Using TLS 1.3 with HTTP/2
draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (httpbis WG)
Last updated 2019-05-14 (latest revision 2019-05-13)
Replaces draft-davidben-http2-tls13
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HTTP                                                         D. Benjamin
Internet-Draft                                                Google LLC
Updates: 7540 (if approved)                                 May 13, 2019
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: November 14, 2019

                       Using TLS 1.3 with HTTP/2
                   draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13-00

Abstract

   This document clarifies the use of TLS 1.3 post-handshake
   authentication and key update with HTTP/2.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 14, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Post-Handshake Authentication in HTTP/2 . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   4.  Key Updates in HTTP/2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  Introduction

   TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and earlier support renegotiation, a mechanism for
   changing parameters and keys partway through a connection.  This was
   sometimes used to implement reactive client authentication in
   HTTP/1.1 [RFC7230], where the server decides whether to request a
   client certificate based on the HTTP request.

   HTTP/2 [RFC7540] multiplexes multiple HTTP requests over a single
   connection, which is incompatible with the mechanism above.  Clients
   cannot correlate the certificate request with the HTTP request which
   triggered it.  Thus, section 9.2.1 of [RFC7540] forbids
   renegotiation.

   TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] updates TLS 1.2 to remove renegotiation in favor of
   separate post-handshake authentication and key update mechanisms.
   The former shares the same problems with multiplexed protocols, but
   has a different name.  This makes it ambiguous whether post-handshake
   authentication is allowed in TLS 1.3.

   This document clarifies that the prohibition applies to post-
   handshake authentication but not to key updates.

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Post-Handshake Authentication in HTTP/2

   The prohibition on renegotiation in section 9.2.1 of [RFC7540]
   additionally applies to TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication.
   HTTP/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake TLS 1.3
   CertificateRequest messages.  HTTP/2 clients MUST treat TLS 1.3 post-

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   handshake authentication as a connection error (see section 5.4.1 of
   [RFC7540]) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR.

   [RFC7540] permitted renegotiation before the HTTP/2 connection
   preface to provide confidentiality of the client certificate.  TLS
   1.3 encrypts the client certificate in the initial handshake, so this
   is no longer necessary.  HTTP/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake
   TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest messages before the connection preface.
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