Fixing IKE Phase 1 & 2 Authentication HASH
draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-hash-revised-03
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(ipsec WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Tero Kivinen | ||
| Last updated | 2001-11-26 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document defines new method of calculating the authentication HASH of the IKE [RFC-2409] protocol. It fixes known problems with the IKE. The way the HASH is currently defined in the [RFC-2409] does not authen- ticate the ISAKMP [RFC-2408] packet header, nor does it authenticate any extra ISAKMP payloads inside phase 1 ISAKMP packets. This causes a secu- rity problem when using extra ISAKMP payloads as already defined in the IKE and DOI [RFC-2407] (vendor ID payload, INITIAL-CONTACT notification etc). There is also suggestion how to fix the Phase 2 authentication hashes so that they will also authenticate the ISAKMP packet header.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)