Abstract

Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on marking routes by operator configuration, with no check that the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP neighbor, or enforcement that the two BGP speakers agree on the relationship. This document enhances BGP OPEN to establish agreement of the (peer, customer, provider, Route Server, Route Server client) relationship of two neighboring BGP speakers to enforce appropriate configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then marked with an OTC attribute according to the agreed relationship, allowing both prevention and detection of route leaks.

Authors

Alexander Azimov (a.e.azimov@gmail.com)
Eugene Bogomazov (eb@qrator.net)
Randy Bush (randy@psg.com)
Keyur Patel (keyur@arrcus.com)
Kotikalapudi Sriram (ksriram@nist.gov)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)