Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network- Based Security Services
draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-00
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (i2nsf WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Jaehoon Paul Jeong , Sangwon Hyun , Tae-Jin Ahn , Susan Hares , Diego Lopez | ||
| Last updated | 2017-10-04 (Latest revision 2017-10-02) | ||
| Replaces | draft-jeong-i2nsf-applicability | ||
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draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-00
Network Working Group J. Jeong
Internet-Draft S. Hyun
Intended status: Informational Sungkyunkwan University
Expires: April 5, 2018 T. Ahn
Korea Telecom
S. Hares
Huawei
D. Lopez
Telefonica I+D
October 2, 2017
Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network-
Based Security Services
draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-00
Abstract
This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network
Security Functions (I2NSF) to network-based security services in
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as
firewall, deep packet inspection, or attack mitigation engines.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 5, 2018.
Copyright Notice
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Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. I2NSF Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE
Security System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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1. Introduction
Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defined a framework
and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions
(NSFs). The I2NSF framework allows heterogeneous NSFs developed by
different security solution vendors to be used in the NFV environment
by utilizing the capabilities of such products and the virtualization
of security functions in the NFV platform. In the I2NSF framework,
each NSF initially registers the profile of its own capabilities into
the system in order for themselves to be available in the system. In
addition, the Security Controller registers itself to the I2NSF user
so that the user can request security services to the Security
Controller.
This document describes the applicability of I2NSF to network-based
security services with use cases, such as firewall
[opsawg-firewalls], Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), and Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack mitigation. We implemented the I2NSF
framework based on SDN for these use cases, and the implementation
successfully verified the effectiveness of the I2NSF framework.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Terminology
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7149],
[ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-OpenFlow], [ONF-SDN-Architecture],
[ITU-T.X.1252], [ITU-T.X.800], [i2nsf-framework],
[i2nsf-terminology], [consumer-facing-inf-im],
[consumer-facing-inf-dm], [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im], [nsf-facing-inf-dm],
[registration-inf-im], [registration-inf-dm], and
[nsf-triggered-steering]. In addition, the following terms are
defined below:
o Software-Defined Networking (SDN): A set of techniques that
enables to directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage
network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and
operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner
[ITU-T.Y.3300].
o Firewall: A service function at the junction of two network
segments that inspects every packet that attempts to cross the
boundary. It also rejects any packet that does not satisfy
certain criteria for, for example, disallowed port numbers or IP
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addresses.
o Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can
establish and distribute policy rules into network resources for
efficient firewall management. These rules can be managed
dynamically by a centralized server for firewall. SDN can work as
a network-based firewall system through a standard interface
between an SDN switch and a firewall function as a vitual network
function (VNF).
o Centralized VoIP Security System: A centralized security system
that handles the security functions required for VoIP and VoLTE
services. SDN can work as a network-based security system through
a standard interface between an SDN switch and a VoIP/VoLTE
security function as a VNF.
o Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator
that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into
network resources for efficient DDoS-attack mitigation. These
rules can be managed dynamically by a centralized server for DDoS-
attack mitigation. The SDN controller and switches can
cooperatively work as a network-based firewall system through a
standard interface between an SDN switch and a firewall function
as a VNF running in the SDN controller.
4. I2NSF Framework
This section describes an I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF
applicability and use cases, such as firewall, deep packet
inspection, and DDoS-attack mitigation functions.
Figure 1 shows an I2NSF framework [i2nsf-framework] with SDN networks
to support network-based security services. As shown in Figure 1,
I2NSF User can use security functions by delivering their high-level
security policies to the Security Controller via the Consumer-Facing
Interface [consumer-facing-inf-im][consumer-facing-inf-dm].
The Security Controller can translate the high-level security
policies (received from an I2NSF User via the Consumer-Facing
Interface) into low-level security policies for the corresponding
NSFs. These low-level security policies are sent to NSFs via the
NSF-Facing Interface [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im][nsf-facing-inf-dm].
The Security Controller requests NSFs to perform low-level security
services via the NSF-Facing Interface. The NSFs are enabled as
Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) on top of virtual machines through
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) [ETSI-NFV]. The Security
Controller also instructs the Switch Controller to perform their
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required security services on switches under the supervision of
Switch Controller (i.e., SDN Controller). In addition, the Security
Controller uses the I2NSF Registration Interface
[registration-inf-im][registration-inf-dm] to communicate with
Developer's Management System (called Developer's Mgmt System) for
registering (or deregistering) the developer's NSFs into (or from)
the NFV system using the I2NSF framework.
The Consumer-Facing Interface between an I2NSF User and the Security
Controller can be implemented using, for example, RESTCONF [RFC8040].
Data models specified by YANG [RFC6020] describe high-level security
policies to be specified by an I2NSF User. The data model defined in
[consumer-facing-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing
Interface.
+------------+
| I2NSF User |
+------------+
^
| Consumer-Facing Interface
v
+-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+
|Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System|
+-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+
^ ^
| | NSF-Facing Interface
| v
| +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
| | NSF-1 |-| NSF-2 |...| NSF-n |
| | (Firewall) | | (DPI) | |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)|
| +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
|
| NSF-Facing Interface
v SDN Network
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| +-----------------+ |
| |Switch Controller| |
| +-----------------+ |
| ^ |
| | SDN Southbound Interface |
| v |
| +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ |
| |Switch 1|-|Switch 2|......|Switch m| |
| +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Networks
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The NSF-Facing Interface between Security Controller and NSFs can be
implemented using NETCONF [RFC6241]. YANG data models describe low-
level security policies for the sake of NSFs, which are translated
from the high-level security policies by the Security Controller.
The data model defined in [nsf-facing-inf-dm] can be used for the
I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface.
The Registration Interface between the Security Controller and the
Developer's Mgmt System can be implemented by RESTCONF [RFC8040].
The data model defined in [registration-inf-dm] can be used for the
I2NSF Registration Interface.
Also, the I2NSF framework can enforce multiple chained NSFs for the
low-level security policies by means of service function chaining
(SFC) techniques for the I2NSF architecture described in
[nsf-triggered-steering].
5. Use Cases
This section introduces three use cases for cloud-based security
services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep packet inspection system,
and (iii) attack mitigation system. [RFC8192]
5.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System
A centralized network firewall can manage each network resource and
firewall rules can be managed flexibly by a centralized server for
firewall (called Firewall). The centralized network firewall
controls each switch for the network resource management and the
firewall rules can be added or deleted dynamically.
The procedure of firewall operations in this system is as follows:
1. A switch forwards an unknown flow's packet to one of the Switch
Controllers.
2. The Switch Controller forwards the unknown flow's packet to an
appropriate security service application, such as the Firewall.
3. The Firewall analyzes, typically, the headers and contents of the
packet.
4. If the Firewall regards the packet as a malicious one with a
suspicious pattern, it reports the malicious packet to the Switch
Controller.
5. The Switch Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets with
the suspicious pattern) into underlying switches.
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6. The suspected packets are dropped by these switches.
Existing SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces
between the firewall application and switches
[RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow] [ONF-SDN-Architecture].
Legacy firewalls have some challenges such as the expensive cost,
performance, management of access control, establishment of policy,
and packet-based access mechanism. The proposed framework can
resolve the challenges through the above centralized firewall system
based on SDN as follows:
o Cost: The cost of adding firewalls to network resources such as
routers, gateways, and switches is substantial due to the reason
that we need to add firewall on each network resource. To solve
this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a
single firewall is manipulated by a centralized server.
o Performance: The performance of firewalls is often slower than the
link speed of network interfaces. Every network resource for
firewall needs to check firewall rules according to network
conditions. Firewalls can be adaptively deployed among network
switches, depending on network conditions in the framework.
o The management of access control: Since there may be hundreds of
network resources in a network, the dynamic management of access
control for security services like firewall is a challenge. In
the framework, firewall rules can be dynamically added for new
malware.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for firewall within a specific
organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view
is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.
o Packet-based access mechanism: Packet-based access mechanism is
not enough for firewall in practice since the basic unit of access
control is usually users or applications. Therefore, application
level rules can be defined and added to the firewall system
through the centralized server.
5.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System
A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE
flow and manage VoIP/VoLTE security rules controlled by a centralized
server for VoIP/VoLTE security service called VoIP Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS). The VoIP/VoLTE security system controls
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each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow management by manipulating
the rules that can be added, deleted or modified dynamically.
The procedure of VoIP/VoLTE security operations in this system is as
follows:
1. A switch forwards an unknown call flow's signal packet (e.g., SIP
packet) to the Switch Controller. Also, if the packet belongs to
a matched flow's packet related to SIP (called matched SIP
packet), the Switch forwards the packet to the Switch Controller
so that the packet can be checked by an NSF for VoIP (i.e., VoIP
IPS) via the Switch Controller, which monitors the behavior of
its SIP call.
2. The Switch Controller forwards the unknown flow's packet or the
matched SIP packet to an appropriate security service function,
such as VoIP IPS.
3. VoIP IPS analyzes the headers and contents of the signal packet,
such as IP addresses, calling number, and session description
headers [RFC4566].
4. If, for example, VoIP IPS regards the packet as a spoofed packet
by hackers or a scanning packet searching for VoIP/VoLTE devices,
it requests the Switch Controller to block that packet and the
subsequent packets that have the same call-id.
5. The Switch Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets)
into underlying switches.
6. The illegal packets are dropped by these switches.
Existing SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces
between the VoIP IPS application and switches [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300]
[ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture].
Legacy hardware based VoIP IPS has some challenges, such as
provisioning time, the granularity of security, expensive cost, and
the establishment of policy. The I2NSF framework can resolve the
challenges through the above centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system
based on SDN as follows:
o Provisioning: The provisioning time of setting up a legacy VoIP
IPS to network is substantial because it takes from some hours to
some days. By managing the network resources centrally, VoIP IPS
can provide more agility in provisioning both virtual and physical
network resources from a central location.
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o The granularity of security: The security rules of a legacy VoIP
IPS are compounded considering the granularity of security. The
proposed framework can provide more granular security by
centralizing security control into a switch controller. The VoIP
IPS can effectively manage security rules throughout the network.
o Cost: The cost of adding VoIP IPS to network resources, such as
routers, gateways, and switches is substantial due to the reason
that we need to add VoIP IPS on each network resource. To solve
this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a
single VoIP IPS is manipulated by a centralized server.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for VoIP IPS within a specific
organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view
is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.
5.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System
A centralized DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource
and manipulate rules to each switch through a centralized server for
DDoS-attack mitigation (called DDoS-attack Mitigator). The
centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system defends servers against
DDoS attacks outside private network, that is, from public network.
Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers)
and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack
mitigation, traffic flows in switches are dynamically configured by
traffic flow forwarding path management according to the category of
servers [AVANT-GUARD]. Such a managenent should consider the load
balance among the switches for the defense against DDoS attacks.
The procedure of DDoS-attack mitigation operations in this system is
as follows:
1. A Switch periodically reports an inter-arrival pattern of a
flow's packets to one of the Switch Controllers.
2. The Switch Controller forwards the flow's inter-arrival pattern
to an appropriate security service application, such as DDoS-
attack Mitigator.
3. The DDoS-attack Mitigator analyzes the reported pattern for the
flow.
4. If the DDoS-attack Mitigator regards the pattern as a DDoS
attack, it computes a packet dropping probability corresponding
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to suspiciousness level and reports this DDoS-attack flow to
Switch Controller.
5. The Switch Controller installs new rules into switches (e.g.,
forward packets with the suspicious inter-arrival pattern with a
dropping probability).
6. The suspicious flow's packets are randomly dropped by switches
with the dropping probability.
For the above centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, the existing
SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces between the
DDoS-attack mitigator application and switches [RFC7149]
[ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture].
The centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system has challenges similar
to the centralized firewall system. The proposed framework can
resolve the challenges through the above centralized DDoS-attack
mitigation system based on SDN as follows:
o Cost: The cost of adding DDoS-attack mitigators to network
resources such as routers, gateways, and switches is substantial
due to the reason that we need to add DDoS-attack mitigator on
each network resource. To solve this, each network resource can
be managed centrally such that a single DDoS-attack mitigator is
manipulated by a centralized server.
o Performance: The performance of DDoS-attack mitigators is often
slower than the link speed of network interfaces. The checking of
DDoS attacks may reduce the performance of the network interfaces.
DDoS-attack mitigators can be adaptively deployed among network
switches, depending on network conditions in the framework.
o The management of network resources: Since there may be hundreds
of network resources in an administered network, the dynamic
management of network resources for performance (e.g., load
balancing) is a challenge for DDoS-attack mitigation. In the
framework, as dynamic network resource management, traffic flow
forwarding path management can handle the load balancing of
network switches [AVANT-GUARD]. With this management, the current
and near-future workload can be spread among the network switches
for DDoS-attack mitigation. In addition, DDoS-attack mitigation
rules can be dynamically added for new DDoS attacks.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for new DDoS-attacks (e.g., DNS reflection
attack) within a specific organization network under management.
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Thus, a centralized view is helpful to determine security policies
for such a network.
So far this document has described the procedure and impact of the
three use cases for network-based security services using the I2NSF
framework with SDN networks. To support these use cases in the
proposed data-driven security service framework, YANG data models
described in [consumer-facing-inf-dm], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], and
[registration-inf-dm] can be used as Consumer-Facing Interface, NSF-
Facing Interface, and Registration Interface, respectively, along
with RESTCONF [RFC8040] and NETCONF [RFC6241].
6. Security Considerations
The I2NSF framework with SDN networks in this document is derived
from the I2NSF framework [i2nsf-framework], so the security
considerations of the I2NSF framework should be included in this
document. Therefore, proper secure communication channels should be
used the delivery of control or management messages among the
components in the proposed framework.
This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are
specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300].
7. Acknowledgments
This work was supported by Institute for Information & communications
Technology Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government
(MSIP) (No.R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence
Technology Development for the Customized Security Service
Provisioning).
8. Contributors
I2NSF is a group effort. I2NSF has had a number of contributing
authors. The following are considered co-authors:
o Hyoungshick Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)
o Jung-Soo Park (ETRI)
o Tae-Jin Ahn (Korea Telecom)
o Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom)
o Mohamed Boucadair (Orange)
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119, March 1997.
[i2nsf-framework] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L.,
Strassner, J., and R. Kumar, "Framework for
Interface to Network Security Functions",
draft-ietf-i2nsf-framework-07 (work in
progress), August 2017.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling
Language for the Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
October 2010.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J.,
and A. Bierman, "Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, June 2011.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen,
"RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040,
January 2017.
9.2. Informative References
[consumer-facing-inf-im] Kumar, R., Lohiya, A., Qi, D., Bitar, N.,
Palislamovic, S., and L. Xia, "Information
model for Client-Facing Interface to
Security Controller", draft-kumar-i2nsf-
client-facing-interface-im-03 (work in
progress), July 2017.
[consumer-facing-inf-dm] Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and
S. Hares, "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface
YANG Data Model", draft-jeong-i2nsf-
consumer-facing-interface-dm-04 (work in
progress), October 2017.
[i2nsf-nsf-cap-im] Xia, L., Strassner, J., Basile, C., and D.
Lopez, "Information Model of NSFs
Capabilities",
draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-00 (work in
progress), September 2017.
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[nsf-facing-inf-dm] Kim, J., Jeong, J., Park, J., Hares, S.,
and L. Xia, "I2NSF Network Security
Functions-Facing Interface YANG Data
Model", draft-kim-i2nsf-nsf-facing-
interface-data-model-03 (work in progress),
October 2017.
[registration-inf-im] Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Woo, S., Yeo, Y., and
J. Park, "I2NSF Registration Interface
Information Model", draft-hyun-i2nsf-
registration-interface-im-02 (work in
progress), July 2017.
[registration-inf-dm] Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Yeo, Y., Woo, S., and
J. Park, "I2NSF Registration Interface YANG
Data Model",
draft-hyun-i2nsf-registration-dm-01 (work
in progress), July 2017.
[nsf-triggered-steering] Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Park, J., and S.
Hares, "Service Function Chaining-Enabled
I2NSF Architecture",
draft-hyun-i2nsf-nsf-triggered-steering-03
(work in progress), July 2017.
[RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-
Defined Networking: A Perspective from
within a Service Provider Environment",
RFC 7149, March 2014.
[ITU-T.Y.3300] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300, "Framework of
Software-Defined Networking", June 2014.
[ONF-OpenFlow] ONF, "OpenFlow Switch Specification
(Version 1.4.0)", October 2013.
[ONF-SDN-Architecture] ONF, "SDN Architecture", June 2014.
[ITU-T.X.1252] Recommendation ITU-T X.1252, "Baseline
Identity Management Terms and Definitions",
April 2010.
[ITU-T.X.800] Recommendation ITU-T X.800, "Security
Architecture for Open Systems
Interconnection for CCITT Applications",
March 1991.
[AVANT-GUARD] Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and
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G. Gu, "AVANT-GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant
Switch Flow Management in Software-Defined
Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013.
[ETSI-NFV] ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, "Network Functions
Virtualisation (NFV); Architectural
Framework", October 2013.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins,
"SDP: Session Description Protocol",
RFC 4566, July 2006.
[i2nsf-terminology] Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia,
L., and H. Birkholz, "Interface to Network
Security Functions (I2NSF) Terminology",
draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-04 (work in
progress), July 2017.
[opsawg-firewalls] Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in
Internet Security",
draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in
progress), October 2012.
[RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet,
C., Kumar, R., and J. Jeong, "Interface to
Network Security Functions (I2NSF): Problem
Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192,
July 2017.
Authors' Addresses
Jaehoon Paul Jeong
Department of Software
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4957
Fax: +82 31 290 7996
EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu
URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
Jeong, et al. Expires April 5, 2018 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Applicability October 2017
Sangwon Hyun
Department of Software
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 290 7222
Fax: +82 31 299 6673
EMail: swhyun77@skku.edu
URI: http://imtl.skku.ac.kr/
Tae-Jin Ahn
Korea Telecom
70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon 305-811
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 42 870 8409
EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com
Susan Hares
Huawei
7453 Hickory Hill
Saline, MI 48176
USA
Phone: +1-734-604-0332
EMail: shares@ndzh.com
Diego R. Lopez
Telefonica I+D
Jose Manuel Lara, 9
Seville, 41013
Spain
Phone: +34 682 051 091
EMail: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com
Jeong, et al. Expires April 5, 2018 [Page 15]