Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-06
Document | Type | This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as an RFC. | |
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Authors | Alexander Azimov , Eugene Bogomazov , Randy Bush , Keyur Patel , Kotikalapudi Sriram | ||
Last updated | 2020-01-09 (Latest revision 2019-07-08) | ||
Replaces | draft-ymbk-idr-bgp-open-policy | ||
Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats |
Expired & archived
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Reviews |
GENART Last Call review
(of
-18)
Ready with Nits
RTGDIR Early review
(of
-15)
Has Issues
OPSDIR Early Review
Incomplete, due 2021-02-01
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Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
Document shepherd | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-06.txt
Abstract
Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on marking routes by operator configuration, with no check that the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP neighbor, or enforcement that the two BGP speakers agree on the relationship. This document enhances BGP OPEN to establish agreement of the (peer, customer, provider, Route Server, Route Server client) relationship of two neighboring BGP speakers to enforce appropriate configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then marked with an OTC attribute according to the agreed relationship, allowing both prevention and detection of route leaks.
Authors
Alexander Azimov
Eugene Bogomazov
Randy Bush
Keyur Patel
Kotikalapudi Sriram
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)