Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-07

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Last updated 2017-09-06
Replaces draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation
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IDR and SIDR                                                   K. Sriram
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Intended status: Standards Track                                 US NIST
Expires: March 10, 2018                                       B. Dickson

                                                                K. Patel
                                                                  Arrcus
                                                          A. Robachevsky
                                                        Internet Society
                                                       September 6, 2017

        Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
           draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-07

Abstract

   RFC 7908 provides a definition of the route leak problem, and also
   enumerates several types of route leaks.  This document first
   examines which of those route-leak types are detected and mitigated
   by the existing origin validation (OV) [RFC 6811].  It is recognized
   that OV offers a limited detection and mitigation capability against
   route leaks.  This document specifies enhancements that significantly
   extend the route-leak prevention, detection, and mitigation
   capabilities of BGP.  One solution component involves intra-AS
   messaging from ingress router to egress router using a BGP Community
   or Attribute.  This intra-AS messaging prevents the AS from causing
   route leaks.  Another solution component involves carrying a per-hop
   route-leak protection (RLP) field in BGP updates.  The RLP fields are
   proposed to be carried in a new optional transitive attribute, called
   BGP RLP attribute.  The RLP attribute helps with detection and
   mitigation of route leaks at ASes downstream from the leaking AS.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Sriram, et al.           Expires March 10, 2018                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     Route Leak Detection and Mitigation    September 2017

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 10, 2018.

Copyright Notice

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Related Prior Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Do Origin Validation and BGPsec Assist in Route-Leak
       Detection?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Mechanisms for Prevention, Detection and Mitigation of Route
       Leaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Ascertaining Peering Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Prevention of Route Leaks at Local AS: Intra-AS Messaging   7
       4.2.1.  Non-Transitive BGP Community for Intra-AS Messaging .   7
       4.2.2.  Non-Transitive BGP pRLP Attribute for Intra-AS
               Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Route-Leak Protection (RLP) Field Encoding by Sending
           Router  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.3.1.  BGP RLP Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.3.2.  Carrying RLP Field Values in the BGPsec Flags . . . .  11
     4.4.  Recommended Actions at a Receiving Router for Detection
           of Route Leaks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.5.  Possible Actions at a Receiving Router for Mitigation . .  12
   5.  Stopgap Solution when Only Origin Validation is Deployed  . .  12
   6.  Design Rationale and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
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