Integrity of In-situ OAM Data Fields
draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data-integrity-02
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| Authors | Frank Brockners , Shwetha Bhandari , Tal Mizrahi , Justin Iurman | ||
| Last updated | 2022-07-05 | ||
| Replaces | draft-brockners-ippm-ioam-data-integrity | ||
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draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data-integrity-02
ippm F. Brockners
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track S. Bhandari
Expires: January 6, 2023 Thoughtspot
T. Mizrahi
Huawei
J. Iurman
ULiege
July 5, 2022
Integrity of In-situ OAM Data Fields
draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data-integrity-02
Abstract
In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) records
operational and telemetry information in the packet while the packet
traverses a path in the network. IETF protocols require features to
ensure their security. This document describes the integrity
protection of IOAM-Data-Fields.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Modification: IOAM-Data-Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Modification: IOAM Option-Type Headers . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Injection: IOAM-Data-Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Injection: IOAM Option-Type Headers . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Management and Exporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.6. Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.7. Threat Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Integrity Protected Option-Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Integrity Protected Trace Option-Types . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Integrity Protected POT Option-Type . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Integrity Protected E2E Option-Type . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Methods for space optimized integrity protection . . . . . . 10
5.1. Symmetric key based signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. Asymmetric key based signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. IOAM Option-Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. IOAM Integrity Protection Algorithm Suite Registry . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Replay protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
"In-situ" Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) records
OAM information within the packet while the packet traverses a
particular network domain. The term "in-situ" refers to the fact
that the OAM data is added to the data packets rather than being sent
within packets specifically dedicated to OAM. IOAM is to complement
mechanisms such as Ping or Traceroute. In terms of "active" or
"passive" OAM, "in-situ" OAM can be considered a hybrid OAM type.
"In-situ" mechanisms do not require extra packets to be sent. IOAM
adds information to the already available data packets and therefore
cannot be considered passive. In terms of the classification given
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in [RFC7799], IOAM could be portrayed as Hybrid Type I. IOAM
mechanisms can be leveraged where mechanisms using, e.g., ICMP do not
apply or do not offer the desired results, such as proving that a
certain traffic flow takes a pre-defined path, SLA verification for
the data traffic, detailed statistics on traffic distribution paths
in networks that distribute traffic across multiple paths, or
scenarios in which probe traffic is potentially handled differently
from regular data traffic by the network devices.
[RFC9197] assumes that IOAM is deployed in limited domains, where an
operator has means to select, monitor, and control the access to all
the networking devices, making the domain a trusted network. As
such, IOAM-Data-Fields are carried in clear within packets and there
are no protections against any node or middlebox tampering with the
data. IOAM-Data-Fields collected in an untrusted or semi-trusted
environment require integrity protection to support critical
operational decisions.
The following considerations and requirements are to be taken into
account in addition to addressing the problem of detectability of any
integrity breach of the IOAM-Data-Fields collected:
1. IOAM data is processed by the data plane, hence viability of any
method to prove integrity of the IOAM-Data-Fields must be
feasible at data plane processing/forwarding rates (IOAM might be
applied to all traffic a router forwards).
2. IOAM data is carried within packets. Additional space required
to prove integrity of the IOAM-Data-Fields needs to be optimal,
i.e. should not exceed the MTU or have adverse effect on packet
processing.
3. Replay protection of older IOAM data should be possible. Without
replay protection, a rogue node can present the old IOAM data,
masking any ongoing network issues/activity and making the IOAM-
Data-Fields collection useless.
This document defines the methods to protect the integrity of IOAM-
Data-Fields, using the IOAM Option-Types specified in [RFC9197] as an
example. The methods similarly apply to other IOAM Option-Types
which contain IOAM-Data-Fields.
2. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174].
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Abbreviations used in this document:
IOAM: In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance
MTU: Maximum Transmit Unit
OAM: Operations, Administration, and Maintenance
POT: Proof of Transit
E2E: Edge to Edge
3. Threat Analysis
This section presents a threat analysis of integrity-related threats
in the context of IOAM. The threats that are discussed are assumed
to be independent of the lower layer protocols; it is assumed that
threats at other layers are handled by security mechanisms that are
deployed at these layers.
This document is focused on integrity protection for IOAM-Data-
Fields. Thus the threat analysis includes threats that are related
to or result from compromising the integrity of IOAM-Data-Fields.
Other security aspects such as confidentiality are not within the
scope of this document.
Throughout the analysis there is a distinction between on-path and
off-path attackers. As discussed in [RFC9055], on-path attackers are
located in a position that allows interception and modification of
in-flight protocol packets, whereas off-path attackers can only
attack by generating protocol packets.
The analysis also includes the impact of each of the threats.
Generally speaking, the impact of a successful attack on an OAM
protocol [RFC7276] is a false illusion of nonexistent failures or
preventing the detection of actual ones; in both cases, the attack
may result in denial of service (DoS). Furthermore, creating the
false illusion of a nonexistent issue may trigger unnecessary
processing in some of the IOAM nodes along the path, and may cause
more IOAM-related data to be exported to the management plane than is
conventionally necessary. Beyond these general impacts, threat-
specific impacts are discussed in each of the subsections below.
3.1. Modification: IOAM-Data-Fields
Threat
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An attacker can maliciously modify the IOAM-Data-Fields of in-
transit packets. The modification can either be applied to all
packets or selectively applied to a subset of the en route
packets. This threat is applicable to on-path attackers.
Impact
By systematically modifying the IOAM-Data-Fields of some or all of
the in-transit packets, an attacker can create a false picture of
the paths in the network, the existence of faulty nodes and their
location, and the network performance.
3.2. Modification: IOAM Option-Type Headers
Threat
An on-path attacker can modify the header in IOAM Option-Types in
order to change or disrupt the behavior of nodes processing IOAM-
Data-Fields along the path. This threat is not within the scope
of this document.
Impact
Changing the header of IOAM Option-Types may have several
implications. An attacker can maliciously increase the processing
overhead in nodes that process IOAM-Data-Fields and increase the
on-the-wire overhead of IOAM-Data-Fields, for example by modifying
the IOAM-Trace-Type field in the IOAM Trace Option-Type header.
An attacker can also prevent some of the nodes that process IOAM-
Data-Fields from incorporating IOAM-Data-Fields, by modifying the
RemainingLen field in the IOAM Trace Option-Type header.
3.3. Injection: IOAM-Data-Fields
Threat
An attacker can inject packets with IOAM Option-Types and IOAM-
Data-Fields. This threat is applicable to both on-path and off-
path attackers.
Impact
This attack and its impacts are similar to Section 3.1.
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3.4. Injection: IOAM Option-Type Headers
Threat
An attacker can inject packets with IOAM Option-Type headers, thus
manipulating other nodes that process IOAM-Data-Fields in the
network. This threat is applicable to both on-path and off-path
attackers. This threat is not within the scope of this document.
Impact
This attack and its impacts are similar to Section 3.2.
3.5. Management and Exporting
Threat
Attacks that compromise the integrity of IOAM-Data-Fields can be
applied at the management plane, e.g., by manipulating network
management packets. Furthermore, the integrity of IOAM-Data-
Fields that are exported to a receiving entity can also be
compromised. Management plane attacks are not within the scope of
this document; the network management protocol is expected to
include inherent security capabilities. The integrity of exported
data is also not within the scope of this document. It is
expected that the specification of the export format will discuss
the relevant security aspects.
Impact
Malicious manipulation of the management protocol can cause nodes
that process IOAM-Data-Fields to malfunction, to be overloaded, or
to incorporate unnecessary IOAM-Data-Fields into user packets.
The impact of compromising the integrity of exported IOAM-Data-
Fields is similar to the impacts of previous threats that were
described in this section.
3.6. Delay
Threat
An on-path attacker may delay some or all of the in-transit
packets that include IOAM-Data-Fields in order to create the false
illusion of congestion. Delay attacks are well known in the
context of deterministic networks [RFC9055] and synchronization
[RFC7384], and may be somewhat mitigated in these environments by
using redundant paths in a way that is resilient to an attack
along one of the paths. This approach does not address the threat
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in the context of IOAM, as it does not meet the requirement to
measure a specific path or to detect a problem along the path. It
is noted that this threat is not within the scope of the threats
that are mitigated in this document.
Impact
Since IOAM can be applied to a fraction of the traffic, an
attacker can detect and delay only the packets that include IOAM-
Data-Fields, thus preventing the authenticity of delay and load
measurements.
3.7. Threat Summary
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
| Threat |In scope|Out of scope|
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Modification: IOAM-Data-Fields | + | |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Modification: IOAM Option-Type Headers | | + |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Injection: IOAM-Data-Fields | + | |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Injection: IOAM Option-Type Headers | | + |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Management and Exporting | | + |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Delay | | + |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
Figure 1: Threat Analysis Summary
4. Integrity Protected Option-Types
This section defines new IOAM Option-Types to be allocated in the
IOAM Option-Type Registry. Their purpose is to carry IOAM-Data-
Fields with integrity protection. Each of the IOAM Option-Types
defined in [RFC9197] is extended as follows:
64 IOAM Pre-allocated Trace Integrity Protected Option-Type:
corresponds to the IOAM Pre-allocated Trace Option-Type with
integrity protection.
65 IOAM Incremental Trace Integrity Protected Option-Type:
corresponds to the IOAM Incremental Trace Option-Type with
integrity protection.
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66 IOAM POT Integrity Protected Option-Type: corresponds to the IOAM
POT Option-Type with integrity protection.
67 IOAM E2E Integrity Protected Option-Type: corresponds to the IOAM
E2E Option-Type with integrity protection.
The Integrity Protection subheader follows the IOAM Option-Type
header when the IOAM Option-Type is an Integrity Protected Option-
Type. It is defined as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Signature-suite| Nonce length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nonce ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Signature-suite: 8-bit unsigned integer. This field defines the
algorithms used to compute the digest and the signature over the
IOAM-Data-Fields.
Nonce length: 8-bit unsigned integer. This field specifies the
length of the Nonce in octets.
Reserved: 16-bit Reserved field. MUST be set to zero upon
transmission and ignored upon receipt.
Nonce: Variable length field with length specified in Nonce length.
Signature: Digital signature value generated by the method and
algorithm specified by Signature-suite.
4.1. Integrity Protected Trace Option-Types
Both the IOAM Pre-allocated Trace Option-Type header and the IOAM
Incremental Trace Option-Type header, as defined in [RFC9197], are
followed by the Integrity Protection subheader when the IOAM Option-
Type is respectively set to the IOAM Pre-allocated Trace Integrity
Protected Option-Type or the IOAM Incremental Trace Integrity
Protected Option-Type:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Namespace-ID | NodeLen | Flags | RemainingLen|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IOAM-Trace-Type | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Signature-suite| Nonce length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nonce ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
4.2. Integrity Protected POT Option-Type
The IOAM POT Option-Type header, as defined in [RFC9197], is followed
by the Integrity Protection subheader when the IOAM Option-Type is
set to the IOAM POT Integrity Protected Option-Type:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Namespace-ID | IOAM-POT-Type | IOAM-POT-Flags|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Signature-suite| Nonce length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nonce ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
4.3. Integrity Protected E2E Option-Type
The IOAM E2E Option-Type header, as defined in [RFC9197], is followed
by the Integrity Protection subheader when the IOAM Option-Type is
set to the IOAM E2E Integrity Protected Option-Type:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Namespace-ID | IOAM-E2E-Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Signature-suite| Nonce length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nonce ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
5. Methods for space optimized integrity protection
Methods for space optimized integrity protection can leverage
symmetric or asymmetric key based signatures, as described in the
subsections below. The Signature consumes 32 octets and is carried
only once for the entire packet. In case of performance concerns,
such method can be applied to a subset of the traffic by using
sampling of data to enable IOAM with integrity protection. Both
symmetric and asymmetric signature methods work similarly, as
follows:
1. The encapsulating node creates a nonce and stores it in the Nonce
field of the Integrity Protection subheader. The signature is
generated over the Nonce field and the hash of IOAM-Data-Fields
it has inserted, i.e., sign(Nonce || hash(IOAM-Data-Fields)).
IOAM-Data-Fields supposed to be modified by other IOAM nodes on
the path MUST be excluded from the signature (e.g., the POT
Cumulative field). The signature is stored in the Signature
field of the Integrity Protection subheader. Important note: if
all the inserted IOAM-Data-Fields are supposed to be modified by
other IOAM nodes on the path, or if there is no IOAM-Data-Field
inserted at all, then the encapsulating node MUST NOT use an
Integrity Protected Option-Type.
2. A transit node generates a signature over the Signature field and
the hash of IOAM-Data-Fields it has inserted, i.e.,
sign(Signature || hash(IOAM-Data-Fields)). IOAM-Data-Fields
modified in-place by the transit node MUST be excluded from the
signature (e.g., the POT Cumulative field). The signature is
stored in the Signature field of the Integrity Protection
subheader. Important note: if the transit node does not insert
IOAM-Data-Fields (e.g., it only modifies IOAM-Data-Fields in-
place, or does nothing), then the transit node MUST NOT generate
a signature and MUST NOT update the Signature field.
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3. The decapsulating node (aka the Validator) is responsible for the
integrity verification of the IOAM-Data-Fields collected.
Serving as the Validator, the decapsulating node MUST NOT
generate a signature based on IOAM-Data-Fields it has inserted,
if any, and therefore MUST NOT update the Signature field. To
validate the IOAM-Data-Fields integrity, the Validator recomputes
the signature by iteratively following the same procedure as for
the encapsulating and transit nodes, in that order, using their
respective keys (see Section 5.1 or Section 5.2 depending on the
approach, i.e., symmetric or asymmetric). The recomputed
signature is then compared to the Signature field. It is trivial
in some cases (e.g., with POT Type-0 or E2E Option-Types), where
only the encapsulating node generates a signature, as specified
by the method described in this section. For other cases where
transit nodes also generate a signature (e.g., with Trace Option-
Types), node-ids MUST be included in IOAM-Data-Fields. Details
on how the mapping between node-ids and keys is implemented on
the Validator are outside the scope of this document.
5.1. Symmetric key based signature
This method assumes that symmetric keys have been distributed to the
respective nodes as well as the Validator (the Validator receives all
the keys). The details of the mechanisms responsible for key
distribution are outside the scope of this document.
This method MUST use an algorithm pair defined in Section 6.2 and the
approach MUST be symmetric.
5.2. Asymmetric key based signature
This method assumes that asymmetric keys have been generated per IOAM
node and the respective nodes can access their keys (the Validator
receives all the public keys). The details of the mechanisms
responsible for key distribution are outside the scope of this
document.
This method MUST use an algorithm pair defined in Section 6.2 and the
approach MUST be asymmetric.
6. IANA Considerations
6.1. IOAM Option-Type Registry
This draft defines the following new code points in the IOAM Option-
Type Registry:
64 IOAM Pre-allocated Trace Integrity Protected Option-Type
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65 IOAM Incremental Trace Integrity Protected Option-Type
66 IOAM POT Integrity Protected Option-Type
67 IOAM E2E Integrity Protected Option-Type
6.2. IOAM Integrity Protection Algorithm Suite Registry
"IOAM Integrity Protection Algorithm Suite Registry" in the "In-Situ
OAM (IOAM) Protocol Parameters" group. The one-octet "IOAM Integrity
Protection Algorithm Suite Registry" identifiers assigned by IANA
identify the digest algorithm and signature algorithm used in the
Signature Suite Identifier field. IANA has registered the following
algorithm suite identifiers for the digest algorithm and for the
signature algorithm.
Algorithm
Suite Digest Signature Specification
Identifier Algorithm Algorithm Pointer Approach
+-----------+------------+-------------+----------------+------------+
| 0x00 | Reserved | Reserved | This document | None |
+-----------+------------+-------------+----------------+------------+
| 0x01 | SHA-256 | ECDSA P-256 | [SHS] [DSS] | Asymmetric |
| | | | [RFC6090] | |
| | | | This document | |
+-----------+------------+-------------+----------------+------------+
| 0x02 | SHA-256 | AES-256 | [AES] | Symmetric |
| | | | [NIST.800-38D] | |
| | | | This document | |
+-----------+------------+-------------+----------------+------------+
| 0x03-0xFF | Unassigned | Unassigned | | |
+-----------+------------+-------------+----------------+------------+
IOAM Integrity Protection Algorithm Suite Registry
Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process
defined in [RFC8126]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm
suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and
signature algorithm name.
7. Security Considerations
This section discusses additional security aspects.
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7.1. Replay protection
The nonce makes a signature chain unique but does not necessarily
prevent replay attacks. To enable replay protection, the
encapsulating node and the Validator MUST use a common, unique nonce.
8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Santhosh N, Rakesh Kandula, Saiprasad
Muchala, Al Morton, Greg Mirsky, Benjamin Kaduk and Martin Duke for
their comments and advice.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, 2001,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-
197.pdf>.
[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST FIPS Publication 186-4,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, 2013,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.
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[NIST.800-38D]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST Special
Publication 800-38D, 2001,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-
800-38D.pdf>.
[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>.
[RFC7276] Mizrahi, T., Sprecher, N., Bellagamba, E., and Y.
Weingarten, "An Overview of Operations, Administration,
and Maintenance (OAM) Tools", RFC 7276,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7276, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7276>.
[RFC7384] Mizrahi, T., "Security Requirements of Time Protocols in
Packet Switched Networks", RFC 7384, DOI 10.17487/RFC7384,
October 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7384>.
[RFC7799] Morton, A., "Active and Passive Metrics and Methods (with
Hybrid Types In-Between)", RFC 7799, DOI 10.17487/RFC7799,
May 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7799>.
[RFC9055] Grossman, E., Ed., Mizrahi, T., and A. Hacker,
"Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security
Considerations", RFC 9055, DOI 10.17487/RFC9055, June
2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9055>.
[RFC9197] Brockners, F., Ed., Bhandari, S., Ed., and T. Mizrahi,
Ed., "Data Fields for In Situ Operations, Administration,
and Maintenance (IOAM)", RFC 9197, DOI 10.17487/RFC9197,
May 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9197>.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)", NIST FIPS Publication 180-4, DOI
10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, 2015,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.
Authors' Addresses
Brockners, et al. Expires January 6, 2023 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft IOAM-Data-Fields Integrity July 2022
Frank Brockners
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Hansaallee 249, 3rd Floor
DUESSELDORF, NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN 40549
Germany
Email: fbrockne@cisco.com
Shwetha Bhandari
Thoughtspot
3rd Floor, Indiqube Orion, 24th Main Rd, Garden Layout, HSR Layout
Bangalore, KARNATAKA 560 102
India
Email: shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com
Tal Mizrahi
Huawei
8-2 Matam
Haifa 3190501
Israel
Email: tal.mizrahi.phd@gmail.com
Justin Iurman
Universite de Liege
10, Allee de la decouverte (B28)
Sart-Tilman, LIEGE 4000
Belgium
Email: justin.iurman@uliege.be
Brockners, et al. Expires January 6, 2023 [Page 15]