BLACKHOLE BGP Community for Blackholing
draft-ietf-grow-blackholing-02

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (grow WG)
Authors Thomas King  , Christoph Dietzel  , Job Snijders  , Gert Doering , Greg Hankins 
Last updated 2016-08-04 (latest revision 2016-07-01)
Replaces draft-ymbk-grow-blackholing
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Informational
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Document shepherd Chris Morrow
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Send notices to "Christopher Morrow" <christopher.morrow@gmail.com>
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Network Working Group                                            T. King
Internet-Draft                                                C. Dietzel
Intended status: Informational                    DE-CIX Management GmbH
Expires: January 2, 2017                                     J. Snijders
                                                                     NTT
                                                              G. Doering
                                                             SpaceNet AG
                                                              G. Hankins
                                                                   Nokia
                                                            July 1, 2016

                BLACKHOLE BGP Community for Blackholing
                     draft-ietf-grow-blackholing-02

Abstract

   This document describes the use of a well-known Border Gateway
   Protocol (BGP) community for destination based blackholing in IP
   networks.  This well-known advisory transitive BGP community, namely
   BLACKHOLE, allows an origin AS to specify that a neighboring network
   should discard any traffic destined towards the tagged IP prefix.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all
   upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
   words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2017.

King, et al.             Expires January 2, 2017                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft   BLACKHOLE BGP Community for Blackholing       July 2016

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  BLACKHOLE Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  IP Prefix Announcements with BLACKHOLE Community Attached   3
     3.2.  Local Scope of Blackholes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.3.  Accepting Blackholed IP Prefixes  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Vendor Implementation Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   Network infrastructures have been increasingly hampered by DDoS
   attacks.  In order to dampen the effects of these DDoS attacks, IP
   networks have offered BGP blackholing to neighboring networks via
   various mechanisms such as described in [RFC3882] and [RFC5635].

   DDoS attacks targeting a certain IP address may cause congestion of
   links used to connect to other networks.  In order to limit the
   impact of such a scenario on legitimate traffic, networks adopted a
   mechanism called BGP blackholing.  A network that wants to trigger
   blackholing needs to understand the triggering mechanism adopted by
   its neighboring networks.  Different networks provide different
   mechanisms to trigger blackholing, including but not limited to pre-
   defined blackhole next-hop IP addresses, specific BGP communities or
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