Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-03

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Network Working Group                                          A. Azimov
Internet-Draft                                              E. Bogomazov
Intended status: Standards Track                             Qrator Labs
Expires: December 30, 2018                                       R. Bush
                                               Internet Initiative Japan
                                                                K. Patel
                                                            Arrcus, Inc.
                                                               K. Sriram
                                                                 US NIST
                                                           June 28, 2018

     Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
                   draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-03

Abstract

   Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate
   assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route
   learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider,
   passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit
   provider or to a peer.  Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on
   marking routes according to operator configuration options without
   any check that the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP
   neighbor, or enforcement that the two BGP speakers agree on the
   relationship.  This document enhances BGP Open to establish agreement
   of the (peer, customer, provider, internal) relationship of two
   neighboring BGP speakers to enforce appropriate configuration on both
   sides.  Propagated routes are then marked with an iOTC attribute
   according to agreed relationship allowing prevention of route leaks.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
   appear in all upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed
   case as English words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Azimov, et al.          Expires December 30, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            Route Leak Prevention                June 2018

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Preamble  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Role Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  BGP Role  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Role capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Role correctness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.1.  Strict mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  BGP Internal Only To Customer attribute . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Attribute or Community  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  Compatibility with BGPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8