I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model
draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-25
The information below is for an old version of the document.
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| Authors | Susan Hares , Jaehoon Paul Jeong , Jinyong Tim Kim , Robert Moskowitz , Qiushi Lin | ||
| Last updated | 2022-02-03 (Latest revision 2022-02-02) | ||
| Replaces | draft-hares-i2nsf-capability-data-model | ||
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| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Linda Dunbar | ||
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draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-25
I2NSF Working Group S. Hares, Ed.
Internet-Draft Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track J. Jeong, Ed.
Expires: 6 August 2022 J. Kim
Sungkyunkwan University
R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Q. Lin
Huawei
2 February 2022
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model
draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-25
Abstract
This document defines an information model and the corresponding YANG
data model for the capabilities of various Network Security Functions
(NSFs) in the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF)
framework to centrally manage the capabilities of the various NSFs.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 August 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Information Model of I2NSF NSF Capability . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Design Principles and ECA Policy Model . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Conflict, Resolution Strategy and Default Action . . . . 8
4. Overview of YANG Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. YANG Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities . . . . . . 12
6. YANG Data Model of I2NSF NSF Capability . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Appendix A. Configuration Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
A.1. Example 1: Registration for the Capabilities of a General
Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
A.2. Example 2: Registration for the Capabilities of a
Time-based Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.3. Example 3: Registration for the Capabilities of a Web
Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.4. Example 4: Registration for the Capabilities of a VoIP/
VoLTE Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.5. Example 5: Registration for the Capabilities of a HTTP and
HTTPS Flood Mitigator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Appendix C. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
1. Introduction
As the industry becomes more sophisticated and network devices (e.g.,
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, autonomous vehicles, and
smartphones using Voice over IP (VoIP) and Voice over LTE (VoLTE))
require advanced security protection in various scenarios, security
service providers have a lot of problems described in [RFC8192] to
provide such network devices with efficient and reliable security
services in network infrastructure. To resolve these problems, this
document specifies the information and data models of the
capabilities of Network Security Functions (NSFs) in a framework of
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the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) [RFC8329].
NSFs produced by multiple security vendors provide various security
capabilities to customers. Multiple NSFs can be combined together to
provide security services over the given network traffic, regardless
of whether the NSFs are implemented as physical or virtual functions.
Security Capabilities describe the functions that Network Security
Functions (NSFs) can provide for security policy enforcement.
Security Capabilities are independent of the actual security policy
that will implement the functionality of the NSF.
Every NSF should be described with the set of capabilities it offers.
Security Capabilities enable security functionality to be described
in a vendor-neutral manner. Security Capabilities are a market
enabler, providing a way to define customized security protection by
unambiguously describing the security features offered by a given
NSF. Note that this YANG data model forms the basis of the NSF
Monitoring Interface YANG data model
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] and the NSF-Facing
Interface YANG data model [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm].
This document provides an information model and the corresponding
YANG data model [RFC6020][RFC7950] that defines the capabilities of
NSFs to centrally manage the capabilities of those NSFs. The NSFs
can register their own capabilities into a Network Operator
Management (Mgmt) System (i.e., Security Controller) with this YANG
data model through the registration interface [RFC8329]. With the
database of the capabilities of those NSFs that are maintained
centrally, those NSFs can be more easily managed [RFC8329].
This YANG data model uses an "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy
model that is used as the basis for the design of I2NSF Policy as
described in [RFC8329] and Section 3.1. The "ietf-i2nsf-capability"
YANG module defined in this document provides the following features:
* Definition for event capabilities of network security functions.
* Definition for condition capabilities of network security
functions.
* Definition for action capabilities of network security functions.
* Definition for resolution strategy capabilities of network
security functions.
* Definition for default action capabilities of network security
functions.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC8329].
This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common
YANG types defined in [RFC6991], and adopts the Network Management
Datastore Architecture (NMDA). The meaning of the symbols in tree
diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].
3. Information Model of I2NSF NSF Capability
This section provides the I2NSF Capability Information Model (CapIM).
A CapIM is a formalization of the functionality that an NSF
advertises. This enables the precise specification of what an NSF
can do in terms of security policy enforcement, so that computer-
based tasks can unambiguously refer to, use, configure, and manage
NSFs. Capabilities are defined in a vendor- and technology-
independent manner (i.e., regardless of the differences among vendors
and individual products).
Network security experts can refer to categories of security controls
and understand each other. For instance, network security experts
agree on what is meant by the terms "NAT", "filtering", and "VPN
concentrator". As a further example, network security experts
unequivocally refer to "packet filters" as devices that allow or deny
packet forwarding based on various conditions (e.g., source and
destination IP addresses, source and destination ports, and IP
protocol type fields) [Alshaer].
However, more information is required in case of other devices, like
stateful firewalls or application layer filters. These devices
filter packets or communications, but there are differences in the
packets and communications that they can categorize and the states
they maintain. Network engineers deal with these differences by
asking more questions to determine the specific category and
functionality of the device. Machines can follow a similar approach,
which is commonly referred to as question-answering [Hirschman]. In
this context, the CapIM and the derived data model can provide
important and rich information sources.
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Analogous considerations can be applied for channel protection
protocols, where we all understand that they will protect packets by
means of symmetric algorithms whose keys could have been negotiated
with asymmetric cryptography, but they may work at different layers
and support different algorithms and protocols. To ensure
protection, these protocols apply integrity, optionally
confidentiality, anti-reply protections, and authentication.
The CapIM is intended to clarify these ambiguities by providing a
formal description of NSF functionality. The set of functions that
are advertised MAY be restricted according to the privileges of the
user or application that is viewing those functions. I2NSF
Capabilities enable unambiguous specification of the security
capabilities available in a (virtualized) networking environment, and
their automatic processing by means of computer-based techniques.
This CapIM includes enabling a security controller in an I2NSF
framework [RFC8329] to properly identify and manage NSFs, and allow
NSFs to properly declare their functionality through a Developer's
Management System (DMS) [RFC8329], so that they can be used in the
correct way.
3.1. Design Principles and ECA Policy Model
This document defines an information model for representing NSF
capabilities. Some basic design principles for security capabilities
and the systems that manage them are:
* Independence: Each security capability (e.g., events, conditions,
and actions) SHOULD be an independent function, with minimum
overlap or dependency on other capabilities. This enables each
security capability to be utilized and assembled with other
security capabilities together freely. More importantly, changes
to one capability SHOULD NOT affect other capabilities. This
follows the Single Responsibility Principle [Martin] [OODSRP].
* Abstraction: Each capability MUST be defined in a vendor-
independent manner.
* Advertisement: Registration Interface
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm] MUST be used to
advertise and register the capabilities of each NSF. This same
interface MUST be used by other I2NSF Components to determine what
Capabilities are currently available to them.
* Execution: NSF-Facing Interface
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm] and NSF Monitoring
Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] MUST be used
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to configure the use of a capability into an NSF and monitor the
NSF, respectively. These provide a standardized ability to
describe its functionality, and report its processing results,
respectively. These facilitate multi-vendor interoperability.
* Automation: The system MUST have the ability to auto-discover,
auto-negotiate, and auto-update its security capabilities (i.e.,
without human intervention). These features are especially useful
for the management of a large number of NSFs. They are essential
for adding smart services (e.g., refinement, analysis, capability
reasoning, and optimization) to the security scheme employed.
These features are supported by many design patterns, including
the Observer Pattern [OODOP], the Mediator Pattern [OODMP], and a
set of Message Exchange Patterns [Hohpe]. Registration Interface
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm] can register the
capabilities of NSFs with the security controller from the request
of Developer's Management System providing NSFs and the
corresponding security capabilities. Also, this interface can
send a query to Developer's Management System in order to find an
NSF to satisfy the requested security capability from the security
controller that receives a security policy.
* Scalability: The management system SHOULD have the capability to
scale up/down or scale in/out. Thus, it can meet various
performance requirements derived from changeable network traffic
or service requests. In addition, security capabilities that are
affected by scalability changes SHOULD support reporting
statistics to the security controller to assist its decision on
whether it needs to invoke scaling or not. NSF Monitoring
Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] can observe
the performance of NSFs to let the security controller decide
scalability changes of the NSFs.
Based on the above principles, this document defines a capability
model that enables an NSF to register (and hence advertise) its set
of capabilities that other I2NSF Components can use. These
capabilities MUST have their access control restricted by a policy;
this is out of scope for this document. The set of capabilities
provided by a given set of NSFs unambiguously defines the security
services offered by the set of NSFs used. The security controller
can compare the requirements of users and applications with the set
of capabilities that are currently available in order to choose which
capabilities of which NSFs are needed to meet those requirements.
Note that this choice is independent of vendor, and instead relies
specifically on the capabilities (i.e., the description) of the
functions provided.
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Furthermore, NSFs are subject to the updates of security capabilities
and software to cope with newly found security attacks or threats,
hence new capabilities may be created, and/or existing capabilities
may be updated (e.g., by updating its signature and algorithm). New
capabilities may be sent to and stored in a centralized repository,
or stored separately in a vendor's local repository. In either case,
Registration Interface can facilitate this update process to
Developer's Management System to let the security controller update
its repository for NSFs and their security capabilities.
The "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy model in [RFC8329] is used
as the basis for the design of the capability model; The following
three terms define the structure and behavior of an I2NSF imperative
policy rule:
* Event: An Event is defined as any important occurrence in time of
a change in the system being managed, and/or in the environment of
the system being managed. When used in the context of I2NSF
Policy Rules, it is used to determine whether the condition clause
of an I2NSF Policy Rule can be evaluated or not. Examples of an
I2NSF Event include time and user actions (e.g., logon, logoff,
and actions that violate an ACL).
* Condition: A condition is defined as a set of attributes,
features, and/or values that are to be compared with a set of
known attributes, features, and/or values in order to determine
whether or not the set of actions in that (imperative) I2NSF
Policy Rule can be executed or not. Examples of I2NSF conditions
include matching attributes of a packet or flow, and comparing the
internal state of an NSF with a desired state.
* Action: An action is used to control and monitor aspects of NSFs
to handle packets or flows when the event and condition clauses
are satisfied. NSFs provide security functions by executing
various Actions. Examples of I2NSF actions include providing
intrusion detection and/or protection, web filtering (i.e., URL
filtering) and flow filtering, and deep packet inspection for
packets and flows.
An I2NSF Policy Rule is made up of three clauses: an Event clause, a
Condition clause, and an Action clause. This structure is also
called an ECA (Event-Condition-Action) Policy Rule. A Boolean clause
is a logical statement that evaluates to either TRUE or FALSE. It
may be made up of one or more terms; if more than one term is
present, then each term in the Boolean clause is combined using
logical connectives (i.e., AND, OR, and NOT).
An I2NSF ECA Policy Rule has the following semantics:
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IF <event-clause> is TRUE
IF <condition-clause> is TRUE
THEN execute <action-clause> [constrained by metadata]
END-IF
END-IF
Technically, the "Policy Rule" is really a container that aggregates
the above three clauses, as well as metadata, which describe the
characteristics and behaviors of a capability (or an NSF).
Aggregating metadata enables a business logic to be used to prescribe
a behavior. For example, suppose a particular ECA Policy Rule
contains three actions (A1, A2, and A3, in that order). Action A2
has a priority of 10; actions A1 and A3 have no priority specified.
Then, metadata may be used to restrict the set of actions that can be
executed when the event and condition clauses of this ECA Policy Rule
are evaluated to be TRUE; two examples are: (1) only the first action
(A1) is executed, and then the policy rule returns to its caller, or
(2) all actions are executed, starting with the highest priority.
The above ECA policy model is very general and easily extensible.
For example, when an NSF has both url filtering capability and packet
filtering capability for protocol headers, it means that it can match
the URL as well as the Ethernet header, IP header, and Transport
header for packet filtering. The condition capability for url
filtering and packet filtering is not tightly linked to the action
capability due to the independence of our ECA design principle. The
action capability only lists the type of action that the NSF can take
to handle the matched packets.
3.2. Conflict, Resolution Strategy and Default Action
Formally, two I2NSF Policy Rules conflict with each other if:
* the Event Clauses of each evaluate to TRUE;
* the Condition Clauses of each evaluate to TRUE;
* the Action Clauses affect the same object in different ways.
For example, if we have two Policy Rules called R1 and R2 in the same
Policy:
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R1: During 8am-6pm, if traffic is external, then run through
firewall
R2: During 7am-8pm, run anti-virus
There is no conflict between the two policy rules R1 and R2, since
the actions are different. However, consider these two rules called
R3 and R4:
R3: During 9am-6pm, allow John to access social networking service
websites
R4: During 9am-6pm, disallow all users to access social networking
service websites
The two policy rules R3 and R4 are now in conflict, between the hours
of 9am and 6pm, because the actions of R3 and R4 are different and
apply to the same user (i.e., John).
Conflicts theoretically compromise the correct functioning of
devices. However, NSFs have been designed to cope with these issues.
Since conflicts are originated by simultaneously matching rules, an
additional process decides the action to be applied, e.g., among the
actions which the matching rule would have enforced. This process is
described by means of a resolution strategy for conflicts. The
finding and handling of conflicted matching rules is performed by
resolution strategies in the security controller. The implementation
of such resolution strategies is out of scope for I2NSF.
On the other hand, it may happen that, if an event is caught, none of
the policy rules matches the condition. Note that a packet or flow
is handled only when it matches both the event and condition of a
policy rule according to the ECA policy model. As a simple case, no
condition in the rules may match a packet arriving at the border
firewall. In this case, the packet is usually dropped, that is, the
firewall has a default behavior of packet dropping in order to manage
the cases that are not covered by specific rules.
Therefore, this document introduces two further capabilities for an
NSF to handle security policy conflicts with resolution strategies
and enforce a default action if no rules match.
* Resolution Strategies: They can be used to specify how to resolve
conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different
policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular
NSF;
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* Default Action: It provides the default behavior to be executed
when there are no other alternatives. This action can be either
an explicit action or a set of actions.
4. Overview of YANG Data Model
This section provides an overview of how the YANG data model can be
used in the I2NSF framework described in [RFC8329]. Figure 1 shows
the capabilities (e.g., firewall and web filter) of NSFs in the I2NSF
Framework. As shown in this figure, a Developer's Management System
(DMS) can register NSFs and their capabilities with a Security
Controller. To register NSFs in this way, the DMS utilizes the
standardized capability YANG data model in this document through the
I2NSF Registration Interface [RFC8329]. That is, this Registration
Interface uses the YANG module described in this document to describe
the capabilities of an NSF that is registered with the Security
Controller. As described in [RFC8192], with the usage of
Registration Interface and the YANG module in this document, the NSFs
manufactured by multiple vendors can be managed together by the
Security Controller in a centralized way and be updated dynamically
by each vendor as the NSF has software or hardware updates.
In Figure 1, a new NSF at a Developer's Management System has
capabilities of Firewall (FW) and Web Filter (WF), which are denoted
as (Cap = {FW, WF}), to support Event-Condition-Action (ECA) policy
rules where 'E', 'C', and 'A' mean "Event", "Condition", and
"Action", respectively. The condition involves IPv4 or IPv6
datagrams, and the action includes "Allow" and "Deny" for those
datagrams.
Note that the NSF-Facing Interface [RFC8329] is used by the Security
Controller to configure the security policy rules of NSFs (e.g.,
firewall and Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack mitigator)
with the capabilities of the NSFs registered with the Security
Controller.
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+------------------------------------------------------+
| I2NSF User (e.g., Overlay Network Mgmt, Enterprise |
| Network Mgmt, another network domain's mgmt, etc.) |
+--------------------+---------------------------------+
I2NSF ^
Consumer-Facing Interface |
|
v I2NSF
+-----------------+------------+ Registration +-------------+
| Network Operator Mgmt System | Interface | Developer's |
| (i.e., Security Controller) |<------------->| Mgmt System |
+-----------------+------------+ +-------------+
^ New NSF
| Cap = {FW, WF}
I2NSF | E = {}
NSF-Facing Interface | C = {IPv4, IPv6}
| A = {Allow, Deny}
v
+---------------+----+------------+-----------------+
| | | |
+---+---+ +---+---+ +---+---+ +---+---+
| NSF-1 | ... | NSF-m | | NSF-1 | ... | NSF-n |
+-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+
NSF-1 NSF-m NSF-1 NSF-n
Cap = {FW, WF} Cap = {FW, WF} Cap = {FW, WF} Cap = {FW, WF}
E = {} E = {user} E = {dev} E = {time}
C = {IPv4} C = {IPv6} C = {IPv4, IPv6} C = {IPv4}
A = {Allow, Deny} A = {Allow, Deny} A = {Allow, Deny} A = {Allow, Deny}
Developer's Mgmt System A Developer's Mgmt System B
Figure 1: Capabilities of NSFs in I2NSF Framework
A use case of an NSF with the capabilities of firewall and web filter
is described as follows.
* If a network administrator wants to apply security policy rules to
block malicious users with firewall and web filter, it is a
tremendous burden for a network administrator to apply all of the
needed rules to NSFs one by one. This problem can be resolved by
managing the capabilities of NSFs as described in this document.
* If a network administrator wants to block IPv4 or IPv6 packets
from malicious users, the network administrator sends a security
policy rule to block the users to the Network Operator Management
System (i.e., Security Controller) using the I2NSF Consumer-Facing
Interface.
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* When the Network Operator Management System receives the security
policy rule, it automatically sends that security policy rule to
appropriate NSFs (i.e., NSF-m in Developer's Management System A
and NSF-1 in Developer's Management System B) which can support
the capabilities (i.e., IPv6). This lets an I2NSF User not
consider which specific NSF(s) will work for the security policy
rule.
* If NSFs encounter the suspicious IPv4 or IPv6 packets of malicious
users, they can filter the packets out according to the configured
security policy rule. Therefore, the security policy rule against
the malicious users' packets can be automatically applied to
appropriate NSFs without human intervention.
5. YANG Tree Diagram
This section shows a YANG tree diagram of capabilities of network
security functions, as defined in the Section 3.
5.1. Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities
This section explains a YANG tree diagram of NSF capabilities and its
features. Figure 2 shows a YANG tree diagram of NSF capabilities.
The NSF capabilities in the tree include time capabilities, event
capabilities, condition capabilities, action capabilities, resolution
strategy capabilities, and default action capabilities. Those
capabilities can be tailored or extended according to a vendor's
specific requirements. Refer to the NSF capabilities information
model for detailed discussion in Section 3.
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module: ietf-i2nsf-capability
+--rw nsf* [nsf-name]
+--rw nsf-name string
+--rw directional-capabilities* identityref
+--rw event-capabilities
| +--rw system-event-capability* identityref
| +--rw system-alarm-capability* identityref
| +--rw time-capabilities* identityref
+--rw condition-capabilities
| +--rw generic-nsf-capabilities
| | +--rw ethernet-capability* identityref
| | +--rw ipv4-capability* identityref
| | +--rw ipv6-capability* identityref
| | +--rw icmpv4-capability* identityref
| | +--rw icmpv6-capability* identityref
| | +--rw tcp-capability* identityref
| | +--rw udp-capability* identityref
| | +--rw sctp-capability* identityref
| | +--rw dccp-capability* identityref
| +--rw advanced-nsf-capabilities
| | +--rw anti-ddos-capability* identityref
| | +--rw ips-capability* identityref
| | +--rw anti-virus-capability* identityref
| | +--rw url-filtering-capability* identityref
| | +--rw voip-volte-filtering-capability* identityref
| +--rw context-capabilities
| +--rw application-filter-capabilities* identityref
| +--rw device-type-capabilities* identityref
| +--rw user-condition-capabilities* identityref
| +--rw geographic-capabilities* identityref
+--rw action-capabilities
| +--rw ingress-action-capability* identityref
| +--rw egress-action-capability* identityref
| +--rw log-action-capability* identityref
+--rw resolution-strategy-capabilities* identityref
+--rw default-action-capabilities* identityref
Figure 2: YANG Tree Diagram of Capabilities of Network Security
Functions
The data model in this document provides identities for the
capabilities of NSFs. Every identity in the data model represents
the capability of an NSF. Each identity is explained in the
description of the identity.
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Event capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe
an event that would trigger the evaluation of the condition clause of
the I2NSF Policy Rule. The defined event capabilities are system
event, system alarm, and time. Time capabilities are used to specify
the capabilities which describe when to execute the I2NSF policy
rule. The time capabilities are defined in terms of absolute time
and periodic time. The absolute time means the exact time to start
or end. The periodic time means repeated time like day, week, month,
or year.
Condition capabilities are used to specify capabilities of a set of
attributes, features, and/or values that are to be compared with a
set of known attributes, features, and/or values in order to
determine whether a set of actions needs to be executed or not so
that an imperative I2NSF policy rule can be executed. In this
document, two kinds of condition capabilities are used to classify
different capabilities of NSFs such as generic-nsf-capabilities and
advanced-nsf-capabilities. First, the generic-nsf-capabilities
define NSFs that operate on packet header for layer 2 (i.e., Ethernet
capability), layer 3 (i.e., IPv4 capability, IPv6 capability, ICMPv4
capability, and ICMPv6 capability.), and layer 4 (i.e., TCP
capability, UDP capability, SCTP capability, and DCCP capability).
Second, the advanced-nsf-capabilities define NSFs that operate on
features different from the generic-nsf-capabilities, e.g., the
payload, cross flow state, application layer, traffic statistics,
network behavior, etc. This document defines the advanced-nsf into
two categories such as content-security-control and attack-
mitigation-control.
* Content security control is an NSF that evaluates the payload of a
packet, such as Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), URL-Filtering,
Antivirus, and VoIP/VoLTE Filter.
* Attack mitigation control is an NSF that mitigates an attack such
as anti-DDoS (DDoS-mitigator).
The advanced-nsf can be extended with other types of NSFs. This
document only provides five advanced-nsf capabilities, i.e., IPS
capability, URL-Filtering capability, Antivirus capability, VoIP/
VoLTE Filter capability, and Anti-DDoS capability. Note that VoIP
and VoLTE are merged into a single capability in this document
because VoIP and VoLTE use the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
[RFC3261] for a call setup. See Section 3.1 for more information
about the condition in the ECA policy model.
The context capabilities provide extra information for the condition.
The given context conditions are application filter, target, user
condition, and geographic location. The application filter
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capability is capability in matching the packet based on the
application protocol, such as HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, etc. The device type
capability is capability in matching the type of the destination
devices, such as PC, IoT, Network Infrastructure devices, etc. The
user condition is capability in matching the users of the network by
mapping each user ID to an IP address. Users can be combined into
one group. The geographic location capability is capability in
matching the geographical location of a source or destination of a
packet.
Action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that
describe the control and monitoring aspects of flow-based NSFs when
the event and condition clauses are satisfied. The action
capabilities are defined as ingress-action capability, egress-action
capability, and log-action capability. See Section 3.1 for more
information about the action in the ECA policy model. Also, see
Section 7.2 (NSF-Facing Flow Security Policy Structure) in [RFC8329]
for more information about the ingress and egress actions. In
addition, see Section 9.1 (Flow-Based NSF Capability
Characterization) in [RFC8329] and Section 7.5 (NSF Logs) in
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] for more information about
logging at NSFs.
Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify the capabilities
that describe conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or
different policy rules that are matched and contained in this
particular NSF. The resolution strategy capabilities are defined as
First Matching Rule (FMR), Last Matching Rule (LMR), Prioritized
Matching Rule (PMR), Prioritized Matching Rule with Errors (PMRE),
and Prioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN). See Section 3.2
for more information about the resolution strategy.
Default action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that
describe how to execute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a
packet. The default action capabilities are defined as pass, drop,
reject, rate-limit, and mirror. See Section 3.2 for more information
about the default action.
6. YANG Data Model of I2NSF NSF Capability
This section introduces a YANG module for NSFs' capabilities, as
defined in the Section 3.
It makes references to
* [RFC0768]
* [RFC0791]
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* [RFC0792]
* [RFC0854]
* [RFC0959]
* [RFC1939]
* [RFC2474]
* [RFC3168]
* [RFC3261]
* [RFC9051]
* [RFC4250]
* [RFC4340]
* [RFC4443]
* [RFC4766]
* [RFC5103]
* [RFC5321]
* [RFC5595]
* [RFC6335]
* [RFC6437]
* [RFC6691]
* [RFC6864]
* [RFC7323]
* [RFC8200]
* [RFC8311]
* [RFC8329]
* [RFC8805]
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* [IEEE802.3-2018]
* [IANA-Protocol-Numbers]
* [I-D.ietf-httpbis-messaging]
* [I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics]
* [I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis]
* [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]
* [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis]
* [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-udp-options]
* [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model]
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-i2nsf-capability@2022-02-02.yang"
module ietf-i2nsf-capability {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability";
prefix
nsfcap;
organization
"IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions)
Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/i2nsf/>
WG List: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
Editor: Susan Hares
<mailto:shares@ndzh.com>
Editor: Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong
<mailto:pauljeong@skku.edu>
Editor: Jinyong (Tim) Kim
<mailto:timkim@skku.edu>
Editor: Robert Moskowitz
<mailto:rgm@htt-consult.com>
Editor: Qiushi Lin
<mailto:linqiushi@huawei.com>
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Editor: Patrick Lingga
<mailto:patricklink@skku.edu>";
description
"This module is a YANG module for I2NSF Network Security
Functions (NSFs)'s Capabilities.
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself
for full legal notices.";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove
// this note.
revision "2022-02-02"{
description "Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove
// this note.
}
/*
* Identities
*/
identity event {
description
"Base identity for I2NSF events.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - Event";
}
identity system-event {
base event;
description
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"Identity for system event. System event (called alert) is
defined as a warning about any changes of configuration, any
access violation, the information of sessions and traffic
flows.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System event";
}
identity system-alarm {
base event;
description
"Identity for system alarm. System alarm is defined as a
warning related to service degradation in system hardware.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System alarm";
}
identity time {
base event;
description
"Identity for time capabilities";
}
identity access-violation {
base system-event;
description
"Identity for access violation event. Access-violation system
event is an event when a user tries to access (read, write,
create, or delete) any information or execute commands
above their privilege (i.e., not-conformant with the
access profile).";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System event for access
violation";
}
identity configuration-change {
base system-event;
description
"Identity for configuration change event. Configuration change is
a system event when a new configuration is added or an
existing configuration is modified.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System event for
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configuration change";
}
identity memory-alarm {
base system-alarm;
description
"Identity for memory alarm. Alarm when memory usage
exceeds a threshold.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System alarm for memory";
}
identity cpu-alarm {
base system-alarm;
description
"Identity for CPU alarm. CPU is the Central Processing Unit
that executes basic operations of the system. A cpu-alarm
is emitted when the CPU usage is exceeding the threshold.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for CPU";
}
identity disk-alarm {
base system-alarm;
description
"Identity for disk alarm. Disk is the hardware to store
information for a long period, i.e., Hard Disk and Solid-State
Drive. A disk-alarm is emitted when the disk usage is
exceeding the threshold.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System alarm for disk";
}
identity hardware-alarm {
base system-alarm;
description
"Identity for hardware alarm. A hardware alarm is emitted
when a problem of hardware (e.g., CPU, memory, disk, or
interface) is detected.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System alarm for
hardware";
}
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identity interface-alarm {
base system-alarm;
description
"Identity for interface alarm. Interface is the network
interface for connecting a device with the network. The
interface-alarm is emitted when the state of the interface
is changed.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System alarm for
interface";
}
identity absolute-time {
base time;
description
"absolute time capabilities.
If a network security function has the absolute time
capability, the network security function supports
rule execution according to absolute time.";
}
identity periodic-time {
base time;
description
"periodic time capabilities.
If a network security function has the periodic time
capability, the network security function supports
rule execution according to periodic time.";
}
identity device-type {
description
"Identity for device type condition capability. The capability
for matching the destination device type.";
}
identity computer {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for computer such as personal computer (PC)
and server";
}
identity mobile-phone {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for mobile-phone such as smartphone and
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cellphone";
}
identity voip-volte-phone {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for voip-volte-phone";
}
identity tablet {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for tablet";
}
identity network-infrastructure-device {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for network infrastructure devices
such as switch, router, and access point";
}
identity iot {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for Internet of Things (IoT) devices
such as sensors, actuators, and low-power
low-capacity computing devices";
}
identity ot {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for Operational Technology (OT) devices
also known as industrial control systems such as
programmable logic controllers (PLCs), digital
oscilloscopes, and building management systems (BMS)";
}
identity vehicle {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for vehicle that connects to and shares
data through the Internet";
}
identity user-condition {
description
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"Base identity for user condition capability. This is the
capability of mapping user(s) into their corresponding IP
address";
}
identity user {
base user-condition;
description
"Identity for user condition capability.
A user (e.g., employee) can be mapped to an IP address of
a computing device (e.g., computer, laptop, and virtual
machine) which the user is using.";
}
identity group {
base user-condition;
description
"Identity for group condition capability.
A group (e.g., employees) can be mapped to multiple IP
addresses of computing devices (e.g., computers, laptops,
and virtual machines) which the group is using.";
}
identity geographic-location {
description
"Identity for geographic location condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8805: A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds -
An access control for a geographical location (i.e.,
geolocation) that has the corresponding IP prefix.";
}
identity source-location {
base geographic-location;
description
"Identity for source geographic location condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8805: A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds -
An access control for a geographical location (i.e.,
geolocation) that has the corresponding IP prefix.";
}
identity destination-location {
base geographic-location;
description
"Identity for destination geographic location condition
capability";
reference
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"RFC 8805: A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds -
An access control for a geographical location (i.e.,
geolocation) that has the corresponding IP prefix.";
}
identity directional {
description
"Base identity for directional traffic flow capability";
reference
"RFC 5103: Bidirectional Flow Export Using IP Flow Information
Export (IPFIX) - Terminology Unidirectional and Bidirectional
Flow";
}
identity unidirectional {
base directional;
description
"Identity for unidirectional traffic flow.";
reference
"RFC 5103: Bidirectional Flow Export Using IP Flow Information
Export (IPFIX) - Terminology Unidirectional Flow";
}
identity bidirectional {
base directional;
description
"Identity for bidirectional traffic flow.";
reference
"RFC 5103: Bidirectional Flow Export Using IP Flow Information
Export (IPFIX) - Terminology Bidirectional Flow";
}
identity protocol {
description
"Base identity for protocols";
}
identity ethernet {
base protocol;
description
"Base identity for Ethernet protocol.";
}
identity source-mac-address {
base ethernet;
description
"Identity for the capability of matching Media Access Control
(MAC) source address(es) condition capability.";
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reference
"IEEE 802.3 - 2018: IEEE Standard for Ethernet";
}
identity destination-mac-address {
base ethernet;
description
"Identity for the capability of matching Media Access Control
(MAC) destination address(es) condition capability.";
reference
"IEEE 802.3 - 2018: IEEE Standard for Ethernet";
}
identity ether-type {
base ethernet;
description
"Identity for the capability of matching the EtherType in
Ethernet II and Length in Ethernet 802.3 of a packet.";
reference
"IEEE 802.3 - 2018: IEEE Standard for Ethernet";
}
identity ip {
base protocol;
description
"Base identity for internet/network layer protocol,
e.g., IPv4, IPv6, and ICMP.";
}
identity ipv4 {
base ip;
description
"Base identity for IPv4 condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol";
}
identity ipv6 {
base ip;
description
"Base identity for IPv6 condition capabilities";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification";
}
identity dscp {
base ipv4;
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base ipv6;
description
"Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 annd IPv6
Differentiated Services Codepoint (DSCP) condition";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Type of Service
RFC 2474: Definition of the Differentiated
Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and
IPv6 Headers
RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Traffic Class";
}
identity ecn {
base ipv4;
base ipv6;
description
"Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 annd IPv6
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) condition";
reference
"RFC 3168: The Addition of Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) to IP.
RFC 8311: Relaxing Restrictions on Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) Experimentation";
}
identity total-length {
base ipv4;
base ipv6;
description
"Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 Total Length
header field or IPv6 Payload Length header field.
IPv4 Total Length is the length of datagram, measured in
octets, including internet header and data.
IPv6 Payload Length is the length of the IPv6 payload, i.e.,
the rest of the packet following the IPv6 header, measured in
octets.";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Total Length
RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Payload Length";
}
identity ttl {
base ipv4;
base ipv6;
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description
"Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 Time-To-Live
(TTL) or IPv6 Hop Limit.";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Time To Live (TTL)
RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Hop Limit";
}
identity next-header {
base ipv4;
base ipv6;
description
"Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 Protocol Field or
equivalent to IPv6 Next Header.";
reference
"IANA Website: Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers
- Protocol Number for IPv4
RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Protocol
RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Next Header";
}
identity source-address {
base ipv4;
base ipv6;
description
"Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 or IPv6 source
address(es) condition capability.";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Address
RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Source Address";
}
identity destination-address {
base ipv4;
base ipv6;
description
"Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 or IPv6
destination address(es) condition capability.";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Address
RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Destination Address";
}
identity flow-direction {
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base ipv4;
base ipv6;
description
"Identity for flow direction of matching IPv4/IPv6 source
or destination address(es) condition capability where a flow's
direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol
RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification";
}
identity header-length {
base ipv4;
description
"Identity for matching IPv4 header-length (IHL)
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Header Length";
}
identity identification {
base ipv4;
description
"Identity for IPv4 identification condition capability.
IPv4 ID field is used for fragmentation and reassembly.";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Identification
RFC 6864: Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field -
Fragmentation and Reassembly";
}
identity fragment-flags {
base ipv4;
description
"Identity for IPv4 fragment flags condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Fragmentation Flags";
}
identity fragment-offset {
base ipv4;
description
"Identity for matching IPv4 fragment offset
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Fragmentation Offset";
}
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identity flow-label {
base ipv6;
description
"Identity for matching IPv6 flow label
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Flow Label
RFC 6437: IPv6 Flow Label Specification";
}
identity header-order {
base ipv6;
description
"Identity for IPv6 extension header order condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Extension Header Order";
}
identity hop-by-hop {
base ipv6;
description
"Identity for IPv6 hop by hop options header
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Hop-by-Hop Options Header";
}
identity routing-header {
base ipv6;
description
"Identity for IPv6 routing header condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Routing Header";
}
identity fragment-header {
base ipv6;
description
"Identity for IPv6 fragment header condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
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Specification - Fragment Header";
}
identity destination-options {
base ipv6;
description
"Identity for IPv6 destination options condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Destination Options";
}
identity icmp {
base protocol;
description
"Base identity for ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 condition capability";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol
RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification
- ICMPv6";
}
identity icmpv4 {
base icmp;
description
"Base identity for ICMPv4 condition capability";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol";
}
identity icmpv6 {
base icmp;
description
"Base identity for ICMPv6 condition capability";
reference
"RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Ver sion 6 (IPv6) Specification
- ICMPv6";
}
identity type {
base icmpv4;
base icmpv6;
description
"Identity for ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 type condition capability";
reference
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"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol
RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification
- ICMPv6";
}
identity code {
base icmpv4;
base icmpv6;
description
"Identity for ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 code condition capability";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol
RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification
- ICMPv6";
}
identity transport-protocol {
base protocol;
description
"Base identity for Layer 4 protocol condition capabilities,
e.g., TCP, UDP, SCTP, and DCCP";
}
identity tcp {
base transport-protocol;
description
"Base identity for TCP condition capabilities";
reference
"draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) Specification";
}
identity udp {
base transport-protocol;
description
"Base identity for UDP condition capabilities";
reference
"RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol";
}
identity sctp {
base transport-protocol;
description
"Identity for SCTP condition capabilities";
reference
"draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18: Stream Control Transmission
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Protocol";
}
identity dccp {
base transport-protocol;
description
"Identity for DCCP condition capabilities";
reference
"RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol";
}
identity source-port-number {
base tcp;
base udp;
base sctp;
base dccp;
description
"Identity for matching TCP, UDP, SCTP, and DCCP source port
number condition capability";
reference
"draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) Specification
RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol
draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18: Stream Control Transmission
Protocol
RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol";
}
identity destination-port-number {
base tcp;
base udp;
base sctp;
base dccp;
description
"Identity for matching TCP, UDP, SCTP, and DCCP destination
port number condition capability";
reference
"draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) Specification";
}
identity flags {
base tcp;
description
"Identity for TCP control bits (flags) condition capability";
reference
"draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) Specification - TCP Header Flags
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RFC 3168: The Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification
(ECN) to IP - ECN-Echo (ECE) Flag and Congestion Window
Reduced (CWR) Flag
draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-15: More Accurate ECN Feedback
in TCP - ECN-Echo (ECE) Flag and Congestion Window Reduced
(CWR) Flag";
}
identity options {
base tcp;
description
"Identity for TCP options condition capability";
reference
"draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) Specification
RFC 6691: TCP Options and Maximum Segment Size
RFC 7323: TCP Extensions for High Performance";
}
identity length {
base tcp;
base udp;
description
"Identity for matching TCP or UDP length condition capability.
TCP length is the length in octets of this TCP segment including
the TCP header and the TCP payload.
The UDP length is the length in octets of this user datagram
including this header and the datagram.
The UDP length can be smaller than the IP transport
length for UDP transport layer options.";
reference
"draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) Specification - Data Offset
RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Length
draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options: Transport Options for UDP";
}
identity reserved {
base tcp;
description
"Identity for TCP header reserved field condition capability.
The set of control bits reserved for future used. The control
bits are also known as flags. Must be zero in generated
segments and must be ignored in received segments, if
corresponding future features are unimplemented by the
sending or receiving host.";
reference
"draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol
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(TCP) Specification";
}
identity window-size {
base tcp;
description
"Identity for TCP header Window field condition capability.
The number of data octets beginning with the one indicated
in the acknowledgment field that the sender of this segment
is willing to accept.";
reference
"draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) Specification";
}
identity urgent-pointer {
base tcp;
description
"Identity for TCP Urgent Pointer header field condition
capability. The Urgent Pointer field in TCP describes the
current value of urgent pointer as a positive offset from
the sequence number in this segment. The urgent pointer
points to the sequence number of the octet following the
urgent data. This field is only be interpreted in segments
with the URG control bit set.";
reference
"draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) Specification";
}
identity chunk-type {
base sctp;
description
"Identity for SCTP chunk type condition capability";
reference
"draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18: Stream Control Transmission
Protocol - Chunk Type";
}
identity service-code {
base dccp;
description
"Identity for DCCP Service Code condition capabilitiy";
reference
"RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol
RFC 5595: The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)
Service Codes
RFC 6335: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
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Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry - Service Code";
}
identity application-protocol {
base protocol;
description
"Base identity for Application protocol";
}
identity http {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for Hypertext Transfer Protocol.";
reference
"draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics-19: HTTP Semantics
draft-ietf-httpbis-messaging-19: HTTP/1.1";
}
identity https {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure.";
reference
"draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics-19: HTTP Semantics
draft-ietf-httpbis-messaging-19: HTTP/1.1";
}
identity ftp {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for File Transfer Protocol.";
reference
"RFC 959: File Transfer Protocol (FTP)";
}
identity ssh {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for Secure Shell (SSH) protocol.";
reference
"RFC 4250: The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol";
}
identity telnet {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for telnet.";
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reference
"RFC 854: Telnet Protocol";
}
identity smtp {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.";
reference
"RFC 5321: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)";
}
identity pop3 {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for Post Office Protocol 3. This includes
POP3 over TLS";
reference
"RFC 1939: Post Office Protocol - Version 3 (POP3)";
}
identity imap {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for Internet Message Access Protocol. This
includes IMAP over TLS";
reference
"RFC 9051: Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) - Version
4rev2";
}
identity action {
description
"Base identity for action capability";
}
identity log-action {
base action;
description
"Base identity for log-action capability";
}
identity ingress-action {
base action;
description
"Base identity for ingress-action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
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Functions - Section 7.2";
}
identity egress-action {
base action;
description
"Base identity for egress-action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Section 7.2";
}
identity default-action {
base action;
description
"Base identity for default-action capability";
}
identity rule-log {
base log-action;
description
"Identity for rule log-action capability.
Log the received packet based on the rule";
}
identity session-log {
base log-action;
description
"Identity for session log-action capability.
Log the received packet based on the session.";
}
identity pass {
base ingress-action;
base egress-action;
base default-action;
description
"Identity for pass action capability. The pass action allows
packet or flow to go through the NSF entering or exiting the
internal network.";
}
identity drop {
base ingress-action;
base egress-action;
base default-action;
description
"Identity for drop action capability. The drop action denies
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a packet to go through the NSF entering or exiting the
internal network without sending any response back to the
source.";
}
identity reject {
base ingress-action;
base egress-action;
base default-action;
description
"Identity for reject action capability. The reject action
denies a packet to go through the NSF entering or exiting the
internal network and sends a response back to the source.
The response depends on the packet and implementation.
For example, a TCP packet is rejected with TCP RST response
or a UDP packet may be rejected with ICMP message Type 3
Code 3 response, i.e., Destination Unreachable: Destination
port unreachable.";
}
identity mirror {
base ingress-action;
base egress-action;
base default-action;
description
"Identity for mirror action capability. The mirror action
copies packet and send it to the monitoring entity while still
allow the packet or flow to go through the NSF.";
}
identity rate-limit {
base ingress-action;
base egress-action;
base default-action;
description
"Identity for rate limiting action capability. The rate limit
action limits the number of packets or flows that can go
through the NSF by dropping packets or flows (randomly or
systematically).";
}
identity invoke-signaling {
base egress-action;
description
"Identity for invoke signaling action capability";
}
identity tunnel-encapsulation {
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base egress-action;
description
"Identity for tunnel encapsulation action capability";
}
identity forwarding {
base egress-action;
description
"Identity for forwarding action capability";
}
identity transformation {
base egress-action;
description
"Identity for transformation action capability";
}
identity resolution-strategy {
description
"Base identity for resolution strategy capability";
}
identity fmr {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Identity for First Matching Rule (FMR) resolution
strategy capability";
}
identity lmr {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Identity for Last Matching Rule (LMR) resolution
strategy capability";
}
identity pmr {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule (PMR) resolution
strategy capability";
}
identity pmre {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule with Errors (PMRE)
resolution strategy capability";
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}
identity pmrn {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN)
resolution strategy capability";
}
identity advanced-nsf {
description
"Base identity for advanced Network Security Function (NSF)
capability.";
}
identity content-security-control {
base advanced-nsf;
description
"Base identity for content security control. Content security
control is an NSF that evaluates a packet's payload such as
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), URL-Filtering, Antivirus,
and VoIP/VoLTE Filter.";
}
identity attack-mitigation-control {
base advanced-nsf;
description
"Base identity for attack mitigation control. Attack mitigation
control is an NSF that mitigates an attack such as anti-DDoS
or DDoS-mitigator.";
}
identity ips {
base content-security-control;
description
"Base identity for IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) capability
that prevents malicious activity within a network";
}
identity url-filtering {
base content-security-control;
description
"Base identity for url filtering capability that limits access
by comparing the web traffic's URL with the URLs for web
filtering in a database";
}
identity anti-virus {
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base content-security-control;
description
"Base identity for anti-virus capability to protect the network
by detecting and removing viruses.";
}
identity voip-volte-filtering {
base content-security-control;
description
"Base identity for advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE Security Service
capability to filter the VoIP/VoLTE packets or flows.";
reference
"RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol";
}
identity anti-ddos {
base attack-mitigation-control;
description
"Base identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS Attack or DDoS
Mitigator capability.";
}
identity packet-rate {
base anti-ddos;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS detecting Packet Rate
Capability where a packet rate is defined as the arrival rate
of Packets toward a victim destination node. The NSF with
this capability can detect the incoming packet rate and create
an alert if the rate exceeds the threshold.";
}
identity flow-rate {
base anti-ddos;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS detecting Flow Rate
Capability where a flow rate is defined as the arrival rate of
flows towards a victim destination node. The NSF with this
capability can detect the incoming flow rate and create an
alert if the rate exceeds the threshold.";
}
identity byte-rate {
base anti-ddos;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS detecting Byte Rate
Capability where a byte rate is defined as the arrival rate of
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Bytes toward a victim destination node. The NSF with this
capability can detect the incoming byte rate and create an
alert if the rate exceeds the threshold.";
}
identity signature-set {
base ips;
description
"Identity for the capability of IPS to set the signature.
Signature is a set of rules to detect an intrusive activity.";
reference
"RFC 4766: Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Requirements -
Section 2.2.13";
}
identity exception-signature {
base ips;
description
"Identity for the capability of IPS to exclude signatures from
detecting the intrusion.";
reference
"RFC 4766: Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Requirements -
Section 2.2.13";
}
identity detect {
base anti-virus;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Antivirus capability to detect
viruses using a security profile. The security profile is used
to scan threats, such as virus, malware, and spyware. The NSF
should be able to update the security profile.";
}
identity exception-files {
base anti-virus;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Antivirus capability to exclude a
certain file type or name from detection.";
}
identity pre-defined {
base url-filtering;
description
"Identity for pre-defined URL Database condition capability
where URL database is a public database for URL filtering.";
}
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identity user-defined {
base url-filtering;
description
"Identity for user-defined URL Database condition capability
that allows a user's manual addition of URLs for URL
filtering.";
}
identity call-id {
base voip-volte-filtering;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE Call Identifier (ID)
capability.";
}
identity user-agent {
base voip-volte-filtering;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE User Agent capability.";
}
/*
* Grouping
*/
grouping nsf-capabilities {
description
"Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure.";
leaf-list directional-capabilities {
type identityref {
base directional;
}
description
"The capability of an NSF for handling directional traffic
flow (i.e., unidirectional or bidirectional traffic flow).";
}
container event-capabilities {
description
"Capabilities of events.
If a network security function has the event capabilities,
the network security function supports rule execution
according to system event and system alarm.";
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reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Section 7.
draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF
NSF Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System Alarm and
System Events.";
leaf-list system-event-capability {
type identityref {
base system-event;
}
description
"System event capabilities";
}
leaf-list system-alarm-capability {
type identityref {
base system-alarm;
}
description
"System alarm capabilities";
}
leaf-list time-capabilities {
type identityref {
base time;
}
description
"The capabilities for activating the policy within a
specific time.";
}
}
container condition-capabilities {
description
"Conditions capabilities.";
container generic-nsf-capabilities {
description
"Conditions capabilities.
If a network security function has the condition
capabilities, the network security function
supports rule execution according to conditions of
IPv4, IPv6, TCP, UDP, SCTP, DCCP, ICMP, or ICMPv6.";
reference
"RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - UDP.
RFC 791: Internet Protocol - IPv4.
RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol - ICMP.
RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
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for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification
- ICMPv6.
draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18: Stream Control Transmission
Protocol - SCTP.
RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - IPv6.
RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure.
draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) Specification";
leaf-list ethernet-capability {
type identityref {
base ethernet;
}
description
"Media Access Control (MAC) capabilities";
reference
"IEEE 802.3: IEEE Standard for Ethernet";
}
leaf-list ipv4-capability {
type identityref {
base ipv4;
}
description
"IPv4 packet capabilities";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol";
}
leaf-list ipv6-capability {
type identityref {
base ipv6;
}
description
"IPv6 packet capabilities";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - IPv6";
}
leaf-list icmpv4-capability {
type identityref {
base icmpv4;
}
description
"ICMPv4 packet capabilities";
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reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol - ICMP";
}
leaf-list icmpv6-capability {
type identityref {
base icmpv6;
}
description
"ICMPv6 packet capabilities";
reference
"RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification
- ICMPv6";
}
leaf-list tcp-capability {
type identityref {
base tcp;
}
description
"TCP packet capabilities";
reference
"draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) Specification";
}
leaf-list udp-capability {
type identityref {
base udp;
}
description
"UDP packet capabilities";
reference
"RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - UDP";
}
leaf-list sctp-capability {
type identityref {
base sctp;
}
description
"SCTP packet capabilities";
reference
"draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18: Stream Control
Transmission Protocol - SCTP";
}
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leaf-list dccp-capability {
type identityref {
base dccp;
}
description
"DCCP packet capabilities";
reference
"RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol - DCCP";
}
}
container advanced-nsf-capabilities {
description
"Advanced Network Security Function (NSF) capabilities,
such as Anti-DDoS, IPS, and VoIP/VoLTE.
This container contains the leaf-lists of advanced
NSF capabilities";
leaf-list anti-ddos-capability {
type identityref {
base anti-ddos;
}
description
"Anti-DDoS Attack capabilities";
}
leaf-list ips-capability {
type identityref {
base ips;
}
description
"IPS capabilities";
}
leaf-list anti-virus-capability {
type identityref {
base anti-virus;
}
description
"Anti-Virus capabilities";
}
leaf-list url-filtering-capability {
type identityref {
base url-filtering;
}
description
"URL Filtering capabilities";
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}
leaf-list voip-volte-filtering-capability {
type identityref {
base voip-volte-filtering;
}
description
"VoIP/VoLTE capabilities";
}
}
container context-capabilities {
description
"Security context capabilities";
leaf-list application-filter-capabilities{
type identityref {
base application-protocol;
}
description
"Context capabilities based on the application protocol";
}
leaf-list device-type-capabilities {
type identityref {
base device-type;
}
description
"Context capabilities based on the device attribute that
can identify a device type
(i.e., router, switch, pc, ios, or android).";
}
leaf-list user-condition-capabilities {
type identityref {
base user-condition;
}
description
"Context capabilities based on user condition, such as
user-id or user-name. The users can collected into a
user-group and identified with group-id or group-name.
An NSF is aware of the IP address of the user provided
by a unified user management system via network. Based
on name-address association, an NSF is able to enforce
the security functions over the given user (or user
group)";
}
leaf-list geographic-capabilities {
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type identityref {
base geographic-location;
}
description
"Context condition capabilities based on the geographical
location of the source or destination";
}
}
}
container action-capabilities {
description
"Action capabilities.
If a network security function has the action capabilities,
the network security function supports the attendant
actions for policy rules.";
leaf-list ingress-action-capability {
type identityref {
base ingress-action;
}
description
"Ingress-action capabilities";
}
leaf-list egress-action-capability {
type identityref {
base egress-action;
}
description
"Egress-action capabilities";
}
leaf-list log-action-capability {
type identityref {
base log-action;
}
description
"Log-action capabilities";
}
}
leaf-list resolution-strategy-capabilities {
type identityref {
base resolution-strategy;
}
description
"Resolution strategy capabilities.
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The resolution strategies can be used to specify how
to resolve conflicts that occur between the actions
of the same or different policy rules that are matched
for the same packet and by particular NSF.";
}
leaf-list default-action-capabilities {
type identityref {
base default-action;
}
description
"Default action capabilities.
A default action is used to execute I2NSF policy rules
when no rule matches a packet. The default action is
defined as pass, drop, reject, rate-limit, or mirror.";
}
}
/*
* Data nodes
*/
list nsf {
key "nsf-name";
description
"The list of Network Security Functions (NSFs)";
leaf nsf-name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The name of Network Security Function (NSF)";
}
uses nsf-capabilities;
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
Figure 3: YANG Data Module of I2NSF Capability
7. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the
"IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
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ID: yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
Filename: [ TBD-at-Registration ]
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]
This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in
the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950][RFC8525]:
Name: ietf-i2nsf-capability
Maintained by IANA? N
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability
Prefix: nsfcap
Module:
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]
8. Privacy Considerations
This YANG module specifies the capabilities of NSFs. These
capabilities are consistent with the diverse set of network security
functions in common use in enterprise security operations. The
configuration of the capabilities may entail privacy sensitive
information as explicitly outlined in Section 9. The NSFs
implementing these capabilities may inspect, alter or drop user
traffic; and be capable of attributing user traffic to individual
users.
Due to the sensitivity of these capabilities, notice must be provided
to and consent must be received from the users of the network.
Additionally, the collected data and associated infrastructure must
be secured to prevent the leakage or unauthorized disclosure of this
private data.
9. Security Considerations
The YANG module specified in this document defines a data schema
designed to be accessed through network management protocols such as
NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest layer of NETCONF
protocol layers MUST use Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4254][RFC6242] as a
secure transport layer. The lowest layer of RESTCONF protocol layers
MUST use HTTP over Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8446], that is,
HTTPS as a secure transport layer.
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The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
provides a means of restricting access to specific NETCONF or
RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
RESTCONF protocol operations and contents. Thus, NACM SHOULD be used
to restrict the NSF registration from unauthorized users.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
writable, creatable, and deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. Write operations to these data nodes
could have a negative effect on network and security operations.
These data nodes are collected into a single list node. This list
node is defined by list nsf with the following sensitivity/
vulnerability:
* list nsf: An attacker could alter the security capabilities
associated with an NSF by disabling or enabling the functionality
of the security capabilities of the NSF.
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data
nodes with their sensitivity/vulnerability:
* list nsf: The leak of this node to an attacker could reveal the
specific configuration of security controls to an attacker. An
attacker can craft an attack path that avoids observation or
mitigations; one may reveal topology information to inform
additional targets or enable lateral movement; one enables the
construction of an attack path that avoids observation or
mitigations; one provides an indication that the operator has
discovered the attack.
Some of the capability indicators (i.e., identities) defined in this
document are highly sensitive and/or privileged operations that
inherently require access to individuals' private data. These are
subtrees and data nodes that are considered privacy sensitive:
* voip-volte-filtering-capability: The NSF that is able to filter
VoIP/VoLTE calls might identify certain individual identification.
* user-condition-capabilities: The capability uses a set of IP
addresses mapped to users.
* geographic-capabilities: The IP address used in this capability
can identify a user's geographical location.
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It is noted that some private information is made accessible in this
manner. Thus, the nodes/entities given access to this data MUST be
tightly secured, monitored, and audited to prevent leakage or other
unauthorized disclosure of private data. Refer to [RFC6973] for the
description of privacy aspects that protocol designers (including
YANG data model designers) should consider along with regular
security and privacy analysis.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
[RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.
[RFC0854] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol
Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, DOI 10.17487/RFC0854, May
1983, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc854>.
[RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol",
STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc959>.
[RFC1939] Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3",
STD 53, RFC 1939, DOI 10.17487/RFC1939, May 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1939>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
"Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2474, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2474>.
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[RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3168>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4250, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4250>.
[RFC4254] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Connection Protocol", RFC 4254, DOI 10.17487/RFC4254,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4254>.
[RFC4340] Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram
Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
[RFC4766] Wood, M. and M. Erlinger, "Intrusion Detection Message
Exchange Requirements", RFC 4766, DOI 10.17487/RFC4766,
March 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4766>.
[RFC5103] Trammell, B. and E. Boschi, "Bidirectional Flow Export
Using IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)", RFC 5103,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5103, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5103>.
[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.
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[RFC5595] Fairhurst, G., "The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol
(DCCP) Service Codes", RFC 5595, DOI 10.17487/RFC5595,
September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5595>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
[RFC6437] Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme,
"IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6437, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6437>.
[RFC6864] Touch, J., "Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field",
RFC 6864, DOI 10.17487/RFC6864, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6864>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7323] Borman, D., Braden, B., Jacobson, V., and R.
Scheffenegger, Ed., "TCP Extensions for High Performance",
RFC 7323, DOI 10.17487/RFC7323, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7323>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
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[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
[RFC8311] Black, D., "Relaxing Restrictions on Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) Experimentation", RFC 8311,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8311, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8311>.
[RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
[RFC8407] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8525] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Watsen, K.,
and R. Wilton, "YANG Library", RFC 8525,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8525, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8525>.
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[RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W.
Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation
Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8805>.
[RFC9051] Melnikov, A., Ed. and B. Leiba, Ed., "Internet Message
Access Protocol (IMAP) - Version 4rev2", RFC 9051,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9051, August 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9051>.
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-messaging]
Fielding, R. T., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke,
"HTTP/1.1", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
httpbis-messaging-19, 12 September 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-
messaging-19.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics]
Fielding, R. T., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
Semantics", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
httpbis-semantics-19, 12 September 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-
semantics-19.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm]
Kim, J. (., Jeong, J. (., Park, J., Hares, S., and Q. Lin,
"I2NSF Network Security Function-Facing Interface YANG
Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-16, 13 November 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-
facing-interface-dm-16.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model]
Jeong, J. (., Lingga, P., Hares, S., Xia, L. (., and H.
Birkholz, "I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface YANG Data
Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-12, 17 November 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-
monitoring-data-model-12.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm]
Hyun, S., Jeong, J. P., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park,
"I2NSF Registration Interface YANG Data Model", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-registration-
interface-dm-13, 4 October 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf-
registration-interface-dm-13.txt>.
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[I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis]
Eddy, W. M., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
Specification", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25, 7 September 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-
rfc793bis-25.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]
Briscoe, B., Kühlewind, M., and R. Scheffenegger, "More
Accurate ECN Feedback in TCP", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-15, 12 July 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-
ecn-15.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis]
Stewart, R. R., Tüxen, M., and K. E. E. Nielsen, "Stream
Control Transmission Protocol", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18, 16
January 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-udp-options]
Touch, J., "Transport Options for UDP", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options-13, 19 June
2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tsvwg-
udp-options-13.txt>.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC6691] Borman, D., "TCP Options and Maximum Segment Size (MSS)",
RFC 6691, DOI 10.17487/RFC6691, July 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6691>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R.,
and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions
(I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8192, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8192>.
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[IANA-Protocol-Numbers]
"Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers", Available:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-
numbers/protocol-numbers.xhtml, September 2020.
[IEEE802.3-2018]
Committee, I. S., "IEEE 802.3-2018 - IEEE Standard for
Ethernet", August 2018,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8457469>.
[Alshaer] Shaer, Al., Hamed, E., and H. Hamed, "Modeling and
management of firewall policies", 2004.
[Hirschman]
Hirschman, L. and R. Gaizauskas, "Natural Language
Question Answering: The View from Here", Natural Language
Engineering 7:4, pgs 275-300, Cambridge University Press ,
November 2001.
[Hohpe] Hohpe, G. and B. Woolf, "Enterprise Integration Patterns",
ISBN 0-32-120068-3 , 2003.
[Martin] Martin, R.C., "Agile Software Development, Principles,
Patterns, and Practices", Prentice-Hall , ISBN:
0-13-597444-5 , 2002.
[OODMP] "https://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html".
[OODOP] "https://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html".
[OODSRP] "https://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html".
Appendix A. Configuration Examples
This section shows configuration examples of "ietf-i2nsf-capability"
module for capabilities registration of general firewall.
A.1. Example 1: Registration for the Capabilities of a General Firewall
This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities
registration of a general firewall in either an IPv4 network or an
IPv6 network.
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<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>general_firewall</nsf-name>
<condition-capabilities>
<generic-nsf-capabilities>
<ipv4-capability>next-header</ipv4-capability>
<ipv4-capability>flow-direction</ipv4-capability>
<ipv4-capability>source-address</ipv4-capability>
<ipv4-capability>destination-address</ipv4-capability>
<tcp-capability>source-port-number</tcp-capability>
<tcp-capability>destination-port-number</tcp-capability>
<udp-capability>source-port-number</udp-capability>
<udp-capability>destination-port-number</udp-capability>
</generic-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 4: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of
a General Firewall in an IPv4 Network
Figure 4 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities
registration of a general firewall as an NSF in an IPv4 network. Its
capabilities are as follows.
1. The name of the NSF is general_firewall.
2. The NSF can inspect the IPv4 protocol header field, flow
direction, source address(es), and destination address(es)
3. The NSF can inspect the port number(s) and flow direction for the
transport layer protocol, i.e., TCP and UDP.
4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or mirror.
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<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>general_firewall</nsf-name>
<condition-capabilities>
<generic-nsf-capabilities>
<ipv6-capability>next-header</ipv6-capability>
<ipv6-capability>flow-direction</ipv6-capability>
<ipv6-capability>source-address</ipv6-capability>
<ipv6-capability>destination-address</ipv6-capability>
<tcp-capability>source-port-number</tcp-capability>
<tcp-capability>destination-port-number</tcp-capability>
<udp-capability>source-port-number</udp-capability>
<udp-capability>destination-port-number</udp-capability>
</generic-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 5: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of
a General Firewall in an IPv6 Network
In addition, Figure 5 shows the configuration XML for the
capabilities registration of a general firewall as an NSF in an IPv6
network. Its capabilities are as follows.
1. The name of the NSF is general_firewall.
2. The NSF can inspect IPv6 next header, flow direction, source
address(es), and destination address(es)
3. The NSF can inspect the port number(s) and flow direction for the
transport layer protocol, i.e., TCP and UDP.
4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or mirror.
A.2. Example 2: Registration for the Capabilities of a Time-based
Firewall
This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities
registration of a time-based firewall in either an IPv4 network or an
IPv6 network.
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<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>time_based_firewall</nsf-name>
<event-capabilities>
<time-capabilities>absolute-time</time-capabilities>
<time-capabilities>periodic-time</time-capabilities>
</event-capabilities>
<condition-capabilities>
<generic-nsf-capabilities>
<ipv4-capability>next-header</ipv4-capability>
<ipv4-capability>flow-direction</ipv4-capability>
<ipv4-capability>source-address</ipv4-capability>
<ipv4-capability>destination-address</ipv4-capability>
</generic-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 6: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of
a Time-based Firewall in an IPv4 Network
Figure 6 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities
registration of a time-based firewall as an NSF in an IPv4 network.
Its capabilities are as follows.
1. The name of the NSF is time_based_firewall.
2. The NSF can execute the security policy rule according to
absolute time and periodic time.
3. The NSF can inspect the IPv4 protocol header field, flow
direction, source address(es), and destination address(es).
4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or mirror.
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<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>time_based_firewall</nsf-name>
<event-capabilities>
<time-capabilities>absolute-time</time-capabilities>
<time-capabilities>periodic-time</time-capabilities>
</event-capabilities>
<condition-capabilities>
<generic-nsf-capabilities>
<ipv6-capability>next-header</ipv6-capability>
<ipv6-capability>flow-direction</ipv6-capability>
<ipv6-capability>source-address</ipv6-capability>
<ipv6-capability>destination-address</ipv6-capability>
</generic-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 7: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of
a Time-based Firewall in an IPv6 Network
In addition, Figure 7 shows the configuration XML for the
capabilities registration of a time-based firewall as an NSF in an
IPv6 network. Its capabilities are as follows.
1. The name of the NSF is time_based_firewall.
2. The NSF can execute the security policy rule according to
absolute time and periodic time.
3. The NSF can inspect the IPv6 protocol header field, flow
direction, source address(es), and destination address(es).
4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or mirror.
A.3. Example 3: Registration for the Capabilities of a Web Filter
This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities
registration of a web filter.
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<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>web_filter</nsf-name>
<condition-capabilities>
<advanced-nsf-capabilities>
<url-filtering-capability>user-defined</url-filtering-capability>
</advanced-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 8: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of
a Web Filter
Figure 8 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities
registration of a web filter as an NSF. Its capabilities are as
follows.
1. The name of the NSF is web_filter.
2. The NSF can inspect a URL matched from a user-defined URL. User
can specify their own URL.
3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or mirror.
4. Overall, the NSF can compare the URL of a packet to a user-
defined database. The matched packet can be passed, dropped, or
mirrored.
A.4. Example 4: Registration for the Capabilities of a VoIP/VoLTE
Filter
This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities
registration of a VoIP/VoLTE filter.
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<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>voip_volte_filter</nsf-name>
<condition-capabilities>
<advanced-nsf-capabilities>
<voip-volte-filtering-capability>
call-id
</voip-volte-filtering-capability>
</advanced-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 9: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of
a VoIP/VoLTE Filter
Figure 9 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities
registration of a VoIP/VoLTE filter as an NSF. Its capabilities are
as follows.
1. The name of the NSF is voip_volte_filter.
2. The NSF can inspect a voice call id for VoIP/VoLTE packets.
3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or mirror.
A.5. Example 5: Registration for the Capabilities of a HTTP and HTTPS
Flood Mitigator
This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities
registration of a HTTP and HTTPS flood mitigator.
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<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>DDoS_mitigator</nsf-name>
<condition-capabilities>
<advanced-nsf-capabilities>
<anti-ddos-capability>packet-rate</anti-ddos-capability>
<anti-ddos-capability>byte-rate</anti-ddos-capability>
<anti-ddos-capability>flow-rate</anti-ddos-capability>
</advanced-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>mirror</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>mirror</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 10: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of
a HTTP and HTTPS Flood Mitigator
Figure 10 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities
registration of a HTTP and HTTPS flood mitigator as an NSF. Its
capabilities are as follows.
1. The name of the NSF is DDoS_mitigator.
2. The NSF can detect the amount of packet, flow, and byte rate in
the network for potential DDoS Attack.
3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or mirror.
Appendix B. Acknowledgments
This document is a product by the I2NSF Working Group (WG) including
WG Chairs (i.e., Linda Dunbar and Yoav Nir) and Diego Lopez. This
document took advantage of the review and comments from the following
experts: Roman Danyliw, Acee Lindem, Paul Wouters (SecDir), Michael
Scharf (TSVART), Dan Romascanu (GenART), and Tom Petch. We authors
sincerely appreciate their sincere efforts and kind help.
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This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications
Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea
MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based
Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized
Security Service Provisioning). This work was supported in part by
the IITP grant funded by the MSIT (2020-0-00395, Standard Development
of Blockchain based Network Management Automation Technology).
Appendix C. Contributors
The following are co-authors of this document:
Patrick Lingga - Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do
16419, Republic of Korea, EMail: patricklink@skku.edu
Liang Xia - Huawei, 101 Software Avenue, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012,
China, EMail: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com
Cataldo Basile - Politecnico di Torino, Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 34,
Torino, 10129, Italy, EMail: cataldo.basile@polito.it
John Strassner - Huawei, 2330 Central Expressway, Santa Clara, CA
95050, USA, EMail: John.sc.Strassner@huawei.com
Diego R. Lopez - Telefonica I+D, Zurbaran, 12, Madrid, 28010, Spain,
Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com
Hyoungshick Kim - Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do
16419, Republic of Korea, EMail: hyoung@skku.edu
Daeyoung Hyun - Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do
16419, Republic of Korea, EMail: dyhyun@skku.edu
Dongjin Hong - Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer
Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon,
Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea, EMail: dong.jin@skku.edu
Jung-Soo Park - Electronics and Telecommunications Research
Institute, 218 Gajeong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu, Daejeon, 34129, Republic of
Korea, EMail: pjs@etri.re.kr
Tae-Jin Ahn - Korea Telecom, 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu, Daejeon,
305-811, Republic of Korea, EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com
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Se-Hui Lee - Korea Telecom, 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu, Daejeon,
305-811, Republic of Korea, EMail: sehuilee@kt.com
Authors' Addresses
Susan Hares (editor)
Huawei
7453 Hickory Hill
Saline, MI 48176
United States of America
Phone: +1-734-604-0332
Email: shares@ndzh.com
Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong (editor)
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon
Gyeonggi-Do
16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4957
Email: pauljeong@skku.edu
URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
Jinyong (Tim) Kim
Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon
Gyeonggi-Do
16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 10 8273 0930
Email: timkim@skku.edu
Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI
United States of America
Phone: +1-248-968-9809
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Email: rgm@htt-consult.com
Qiushi Lin
Huawei
Huawei Industrial Base
Shenzhen
Guangdong 518129,
China
Email: linqiushi@huawei.com
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