Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-08

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Last updated 2018-03-21 (latest revision 2018-03-05)
Replaces draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation
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IDR and SIDR                                                   K. Sriram
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Intended status: Standards Track                                USA NIST
Expires: September 6, 2018                                    B. Dickson

                                                                K. Patel
                                                                  Arrcus
                                                          A. Robachevsky
                                                        Internet Society
                                                           March 5, 2018

        Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
           draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-08

Abstract

   Problem definition for route leaks and enumeration of types of route
   leaks are provided in RFC 7908.  This document specifies BGP
   enhancements that significantly extend its route-leak detection and
   mitigation capabilities.  The solution involves carrying a per-hop
   route-leak protection (RLP) field in BGP updates.  The RLP fields are
   carried in a new optional transitive attribute, called BGP RLP
   attribute.  The RLP attribute helps with detection and mitigation of
   route leaks at ASes downstream from the leaking AS (in the path of
   BGP update).  This is an inter-AS (multi-hop) solution mechanism.
   This solution complements the intra-AS (local AS) route-leak
   avoidance solution that is described in ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy
   draft.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018.

Sriram, et al.          Expires September 6, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     Route Leak Detection and Mitigation        March 2018

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Rote-Leak Types that the Solution Must Address  . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Mechanisms for Detection and Mitigation of Route Leaks  . . .   6
     3.1.  Ascertaining Peering Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Route-Leak Protection (RLP) Field Encoding by Sending
           Router  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.1.  BGP RLP Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.2.  Carrying RLP Field Values in the BGPsec Flags . . . .   9
     3.3.  Recommended Actions at a Receiving Router for Detection
           of Route Leaks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.4.  Possible Actions at a Receiving Router for Mitigation . .  10
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Appendix A.  Related Prior Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix B.  Prevention of Route Leaks at Local AS: Intra-AS
                Messaging  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     B.1.  Non-Transitive BGP Community for Intra-AS Messaging . . .  16
   Appendix C.  Stopgap Solution when Only Origin Validation is
                Deployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Appendix D.  Design Rationale and Discussion  . . . . . . . . . .  18
     D.1.  Is route-leak solution without cryptographic protection a
           serious attack vector?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     D.2.  Combining results of route-leak detection, OV and BGPsec
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