Using TLS 1.3 with HTTP/2
draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (httpbis WG)
Last updated 2019-10-22 (latest revision 2019-10-17)
Replaces draft-davidben-http2-tls13
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HTTP                                                         D. Benjamin
Internet-Draft                                                Google LLC
Updates: 7540 (if approved)                             October 17, 2019
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: April 19, 2020

                       Using TLS 1.3 with HTTP/2
                   draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13-03

Abstract

   This document updates RFC 7540 by forbidding TLS 1.3 post-handshake
   authentication, as an analog to the existing TLS 1.2 renegotiation
   restriction.

Note to Readers

   _RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication_

   Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTP working group
   mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at
   https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/ [1].

   Working Group information can be found at https://httpwg.org/ [2];
   source code and issues list for this draft can be found at
   https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/labels/http2-tls13 [3].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 19, 2020.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Post-Handshake Authentication in HTTP/2 . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Other Post-Handshake TLS Messages in HTTP/2 . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.3.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and earlier support renegotiation, a mechanism for
   changing parameters and keys partway through a connection.  This was
   sometimes used to implement reactive client authentication in
   HTTP/1.1 [RFC7230], where the server decides whether to request a
   client certificate based on the HTTP request.

   HTTP/2 [RFC7540] multiplexes multiple HTTP requests over a single
   connection, which is incompatible with the mechanism above.  Clients
   cannot correlate the certificate request with the HTTP request which
   triggered it.  Thus, Section 9.2.1 of [RFC7540] forbids
   renegotiation.

   TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] updates TLS 1.2 to remove renegotiation in favor of
   separate post-handshake authentication and key update mechanisms.
   The former shares the same problems with multiplexed protocols, but
   the prohibition in [RFC7540] only applies to TLS 1.2 renegotiation.

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   This document updates HTTP/2 to similarly forbid TLS 1.3 post-
   handshake authentication.

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Post-Handshake Authentication in HTTP/2

   HTTP/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake TLS 1.3
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