BLACKHOLE BGP Community for Blackholing
draft-ietf-grow-blackholing-01
Network Working Group T. King
Internet-Draft C. Dietzel
Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX Management GmbH
Expires: December 31, 2016 J. Snijders
NTT
G. Doering
SpaceNet AG
G. Hankins
Nokia
June 29, 2016
BLACKHOLE BGP Community for Blackholing
draft-ietf-grow-blackholing-01
Abstract
This document describes the use of a well-known Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) community for blackholing in IP networks. This well-
known advisory transitive BGP community, namely BLACKHOLE, allows an
origin AS to specify that a neighboring network should blackhole a
specific IP prefix.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all
upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
words, without normative meaning.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2016.
King, et al. Expires December 31, 2016 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft BLACKHOLE BGP Community for Blackholing June 2016
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. BLACKHOLE Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. IP Prefix Announcements with BLACKHOLE Community Attached 3
3.2. Local Scope of Blackholes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.3. Accepting Blackholed IP Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
Network infrastructures have been increasingly hampered by DDoS
attacks. In order to dampen the effects of these DDoS attacks, IP
networks have offered BGP blackholing to neighboring networks via
various mechanisms such as described in [RFC3882] and [RFC5635].
DDoS attacks targeting a certain IP address may cause congestion of
links used to connect to other networks. In order to limit the
impact of such a scenario on legitimate traffic, networks adopted a
mechanism called BGP blackholing. A network that wants to trigger
blackholing needs to understand the triggering mechanism adopted by
its neighboring networks. Different networks provide different
mechanisms to trigger blackholing, including but not limited to pre-
defined blackhole next-hop IP addresses, specific BGP communities or
via an out-of-band BGP session with a special BGP speaker.
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