Skip to main content

Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as an RFC.
Authors Alexander Azimov , Eugene Bogomazov , Randy Bush , Keyur Patel , Kotikalapudi Sriram
Last updated 2018-12-30 (Latest revision 2018-06-28)
Replaces draft-ymbk-idr-bgp-open-policy
Stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Expired & archived
OPSDIR Early Review Incomplete, due 2021-02-01
Stream WG state WG Document
Other - see Comment Log
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Consensus boilerplate Yes
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at:


Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on marking routes according to operator configuration options without any check that the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP neighbor, or enforcement that the two BGP speakers agree on the relationship. This document enhances BGP Open to establish agreement of the (peer, customer, provider, internal) relationship of two neighboring BGP speakers to enforce appropriate configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then marked with an iOTC attribute according to agreed relationship allowing prevention of route leaks.


Alexander Azimov
Eugene Bogomazov
Randy Bush
Keyur Patel
Kotikalapudi Sriram

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)