Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-03

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (idr WG)
Last updated 2018-12-30 (latest revision 2018-06-28)
Replaces draft-ymbk-idr-bgp-open-policy
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
Formats
Expired & archived
pdf htmlized bibtex
Stream WG state WG Document
Other - see Comment Log
Document shepherd No shepherd assigned
IESG IESG state Expired
Consensus Boilerplate Yes
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-03.txt

Abstract

Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on marking routes according to operator configuration options without any check that the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP neighbor, or enforcement that the two BGP speakers agree on the relationship. This document enhances BGP Open to establish agreement of the (peer, customer, provider, internal) relationship of two neighboring BGP speakers to enforce appropriate configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then marked with an iOTC attribute according to agreed relationship allowing prevention of route leaks.

Authors

Alexander Azimov (aa@qrator.net)
Eugene Bogomazov (eb@qrator.net)
Randy Bush (randy@psg.com)
Keyur Patel (keyur@arrcus.com)
Kotikalapudi Sriram (ksriram@nist.gov)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)