Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Rendezvous Extension
draft-ietf-hip-rvs-05
The information below is for an old version of the document that is already published as an RFC.
| Document | Type | RFC Internet-Draft (hip WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Lars Eggert , Julien Laganier | ||
| Last updated | 2015-10-14 (Latest revision 2006-06-07) | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | plain text htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
| Stream | WG state | (None) | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 5204 (Experimental) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Mark Townsley | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-hip-rvs-05
Network Working Group J. Laganier
Internet-Draft DoCoMo Euro-Labs
Expires: December 9, 2006 L. Eggert
NEC
June 7, 2006
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Rendezvous Extension
draft-ietf-hip-rvs-05
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This document defines a rendezvous extension for the Host Identity
Protocol (HIP). The rendezvous extension extends HIP and the HIP
registration extension for initiating communication between HIP nodes
via HIP rendezvous servers. Rendezvous servers improve reachability
and operation when HIP nodes are multi-homed or mobile.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Overview of Rendezvous Server Operation . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Diagram Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Rendezvous Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Relaying the Base Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Rendezvous Server Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. RENDEZVOUS Registration Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Parameter Formats and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. RVS_HMAC Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2. FROM Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.3. VIA_RVS Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Modified Packets Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.1. Processing Outgoing I1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.2. Processing Incoming I1 packets . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.3. Processing Outgoing R1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.4. Processing Incoming R1 packets . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
The Host Identity Protocol architecture [RFC4423] introduces the
rendezvous mechanism to help a HIP node to contact a frequently
moving HIP node. The rendezvous mechanism involves a third party,
the rendezvous server (RVS), which serves as an initial contact point
("rendezvous point") for its clients. The clients of an RVS are HIP
nodes that use the HIP Registration Protocol [I-D.ietf-hip-
registration] to register their HIT->IP address mappings with the
RVS. After this registration, other HIP nodes can initiate a base
exchange using the IP address of the RVS instead of the current IP
address of the node they attempt to contact. Essentially, the
clients of an RVS become reachable at the RVS' IP addresses. Peers
can initiate a HIP base exchange with the IP address of the RVS,
which will relay this initial communication such that the base
exchange may successfully complete.
2. Terminology
This section defines terms used throughout the remainder of this
specification.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
In addition to the terminology defined in [I-D.ietf-hip-
registration], this document defines and uses the following terms:
Rendezvous Service
A HIP service provided by a rendezvous server to its rendezvous
clients. The rendezvous server offers to relay some of the
arriving base exchange packets between the initiator and
responder.
Rendezvous Server (RVS)
A HIP registrar providing rendezvous service.
Rendezvous Client
A HIP requester that has registered for rendezvous service at a
rendezvous server.
Rendezvous Registration
A HIP registration for rendezvous service, established between a
rendezvous server and a rendezvous client.
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3. Overview of Rendezvous Server Operation
Figure 1 shows a simple HIP base exchange without a rendezvous
server, in which the initiator initiates the exchange directly with
the responder by sending an I1 packet to the responder's IP address,
as per the HIP base specification [I-D.ietf-hip-base].
+-----+ +-----+
| |-------I1------>| |
| I |<------R1-------| R |
| |-------I2------>| |
| |<------R2-------| |
+-----+ +-----+
Figure 1: HIP base exchange without rendezvous server.
Proposed extensions for mobility and multi-homing [I-D.ietf-hip-mm]
allow a HIP node to notify its peers about changes in its set of IP
addresses. These extensions presumes initial reachability of the two
nodes with respect to each other.
However, such a HIP node MAY also want to be reachable to other
future correspondent peers that are unaware of its location change.
The HIP architecture [RFC4423] introduces rendezvous servers with
whom a HIP node MAY register its host identity tags (HITs) and
current IP addresses. An RVS relays HIP packets arriving for these
HITs to the node's registered IP addresses. When a HIP node has
registered with an RVS, it SHOULD record the IP address of its RVS in
its DNS record, using the HIPRVS DNS record type defined in
[I-D.ietf-hip-dns].
+-----+
+--I1--->| RVS |---I1--+
| +-----+ |
| v
+-----+ +-----+
| |<------R1-------| |
| I |-------I2------>| R |
| |<------R2-------| |
+-----+ +-----+
Figure 2: HIP base exchange with a rendezvous server.
Figure 2 shows a HIP base exchange involving a rendezvous server. It
is assumed that HIP node R previously registered its HITs and current
IP addresses with the RVS, using the HIP registration protocol
[I-D.ietf-hip-registration]. When the initiator I tries to establish
contact with the responder R, it must send the I1 of the base
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exchange either to one of R's IP addresses (if known via DNS or other
means) or to one of R's rendezvous servers instead. Here, I obtains
the IP address of R's rendezvous server from R's DNS record and then
sends the I1 packet of the HIP base exchange to RVS. RVS, noticing
that the HIT contained in the arriving I1 packet is not one of its
own, MUST check its current registrations to determine if if needs to
relay the packets. Here, it determines that the HIT belongs to R and
then relays the I1 packet to the registered IP address. R then
completes the base exchange without further assistance from RVS by
sending an R1 directly to the I's IP address, as obtained from the I1
packet. In this specification the client of the RVS is always the
responder. However, there might be reasons to allow a client to
initiate a base exchange through its own RVS, like NAT and firewall
traversal. This specification does not address such scenarios which
should be specified in other documents.
3.1. Diagram Notation
Notation Significance
-------- ------------
I, R I and R are the respective source and destination IP
addresses in the IP header.
HIT-I, HIT-R HIT-I and HIT-R are the initiator's and the
responder's HITs in the packet, respectively.
REG_REQ A REG_REQUEST parameter is present in the HIP header.
REG_RES A REG_RESPONSE parameter is present in the HIP header.
FROM:I A FROM parameter containing the IP address I is
present in the HIP header.
RVS_HMAC A RVS_HMAC parameter containing a HMAC keyed with the
appropriate registration key is present in the HIP
header.
VIA:RVS A VIA_RVS parameter containing the IP address RVS of a
rendezvous server is present in the HIP header.
3.2. Rendezvous Client Registration
Before a rendezvous server starts to relay HIP packets to a
rendezvous client, the rendezvous client needs to register with it to
receive rendezvous service by using the HIP registration extension
[I-D.ietf-hip-registration] as illustrated in the following schema:
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+-----+ +-----+
| | I1 | |
| |--------------------------->| |
| |<---------------------------| |
| I | R1(REG_INFO) | RVS |
| | I2(REG_REQ) | |
| |--------------------------->| |
| |<---------------------------| |
| | R2(REG_RES) | |
+-----+ +-----+
3.3. Relaying the Base Exchange
If a HIP node and one of its rendezvous servers have a rendezvous
registration, the rendezvous servers relay inbound I1 packets that
contain one of the client's HITs by rewriting the IP header. They
replace the destination IP address of the I1 packet with one of the
IP addresses of the owner of the HIT, i.e., the rendezvous client.
They MUST also recompute the IP checksum accordingly.
Because of egress filtering on the path from the RVS to the client
[RFC2827][RFC3013], a HIP rendezvous server SHOULD replace the source
IP address, i.e., the IP address of I, with one of its own IP
addresses. The replacement IP address SHOULD be chosen according to
[RFC1122] and, when IPv6 is used, to [RFC3484]. Because this
replacement conceals the initiator's IP address, the RVS MUST append
a FROM parameter containing the original source IP address of the
packet. This FROM parameter MUST be integrity protected by an
RVS_HMAC keyed with the corresponding rendezvous registration
integrity key [I-D.ietf-hip-registration].
I1(RVS, R, HIT-I, HIT-R
I1(I, RVS, HIT-I, HIT-R) +---------+ FROM:I, RVS_HMAC)
+----------------------->| |--------------------+
| | RVS | |
| | | |
| +---------+ |
| V
+-----+ R1(R, I, HIT-R, HIT-I, VIA:RVS) +-----+
| |<---------------------------------------------| |
| | | |
| I | I2(I, R, HIT-I, HIT-R) | R |
| |--------------------------------------------->| |
| |<---------------------------------------------| |
+-----+ R2(R, I, HIT-R, HIT-I) +-----+
This modification of HIP packets at a rendezvous server can be
problematic because the HIP protocol uses integrity checks. Because
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the I1 does not include HMAC or SIGNATURE parameters, these two end-
to-end integrity checks are unaffected by the operation of rendezvous
servers.
The RVS SHOULD verify the checksum field of an I1 packet before doing
any modifications. After modification, it MUST recompute the
checksum field using the updated HIP header, which possibly included
new FROM and RVS_HMAC parameters, and a pseudo-header containing the
updated source and destination IP addresses. This enables the
responder to validate the checksum of the I1 packet "as is", without
having to parse any FROM parameters.
4. Rendezvous Server Extensions
The following sections describe extensions to the HIP registration
protocol [I-D.ietf-hip-registration], allowing a HIP node to register
with a rendezvous server for rendezvous service and notify the RVS
aware of changes to its current location. It also describes an
extension to the HIP protocol [I-D.ietf-hip-base] itself, allowing
establishment of HIP associations via one or more HIP rendezvous
server(s).
4.1. RENDEZVOUS Registration Type
This specification defines an additional registration for the HIP
registration protocol [I-D.ietf-hip-registration] that allows
registering with a rendezvous server for rendezvous service.
Number Registration Type
------ -----------------
1 RENDEZVOUS
4.2. Parameter Formats and Processing
4.2.1. RVS_HMAC Parameter
The RVS_HMAC is a non-critical parameter whose only difference with
the HMAC parameter defined in [I-D.ietf-hip-base] is its "type" code.
This change causes it to be located after the FROM parameter (as
opposed to the HMAC):
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Type [ TBD by IANA (65500 = 2^16 - 2^5 - 2^2) ]
Length 20
HMAC 160 low order bits of a HMAC keyed with the
appropriate HIP integrity key (HIP_lg or HIP_gl),
established when rendezvous registration happened.
This HMAC is computed over the HIP packet, excluding
RVS_HMAC and any following parameters. The
"checksum" field MUST be set to zero and the HIP header
length in the HIP common header MUST be calculated
not to cover any excluded parameter when the
"authenticator" field is calculated.
To allow a rendezvous client and its RVS to verify the integrity of
packets flowing between them, both SHOULD protect packets with an
added RVS_HMAC parameter keyed with the HIP_lg or HIP_gl integrity
key established while registration occurred. A valid RVS_HMAC SHOULD
be present on every packets flowing between a client and a server and
MUST be present when a FROM parameters is processed.
4.2.2. FROM Parameter
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Address |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type [ TBD by IANA (65498 = 2^16 - 2^5 - 2) ]
Length 16
Address An IPv6 address or an IPv4-in-IPv6 format IPv4 address.
A rendezvous server MUST add a FROM parameter containing the original
source IP address of a HIP packet whenever the source IP address in
the IP header is rewritten. If one or more FROM parameters are
already present, the new FROM parameter MUST be appended after the
existing ones.
Whenever an RVS inserts a FROM parameter, it MUST insert an RVS_HMAC
protecting the packet integrity, especially the IP address included
in the FROM parameter.
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4.2.3. VIA_RVS Parameter
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Address |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. . .
. . .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Address |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type [ TBD by IANA (65502 = 2^16 - 2^5 + 2) ]
Length Variable
Address An IPv6 address or an IPv4-in-IPv6 format IPv4 address
After the responder receives a relayed I1 packet, it can begin to
send HIP packets addressed to the initiator's IP address, without
further assistance from an RVS. For debugging purposes, it MAY
include a subset of the IP addresses of its RVSs in some of these
packets. When a responder does so, it MUST append a newly created
VIA_RVS parameter at the end of the HIP packet. The main goal of
using the VIA_RVS parameter is to allow operators to diagnose
possible issues encountered while establishing a HIP association via
an RVS.
4.3. Modified Packets Processing
The following subsections describe the differences of processing of
I1 and R1 while a rendezvous server is involved in the base exchange.
4.3.1. Processing Outgoing I1 Packets
An initiator SHOULD NOT send an opportunistic I1 with a NULL
destination HIT to an IP address which is known to be a rendezvous
server address, unless it wants to establish a HIP association with
the rendezvous server itself and does not know its HIT.
When an RVS rewrites the source IP address of an I1 packet due to
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egress filtering, it MUST add a FROM parameter to the I1 that
contains the initiator's source IP address. This FROM parameter MUST
be protected by an RVS_HMAC keyed with the integrity key established
at rendezvous registration.
4.3.2. Processing Incoming I1 packets
When a rendezvous server receives an I1 whose destination HIT is not
its own, it consults its registration database to find a registration
for the rendezvous service established by the HIT owner. If it finds
an appropriate registration, it relays the packet to the registered
IP address. If it does not find an appropriate registration, it
drops the packet.
A rendezvous server SHOULD interpret any incoming opportunistic I1
(i.e., an I1 with a NULL destination HIT) as an I1 addressed to
itself and SHOULD NOT attempt to relay it to one of its clients.
When a rendezvous client receives an I1, it MUST validate any present
RVS_HMAC parameter. If the RVS_HMAC cannot be verified, the packet
SHOULD be dropped. If the RVS_HMAC cannot be verified and a FROM
parameter is present, the packet MUST be dropped.
A rendezvous client acting as responder SHOULD drop opportunistic I1s
that include a FROM parameter, because this indicates that the I1 has
been relayed.
4.3.3. Processing Outgoing R1 Packets
When a responder replies to an I1 relayed via an RVS, it MUST append
to the regular R1 header a VIA_RVS parameter containing the IP
addresses of the traversed RVS's.
4.3.4. Processing Incoming R1 packets
The HIP base specification [I-D.ietf-hip-base] mandates that a system
receiving an R1 MUST first check to see if it has sent an I1 to the
originator of the R1 (i.e., it is in state I1-SENT). When the R1 is
replying to a relayed I1, this check SHOULD be based on HITs only.
In case the IP addresses are also checked, then the source IP address
MUST be checked against the IP address included in the VIA_RVS
parameter.
5. Security Considerations
This section discusses the known threats introduced by these HIP
extensions and implications on the overall security of HIP. In
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particular, it argues that the extensions described in this document
do not introduce additional threats to the Host Identity Protocol.
It is difficult to encompass the whole scope of threats introduced by
rendezvous servers, because their presence has implications both at
the IP and HIP layers. In particular, these extensions might allow
for redirection, amplification and reflection attacks at the IP
layer, as well as attacks on the HIP layer itself, for example, man-
in-the-middle attacks against the HIP base exchange.
If an initiator has a priori knowledge of the responder's host
identity when it first contacts it via an RVS, it has a means to
verify the signatures in the HIP base exchange, which is known to be
thus resilient to man-in-the-middle attacks.
If an initiator does not have a priori knowledge of the responder's
host identity (so-called "opportunistic initiators"), it is almost
impossible to defend the HIP exchange against these attacks, because
the public keys exchanged cannot be authenticated. The only approach
would be to mitigate hijacking threats on HIP state by requiring an
R1 answering an opportunistic I1 to come from the same IP address
that originally sent the I1. This procedure retains a level of
security which is equivalent to what exists in the Internet today.
However, for reasons of simplicity, this specification does not allow
to establish a HIP association via a rendezvous server in an
opportunistic manner.
6. IANA Considerations
This section is to be interpreted according to [RFC2434].
This document updates the IANA Registry for HIP Parameters Types by
assigning new HIP Parameter Types values for the new HIP Parameters
defined in Section 4.2:
o RVS_HMAC (defined in Section 4.2.1)
o FROM (defined in Section 4.2.2)
o VIA_RVS (defined in Section 4.2.3)
7. Acknowledgments
The following people have provided thoughtful and helpful discussions
and/or suggestions that have improved this document: Marcus Brunner,
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Tom Henderson, Miika Komu, Mika Kousa, Pekka Nikander, Justino
Santos, Simon Schuetz, Tim Shepard, Kristian Slavov, Martin
Stiemerling and Juergen Quittek.
Julien Laganier and Lars Eggert are partly funded by Ambient
Networks, a research project supported by the European Commission
under its Sixth Framework Program. The views and conclusions
contained herein are those of the authors and should not be
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or
endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the Ambient Networks
project or the European Commission.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-hip-base]
Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol",
draft-ietf-hip-base-05 (work in progress), March 2006.
[I-D.ietf-hip-dns]
Nikander, P. and J. Laganier, "Host Identity Protocol
(HIP) Domain Name System (DNS) Extensions",
draft-ietf-hip-dns-06 (work in progress), February 2006.
[I-D.ietf-hip-registration]
Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Registration
Extension", draft-ietf-hip-registration-01 (work in
progress), December 2005.
[RFC1122] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, October 1989.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
[RFC3484] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3484, February 2003.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-hip-mm]
Nikander, P., "End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the
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Host Identity Protocol", draft-ietf-hip-mm-03 (work in
progress), March 2006.
[RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
[RFC3013] Killalea, T., "Recommended Internet Service Provider
Security Services and Procedures", BCP 46, RFC 3013,
November 2000.
[RFC4423] Moskowitz, R. and P. Nikander, "Host Identity Protocol
(HIP) Architecture", RFC 4423, May 2006.
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Authors' Addresses
Julien Laganier
DoCoMo Communications Laboratories Europe GmbH
Landsberger Strasse 312
Munich 80687
Germany
Phone: +49 89 56824 231
Email: julien.ietf@laposte.net
URI: http://www.docomolab-euro.com/
Lars Eggert
NEC Network Laboratories
Kurfuerstenanlage 36
Heidelberg 69115
Germany
Phone: +49 6221 90511 43
Fax: +49 6221 90511 55
Email: lars.eggert@netlab.nec.de
URI: http://www.netlab.nec.de/
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