Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-15
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (idr WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Alexander Azimov , Eugene Bogomazov , Randy Bush , Keyur Patel , Kotikalapudi Sriram | ||
| Last updated | 2021-01-16 | ||
| Replaces | draft-ymbk-idr-bgp-open-policy | ||
| Stream | Internent Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | plain text xml pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Susan Hares | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2021-01-13) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Publication Requested | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | Alvaro Retana | ||
| Send notices to | Susan Hares <shares@ndzh.com> | ||
Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Qrator Labs & Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov
Expires: July 20, 2021 Qrator Labs
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
K. Patel
Arrcus
K. Sriram
USA NIST
January 16, 2021
Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-15
Abstract
Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate
assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route
learned from one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit
provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to
another transit provider or a lateral peer. Existing approaches to
leak prevention rely on marking routes by operator configuration,
with no check that the configuration corresponds to that of the eBGP
neighbor, or enforcement that the two eBGP speakers agree on the
relationship. This document enhances BGP OPEN to establish agreement
of the (peer, customer, provider, Route Server, Route Server client)
relationship of two neighboring eBGP speakers to enforce appropriate
configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then marked with
an Only to Customer (OTC) attribute according to the agreed
relationship, allowing both prevention and detection of route leaks.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
Azimov, et al. Expires July 20, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Route Leak Prevention January 2021
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. BGP Role Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Role correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Strict mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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