order of processing
   multiple Request-Action TLVs is implementation dependent.  If the
   receiving side processes the optional (non-fatal) items first, it is
   possible that the fatal items will disappear at a later time.  If the
   receiving side processes the fatal items first, the communication
   time will be shorter.

   The peer or the server MAY return a new set of Request-Action TLVs
   after one or more of the requested items have been processed and the
   other side has signaled it wants to end the EAP conversation.

   The Request-Action TLV is defined as follows:

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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Status   |      Action    |                TLVs....
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   M

      Mandatory, set to one (1)

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      8 - Request-Action TLV

   Length

      2 + cumulative length of all included TLVs

   Status

      The Status field is one octet.  This indicates the result if the
      party who receives this TLV does not process the action.  Values
      include:

         1 Success

         2 Failure

   Action

      The Action field is one octet.  Values include:

         1 Process-TLV

         2 Negotiate-EAP

   TLVs

      This field is of indefinite length.  It contains TLVs that the
      peer wants the server to process.

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4.2.10.  EAP-Payload TLV

   To allow coalescing an EAP request or response with other TLVs, the
   EAP-Payload TLV is defined, which includes an encapsulated EAP packet
   and a list of optional TLVs.  The optional TLVs are provided for
   future extensibility to provide hints about the current EAP
   authentication.  Only one EAP-Payload TLV is allowed in a message.
   The EAP-Payload TLV is defined as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          EAP packet...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                             TLVs...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      Mandatory, set to one (1)

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      9 - EAP-Payload TLV

   Length

      length of embedded EAP packet + cumulative length of additional
      TLVs

   EAP packet

      This field contains a complete EAP packet, including the EAP
      header (Code, Identifier, Length, Type) fields.  The length of
      this field is determined by the Length field of the encapsulated
      EAP packet.

   TLVs

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      This (optional) field contains a list of TLVs associated with the
      EAP packet field.  The TLVs MUST NOT have the mandatory bit set.
      The total length of this field is equal to the Length field of the
      EAP-Payload TLV, minus the Length field in the EAP header of the
      EAP packet field.

4.2.11.  Intermediate-Result TLV

   The Intermediate-Result TLV signals intermediate Success and Failure
   messages for all inner methods.  The Intermediate-Result TLV MUST be
   be used for all inner methods.

   An Intermediate-Result TLV indicating Success MUST be accompanied by
   a Crypto-Binding TLV.

   An Intermediate-Result TLV indicating Failure SHOULD be accompanied
   by an Error TLV which indicates why the authentication failed.

   The optional TLVs associated with this TLV are provided for future
   extensibility to provide hints about the current result.  The
   Intermediate-Result TLV is defined as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |             Status            |        TLVs...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      Mandatory, set to one (1)

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      10 - Intermediate-Result TLV

   Length

      2 + cumulative length of the embedded associated TLVs

   Status

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      The Status field is two octets.  Values include:

         1 Success

         2 Failure

   TLVs

      This field is of indeterminate length and contains zero or more of
      the TLVs associated with the Intermediate Result TLV.  The TLVs in
      this field MUST NOT have the mandatory bit set.

4.2.12.  PAC TLV

   [RFC7170] defined a Protected Access Credential (PAC) to mirror EAP-
   FAST [RFC4851].  However, implementation experience and analysis
   determined that the PAC was not necessary.  Instead, TEAP performs
   session resumption using the NewSessionTicket message as defined in
   [RFC9190] Section 2.1.2 and Section 2.1.3.  As such, the PAC TLV has
   been deprecated.

   As the PAC TLV is deprecated, an entity receiving it SHOULD send a
   Result TLV indicating failure, and an Error TLV of Unexpected TLVs
   Exchanged.

4.2.13.  Crypto-Binding TLV

   The Crypto-Binding TLV is used to prove that both the peer and server
   participated in the tunnel establishment and sequence of
   authentications.  It also provides verification of the TEAP type,
   version negotiated, and Outer TLVs exchanged before the TLS tunnel
   establishment.

   The Crypto-Binding TLV MUST be exchanged and validated before any
   Intermediate-Result or Result TLV value is examined, regardless of
   whether there is an inner method or not.  It MUST be included with
   the Intermediate-Result TLV to perform cryptographic binding after
   each successful inner method in a sequence of inner methods, before
   proceeding with another inner method.  If no MSK or EMSK has been
   generated and a Crypto-Binding TLV is required then the MSK Compound
   MAC field contains the MAC using keys generated according to
   Section 5.3.

   The Crypto-Binding TLV is valid only if the following checks pass:

   *  The Crypto-Binding TLV version is supported.

   *  The MAC verifies correctly.

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   *  The received version in the Crypto-Binding TLV matches the version
      sent by the receiver during the EAP version negotiation.

   *  The subtype is set to the correct value.

   If any of the above checks fails, then the TLV is invalid.  An
   invalid Crypto-Binding TLV is a fatal error and is handled as
   described in Section 3.9.3

   The Crypto-Binding TLV is defined as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Reserved   |    Version    |  Received Ver.| Flags|Sub-Type|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                             Nonce                             ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                   EMSK Compound MAC                           ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                    MSK Compound MAC                           ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      Mandatory, set to one (1)

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      12 - Crypto-Binding TLV

   Length

      76

   Reserved

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      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   Version

      The Version field is a single octet, which is set to the version
      of Crypto-Binding TLV the TEAP method is using.  For an
      implementation compliant with this version of TEAP, the version
      number MUST be set to one (1).

   Received Ver

      The Received Ver field is a single octet and MUST be set to the
      TEAP version number received during version negotiation.  Note
      that this field only provides protection against downgrade
      attacks, where a version of EAP requiring support for this TLV is
      required on both sides.

   Flags

      The Flags field is four bits.  Defined values include

         1 EMSK Compound MAC is present

         2 MSK Compound MAC is present

         3 Both EMSK and MSK Compound MAC are present

   Sub-Type

      The Sub-Type field is four bits.  Defined values include

         0 Binding Request

         1 Binding Response

   Nonce

      The Nonce field is 32 octets.  It contains a 256-bit nonce that is
      temporally unique, used for Compound MAC key derivation at each
      end.  The nonce in a request MUST have its least significant bit
      set to zero (0), and the nonce in a response MUST have the same
      value as the request nonce except the least significant bit MUST
      be set to one (1).

   EMSK Compound MAC

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      The EMSK Compound MAC field is 20 octets.  This can be the Server
      MAC (B1_MAC) or the Client MAC (B2_MAC).  The computation of the
      MAC is described in Section 5.3.

      Note that this field is always 20 octets in length.  Any larger
      MAC is simply truncated.  All validations or comparisons MUST be
      done on the truncated value.

   MSK Compound MAC

      The MSK Compound MAC field is 20 octets.  This can be the Server
      MAC (B1_MAC) or the Client MAC (B2_MAC).  The computation of the
      MAC is described in Section 5.3.

      Note that this field is always 20 octets in length.  Any larger
      MAC is simply truncated.  All validations or comparisons MUST be
      done on the truncated value.

4.2.14.  Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV

   The Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV is used by the authentication server
   to request a username and password from the peer.  It contains an
   optional user prompt message for the request.  The peer is expected
   to obtain the username and password and send them in a Basic-
   Password-Auth-Resp TLV.

   The Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV is defined as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Prompt ....
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      Mandatory, set to one (1)

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      13 - Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV

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   Length

      variable

   Prompt

      optional user prompt message in UTF-8 [RFC3629] format

4.2.15.  Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV

   The Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV is used by the peer to respond to a
   Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV with a username and password.  The TLV
   contains a username and password.  The username and password are in
   UTF-8 [RFC3629] format.

   The Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV is defined as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Userlen     |             Username
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
         ...     Username    ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Passlen     |             Password
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
         ...     Password    ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   M

      Mandatory, set to one (1)

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      14 - Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV

   Length

      variable

   Userlen

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      Length of Username field in octets

      The value of Userlen MUST NOT be zero.

   Username

      Username in UTF-8 [RFC3629] format

      The content of Username SHOULD follow the guidelines set in
      [RFC9427] Section 3.1.

   Passlen

      Length of Password field in octets

      The value of Passlen MUST NOT be zero.

   Password

      Password in UTF-8 [RFC3629] format

      Note that there is no requirement that passwords be humanly
      readable.  Octets in a passwords may have values less than 0x20,
      including 0x00.

4.2.16.  PKCS#7 TLV

   The PKCS#7 TLV is used by the EAP server to deliver certificate(s) to
   the peer.  The format consists of a certificate or certificate chain
   in binary DER encoding [X.690] in a degenerate Certificates Only
   PKCS#7 SignedData Content as defined in [RFC5652].

   When used in response to a Trusted-Server-Root TLV request from the
   peer, the EAP server MUST send the PKCS#7 TLV inside a Trusted-
   Server-Root TLV.  When used in response to a PKCS#10 certificate
   enrollment request from the peer, the EAP server MUST send the PKCS#7
   TLV without a Trusted-Server-Root TLV.  The PKCS#7 TLV is always
   marked as optional, which cannot be responded to with a NAK TLV.
   TEAP implementations that support the Trusted-Server-Root TLV or the
   PKCS#10 TLV MUST support this TLV.  Peers MUST NOT assume that the
   certificates in a PKCS#7 TLV are in any order.

   TEAP servers MAY return self-signed certificates.  Peers that handle
   self-signed certificates or trust anchors MUST NOT implicitly trust
   these certificates merely due to their presence in the certificate
   bag.  Note: Peers are advised to take great care in deciding whether
   to use a received certificate as a trust anchor.  The authenticated
   nature of the tunnel in which a PKCS#7 bag is received can provide a

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   level of authenticity to the certificates contained therein.  Peers
   are advised to take into account the implied authority of the EAP
   server and to constrain the trust it can achieve through the trust
   anchor received in a PKCS#7 TLV.

   The PKCS#7 TLV is defined as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |           PKCS#7 Data...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   M

      0 - Optional TLV

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      15 - PKCS#7 TLV

   Length

      The length of the PKCS#7 Data field.

   PKCS#7 Data

      This field contains the DER-encoded X.509 certificate or
      certificate chain in a Certificates-Only PKCS#7 SignedData
      message.

4.2.17.  PKCS#10 TLV

   The PKCS#10 TLV is used by the peer to initiate the "simple PKI"
   Request/Response from [RFC5272].  The format of the request is as
   specified in Section 6.4 of [RFC4945].  The PKCS#10 TLV is always
   marked as optional, which cannot be responded to with a NAK TLV.

   The PKCS#10 TLV is defined as follows:

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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |           PKCS#10 Data...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   M

      0 - Optional TLV

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      16 - PKCS#10 TLV

   Length

      The length of the PKCS#10 Data field.

   PKCS#10 Data

      This field contains the DER-encoded PKCS#10 certificate request.

4.2.18.  Trusted-Server-Root TLV

   Trusted-Server-Root TLV facilitates the request and delivery of a
   trusted server root certificate.  The Trusted-Server-Root TLV can be
   exchanged in regular TEAP authentication mode or provisioning mode.
   The Trusted-Server-Root TLV is always marked as optional and cannot
   be responded to with a Negative Acknowledgment (NAK) TLV.  The
   Trusted-Server-Root TLV MUST only be sent as an Inner TLV (inside the
   protection of the tunnel).

   After the peer has determined that it has successfully authenticated
   the EAP server and validated the Crypto-Binding TLV, it MAY send one
   or more Trusted-Server-Root TLVs (marked as optional) to request the
   trusted server root certificates from the EAP server.  The EAP server
   MAY send one or more root certificates with a Public Key
   Cryptographic System #7 (PKCS#7) TLV inside the Trusted-Server-Root
   TLV.  The EAP server MAY also choose not to honor the request.

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   The Trusted-Server-Root TLV allows the peer to send a request to the
   EAP server for a list of trusted roots.  The server may respond with
   one or more root certificates in PKCS#7 [RFC2315] format.

   If the EAP server sets the credential format to PKCS#7-Server-
   Certificate-Root, then the Trusted-Server-Root TLV should contain the
   root of the certificate chain of the certificate issued to the EAP
   server packaged in a PKCS#7 TLV.  If the server certificate is a
   self-signed certificate, then the root is the self-signed
   certificate.

   If the Trusted-Server-Root TLV credential format contains a value
   unknown to the peer, then the EAP peer should ignore the TLV.

   The Trusted-Server-Root TLV is defined as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |           Credential-Format   |     Cred TLVs...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   M

      0 - Optional TLV

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      17 - Trusted-Server-Root TLV

   Length

      >=2 octets

   Credential-Format

      The Credential-Format field is two octets.  Values include:

         1 - PKCS#7-Server-Certificate-Root

   Cred TLVs

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      This field is of indefinite length.  It contains TLVs associated
      with the credential format.  The peer may leave this field empty
      when using this TLV to request server trust roots.

4.2.19.  CSR-Attributes TLV

   The CSR-Attributes TLV provides information from the server to the
   peer on how certificate signing requests should be formed.  The
   purpose of CSR attributes is described in Section 4.5 of [RFC7030].
   Servers MAY send the CSR-Attributes TLV directly after the TLS
   session has been established.  A server MAY also send in the same
   message a Request Action frame for a PKCS#10 TLV.  This is an
   indication to the peer that the server would like the peer to renew
   its certificate using the parameters provided in this TLV.  Servers
   shall construct the contents of the CSR-Attributes TLV as specified
   in [RFC7030] Section 4.5.2 with the exception that the DER encoding
   MUST NOT be encoded in base64.  The base64 encoding is used in
   [RFC7030] because the transport protocol used there requires textual
   encoding.  In contrast, TEAP attributes can transport arbitrary
   binary data.

   Servers and peers MUST follow the guidance provided in
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs] when creating the CSR-Attributes
   TLV.  Peers MAY ignore the contents of the TLV if they are unable to
   do so, but then servers may not process PKCS#10 certificate requests
   for this or any other reason.

   The CSR-Attributes TLV is defined as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                DER Encoded CSR Attributes                     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   M

      0 - Optional TLV

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      18 - CSR-Attributes

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   Length

      >=2 octets

4.2.20.  Identity-Hint TLV

   The Identity-Hint TLV is an optional TLV which can be sent by the
   peer to the server at the beginning of the Phase 2 TEAP conversation.
   The purpose of the TLV is to provide a "hint" as to the identity or
   identities which the peer will be using by subsequent inner methods.

   The purpose of this TLV is to solve the "bootstrapping" problem for
   the server.  In order to perform authentication, the server must
   choose an inner method.  However, the server has no knowledge of what
   methods are supported by the peer.  Without an identity hint, the
   server needs to propose a method, and then have the peer return a
   response indicating that the requested method is not available.  This
   negotiation increases the number of round trips required for TEAP to
   conclude, with no additional benefit.

   When the Identity-Hint is used, the peer can signal which identities
   it has available, which enables the server to choose an inner method
   which is appropriate for that identity.

   The peer SHOULD send an Identity-Hint TLV for each Identity-Type
   which is available to it.  For example, if the peer can do both
   Machine and User authentication, it can send two Identity-Hint TLVs,
   with values "host/name.example.com" (for a machine with hostname
   "name.example.com"), and "user@example.com" (for a person with
   identity "user@example.com").

   The contents of the Identity-Hint TLV SHOULD be in the format of an
   NAI [RFC7542], but we note that as given in the example above,
   Machine identities might not follow that format.  As these identities
   are never used for AAA routing as discussed in [RFC7542] Section 3,
   the format and definition of these identities are entirely site
   local.  Robust implementations MUST support arbitrary data in the
   content of this TLV, including binary octets.

   As the Identity-Hint TLV is a "hint", server implementations are free
   to ignore the hints given, and do whatever is required by site-local
   policies.

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   The Identity-Hint TLV is used only as a guide when selecting which
   inner methods to use.  This TLV has no other meaning, and it MUST NOT
   be used for any other purpose.  Specifically. server implementations
   MUST NOT compare the identities given this TLV to later identities
   given as part of the inner methods.  There is no issue with the
   hint(s) failing to match any subsequent identity which is used.

   The Identity-Hint TLV MUST NOT be used for Server Unauthenticated
   Provisioning.  This TLV is only used as a hint for normal
   authentication.

   The Identity-Hint TLV is defined as follows:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |M|R|         TLV Type          |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                       Identity Hint                           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   M

      0 - Optional TLV

   R

      Reserved, set to zero (0)

   TLV Type

      19 - Identity-Hint

   Length

      >=2 octets

4.3.  TLV Rules

   To save round trips, multiple TLVs can be sent in a single TEAP
   packet.  However, multiple EAP Payload TLVs, multiple Basic Password
   Authentication TLVs, or an EAP Payload TLV with a Basic Password
   Authentication TLV within one single TEAP packet is not supported in
   this version and MUST NOT be sent.  If the peer or EAP server
   receives multiple EAP Payload TLVs, then it MUST terminate the
   connection with the Result TLV.  The order in which TLVs are encoded
   in a TEAP packet does not matter, however there is an order in which
   TLVs in a packet must be processed:

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   1.  Crypto-Binding TLV

   2.  Intermediate-Result TLV

   3.  Result TLV or Request-Action TLV

   4.  Identity-Type TLV

   5.  EAP-Payload TLV[Identity-Request] or Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV

   6.  Other TLVs

   That is, cryptographic binding is checked before any result is used,
   and identities are checked before proposing an inner method, as the
   identity may influence the chosen inner method.

   The following define the meaning of the table entries in the sections
   below:

   0     This TLV MUST NOT be present in the message.

   0+    Zero or more instances of this TLV MAY be present in the
         message.

   0-1   Zero or one instance of this TLV MAY be present in the message.

   1     Exactly one instance of this TLV MUST be present in the
         message.

4.3.1.  Outer TLVs

   The following table provides a guide to which TLVs may be included in
   the TEAP packet outside the TLS channel, which kind of packets, and
   in what quantity:

   Request  Response    Success   Failure   TLVs
   0-1      0           0         0         Authority-ID
   0-1      0-1         0         0         Identity-Type
   0+       0+          0         0         Vendor-Specific

   Outer TLVs MUST be marked as optional.  Vendor TLVs inside of a
   Vendor-Specific TLV MUST be marked as optional when included in Outer
   TLVs.  Outer TLVs MUST NOT be included in messages after the first
   two TEAP messages sent by peer and EAP-server respectively.  That is
   the first EAP-server-to-peer message and first peer-to-EAP-server
   message.  If the message is fragmented, the whole set of messages is
   counted as one message.  If Outer TLVs are included in messages after
   the first two TEAP messages, they MUST be ignored.

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4.3.2.  Inner TLVs

   The following table provides a guide to which Inner TLVs may be
   encapsulated in TLS in TEAP Phase 2, in which kind of packets, and in
   what quantity.  The messages are as follows: Request is a TEAP
   Request, Response is a TEAP Response, Success is a message containing
   a successful Result TLV, and Failure is a message containing a failed
   Result TLV.

   Request  Response    Success   Failure   TLVs
   0-1      0-1         0         0         Identity-Type
   0-1      0-1         1         1         Result
   0+       0+          0         0         NAK
   0+       0+          0+        0+        Error
   0-1      0-1         0         0         Channel-Binding
   0+       0+          0+        0+        Vendor-Specific
   0+       0+          0+        0+        Request-Action
   0-1      0-1         0         0         EAP-Payload
   0-1      0-1         0-1       0-1       Intermediate-Result
   0-1      0-1         0-1       0-1       Crypto-Binding
   0-1      0           0         0         Basic-Password-Auth-Req
   0        0-1         0         0         Basic-Password-Auth-Resp
   0-1      0           0-1       0         PKCS#7
   0        0-1         0         0         PKCS#10
   0-1      0-1         0-1       0         Trusted-Server-Root
   0-1      0           0         0         CSR-Attributes TLV
   0        0+          0         0         Identity-Hint TLV

   NOTE: Vendor TLVs (included in Vendor-Specific TLVs) sent with a
   Result TLV MUST be marked as optional.  Also, the CSR-Attributes TLV
   is never transmitted by the peer, and so is treated as a request in
   this table.

5.  Cryptographic Calculations

   For key derivation and crypto-binding, TEAP uses the Pseudorandom
   Function (PRF) and MAC algorithms negotiated in the underlying TLS
   session.  Since these algorithms depend on the TLS version and cipher
   suite, TEAP implementations need a mechanism to determine the version
   and cipher suite in use for a particular session.  The implementation
   can then use this information to determine which PRF and MAC
   algorithm to use.

5.1.  TEAP Authentication Phase 1: Key Derivations

   With TEAPv1, the TLS master secret is generated as specified in TLS.
   If session resumption is used, then the master secret is obtained as
   described in [RFC5077].

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   TEAPv1 makes use of the TLS Keying Material Exporters defined in
   [RFC5705] to derive the session_key_seed as follows:

      session_key_seed = TLS-Exporter(
                         "EXPORTER: teap session key seed",, 40)

   No context data is used in the export process.

   The session_key_seed is used by the TEAP authentication Phase 2
   conversation to both cryptographically bind the inner method(s) to
   the tunnel as well as generate the resulting TEAP session keys.  The
   other TLS keying materials are derived and used as defined in
   [RFC5246].

5.2.  Intermediate Compound Key Derivations

   The session_key_seed derived as part of TEAP Phase 2 is used in TEAP
   Phase 2 to generate an Intermediate Compound Key (IMCK) used to
   verify the integrity of the TLS tunnel after each successful inner
   authentication and in the generation of Master Session Key (MSK) and
   Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) defined in [RFC3748].  Note that
   the IMCK MUST be recalculated after each successful inner method.

   The first step in these calculations is the generation of the base
   compound key, IMCK[j] from the session_key_seed, and any session keys
   derived from the successful execution of j'th inner methods.  The
   inner method(s) MUST provide Inner Method Session Keys (IMSKs),
   IMSK[1]..IMSK[n], corresponding to inner method 1 through n.  When a
   particular inner method does not provide key material (such as with
   password exchange) then a special "all zero" IMSK is used as
   described below.

   If an inner method supports export of an Extended Master Session Key
   (EMSK), then the IMSK SHOULD be derived from the EMSK as defined in
   [RFC5295].  The optional data parameter is not used in the
   derivation.

      IMSK[j] = First 32 octets of TLS-PRF(
             EMSK[j],
             "TEAPbindkey@ietf.org",
             0x00 | 0x00 | 0x40)

      where "|" denotes concatenation and the TLS-PRF is defined in
      [RFC5246] as:

         PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label | seed)

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      The secret is the EMSK from the j'th inner method, the usage label
      used is "TEAPbindkey@ietf.org" consisting of the ASCII value for
      the label "TEAPbindkey@ietf.org" (without quotes), the seed
      consists of the "\0" null delimiter (0x00) and 2-octet unsigned
      integer length of 64 octets in network byte order (0x00 | 0x40)
      specified in [RFC5295].

   If an inner method does not support export of an Extended Master
   Session Key (EMSK), then the IMSK is derived from the MSK of the
   inner method.  The MSK is truncated at 32 octets if it is longer than
   32 octets or padded to a length of 32 octets with zeros if it is less
   than 32 octets.  In this case, IMSK[j] is the adjusted MSK.

   An inner method may not provider either EMSK or MSK, such as when
   basic password authentication is used or when no inner method has
   been run and the crypto-binding TLV for the Result TLV needs to be
   generated.  In this case, IMSK[j] is set to all zeroes (i.e., IMSK[j]
   = MSK = 32 octets of 0x00s).

   Note that using an MSK of all zeroes opens up TEAP to on-path
   attacks, as discussed below in {#separation-p1-p2}.  It is therefore
   NOT RECOMMENDED to use inner methods which fail to generate an EMSK
   or MSK.  These methods should only be used in conjunction with
   another inner method which does provide for EMSK or MSK generation.
   It is also RECOMMENDED that TEAP peers order authentication such that
   methods which generate EMSKs are performed before methods which do
   not generate EMSKs.

   For example, Phase 2 could perform both Machine authentication using
   EAP-TLS, followed by User authentication via the Basic Password
   Authentication TLVs.  In that case, the use of EAP-TLS would allow an
   attacker to be detected before the User password was sent.

   However, it is possible that the peer and server sides might not have
   the same capability to export EMSK.  In order to maintain maximum
   flexibility while prevent downgrading attack, the following mechanism
   is in place.

   On the sender of the Crypto-Binding TLV side:

      If the EMSK is not available, then the sender computes the
      Compound MAC using the MSK of the inner method.

      If the EMSK is available and the sender's policy accepts MSK-based
      MAC, then the sender computes two Compound MAC values.  The first
      is computed with the EMSK.  The second one is computed using the
      MSK.  Both MACs are then sent to the other side.

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      If the EMSK is available but the sender's policy does not allow
      downgrading to MSK-generated MAC, then the sender SHOULD only send
      EMSK-based MAC.

   On the receiver of the Crypto-Binding TLV side:

      If the EMSK is not available and an MSK-based Compound MAC was
      sent, then the receiver validates the Compound MAC and sends back
      an MSK-based Compound MAC response.

      If the EMSK is not available and no MSK-based Compound MAC was
      sent, then the receiver handles like an invalid Crypto-Binding TLV
      with a fatal error.

      If the EMSK is available and an EMSK-based Compound MAC was sent,
      then the receiver validates it and creates a response Compound MAC
      using the EMSK.

      If the EMSK is available but no EMSK-based Compound MAC was sent
      and its policy accepts MSK-based MAC, then the receiver validates
      it using the MSK and, if successful, generates and returns an MSK-
      based Compound MAC.

      If the EMSK is available but no EMSK Compound MAC was sent and its
      policy does not accept MSK-based MAC, then the receiver handles
      like an invalid Crypto-Binding TLV with a fatal error.

   If an inner method results in failure, then it is not included in
   this calculation.

   The derivation of S-IMCK is as follows:

      S-IMCK[0] = session_key_seed
      For j = 1 to n-1 do
           IMCK[j] = the first 60 octets of TLS-PRF(S-IMCK[j-1],
                "Inner Methods Compound Keys",
                IMSK[j])
           S-IMCK[j] = first 40 octets of IMCK[j]
           CMK[j] = last 20 octets of IMCK[j]

   where TLS-PRF is the PRF described above negotiated as part of TLS
   handshake [RFC5246].  The value j refers to a corresponding inner
   method 1 through n.  The special value of S-IMCK[0] is used to
   bootstrap the calculations, and can be done as soon as the TLS
   connection is established, and before any inner methods are run.

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   In practice, the requirement to use either MSK or EMSK means that an
   implement MUST track two independent derivations of IMCK[j], one
   which depends on the MSK, and another which depends on EMSK.  That
   is, we have both values derived from MSK:

      IMSK_MSK[j]
      S-IMCK_MSK[j]
      CMK_MSK[j]

   and then also values derived from EMSK:

      IMSK_EMSK[j]
      S-IMCK_EMSK[j]
      CMK_EMSK[j]

5.3.  Computing the Compound MAC

   For inner methods that generate keying material, further protection
   against on-path attacks is provided through cryptographically binding
   keying material established by both TEAP Phase 1 and TEAP Phase 2
   conversations.  After each successful inner EAP authentication, EAP
   EMSK and/or MSKs are cryptographically combined with key material
   from TEAP Phase 1 to generate a Compound Session Key (CMK).  The CMK
   is used to calculate the Compound MAC as part of the Crypto-Binding
   TLV described in Section 4.2.13, which helps provide assurance that
   the same entities are involved in all communications in TEAP.  During
   the calculation of the Compound MAC, the MAC field is filled with
   zeros.

   The Compound MAC computation is as follows:

      Compound-MAC = the first 20 octets of MAC( CMK[n], BUFFER )

   where n is the number of the last successfully executed inner method,
   MAC is the MAC function negotiated in TLS (e.g.  TLS 1.2 in
   [RFC5246]), and BUFFER is created after concatenating these fields in
   the following order:

   1.  The entire Crypto-Binding TLV attribute with both the EMSK and
       MSK Compound MAC fields zeroed out.

   2.  The EAP Type sent by the other party in the first TEAP message,
       which MUST be TEAP, encoded as one octet of 0x37.

   3.  All the Outer TLVs from the first TEAP message sent by EAP server
       to peer.  If a single TEAP message is fragmented into multiple
       TEAP packets, then the Outer TLVs in all the fragments of that
       message MUST be included.

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   4.  All the Outer TLVs from the first TEAP message sent by the peer
       to the EAP server.  If a single TEAP message is fragmented into
       multiple TEAP packets, then the Outer TLVs in all the fragments
       of that message MUST be included.

   If no inner method is run, then no EMSK or MSK will be generated.  If
   an IMSK needs to be generated then the MSK and therefore the IMSK is
   set to all zeroes (i.e., IMSK = MSK = 32 octets of 0x00s).

   Note that there is no boundary marker between the fields in steps (3)
   and (4).  However, the server calculates the compound MAC using the
   outer TLVs it sent, and the outer TLVs it received from the peer.  On
   the other side, the peer calculates the compound MAC using the outer
   TLVs it sent, and the outer TLVs it received from the server.  As a
   result, and modification in transit of the outer TLVs will be
   detected because the two sides will calculate different values for
   the compound MAC.

   If no key generating inner method is run then no EMSK or MSK will be
   generated.  If an IMSK needs to be generated then the MSK and
   therefore the IMSK is set to all zeroes (i.e., IMSK = MSK = 32 octets
   of 0x00s)

5.4.  EAP Master Session Key Generation

   TEAP authentication assures the Master Session Key (MSK) and Extended
   Master Session Key (EMSK) output from running TEAP are the combined
   result of all inner methods by generating an Intermediate Compound
   Key (IMCK).  The IMCK is mutually derived by the peer and the server
   as described in Section 5.2 by combining the MSKs from inner methods
   with key material from TEAP Phase 1.  The resulting MSK and EMSK are
   generated from the final ("n"th) inner method, as part of the IMCK[n]
   key hierarchy via the following derivation:

      MSK  = the first 64 octets of TLS-PRF(S-IMCK[n],
             "Session Key Generating Function")
      EMSK = the first 64 octets of TLS-PRF(S-IMCK[n],
             "Extended Session Key Generating Function")

   The TLS-PRF is defined in [RFC5246] as

      PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label | seed).

   where "|" denotes concatenation.  The secret is S-IMCK[n] where n is
   the number of the last generated S-IMCK[j] from Section 5.2.  The
   label is the ASCII value for the string without quotes.  The seed is
   empty (0 length) and is omitted from the derivation.

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   The EMSK is typically only known to the TEAP peer and server and is
   not provided to a third party.  The derivation of additional keys and
   transportation of these keys to a third party are outside the scope
   of this document.

   If no inner method has created an EMSK or MSK, the MSK and EMSK will
   be generated directly from the session_key_seed meaning S-IMCK[0] =
   session_key_seed.

   As we noted above, not all inner methods generate both MSK and EMSK,
   so we have to maintain two independent derivations of S-IMCK[j], one
   for each of MSK[j] and EMSK[j].  The final derivation using S-IMCK[n]
   must choose only one of these keys.

   If the Crypto-Binding TLV contains an EMSK compound MAC, then the
   derivation is taken from the S_IMCK_EMSK[n].  Otherwise it is taken
   from the S_IMCK_MSK[n].

6.  IANA Considerations

   This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers
   Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the TEAP
   protocol, in accordance with BCP 26 [RFC8126].

   Except as noted below, IANA is instructed to update the "Tunnel
   Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Parameters" registry to
   change the Reference field in all tables from [RFC7170] to [THIS-
   DOCUMENT].

6.1.  TEAP TLV Types

   IANA is instructed to update the references in the "TEAP TLV Types"
   registry to from [RFC7170] to [THIS-DOCUMENT], and add TLV 18 and TLV
   19 to to the registry.  The Unassigned values then begin at 20
   instead of at 18.

   Value,Description,Reference
   18,CSR-Attributes TLV,[THIS-DOCUMENT]
   19,Identity-Hint TLV,[THIS-DOCUMENT]
   20-16383,Unassigned,

   IANA is instructed to close the "TEAP PAC TLV (value 11) PAC
   Attribute Type Codes" and "TEAP PAC TLV (value 11) PAC-Type Type
   Codes" to new registrations, and update update those registries with
   with a NOTE:

   This registry has been closed. See [THIS-DOCUMENT].

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6.2.  TEAP Error TLV (value 5) Error Codes

   IANA is instructed to update the "TEAP Error TLV (value 5) Error
   Codes" registry to add the following entry:

   Value,Description,Reference
   1032,Inner method not supported,[THIS-DOCUMENT]

6.3.  TLS Exporter Labels

   IANA is instructed to update the "TLS Exporter Labels" registry to
   change the Reference field for Value "EXPORTER: teap session key
   seed" as follows:

   Value,DTLS-OK,Recommended,Reference
   EXPORTER: teap session key seed,N,Y,[THIS-DOCUMENT]

6.4.  Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) Parameters

   IANA is instructed to update the "User Specific Root Keys (USRK) Key
   Labels" registry to change the Reference field for Value
   "TEAPbindkey@ietf.org" as follows:

   Value,Description,Reference
   TEAPbindkey@ietf.org,TEAP binding usage label,[THIS-DOCUMENT]

6.5.  Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Registry

   IANA is instructed to update the "Method Types" regisry to change the
   Reference field for Value "55" as follows:

   Value,Description,Reference
   55,TEAP,[THIS-DOCUMENT]

7.  Security Considerations

   TEAP is designed with a focus on wireless media, where the medium
   itself is inherent to eavesdropping.  Whereas in wired media an
   attacker would have to gain physical access to the wired medium,
   wireless media enables anyone to capture information as it is
   transmitted over the air, enabling passive attacks.  Thus, physical
   security can not be assumed, and security vulnerabilities are far
   greater.  The threat model used for the security evaluation of TEAP
   is defined in EAP [RFC3748].

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7.1.  Mutual Authentication and Integrity Protection

   As a whole, TEAP provides message and integrity protection by
   establishing a secure tunnel for protecting the inner method(s).  The
   confidentiality and integrity protection is defined by TLS and
   provides the same security strengths afforded by TLS employing a
   strong entropy shared master secret.  The integrity of the key
   generating inner methods executed within the TEAP tunnel is verified
   through the calculation of the Crypto-Binding TLV.  This ensures that
   the tunnel endpoints are the same as the inner method endpoints.

   Where Server Unauthenticated Provisioning is performed, TEAP requires
   that the inner provisioning method provide for both peer and server
   authentication.

7.2.  Method Negotiation

   As is true for any negotiated EAP protocol, EAP NAK message used to
   suggest an alternate EAP authentication method are sent unprotected
   and, as such, are subject to spoofing.  During unprotected EAP method
   negotiation, NAK packets may be interjected as active attacks to bid-
   down to a weaker form of authentication, such as EAP-MD5 (which only
   provides one-way authentication and does not derive a key).  Both the
   peer and server should have a method selection policy that prevents
   them from negotiating down to weaker methods.  Inner method
   negotiation resists attacks because it is protected by the mutually
   authenticated TLS tunnel established.  Selection of TEAP as an
   authentication method does not limit the potential inner methods, so
   TEAP should be selected when available.

   An attacker cannot readily determine the inner method used, except
   perhaps by traffic analysis.  It is also important that peer
   implementations limit the use of credentials with an unauthenticated
   or unauthorized server.

7.3.  Separation of Phase 1 and Phase 2 Servers

   Separation of the TEAP Phase 1 from the Phase 2 conversation is NOT
   RECOMMENDED.  Allowing the Phase 1 conversation to be terminated at a
   different server than the Phase 2 conversation can introduce
   vulnerabilities if there is not a proper trust relationship and
   protection for the protocol between the two servers.  Some
   vulnerabilities include:

   *  Loss of identity protection

   *  Offline dictionary attacks

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   *  Lack of policy enforcement

   *  on-path active attacks (as described in [RFC7029])

   There may be cases where a trust relationship exists between the
   Phase 1 and Phase 2 servers, such as on a campus or between two
   offices within the same company, where there is no danger in
   revealing the inner identity and credentials of the peer to entities
   between the two servers.  In these cases, using a proxy solution
   without end-to-end protection of TEAP MAY be used.  The TEAP
   encrypting/decrypting gateway MUST, at a minimum, provide support for
   IPsec, TLS, or similar protection in order to provide confidentiality
   for the portion of the conversation between the gateway and the EAP
   server.  In addition, separation of the TEAP server and Inner servers
   allows for crypto-binding based on the inner method MSK to be
   thwarted as described in [RFC7029].  If the inner method derives an
   EMSK, then this threat is mitigated as TEAP uses the Crypto-Binding
   TLV tie the inner EMSK to the TLS session via the TLS-PRF, as
   described above in Section 5.

   On the other hand, if the inner method is not deriving EMSK as with
   password authentication or unauthenticated provisioning, then this
   threat still exists.  Implementations therefore need to limit the use
   of inner methods as discussed above in Section 3.6.4

7.4.  Mitigation of Known Vulnerabilities and Protocol Deficiencies

   TEAP addresses the known deficiencies and weaknesses in some EAP
   authentication methods.  By employing a shared secret between the
   peer and server to establish a secured tunnel, TEAP enables:

   *  Per-packet confidentiality and integrity protection

   *  User identity protection

   *  Better support for notification messages

   *  Protected inner method negotiation, including EAP method

   *  Sequencing of inner methods, including EAP methods

   *  Strong mutually derived MSKs

   *  Acknowledged success/failure indication

   *  Faster re-authentications through session resumption

   *  Mitigation of offline dictionary attacks

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   *  Mitigation of on-path attacks

   *  Mitigation of some denial-of-service attacks

   It should be noted that in TEAP, as in many other authentication
   protocols, a denial-of-service attack can be mounted by adversaries
   sending erroneous traffic to disrupt the protocol.  This is a problem
   in many authentication or key agreement protocols and is therefore
   noted for TEAP as well.

   TEAP was designed with a focus on protected inner methods that
   typically rely on weak credentials, such as password-based secrets.
   To that extent, the TEAP authentication mitigates several
   vulnerabilities, such as offline dictionary attacks, by protecting
   the weak credential-based inner method.  The protection is based on
   strong cryptographic algorithms in TLS to provide message
   confidentiality and integrity.  The keys derived for the protection
   relies on strong random challenges provided by both peer and server
   as well as an established key with strong entropy.  Implementations
   should follow the recommendation in [RFC4086] when generating random
   numbers.

7.4.1.  User Identity Protection and Verification

   The initial identity request response exchange is sent in cleartext
   outside the protection of TEAP.  Typically, the Network Access
   Identifier (NAI) [RFC7542] in the identity response is useful only
   for the realm of information that is used to route the authentication
   requests to the right EAP server.  This means that the identity
   response may contain an anonymous identity and just contain realm
   information.  In other cases, the identity exchange may be eliminated
   altogether if there are other means for establishing the destination
   realm of the request.  In no case should an intermediary place any
   trust in the identity information in the identity response since it
   is unauthenticated and may not have any relevance to the
   authenticated identity.  TEAP implementations should not attempt to
   compare any identity disclosed in the initial cleartext EAP Identity
   response packet with those Identities authenticated in Phase 2.

   When the server is authenticated, identity request/response exchanges
   sent after the TEAP tunnel is established are protected from
   modification and eavesdropping by attackers.  For server
   unauthenticated provisioning, the outer TLS session provides little
   security, and the provisioning method must necessarily provide this
   protection instead.

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   When a client certificate is sent outside of the TLS tunnel in Phase
   1, the peer MUST include Identity-Type as an outer TLV, in order to
   signal the type of identity which that client certificate is for.
   Further, when a client certificate is sent outside of the TLS tunnel,
   the server MUST proceed with Phase 2.  If there is no Phase 2 data,
   then the EAP server MUST reject the session.

   Issues related to confidentiality of a client certificate are
   discussed above in Section 3.4.1

   Note that the Phase 2 data could simply be a Result TLV with value
   Success, along with a Crypto-Binding TLV.  This Phase 2 data serves
   as a protected success indication as discussed in [RFC9190]
   Section 2.1.1

7.5.  Dictionary Attack Resistance

   TEAP was designed with a focus on protected inner methods that
   typically rely on weak credentials, such as password-based secrets.
   TEAP mitigates offline dictionary attacks by allowing the
   establishment of a mutually authenticated encrypted TLS tunnel
   providing confidentiality and integrity to protect the weak
   credential-based inner method.

   TEAP mitigates dictionary attacks by permitting inner methods such as
   EAP-pwd which are not vulnerable to dictionary attacks.

   TEAP implementations can mitigate online "brute force" dictionary
   attempts by limiting the number of failed authentication attempts for
   a particular identity.

7.5.1.  Protection against On-Path Attacks

   TEAP provides protection from on-path attacks in a few ways:

   1.  By using a certificates or a session ticket to mutually
       authenticate the peer and server during TEAP authentication Phase
       1 establishment of a secure TLS tunnel.

   2.  When the TLS tunnel is not secured, by using the keys generated
       by the inner method (if the inner methods are key generating) in
       the crypto-binding exchange and in the generation of the key
       material exported by the inner method described in Section 5.

   TEAP crypto binding does not guarantee protection from on-path
   attacks if the client allows a connection to an untrusted server,
   such as in the case where the client does not properly validate the
   server's certificate.  If the TLS cipher suite derives the master

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   secret solely from the contribution of secret data from one side of
   the conversation (such as cipher suites based on RSA key transport),
   then an attacker who can convince the client to connect and engage in
   authentication can impersonate the client to another server even if a
   strong inner method is executed within the tunnel.  If the TLS cipher
   suite derives the master secret from the contribution of secrets from
   both sides of the conversation (such as in cipher suites based on
   Diffie-Hellman), then crypto binding can detect an attacker in the
   conversation if a strong inner method is used.

7.6.  Protecting against Forged Cleartext EAP Packets

   EAP Success and EAP Failure packets are, in general, sent in
   cleartext and may be forged by an attacker without detection.  Forged
   EAP Failure packets can be used to attempt to convince an EAP peer to
   disconnect.  Forged EAP Success packets may be used to attempt to
   convince a peer that authentication has succeeded, even though the
   authenticator has not authenticated itself to the peer.

   By providing message confidentiality and integrity, TEAP provides
   protection against these attacks.  Once the peer and authentication
   server (AS) initiate the TEAP authentication Phase 2, compliant TEAP
   implementations MUST silently discard all cleartext EAP messages,
   unless both the TEAP peer and server have indicated success or
   failure using a protected mechanism.  Protected mechanisms include
   the TLS alert mechanism and the protected termination mechanism
   described in Section 3.6.5.

   The success/failure decisions within the TEAP tunnel indicate the
   final decision of the TEAP authentication conversation.  After a
   success/failure result has been indicated by a protected mechanism,
   the TEAP peer can process unprotected EAP Success and EAP Failure
   messages; however, the peer MUST ignore any unprotected EAP Success
   or Failure messages where the result does not match the result of the
   protected mechanism.

   To abide by [RFC3748], the server sends a cleartext EAP Success or
   EAP Failure packet to terminate the EAP conversation.  However, since
   EAP Success and EAP Failure packets are not retransmitted, the final
   packet may be lost.  While a TEAP-protected EAP Success or EAP
   Failure packet should not be a final packet in a TEAP conversation,
   it may occur based on the conditions stated above, so an EAP peer
   should not rely upon the unprotected EAP Success and Failure
   messages.

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7.7.  Use of Clear-text Passwords

   TEAP can carry clear-text passwords in the Basic-Password-Auth-Resp
   TLV.  Implementations should take care to protect this data.  For
   example, passwords should not normally be logged, and password data
   should be securely scrubbed from memory when it is no longer needed.

7.8.  Security Claims

   This section provides the needed security claim requirement for EAP
   [RFC3748].

  Auth. mechanism:         Certificate-based, shared-secret-based, and
                           various tunneled authentication mechanisms.

  Cipher Suite negotiation: Yes

  Mutual authentication:   Yes

  Integrity protection:    Yes.  Any method executed within the TEAP
                           tunnel is integrity protected.  The
                           cleartext EAP headers outside the tunnel are
                           not integrity protected.  Server
                           unauthenticated provisioning provides its own
                           protection mechanisms.

  Replay protection:       Yes

  Confidentiality:         Yes

  Key derivation:          Yes

  Key strength:            See Note 1 below.

  Dictionary attack prot.: See Note 2 below.

  Fast reconnect:          Yes

  Cryptographic binding:   Yes

  Session independence:    Yes

  Fragmentation:           Yes

  Key Hierarchy:           Yes

  Channel binding:         Yes

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   Notes

   Note 1.  BCP 86 [RFC3766] offers advice on appropriate key sizes.
   The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) also
   offers advice on appropriate key sizes in [NIST-SP-800-57].
   [RFC3766], Section 5 advises use of the following required RSA or DH
   (Diffie-Hellman) module and DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm)
   subgroup size in bits for a given level of attack resistance in bits.
   Based on the table below, a 2048-bit RSA key is required to provide
   112-bit equivalent key strength:

       Attack Resistance     RSA or DH Modulus            DSA subgroup
        (bits)                  size (bits)                size (bits)
       -----------------     -----------------            ------------
          70                        947                        129
          80                       1228                        148
          90                       1553                        167
         100                       1926                        186
         150                       4575                        284
         200                       8719                        383
         250                      14596                        482

   Note 2.  TEAP protects against offline dictionary attacks when secure
   inner methods are used.  TEAP protects against online dictionary
   attacks by limiting the number of failed authentications for a
   particular identity.

8.  Acknowledgments

   Nearly all of the text in this document was taken directly from
   [RFC7170].  We are grateful to the original authors and reviewers for
   that document.  The acknowledgments given here are only for the
   changes which resulted in this document.

   Alexander Clouter provided substantial and detailed technical
   feedback on nearly every aspect of the specification.  The
   corrections in this document are based on his work.

   We wish to thank the many reviewers and commenters in the EMU WG,
   including Eliot Lear, Jouni Malinen, Joe Salowey, Heikki Vatiainen,
   Bruno Pereria Vidal, and Michael Richardson.  Many corner cases and
   edge conditions were caught and corrected as a result of their
   feedback.

9.  Changes from RFC 7170

   Alan DeKok was added as editor.

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   The document was converted to Markdown, from the [RFC7170] text
   output.

   Any formatting changes mostly result from differences between using
   Markdown versus XML for source.

   The IANA considerations section was replaced with a note to change
   the IANA registry references to this document.

   A new section was added to explain that the inner EAP-MSCHAPv2
   derivation follows EAP-FAST.  This is the largest technical change
   from the previous revision of this document, and follows existing
   implementations.

   Many small changes have been made throughout the document to correct
   inconsistencies, and to address mistakes.  At a high level:

   *  All open errata have been addressed.

   *  A new term "inner method" has been defined.

   *  The definitions and derivation of IMSK, S-IMCK, etc. have been
      corrected and clarified.

   *  The diagrams in Appendix C have been updated to match the TEAP
      state machine

   All uses of the PAC were removed.  It had not been implemented, and
   there were no plans by implementors to use it.

   Text was added on recommendations for inner and outer identities.

Appendix A Evaluation against Tunnel-Based EAP Method Requirements

   This section evaluates all tunnel-based EAP method requirements
   described in [RFC6678] against TEAP version 1.

A.1.  Requirement 4.1.1: RFC Compliance

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by being compliant with RFC 3748
   [RFC3748], RFC 4017 [RFC4017], RFC 5247 [RFC5247], and RFC 4962
   [RFC4962].  It is also compliant with the "cryptographic algorithm
   agility" requirement by leveraging TLS 1.2 for all cryptographic
   algorithm negotiation.

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A.2.  Requirement 4.2.1: TLS Requirements

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by mandating TLS version 1.2 support as
   defined in Section 3.2.

A.3.  Requirement 4.2.1.1.1: Cipher Suite Negotiation

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by using TLS to provide protected
   cipher suite negotiation.

A.4.  Requirement 4.2.1.1.2: Tunnel Data Protection Algorithms

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by mandating cipher suites as defined
   in Section 3.2.

A.5.  Requirement 4.2.1.1.3: Tunnel Authentication and Key Establishment

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by mandating cipher suites which only
   include cipher suites that use strong cryptographic algorithms.  They
   do not include cipher suites providing mutually anonymous
   authentication or static Diffie-Hellman cipher suites as defined in
   Section 3.2.

A.6.  Requirement 4.2.1.2: Tunnel Replay Protection

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by using TLS to provide sufficient
   replay protection.

A.7.  Requirement 4.2.1.3: TLS Extensions

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by allowing TLS extensions, such as TLS
   Certificate Status Request extension [RFC6066] and SessionTicket
   extension [RFC5077], to be used during TLS tunnel establishment.

A.8.  Requirement 4.2.1.4: Peer Identity Privacy

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by establishment of the TLS tunnel and
   protection identities specific to the inner method.  In addition, the
   peer certificate can be sent confidentially (i.e., encrypted).

A.9.  Requirement 4.2.1.5: Session Resumption

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by mandating support of TLS session
   resumption as defined in Section 3.5.1 and TLS session resumption
   using the methods defined in [RFC9190]

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A.10.  Requirement 4.2.2: Fragmentation

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by leveraging fragmentation support
   provided by TLS as defined in Section 3.10.

A.11.  Requirement 4.2.3: Protection of Data External to Tunnel

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by including the TEAP version number
   received in the computation of the Crypto-Binding TLV as defined in
   Section 4.2.13.

A.12.  Requirement 4.3.1: Extensible Attribute Types

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by using an extensible TLV data layer
   inside the tunnel as defined in Section 4.2.

A.13.  Requirement 4.3.2: Request/Challenge Response Operation

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by allowing multiple TLVs to be sent in
   a single EAP request or response packet, while maintaining the half-
   duplex operation typical of EAP.

A.14.  Requirement 4.3.3: Indicating Criticality of Attributes

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by having a mandatory bit in each TLV
   to indicate whether it is mandatory to support or not as defined in
   Section 4.2.

A.15.  Requirement 4.3.4: Vendor-Specific Support

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by having a Vendor-Specific TLV to
   allow vendors to define their own attributes as defined in
   Section 4.2.8.

A.16.  Requirement 4.3.5: Result Indication

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by having a Result TLV to exchange the
   final result of the TEAP authentication so both the peer and server
   have a synchronized state as defined in Section 4.2.4.

A.17.  Requirement 4.3.6: Internationalization of Display Strings

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by supporting UTF-8 format in the
   Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV as defined in Section 4.2.14 and the
   Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV as defined in Section 4.2.15.

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A.18.  Requirement 4.4: EAP Channel-Binding Requirements

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by having a Channel-Binding TLV to
   exchange the EAP channel-binding data as defined in Section 4.2.7.

A.19.  Requirement 4.5.1.1: Confidentiality and Integrity

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by running the password authentication
   inside a protected TLS tunnel.

A.20.  Requirement 4.5.1.2: Authentication of Server

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by mandating authentication of the
   server before establishment of the protected TLS and then running
   inner password authentication as defined in Section 3.2.

A.21.  Requirement 4.5.1.3: Server Certificate Revocation Checking

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by supporting TLS Certificate Status
   Request extension [RFC6066] during tunnel establishment.

A.22.  Requirement 4.5.2: Internationalization

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by supporting UTF-8 format in Basic-
   Password-Auth-Req TLV as defined in Section 4.2.14 and Basic-
   Password-Auth-Resp TLV as defined in Section 4.2.15.

A.23.  Requirement 4.5.3: Metadata

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by supporting Identity-Type TLV as
   defined in Section 4.2.3 to indicate whether the authentication is
   for a user or a machine.

A.24.  Requirement 4.5.4: Password Change

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by supporting multiple Basic-Password-
   Auth-Req TLV and Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV exchanges within a
   single EAP authentication, which allows "housekeeping"" functions
   such as password change.

A.25.  Requirement 4.6.1: Method Negotiation

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by supporting inner EAP method
   negotiation within the protected TLS tunnel.

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A.26.  Requirement 4.6.2: Chained Methods

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by supporting inner EAP method chaining
   within protected TLS tunnels as defined in Section 3.6.1.

A.27.  Requirement 4.6.3: Cryptographic Binding with the TLS Tunnel

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by supporting cryptographic binding of
   the inner EAP method keys with the keys derived from the TLS tunnel
   as defined in Section 4.2.13.

A.28.  Requirement 4.6.4: Peer-Initiated EAP Authentication

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by supporting the Request-Action TLV as
   defined in Section 4.2.9 to allow a peer to initiate another inner
   EAP method.

A.29.  Requirement 4.6.5: Method Metadata

   TEAPv1 meets this requirement by supporting the Identity-Type TLV as
   defined in Section 4.2.3 to indicate whether the authentication is
   for a user or a machine.

Appendix B.  Major Differences from EAP-FAST

   This document is a new standard tunnel EAP method based on revision
   of EAP-FAST version 1 [RFC4851] that contains improved flexibility,
   particularly for negotiation of cryptographic algorithms.  The major
   changes are:

   1.  The EAP method name has been changed from EAP-FAST to TEAP; this
       change thus requires that a new EAP Type be assigned.

   2.  This version of TEAP MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246].  TLS 1.1 and
       earlier MUST NOT be used with TEAP.

   3.  The key derivation now makes use of TLS keying material exporters
       [RFC5705] and the PRF and hash function negotiated in TLS.  This
       is to simplify implementation and better support cryptographic
       algorithm agility.

   4.  TEAP is in full conformance with TLS ticket extension [RFC5077].

   5.  Support is provided for passing optional Outer TLVs in the first
       two message exchanges, in addition to the Authority-ID TLV data
       in EAP-FAST.

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   6.  Basic password authentication on the TLV level has been added in
       addition to the existing inner EAP method.

   7.  Additional TLV types have been defined to support EAP channel
       binding and metadata.  They are the Identity-Type TLV and
       Channel-Binding TLVs, defined in Section 4.2.

Appendix C.  Examples

C.1.  Successful Authentication

   The following exchanges show a successful TEAP authentication with
   basic password authentication.  The conversation will appear as
   follows:

      Authenticating Peer     Authenticator
      -------------------     -------------
                              <- EAP-Request/
                              Identity
      EAP-Response/
      Identity (MyID1) ->
                              <- EAP-Request/
                              EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                              (TEAP Start, S bit set, Authority-ID)

      EAP-Response/
      EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
      (TLS client_hello) ->

                              <- EAP-Request/
                              EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                              (TLS server_hello,
                              (TLS change_cipher_spec,
                               TLS finished)

      EAP-Response/
      EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1 ->
      (TLS change_cipher_spec,
       TLS finished)

      TLS channel established
      (messages sent within the TLS channel)

                             <- Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV, Challenge

      Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV, Response with both
      username and password) ->

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      optional additional exchanges (new pin mode,
      password change, etc.) ...

                           <- Intermediate-Result TLV (Success),
                               Crypto-Binding TLV (Request),
                               Result TLV (Success)

      Intermediate-Result TLV (Success),
      Crypto-Binding TLV(Response),
      Result TLV (Success) ->

      TLS channel torn down
      (messages sent in cleartext)

                              <- EAP-Success

C.2.  Failed Authentication

   The following exchanges show a failed TEAP authentication due to
   wrong user credentials.  The conversation will appear as follows:

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      Authenticating Peer     Authenticator
      -------------------     -------------
                              <- EAP-Request/Identity

      EAP-Response/
      Identity (MyID1) ->

                              <- EAP-Request/
                              EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                              (TEAP Start, S bit set, Authority-ID)

      EAP-Response/
      EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
      (TLS client_hello) ->

                              <- EAP-Request/
                              EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                              (TLS server_hello,
                              (TLS change_cipher_spec,
                               TLS finished)

      EAP-Response/
      EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1 ->
      (TLS change_cipher_spec,
       TLS finished)

      TLS channel established
      (messages sent within the TLS channel)

                             <- Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV, Challenge

      Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV, Response with both
      username and password) ->

                              <- Intermediate-Result TLV (Failure),
                                 Result TLV (Failure)

      Intermediate-Result TLV (Failure),
      Result TLV (Failure) ->

      TLS channel torn down
      (messages sent in cleartext)

                              <- EAP-Failure

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C.3.  Full TLS Handshake Using Certificate-Based Cipher Suite

   In the case within TEAP Phase 1 where an abbreviated TLS handshake is
   tried, fails, and falls back to the certificate-based full TLS
   handshake, the conversation will appear as follows:

     Authenticating Peer    Authenticator
     -------------------    -------------
                            <- EAP-Request/Identity
     EAP-Response/
     Identity (MyID1) ->

     // Identity sent in the clear.  May be a hint to help route
        the authentication request to EAP server, instead of the
        full user identity.

                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TEAP Start, S bit set, Authority-ID)
     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     (TLS client_hello with
     SessionTicket extension)->

     // If the server rejects the session resumption,
        it falls through to the full TLS handshake.

                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS server_hello,
                              TLS certificate,
                             [TLS server_key_exchange,]
                             [TLS certificate_request,]
                              TLS server_hello_done)

     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     ([TLS certificate,]
      TLS client_key_exchange,
     [TLS certificate_verify,]
      TLS change_cipher_spec,
      TLS finished) ->
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS change_cipher_spec,
                              TLS finished,
                              EAP-Payload TLV[EAP-Request/
                              Identity])

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     // TLS channel established
        (messages sent within the TLS channel)

     // First EAP Payload TLV is coalesced with the TLS Finished as
        Application Data and protected by the TLS tunnel.

     EAP-Payload TLV
     [EAP-Response/Identity (MyID2)]->

     // identity protected by TLS.

                              <- EAP-Payload TLV
                              [EAP-Request/EAP-Type=X]

     EAP-Payload TLV
     [EAP-Response/EAP-Type=X] ->

     // Method X exchanges followed by Protected Termination

                          <- Intermediate-Result TLV (Success),
                              Crypto-Binding TLV (Request),
                              Result TLV (Success)

     Intermediate-Result TLV (Success),
     Crypto-Binding TLV (Response),
     Result TLV (Success) ->

     // TLS channel torn down
     (messages sent in cleartext)

                             <- EAP-Success

C.4.  Client Authentication during Phase 1 with Identity Privacy

   In the case where a certificate-based TLS handshake occurs within
   TEAP Phase 1 and client certificate authentication and identity
   privacy is desired (and therefore TLS renegotiation is being used to
   transmit the peer credentials in the protected TLS tunnel), the
   conversation will appear as follows for TLS 1.2:

     Authenticating Peer     Authenticator
     -------------------     -------------
                            <- EAP-Request/Identity
     EAP-Response/
     Identity (MyID1) ->

     // Identity sent in the clear.  May be a hint to help route
        the authentication request to EAP server, instead of the

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        full user identity.

                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TEAP Start, S bit set, Authority-ID)
     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     (TLS client_hello)->
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS server_hello,
                              TLS certificate,
                             [TLS server_key_exchange,]
                             [TLS certificate_request,]
                              TLS server_hello_done)
     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     (TLS client_key_exchange,
      TLS change_cipher_spec,
      TLS finished) ->
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS change_cipher_spec,
                              TLS finished,
                              EAP-Payload TLV[EAP-Request/
                              Identity])

     // TLS channel established
        (EAP Payload messages sent within the TLS channel)

     // peer sends TLS client_hello to request TLS renegotiation
     TLS client_hello ->

                             <- TLS server_hello,
                              TLS certificate,
                              [TLS server_key_exchange,]
                              [TLS certificate_request,]
                              TLS server_hello_done
     [TLS certificate,]
      TLS client_key_exchange,
     [TLS certificate_verify,]
      TLS change_cipher_spec,
      TLS finished ->

                             <- TLS change_cipher_spec,
                                TLS finished,
                                Crypto-Binding TLV (Request),
                                Result TLV (Success)

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     Crypto-Binding TLV (Response),
     Result TLV (Success)) ->

     //TLS channel torn down
     (messages sent in cleartext)

                             <- EAP-Success

C.5.  Fragmentation and Reassembly

   In the case where TEAP fragmentation is required, the conversation
   will appear as follows:

     Authenticating Peer     Authenticator
     -------------------     -------------
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             Identity
     EAP-Response/
     Identity (MyID) ->
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TEAP Start, S bit set, Authority-ID)

     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     (TLS client_hello)->

                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS server_hello,
                              TLS certificate,
                             [TLS server_key_exchange,]
                             [TLS certificate_request,]
                              TLS server_hello_done)
                             (Fragment 1: L, M bits set)

     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1 ->

                             <- EAP-Request/
                                EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (Fragment 2: M bit set)
     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1 ->
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (Fragment 3)
     EAP-Response/

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     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     ([TLS certificate,]
      TLS client_key_exchange,
     [TLS certificate_verify,]
      TLS change_cipher_spec,
      TLS finished)
      (Fragment 1: L, M bits set)->

                              <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     (Fragment 2)->
                            <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS change_cipher_spec,
                              TLS finished,
                             [EAP-Payload TLV[
                             EAP-Request/Identity]])

     // TLS channel established
        (messages sent within the TLS channel)

     // First EAP Payload TLV is coalesced with the TLS Finished as
        Application Data and protected by the TLS tunnel.

     EAP-Payload TLV
     [EAP-Response/Identity (MyID2)]->

     // identity protected by TLS.

                              <- EAP-Payload TLV
                              [EAP-Request/EAP-Type=X]

     EAP-Payload TLV
     [EAP-Response/EAP-Type=X] ->

     // Method X exchanges followed by Protected Termination

                          <- Intermediate-Result TLV (Success),
                              Crypto-Binding TLV (Request),
                              Result TLV (Success)

     Intermediate-Result TLV (Success),
     Crypto-Binding TLV (Response),
     Result TLV (Success) ->

     // TLS channel torn down

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     (messages sent in cleartext)

                             <- EAP-Success

C.6.  Sequence of EAP Methods

   When TEAP is negotiated with a sequence of EAP method X followed by
   method Y, the conversation will occur as follows:

     Authenticating Peer     Authenticator
     -------------------     -------------
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             Identity
     EAP-Response/
     Identity (MyID1) ->
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TEAP Start, S bit set, Authority-ID)

     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     (TLS client_hello)->

                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS server_hello,
                              TLS certificate,
                             [TLS server_key_exchange,]
                             [TLS certificate_request,]
                              TLS server_hello_done)
     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     ([TLS certificate,]
      TLS client_key_exchange,
     [TLS certificate_verify,]
      TLS change_cipher_spec,
      TLS finished) ->
                            <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS change_cipher_spec,
                              TLS finished,
                              Identity-Type TLV,
                             EAP-Payload TLV[
                             EAP-Request/Identity])

     // TLS channel established
        (messages sent within the TLS channel)

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     // First EAP Payload TLV is coalesced with the TLS Finished as
        Application Data and protected by the TLS tunnel

     Identity_Type TLV
     EAP-Payload TLV
     [EAP-Response/Identity] ->

                             <- EAP-Payload TLV
                           [EAP-Request/EAP-Type=X]

     EAP-Payload TLV
     [EAP-Response/EAP-Type=X] ->

            // Optional additional X Method exchanges...

                            <- EAP-Payload TLV
                           [EAP-Request/EAP-Type=X]

     EAP-Payload TLV
     [EAP-Response/EAP-Type=X]->

                             <- Intermediate Result TLV (Success),
                              Crypto-Binding TLV (Request),
                              Identity-Type TLV,
                             EAP-Payload TLV[
                             EAP-Request/Identity])

     // Compound MAC calculated using keys generated from
        EAP method X and the TLS tunnel.

     // Next EAP conversation started (with EAP-Request/Identity)
        after successful completion of previous method X.  The
        Intermediate-Result and Crypto-Binding TLVs are sent in
        the next packet to minimize round trips.

     Intermediate Result TLV (Success),
     Crypto-Binding TLV (Response),
     EAP-Payload TLV [EAP-Response/Identity (MyID2)] ->

            // Optional additional EAP method Y exchanges...

                            <- EAP Payload TLV [
                            EAP-Type=Y]

     EAP Payload TLV
     [EAP-Type=Y] ->

                            <- Intermediate-Result TLV (Success),

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                              Crypto-Binding TLV (Request),
                              Result TLV (Success)

     Intermediate-Result TLV (Success),
     Crypto-Binding TLV (Response),
     Result TLV (Success) ->

     // Compound MAC calculated using keys generated from EAP
        methods X and Y and the TLS tunnel.  Compound keys are
        generated using keys generated from EAP methods X and Y
        and the TLS tunnel.

     // TLS channel torn down (messages sent in cleartext)

                             <- EAP-Success

C.7.  Failed Crypto-Binding

   The following exchanges show a failed crypto-binding validation.  The
   conversation will appear as follows:

     Authenticating Peer     Authenticator
     -------------------     -------------
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             Identity
     EAP-Response/
     Identity (MyID1) ->
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TEAP Start, S bit set, Authority-ID)

     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     (TLS client_hello) ->
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS Server Key Exchange
                              TLS Server Hello Done)
     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1 ->
     (TLS Client Key Exchange
      TLS change_cipher_spec,
      TLS finished)

                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS change_cipher_spec
                              TLS finished)

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                              EAP-Payload TLV[
                              EAP-Request/Identity])

        // TLS channel established
           (messages sent within the TLS channel)

        // First EAP Payload TLV is coalesced with the TLS Finished as
           Application Data and protected by the TLS tunnel.

     EAP-Payload TLV/
     EAP Identity Response ->

                            <-  EAP Payload TLV, EAP-Request,
                                (EAP-MSCHAPV2, Challenge)

     EAP Payload TLV, EAP-Response,
     (EAP-MSCHAPV2, Response) ->

                            <-  EAP Payload TLV, EAP-Request,
                                (EAP-MSCHAPV2, Success Request)

     EAP Payload TLV, EAP-Response,
     (EAP-MSCHAPV2, Success Response) ->

                          <- Intermediate-Result TLV (Success),
                              Crypto-Binding TLV (Request),
                                 Result TLV (Success)

        Intermediate-Result TLV (Success),
        Result TLV (Failure)
        Error TLV with
        (Error Code = 2001) ->

     // TLS channel torn down
        (messages sent in cleartext)

                          <- EAP-Failure

C.8.  Sequence of EAP Method with Vendor-Specific TLV Exchange

   When TEAP is negotiated with a sequence of EAP methods followed by a
   Vendor-Specific TLV exchange, the conversation will occur as follows:

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     Authenticating Peer     Authenticator
     -------------------     -------------
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             Identity
     EAP-Response/
     Identity (MyID1) ->
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TEAP Start, S bit set, Authority-ID)

     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     (TLS client_hello)->
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS server_hello,
                              TLS certificate,
                      [TLS server_key_exchange,]
                      [TLS certificate_request,]
                          TLS server_hello_done)

     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     ([TLS certificate,]
      TLS client_key_exchange,
     [TLS certificate_verify,]
      TLS change_cipher_spec,
      TLS finished) ->
                            <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS change_cipher_spec,
                              TLS finished,
                             EAP-Payload TLV[
                             EAP-Request/Identity])

     // TLS channel established
        (messages sent within the TLS channel)

     // First EAP Payload TLV is coalesced with the TLS Finished as
        Application Data and protected by the TLS tunnel.

     EAP-Payload TLV
     [EAP-Response/Identity] ->

                           <- EAP-Payload TLV
                           [EAP-Request/EAP-Type=X]

     EAP-Payload TLV

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     [EAP-Response/EAP-Type=X] ->

                            <- EAP-Payload TLV
                           [EAP-Request/EAP-Type=X]

     EAP-Payload TLV
     [EAP-Response/EAP-Type=X]->

                             <- Intermediate Result TLV (Success),
                              Crypto-Binding TLV (Request),
                              Vendor-Specific TLV,

     // Vendor-Specific TLV exchange started after successful
        completion of previous method X.  The Intermediate-Result
        and Crypto-Binding TLVs are sent with Vendor-Specific TLV
        in next packet to minimize round trips.

     // Compound MAC calculated using keys generated from
        EAP method X and the TLS tunnel.

     Intermediate Result TLV (Success),
     Crypto-Binding TLV (Response),
     Vendor-Specific TLV ->

         // Optional additional Vendor-Specific TLV exchanges...

                            <- Vendor-Specific TLV

     Vendor-Specific TLV ->
                            <- Result TLV (Success)

     Result TLV (Success) ->

     // TLS channel torn down (messages sent in cleartext)

                             <- EAP-Success

C.9.  Peer Requests Inner Method after Server Sends Result TLV

   In the case where the peer is authenticated during Phase 1 and the
   server sends back a Result TLV but the peer wants to request another
   inner method, the conversation will appear as follows:

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     Authenticating Peer    Authenticator
     -------------------    -------------
                            <- EAP-Request/Identity
     EAP-Response/
     Identity (MyID1) ->

     // Identity sent in the clear.  May be a hint to help route
        the authentication request to EAP server, instead of the
        full user identity. TLS client certificate is also sent.

                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TEAP Start, S bit set, Authority-ID)
     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     (TLS client_hello)->
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS server_hello,
                              TLS certificate,
                             [TLS server_key_exchange,]
                             [TLS certificate_request,]
                              TLS server_hello_done)

     EAP-Response/
     EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
     [TLS certificate,]
      TLS client_key_exchange,
     [TLS certificate_verify,]
      TLS change_cipher_spec,
      TLS finished ->
                             <- EAP-Request/
                             EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                             (TLS change_cipher_spec,
                              TLS finished,
                              Crypto-Binding TLV (Request),
                               Result TLV (Success))

     // TLS channel established
        (TLV Payload messages sent within the TLS channel)

      Crypto-Binding TLV(Response),
      Request-Action TLV
      (Status=Failure, Action=Negotiate-EAP)->

                           <- EAP-Payload TLV
                               [EAP-Request/Identity]

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     EAP-Payload TLV
     [EAP-Response/Identity] ->

                           <- EAP-Payload TLV
                           [EAP-Request/EAP-Type=X]

     EAP-Payload TLV
     [EAP-Response/EAP-Type=X] ->

                            <- EAP-Payload TLV
                           [EAP-Request/EAP-Type=X]

     EAP-Payload TLV
     [EAP-Response/EAP-Type=X]->

                             <- Intermediate Result TLV (Success),
                                Crypto-Binding TLV (Request),
                                Result TLV (Success)

     Intermediate Result TLV (Success),
     Crypto-Binding TLV (Response),
     Result TLV (Success)) ->

     // TLS channel torn down
     (messages sent in cleartext)

                             <- EAP-Success

C.10.  Channel Binding

   The following exchanges show a successful TEAP authentication with
   basic password authentication and channel binding using a Request-
   Action TLV.  The conversation will appear as follows:

      Authenticating Peer     Authenticator
      -------------------     -------------
                              <- EAP-Request/
                              Identity
      EAP-Response/
      Identity (MyID1) ->

                              <- EAP-Request/
                              EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                              (TEAP Start, S bit set, Authority-ID)

      EAP-Response/
      EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
      (TLS client_hello) ->

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                              <- EAP-Request/
                              EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1
                              (TLS server_hello,
                              (TLS change_cipher_spec,
                               TLS finished)

      EAP-Response/
      EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1 ->
      (TLS change_cipher_spec,
       TLS finished)

      TLS channel established
      (messages sent within the TLS channel)

                             <- Basic-Password-Auth-Req TLV, Challenge

      Basic-Password-Auth-Resp TLV, Response with both
      username and password) ->

      optional additional exchanges (new pin mode,
      password change, etc.) ...

                           <- Crypto-Binding TLV (Request),
                               Result TLV (Success),

      Crypto-Binding TLV(Response),
      Request-Action TLV
      (Status=Failure, Action=Process TLV,
      TLV=Channel-Binding TLV)->

                               <- Channel-Binding TLV (Response),
                               Result TLV (Success),

      Result TLV (Success) ->

      TLS channel torn down
      (messages sent in cleartext)

                              <- EAP-Success

C.11.  PKCS Exchange

   The following exchanges show the peer sending a PKCS#10 TLV, and
   server replying with a PKCS7 TLV.  The exchange below assumes that
   the EAP peer is authenticated in Phase 1, either via bi-directional
   certificate exchange, or some other TLS method such as a proof of
   knowledge (TLS-POK).  The conversation will appear as follows:

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   ,----.                                             ,-------.
   |Peer|                                             |AuthSrv|
   `-+--'                                             `---+---'
     |               EAP-Request / Identity               |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                                    |
     |           EAP-Response / Identity (MYID1)          |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - >
     |                                                    |
     |             EAP-Request/EAP-Type=TEAP,             |
     |              V=1(TEAP Start,                       |
     |              S bit set,                            |
     |              Authority-ID)                         |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                                    |
     |             EAP-Response/EAP-Type=TEAP,            |
     |              V=1(TLS client_hello)                 |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - >
     |                                                    |
     |             EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=TEAP,            |
     |              V=1(TLS server_hello,                 |
     |              TLS certificate,                      |
     |              TLS certificate_request,              |
     |              TLS finished)                         |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                                    |
     |        EAP-Response/EAP-Type=TEAP,                 |
     |         V=1(TLS change_cipher_spec,                |
     |             TLS certificate,                       |
     |        TLS finished) TLS channel established       |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - >
     |                                                    |
     |               Send Request Action TLV              |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                                    |
     |                   Send PKCS10 TLV                  |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - >
     |                                                    |
     | Sign the CSR and send PKCS7 TLV Intermediate-Result|
     | TLV request(Success),                              |
     |  Crypto-Binding TLV(Request),                      |
     |  Result TLV(Success)                               |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                                    |
     |     Intermediate-Result TLV response(Success),     |
     |      Crypto-Binding TLV(Response),                 |
     |      Result TLV(Success)                           |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - >

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     |                                                    |
     |                     EAP Success                    |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

C.12.  Failure Scenario

   The following exchanges shows a failure scenario.  The conversation
   will appear as follows:

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   ,----.                                                  ,-------.
   |Peer|                                                  |AuthSrv|
   `-+--'                                                  `---+---'
     |                  EAP-Request / Identity                 |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                                         |
     |             EAP-Response / Identity (MYID1)             |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ->
     |                                                         |
     |          EAP-Request/EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1                 |
     |          (TEAP Start, S bit set, Authority-ID)          |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                                         |
     |    EAP-Response/EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1(TLS client_hello)    |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ->
     |                                                         |
     | EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1                         |
     | (TLS server_hello,(TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished)|
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                                         |
     |             EAP-Response/EAP-Type=TEAP, V=1             |
     |             (TLS change_cipher_spec,                    |
     |             TLS finished)                               |
     |             TLS channel established                     |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ->
     |                                                         |
     |                    Request Action TLV                   |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                                         |
     |                      Bad PKCS10 TLV                     |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ->
     |                                                         |
     |        Intermediate-Result TLV request(Failure),        |
     |        Result TLV(Failure)                              |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                                         |
     |        Intermediate-Result TLV response(Failure),       |
     |        Result TLV(Failure)                              |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ->
     |                                                         |
     |                       EAP Failure                       |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

C.13.  Client certificate in Phase 1

   The following exchanges shows a scenario where the client certificate
   is sent in Phase 1, and no additional authentication or provisioning
   is performed in Phase 2.  The conversation will appear as follows:

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   ,----.                                    ,-------.
   |Peer|                                    |AuthSrv|
   `-+--'                                    `---+---'
     |           EAP-Request / Identity          |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                           |
     |      EAP-Response / Identity (MYID1)      |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ->
     |                                           |
     |         EAP-Request/EAP-Type=TEAP,        |
     |          V=1(TEAP Start,                  |
     |          S bit set,                       |
     |          Authority-ID)                    |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                           |
     |        EAP-Response/EAP-Type=TEAP,        |
     |         V=1(TLS client_hello)             |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ->
     |                                           |
     |        EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=TEAP,        |
     |         V=1(TLS server_hello,             |
     |         TLS certificate,                  |
     |         TLS certificate_request,          |
     |         TLS change_cipher_spec,           |
     |         TLS finished)                     |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                           |
     |   EAP-Response/EAP-Type=TEAP,             |
     |    V=1(TLS certificate,                   |
     |        TLS change_cipher_spec,            |
     |   TLS finished) TLS channel established   |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ->
     |                                           |
     |        Crypto-Binding TLV(Request),       |
     |        Result TLV(Success)                |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     |                                           |
     |  Crypto-Binding TLV(Response),            |
     |  Result TLV(Success)                      |
     |  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ->
     |                                           |
     |                EAP Success                |
     | <- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

References

Normative References

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   [BCP14]    Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs]
              Richardson, M., Friel, O., von Oheimb, D., and D. Harkins,
              "Clarification of RFC7030 CSR Attributes definition", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-rfc7030-
              csrattrs-09, 4 April 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
              rfc7030-csrattrs-09>.

   [RFC2985]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2985>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2986>.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3748>.

   [RFC5077]  Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
              Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
              January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5077>.

   [RFC5216]  Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
              Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
              March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5216>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.

   [RFC5295]  Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri,
              "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an
              Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5295, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5295>.

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   [RFC5705]  Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
              March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5705>.

   [RFC5746]  Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
              Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5746>.

   [RFC5929]  Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
              for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, July 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5929>.

   [RFC6677]  Hartman, S., Ed., Clancy, T., and K. Hoeper, "Channel-
              Binding Support for Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP) Methods", RFC 6677, DOI 10.17487/RFC6677, July 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6677>.

   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8996]  Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS
              1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8996>.

   [RFC9190]  Preuß Mattsson, J. and M. Sethi, "EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the
              Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3",
              RFC 9190, DOI 10.17487/RFC9190, February 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9190>.

   [RFC9427]  DeKok, A., "TLS-Based Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP) Types for Use with TLS 1.3", RFC 9427,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9427, June 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9427>.

   [RFC9525]  Saint-Andre, P. and R. Salz, "Service Identity in TLS",
              RFC 9525, DOI 10.17487/RFC9525, November 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9525>.

Informative References

DeKok (Ed)               Expires 9 December 2024              [Page 105]
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   [IEEE.802-1X.2020]
              "*** BROKEN REFERENCE ***".

   [KAMATH]   Palekar, R. H. and A., "Microsoft EAP CHAP Extensions",
              June 2007.

   [MSCHAP]   Corporation, M., "Master Session Key (MSK) Derivation",
              n.d., <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-
              us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-chap/5a860bf5-2aeb-485b-
              82ee-fac1e8e6b76f>.

   [NIST-SP-800-57]
              Technology, N. I. of S. and., "Recommendation for Key
              Management", July 2012.

   [PEAP]     Corporation, M., "[MS-PEAP]: Protected Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (PEAP)", February 2014.

   [RFC2315]  Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax
              Version 1.5", RFC 2315, DOI 10.17487/RFC2315, March 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2315>.

   [RFC3579]  Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
              Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3579, September 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3579>.

   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3629>.

   [RFC3766]  Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For
              Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86,
              RFC 3766, DOI 10.17487/RFC3766, April 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3766>.

   [RFC4017]  Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for
              Wireless LANs", RFC 4017, DOI 10.17487/RFC4017, March
              2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4017>.

   [RFC4072]  Eronen, P., Ed., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter
              Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application",
              RFC 4072, DOI 10.17487/RFC4072, August 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4072>.

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   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4086>.

   [RFC4334]  Housley, R. and T. Moore, "Certificate Extensions and
              Attributes Supporting Authentication in Point-to-Point
              Protocol (PPP) and Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN)",
              RFC 4334, DOI 10.17487/RFC4334, February 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4334>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.

   [RFC4851]  Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, "The
              Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible
              Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)", RFC 4851,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4851, May 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4851>.

   [RFC4945]  Korver, B., "The Internet IP Security PKI Profile of
              IKEv1/ISAKMP, IKEv2, and PKIX", RFC 4945,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4945, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4945>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949>.

   [RFC4962]  Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "Guidance for Authentication,
              Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Key Management",
              BCP 132, RFC 4962, DOI 10.17487/RFC4962, July 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4962>.

   [RFC5247]  Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
              RFC 5247, DOI 10.17487/RFC5247, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5247>.

   [RFC5272]  Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
              (CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5272>.

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   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5281]  Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
              Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
              Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5281, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5281>.

   [RFC5421]  Cam-Winget, N. and H. Zhou, "Basic Password Exchange
              within the Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling
              Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP-FAST)", RFC 5421,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5421, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5421>.

   [RFC5422]  Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou,
              "Dynamic Provisioning Using Flexible Authentication via
              Secure Tunneling Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP-
              FAST)", RFC 5422, DOI 10.17487/RFC5422, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5422>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652>.

   [RFC5931]  Harkins, D. and G. Zorn, "Extensible Authentication
              Protocol (EAP) Authentication Using Only a Password",
              RFC 5931, DOI 10.17487/RFC5931, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5931>.

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6066>.

   [RFC6124]  Sheffer, Y., Zorn, G., Tschofenig, H., and S. Fluhrer, "An
              EAP Authentication Method Based on the Encrypted Key
              Exchange (EKE) Protocol", RFC 6124, DOI 10.17487/RFC6124,
              February 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6124>.

   [RFC6238]  M'Raihi, D., Machani, S., Pei, M., and J. Rydell, "TOTP:
              Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 6238,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6238, May 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6238>.

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   [RFC6678]  Hoeper, K., Hanna, S., Zhou, H., and J. Salowey, Ed.,
              "Requirements for a Tunnel-Based Extensible Authentication
              Protocol (EAP) Method", RFC 6678, DOI 10.17487/RFC6678,
              July 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6678>.

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960>.

   [RFC6961]  Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6961, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6961>.

   [RFC7029]  Hartman, S., Wasserman, M., and D. Zhang, "Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP) Mutual Cryptographic
              Binding", RFC 7029, DOI 10.17487/RFC7029, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7029>.

   [RFC7170]  Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna,
              "Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version
              1", RFC 7170, DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7170>.

   [RFC7299]  Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
              Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7299>.

   [RFC7542]  DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7542>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8146]  Harkins, D., "Adding Support for Salted Password Databases
              to EAP-pwd", RFC 8146, DOI 10.17487/RFC8146, April 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8146>.

   [RFC9325]  Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
              2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325>.

DeKok (Ed)               Expires 9 December 2024              [Page 109]
Internet-Draft                    TEAP                         June 2024

   [X.690]    ITU-T, "SN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
              Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
              Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", November 2008.

Contributors

   Han Zhou

   Joseph Salowey
   Email: joe@salowey.net

   Nancy Cam-Winget
   Email: ncamwing@cisco.com

   Steve Hanna
   Email: steve.hanna@infineon.com

Author's Address

   Alan DeKok
   Email: aland@freeradius.org

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