Ballot for draft-ietf-ippm-explicit-flow-measurements
Yes
No Objection
Abstain
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 03 and is now closed.
# Internet AD comments for draft-ietf-ippm-explicit-flow-measurements-03 CC @ekline * comment syntax: - https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments/blob/main/format.md * "Handling Ballot Positions": - https://ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ ## Nits ### S2.2 * "is comprised of" "is composed of" or "comprises"
The issues that I raised during IESG review have been resolved; removing my DISCUSS. Thank you authors for taking care of my concerns.
# John Scudder, RTG AD, comments for draft-ietf-ippm-explicit-flow-measurements-03 CC @jgscudder Thanks for this document. While I am not sufficiently expert in the subject area to give it a deep review, I trust this has been done by others. I do have a few questions and comments that I hope may help, below. I support Jim Guichard's DISCUSS position. ## COMMENT ### Section 1 the encrypted transport-layer headers (e.g. QUIC, TCP). Since when are TCP headers encrypted? ### Section 3.1 There is a list of bullet items that talk about "by setting the T bit", e.g. * the client selects, generates and consequently transmits a first train of packets, by setting the T bit to 1; The way the sentence is constructed, it literally means "the client causes the train of packets to be generated and transmitted by means of setting the T bit to 1". I doubt that's what you mean. Possibly you mean something like "it sets the T bit to 1 to identify packets in this train"? ### Section 3.1.2 The reflection counter is first introduced by mentioning that the reflection counter is unlocked to start counting incoming marked packets that will be reflected later; This makes for a rather bumpy experience for the first-time reader. I suggest introducing this counter somehow before referencing it. You might also mention that as part of initialization, the reflection counter is locked. I also have a hard time being sure I've understood this correctly: The generation token counter should be capped to limit the effects of a subsequent sudden reduction in the other endpoint's packet rate that could prevent that endpoint from reflecting collected packets. The most conservative cap value is 1. I presume "capped" is used in the normal sense of not being allowed to exceed a certain value. I guess yes, 1 is a conservative value in a way, after all the only lower value is zero and that wouldn't make a lot of sense. As written the text has the odor of recommending the value of 1 without actually doing so, it's just that "conservative" sounds like approval in this context. Is all of that intentional? ### Section 3.3 Surely "IP/IPv6" is the wrong terminology -- should be either "IP" (meaning, IPv4 or IPv6) or "IPv4/IPv6"? ### Section 3.3 Concerning the Unreported Loss counter you have, If the protocol is able to rescind the loss determination later, a positive Unreported Loss counter may be decremented due to the rescission, but it should not become negative due to the rescission. and later, (so Unreported Loss counter may become negative when a packet with L=1 is sent after a partial packet has been lost) Is my conclusion correct, that negative values are permitted and should be supported, but only in the latter case and not the former? ## NITS ### Section 3.5, Section 4 s/this draft/this document/ ### Section 7 s/gleamed/gleaned/ ## Notes This review is in the ["IETF Comments" Markdown format][ICMF], You can use the [`ietf-comments` tool][ICT] to automatically convert this review into individual GitHub issues. [ICMF]: https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments/blob/main/format.md [ICT]: https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments
I support Jim's DISCUSS position. Thanks for a good shepherd writeup.
I support Jim's DISCUSS position.
Thank you to Steve Hanna for the SECDIR review. ** Certain documents previously published out of IPPM were only intended for closed deployments (sometimes called “limited domains”). Are the approaches described in this document intended for the Internet? It would be helpful to state the applicability. ** Section 6. Given that Section 7 reminds the reader that “[a]uthentication techniques may be used where appropriate to guard against these traffic attacks”, what would that mean in the context of QUIC and TCP? ** Section 7. It appears that these measurement fields introduced in the packet are intended only for the sender and recipient with little information to any intermediaries. This seems like a recipe for a covert channel not inspected by typical security devices. Consider noting this possibility.
Thanks for addressing my discuss points and TSVART review.
# Éric Vyncke, INT AD, comments for draft-ietf-ippm-explicit-flow-measurements-03 Thank you for the work put into this document. Please find below some non-blocking COMMENT points (but replies would be appreciated even if only for my own education). I strongly support Jim Guichard's original DISCUSS point on squatting on bits that may be used by the network. I read the follow-up email conversation and then I now wonder what it the point of publishing this I-D as a RFC *in the IETF stream* (as opposed to the *IRTF stream*) to describe a potential plan. Hence, my current ABSTAIN ballot about the stream selection. Other thanks to Pascal Thubert, the Internet directorate reviewer (at my request), please consider this int-dir review: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/review-ietf-ippm-explicit-flow-measurements-03-intdir-telechat-thubert-2023-05-11/ (and I have seen the email exchange with Giuseppe) Special thanks to Marcus Ihlar for the shepherd's detailed write-up including the WG consensus and the justification of the intended status (and the explanation for 8 authors) I hope that this review helps to improve the document and possibly trigger a change of stream, Regards, -éric # COMMENTS ## Section 1 `can be prevented because of the encrypted transport-layer headers (e.g. QUIC, TCP)` since when TCP is encrypted ? ;-) ## Section 8 While it is not really related to privacy, if there is some experimental traffic over an ISP network with those bit sets, the ISP could put this marked traffic in a priority queue to deliver a better service and so 'cheat' on an experiment that would benchmark ISP (e.g., speedtest.net and others).
# GEN AD review of draft-ietf-ippm-explicit-flow-measurements-03 CC @larseggert ## Comments ### Too many authors The document has eight authors, which exceeds the recommended author limit. Has the sponsoring AD agreed that this is appropriate? ### Inclusive language Found terminology that should be reviewed for inclusivity; see https://www.rfc-editor.org/part2/#inclusive_language for background and more guidance: * Term `crippling`; alternatives might be `broken`, `damaged`, `defective`, `deformed`, `impaired` ## Nits All comments below are about very minor potential issues that you may choose to address in some way - or ignore - as you see fit. Some were flagged by automated tools (via https://github.com/larseggert/ietf-reviewtool), so there will likely be some false positives. There is no need to let me know what you did with these suggestions. ### Outdated references Document references `draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-23`, but `-24` is the latest available revision. Document references `draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options-19`, but `-20` is the latest available revision. ### Grammar/style #### "Table of Contents", paragraph 1 ``` headers (e.g. TCP sequence and acknowledgment numbers) to allow for quantitat ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ``` Do not mix variants of the same word ("acknowledgment" and "acknowledgement") within a single text. #### Section 1, paragraph 2 ``` ination. Each technique uses a small number of bits and exposes a specific m ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ``` Specify a number, remove phrase, use "a few", or use "some". #### Section 1, paragraph 2 ``` this document proposes adding a small number of dedicated measurement bits to ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ``` Specify a number, remove phrase, use "a few", or use "some". #### Section 2.1, paragraph 7 ``` on. The delay sample lifetime is comprised of two phases: initialization and ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ``` Did you mean "comprises" or "consists of" or "is composed of"? #### Section 2.2.1, paragraph 5 ``` used to produce a delay measure. Therefore the value of T_Max must also be k ^^^^^^^^^ ``` A comma may be missing after the conjunctive/linking adverb "Therefore". #### Section 3.3.2.2, paragraph 1 ``` Therefore, recommendations in section Section 3.2.3.1 apply equally to impro ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ``` Possible typo: you repeated a word. #### Section 3.4.3.1, paragraph 1 ``` unting packets in this direction with a E bit equal to 1. The upstream CE-ma ^ ``` Use "an" instead of "a" if the following word starts with a vowel sound, e.g. "an article", "an hour". #### Section 3.4.3.2, paragraph 4 ``` header, the available metrics using an unidirectional or bidirectional obse ^^ ``` Use "a" instead of "an" if the following word doesn't start with a vowel sound, e.g. "a sentence", "a university". #### Section 3.4.3.4, paragraph 6 ``` 4 bits, i.e. QL or QR + SD, allow to have more complete and resilient measur ^^^^^^^ ``` Did you mean "having"? Or maybe you should add a pronoun? In active voice, "allow" + "to" takes an object, usually a pronoun. #### Section 3.5, paragraph 1 ``` various situations. The choice of the the methods also depends on the specif ^^^^^^^ ``` Possible typo: you repeated a word. ## Notes This review is in the ["IETF Comments" Markdown format][ICMF], You can use the [`ietf-comments` tool][ICT] to automatically convert this review into individual GitHub issues. Review generated by the [`ietf-reviewtool`][IRT]. [ICMF]: https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments/blob/main/format.md [ICT]: https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments [IRT]: https://github.com/larseggert/ietf-reviewtool