Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Configuration for Encrypted DNS
draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike-14

[Ballot comment]
Clearing discuss based on proposed resolution text.


Minor level comments:

(2) p 0, sec

  This document specifies new Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
  (IKEv2) Configuration Payload Attribute Types to assign DNS resolvers
  that support encrypted DNS protocols, such as DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH),
  DNS-over-TLS (DoT), and DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ).

Are there any updates needed to RFC 9061 needed to cover manageability aspects/updates of the attributes defined in this draft?  Note, I'm not requesting that they be added to this draft, but instead, I want to check if there is any need or plan to address them.


(3) p 2, sec 2.  Terminology

  Do53:  refers to unencrypted DNS.

This term only turns up a few (3 times) in this doc, and its not clear to me that it improves its readability.  I didn't know what it meant, possibly just referencing to "Unencrypted DNS" would be better for the wider audience?


(4) p 3, sec 3.1.  ENCDNS_IP* Configuration Payload Attributes

      -  0 if the Configuration payload has types CFG_REQUEST (if no
        specific DNS resolver is requested) or CFG_ACK.  If the
        'Length' field is set to 0, then later fields shown in Figure 1
        are not present.

I found this text unclear & confusing when combined with the following two paragraphs.  I would suggest rewording the first sentence to something like:

  0, if the Configuration payload has (i) type CFG_REQUEST and no
  specific DNS resolver is requested or (ii) type CFG_ACK.


(5) p 13, sec Appendix A.  Sample Deployment Scenarios

Readability may be slightly improved by adding a sentence here to explain what the purpose of this section is.


(6) p 14, sec Appendix A.  Sample Deployment Scenarios

  Enterprise networks are susceptible to internal and external attacks.
  To minimize that risk all enterprise traffic is encrypted
  (Section 2.1 of [I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t]).

Would "SHOULD be encrypted" be better than "is encrypted"? Or, alternatively, "Encrypting all internal enterprise traffic minimizes the risks of attacks (Section 2.1 of [I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t]).


(7) p 14, sec Appendix B.  Examples

I would suggest putting each of the two examples into its own subsection.



Nit level comments:

(8) p 4, sec 3.1.  ENCDNS_IP* Configuration Payload Attributes

      -  0 if the Configuration payload has types CFG_REQUEST (if no
        specific DNS resolver is requested) or CFG_ACK.  If the
        'Length' field is set to 0, then later fields shown in Figure 1
        are not present.
      -  (4 + Length of the ADN + N * 4 + Length of SvcParams) for
        ENCDNS_IP4 attributes if the Configuration payload has types
        CFG_REQUEST or CFG_REPLY or CFG_SET; N being the number of
        included IPv4 addresses ('Num addresses').

Possibly "(4 + 'Length of the ADN' + (N * 4) + Length of SvcParams)", and similarly for IPv6, would be more explicit.


(9) p 5, sec 3.2.  ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Configuration Payload Attribute

  *  Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the enclosed data
      in octets.  This field MUST be set to "2 + 2 * number of included
      hash algorithm identifiers".

For clarity, I suggest: "2 + (2 * 'number of included
      hash algorithm identifiers')"


(10) p 6, sec 3.2.  ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Configuration Payload Attribute

  *  Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the enclosed data
      in octets.  This field MUST be set to "2 + 2 * number of included
      hash algorithm identifiers".
  *  Num Hash Algs (1 octet) - Indicates the number of included hash
      algorithm identifiers.  This field MUST be set to "(Length -
      2)/2".

I suggest, included 'hash algorithm identifiers'.

Regards,
Rob

[Ballot discuss]
Hi,

Thanks for this document.

This should be a trivial discuss to resolve, and only flagging it as a discuss because I think that it makes the spec unclear (or wrong):

(1) p 4, sec 3.1.  ENCDNS_IP* Configuration Payload Attributes

  *  IP Address(es) (variable) - Includes one or more IP addresses that
      can be used to reach the encrypted DNS resolver identified by the
      Authentication Domain Name.  For ENCDNS_IP4 this field contains
      one or more 4-octet IPv4 addresses, and for ENCDNS_IP6 this field
      contains one or more 16-octet IPv6 addresses.

Shouldn't this be zero or more IP addresses?  Otherwise, the example that only contains a domain and no IP address appears to be invalid.

[Ballot comment]
Minor level comments:

(2) p 0, sec

  This document specifies new Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
  (IKEv2) Configuration Payload Attribute Types to assign DNS resolvers
  that support encrypted DNS protocols, such as DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH),
  DNS-over-TLS (DoT), and DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ).

Are there any updates needed to RFC 9061 needed to cover manageability aspects/updates of the attributes defined in this draft?  Note, I'm not requesting that they be added to this draft, but instead, I want to check if there is any need or plan to address them.


(3) p 2, sec 2.  Terminology

  Do53:  refers to unencrypted DNS.

This term only turns up a few (3 times) in this doc, and its not clear to me that it improves its readability.  I didn't know what it meant, possibly just referencing to "Unencrypted DNS" would be better for the wider audience?


(4) p 3, sec 3.1.  ENCDNS_IP* Configuration Payload Attributes

      -  0 if the Configuration payload has types CFG_REQUEST (if no
        specific DNS resolver is requested) or CFG_ACK.  If the
        'Length' field is set to 0, then later fields shown in Figure 1
        are not present.

I found this text unclear & confusing when combined with the following two paragraphs.  I would suggest rewording the first sentence to something like:

  0, if the Configuration payload has (i) type CFG_REQUEST and no
  specific DNS resolver is requested or (ii) type CFG_ACK.


(5) p 13, sec Appendix A.  Sample Deployment Scenarios

Readability may be slightly improved by adding a sentence here to explain what the purpose of this section is.


(6) p 14, sec Appendix A.  Sample Deployment Scenarios

  Enterprise networks are susceptible to internal and external attacks.
  To minimize that risk all enterprise traffic is encrypted
  (Section 2.1 of [I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t]).

Would "SHOULD be encrypted" be better than "is encrypted"? Or, alternatively, "Encrypting all internal enterprise traffic minimizes the risks of attacks (Section 2.1 of [I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t]).


(7) p 14, sec Appendix B.  Examples

I would suggest putting each of the two examples into its own subsection.



Nit level comments:

(8) p 4, sec 3.1.  ENCDNS_IP* Configuration Payload Attributes

      -  0 if the Configuration payload has types CFG_REQUEST (if no
        specific DNS resolver is requested) or CFG_ACK.  If the
        'Length' field is set to 0, then later fields shown in Figure 1
        are not present.
      -  (4 + Length of the ADN + N * 4 + Length of SvcParams) for
        ENCDNS_IP4 attributes if the Configuration payload has types
        CFG_REQUEST or CFG_REPLY or CFG_SET; N being the number of
        included IPv4 addresses ('Num addresses').

Possibly "(4 + 'Length of the ADN' + (N * 4) + Length of SvcParams)", and similarly for IPv6, would be more explicit.


(9) p 5, sec 3.2.  ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Configuration Payload Attribute

  *  Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the enclosed data
      in octets.  This field MUST be set to "2 + 2 * number of included
      hash algorithm identifiers".

For clarity, I suggest: "2 + (2 * 'number of included
      hash algorithm identifiers')"


(10) p 6, sec 3.2.  ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO Configuration Payload Attribute

  *  Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the enclosed data
      in octets.  This field MUST be set to "2 + 2 * number of included
      hash algorithm identifiers".
  *  Num Hash Algs (1 octet) - Indicates the number of included hash
      algorithm identifiers.  This field MUST be set to "(Length -
      2)/2".

I suggest, included 'hash algorithm identifiers'.

Regards,
Rob

[Ballot comment]
Thank you for the work put into this document. It really helps to achieve the goals of the ADD WG :-) (only regret is that the IPSECME WGLC was not formally extended to the ADD WG, a little more of cross-WG collaboration is always welcome even if authors are also very active in ADD).

Please find below some non-blocking COMMENT points (but replies would be appreciated even if only for my own education), and one nit.

Special thanks to Tero Kivinen for the shepherd's detailed write-up including the WG consensus and the justification of the intended status.

Other thanks to Patrick Mevzek, the DNS directorate reviewer, please consider this dns-dir review:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/review-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike-11-dnsdir-telechat-mevzek-2023-04-04/ (and I have read Med's reply so all it good)
and the previous https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/review-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike-09-dnsdir-lc-mevzek-2023-03-16/ (and the authors/chairs have also replied)

I hope that this review helps to improve the document,

Regards,

-éric

# COMMENTS (non-blocking)

I second Paul Wouters' DISCUSS point #2 and Zahed's one (even if this may be the IPSECME WG usual process, it is not the IETF process).

## Section 1

In the discussion about private CA / address for the DNS resolver, one more sentence stating the obvious (when using a private CA then the client may use the digest info payload) would be welcome. Alternatively, moving this paragraph before the reference to the appendix will make it clearer the link with ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO.

## Section 2

Should RFC 8499 be normative (note RFC 7296 is normative and used in the same way)?

## Section 3.2

What is the responder behaviour when receiving a CFG_REQUEST with "ADN Length" different from 0 ? Symmetrical case for the initiator when "Num Hash Algs" is not 1 in a CFG_SET. If the generic behaviour described in section 4 (`As a reminder, badly formatted attributes or unacceptable fields are handled as per Section 2.21 of [RFC7296].`), then why other fields (notably "R") have specific text ? The reminder of section 4 should rather be in section 3 (but this is a matter of taste).

`Note that SHA2-256 is mandatory to implement` does this mean that SHA2-256 identifier *MUST* always be in the list or is it implicit and does not have to be in the list ?

# NITS (non-blocking / cosmetic)

## Appendix A.1

No need to expand VPN as it is both well-known and used before without expansion ;)

[Ballot discuss]
Thanks for working on this specification.

I don't have transport related issues on this specification.

However, this specification relaxes constrains imposed by RFC8598 but references it informatively. I think it should reference RFC8598 as normative reference and also should clearly indicate that in the document header and abstract. I am assuming this is an oversight but want to discuss it.

[Ballot discuss]
I have a few important items I believe needs fixing, but I believe those are still fairly easy to address.

#1 payload format of ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO

I believe the proposed syntax for ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO in this document
should not be specified this way. Depending on the use of this payload,
it has a different field construction. That is, we have two different
kinds of ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO, which would make defining this field (eg in
C headers or in a class object) impossible without splitting it into two
different names and definitions. Either all the fields must be identical,
with optional 0 lengths field omitted, or the draft should define
ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO_REQUEST and ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO_RESPONSE with their different
field types. This can be further seen by the difficulty to read the examples
in the appendici with the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO() syntax.

If one ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO type is used, I think the syntax for both request
and response should be:

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+
|R|        Attribute Type      |            Length            |
+-+-----------------------------+---------------+---------------+
| Num Hash Algs |  ADN Length  |                              |
+---------------+---------------+                              +
~                Authentication Domain Name                    ~
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Digest Hash Alg Identifier    |                              ~
+-------------------------------+                              +
~                    Certificate Digest                        ~
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+

(eg as the current "response" version)

And Num Hash Algs, ADN Length and Digest Hash Alg Identifier
are mandatory fields in both the request and the response. I would
also always list these 3 fields in the presentation format of
ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO() as used in the appendici examples.

I would rename "Hash Alg Identifier" to "Digest Hash Alg Identifier"
to make it more obvious that is what the hash algorithm is for.

#2 Updates RFC 8598

        Note: [RFC8598] requires INTERNAL_IP6_DNS (or INTERNAL_IP4_DNS)
        attribute to be mandatory present when INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN is
        included. This specification relaxes that constraint

This clearly updates RFC8598, but the document is lacking an Update: clause.
Please add the Update clause and mention the update in the abstract/introduction.

#3 Security Considerations

        The initiator may trust the encrypted DNS resolvers supplied by
        means of IKEv2 from a trusted responder more than the locally
        provided DNS resolvers, especially in the case of connecting
        to unknown or untrusted networks (e.g., coffee shops or hotel
        networks).

This does not seem to be a "Security Consideration".
Also, before this draft, receiving an (unencrypted) DNS server supplied
by IKEv2 would also be more trusted. In general, VPN clients trust the
"VPN provided nameserver" more than the local network one, irrespective
of transport encryption. Perhaps this sentence can just be deleted?

#4 Appendix A.2 and A.3

        Legacy VPN service providers usually preserve end-users' data
        confidentiality by sending all communication traffic through an
        encrypted tunnel.

What is "legacy" about this? I do not understand the point that A.2 is
trying to make?

Similarly, I don't understand Appendix A.3. The VPN service is not involved
in "allowing" an application to send traffic through the tunnel. It is the
VPN client that decided whether or not to send its traffic through the tunnel
or not. Also VPNs typically are configured to be either split-tunnel or not.
This can be, be hardly ever is, dynamic. I don't understand what A.3 is trying
to convey as example use related to the encrypted dns capability of the document.

[Ballot comment]
Appendix A and B are marked as "example". This is confusing. I would rename
Appendix B to "Configuration Payload examples".

The Figure 5 text should add the line:

        * Its Service Priority is 1

Which explains one of the number "1"s in the Figure which is otherwise
unreferenced.

The placement of "AliasMode" confuses me. It appears as part of the
Service Priority as a field name, but it is not a mode or value of
that. Perhaps the text should be moved somewhat down, after the
listing od fields? (It is also somewhat confusing in the reference
document I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https.


        Note that, for many years, typical designs have often considered
        that the DNS resolver was usually located inside the protected
        domain, but could be located outside of it. With encrypted DNS,
        the latter option becomes plausible.

Note that, VPN clients might have code that specifically prohibits the
use of DNS servers on IP addresses that are not covered by the VPN tunnel.

I also have some concern with the word plausible, as that seems to only take
encryption into account and not redirection or privacy concerns towards
the encrypted DNS server, or what could be monitored from an adversary
seeing the encrypted DNS stream not protected by the VPN to a DNS server.
(eg an adversay sees an encrypted DNS packet to 192.1.2.1, and then sees
a plaintext query to the root server for ohnoos.org from IP 192.1.2.1).
Note that based on this reasoning, perhaps a consideration for this should
be added to the Privacy Considerations section.

I would remove this note or rewrite it as a caution note instead, eg:

        Note that existing VPN client implementations might not expect
        the new use case of an obtained DNS server IP being outside of
        the covered IP ranges of the VPN tunnel.



This example does not make it clear if the encrypted DNS resolver can be
used for all DNS or not. It appears to say there is a limitation to only
use it for internal-only domain names. I do not think such a protocol
limitation should be implied by this example?

        Enterprise networks are susceptible to internal and external
        attacks. To minimize that risk all enterprise traffic is encrypted
        (Section 2.1 of [I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t]).

I'm not sure if this sentence is relevant to the document in question? Or
actually, if all enterprise network is encrypted anyway, why cant one just
send "unencrypted DNS", encrypted over the VPN to the VPN server? The VPN
server would then encrypt that traffic to the target internal DNS server
using its regular "all enterprise traffic is encrypted" model. I suggest
to just remove this sentence.


        Hosting encrypted DNS resolvers even in case of split-VPN
        configuration minimizes the attack vector (e.g., a compromised
        network device cannot monitor/modify DNS traffic).

I think "minimizes" should be changed to "can minimize". For example, if the
encrypted DNS is hosted on the VPN server itself, the above claim is not true.


        In this example, the initiator uses the ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO
        attribute to indicate that the encrypted DNS client supports
        SHA2-256 (2), SHA2-384 (3), and SHA2-512 (4) hash algorithms.

Can we add "for certificate digests" to this sentence. I was a bit confused
when I read this and saw support for hash algorithms and wondered what
the list of hash algorithms was for again.


        In this example, no ADN is included ...

Because this sentence is between two examples, it is really confusing as to which
example it belongs to. how about:

        In the following example, no ADN is included ...

[Ballot comment]
# GEN AD review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike-11

CC @larseggert

Thanks to Stewart Bryant for the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) review
(https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/gen-art/4W1GbLLH-dUSHMRjawTAsl7Zp38).

## Notes

This review is in the ["IETF Comments" Markdown format][ICMF], You can use the
[`ietf-comments` tool][ICT] to automatically convert this review into
individual GitHub issues. Review generated by the [`ietf-reviewtool`][IRT].

[ICMF]: https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments/blob/main/format.md
[ICT]: https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments
[IRT]: https://github.com/larseggert/ietf-reviewtool

(Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

The IANA Functions Operator has completed its review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike-09. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let us know.

The IANA Functions Operator understands that, upon approval of this document, there is a single action which we must complete.

In the IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types registry on the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters registry page located at:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/

three, new attribute types are to be registered as follows:

Value: [ TBD-at-Registration ]
Attribute Type: ENCDNS_IP4
Multi-valued: YES
Length: 0 or more
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBD-at-Registration ]
Attribute Type: ENCDNS_IP6
Multi-valued: YES
Length: 0 or more
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBD-at-Registration ]
Attribute Type: ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO
Multi-valued: YES
Length: 0 or more
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

As this document requests registrations in an Expert Review or Specification Required (see RFC 8126) registry, we will initiate the required Expert Review via a separate request. This review must be completed before the document's IANA state can be changed to "IANA OK."

The IANA Functions Operator understands that this is the only action required to be completed upon approval of this document.

Note:  The actions requested in this document will not be completed until the document has been approved for publication as an RFC. This message is meant only to confirm the list of actions that will be performed.

For definitions of IANA review states, please see:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/help/state/draft/iana-review

Thank you,

David Dong
IANA Services Specialist

The following Last Call announcement was sent out (ends 2023-03-16):

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC: draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike@ietf.org, ipsec@ietf.org, ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org, kivinen@iki.fi, rdd@cert.org
Reply-To: last-call@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Configuration for Encrypted DNS) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the IP Security Maintenance and
Extensions WG (ipsecme) to consider the following document: - 'Internet Key
Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Configuration for
  Encrypted DNS'
  as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2023-03-16. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  This document specifies new Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
  (IKEv2) Configuration Payload Attribute Types to assign DNS resolvers
  that support encrypted DNS protocols, such as DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH),
  DNS-over-TLS (DoT), and DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ).




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike/



No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

# Document Shepherd Write-Up for Group Documents

*This version is dated 4 July 2022.*

Thank you for your service as a document shepherd. Among the responsibilities is
answering the questions in this write-up to give helpful context to Last Call
and Internet Engineering Steering Group ([IESG][1]) reviewers, and your
diligence in completing it is appreciated. The full role of the shepherd is
further described in [RFC 4858][2]. You will need the cooperation of the authors
and editors to complete these checks.

Note that some numbered items contain multiple related questions; please be sure
to answer all of them.

## Document History

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a
  few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

There is a broad agreement to adopt and progress this work within IPsecME.

2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where
  the consensus was particularly rough?

No controversy is to be reported for the draft. The authors were responsive in
dealing with the comments raised by reviewers during all the document' development phases.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If
  so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the
  responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this
  questionnaire is publicly available.)

No.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of
  the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated
  plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere,
  either in the document itself (as [RFC 7942][3] recommends) or elsewhere
  (where)?

No implementation was reported to the WG.

## Additional Reviews

5. Do the contents of this document closely interact with technologies in other
  IETF working groups or external organizations, and would it therefore benefit
  from their review? Have those reviews occurred? If yes, describe which
  reviews took place.

Yes, the document follows the design guidelines set by the ADD WG for the discovery
of encrypted DNS resolvers. This is acknowledged in the current specification.

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria,
  such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

No formal review is required other than the review required to perform the IANA
actions.

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module
  been checked with any of the [recommended validation tools][4] for syntax and
  formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is
  the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module
  comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified
  in [RFC 8342][5]?

N/A.

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the
  final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code,
  BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

N/A.

## Document Shepherd Checks

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this
  document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready
  to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

Yes.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled [lists of common issues that their
    reviewers encounter][6]. For which areas have such issues been identified
    and addressed? For which does this still need to happen in subsequent
    reviews?

Yes, intarea/ADD WG.

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream ([Best
    Current Practice][12], [Proposed Standard, Internet Standard][13],
    [Informational, Experimental or Historic][14])? Why is this the proper type
    of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

This document requests publication as a Proposed Standard RFC. That
is indicated on the header page. The intended status is justified
given that the document specifies new IKE attributes with a set of normative
behavior to ensure interoperability.

12. Have reasonable efforts been made to remind all authors of the intellectual
    property rights (IPR) disclosure obligations described in [BCP 79][7]? To
    the best of your knowledge, have all required disclosures been filed? If
    not, explain why. If yes, summarize any relevant discussion, including links
    to publicly-available messages when applicable.

Yes, see https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/QMbmRZRI6Wk20JXxnz2lOMAWF18/

13. Has each author, editor, and contributor shown their willingness to be
    listed as such? If the total number of authors and editors on the front page
    is greater than five, please provide a justification.

Yes.

14. Document any remaining I-D nits in this document. Simply running the [idnits
    tool][8] is not enough; please review the ["Content Guidelines" on
    authors.ietf.org][15]. (Also note that the current idnits tool generates
    some incorrect warnings; a rewrite is underway.)

None to report for this version.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa? See the [IESG
    Statement on Normative and Informative References][16].

No.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did
    the community have sufficient access to review any such normative
    references?

None.

17. Are there any normative downward references (see [RFC 3967][9] and [BCP
    97][10]) that are not already listed in the [DOWNREF registry][17]? If so,
    list them.

None.

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready to be
    submitted to the IESG for publication or are otherwise in an unclear state?
    If so, what is the plan for their completion?

The document has a normative dependency on I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https, which is
in the RFC Editor Queue.

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If
    so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs
    listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the
    introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document
    where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No.

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section,
    especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document.
    Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are
    associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm
    that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm
    that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents,
    allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see [RFC 8126][11]).

All requested actions are clearly documented, with adequate pointers to the target
IANA registry. The shepherd is one of the IANA experts for the registries to be
modified, and one of the authors is the another IANA expert, so all IANA experts
of the registries should be familiar with the registrations.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for
    future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear?
    Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

N/A.

[1]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/
[2]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4858.html
[3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942.html
[4]: https://trac.ietf.org/trac/ops/wiki/yang-review-tools
[5]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8342.html
[6]: https://trac.ietf.org/trac/iesg/wiki/ExpertTopics
[7]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp79
[8]: https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/
[9]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3967.html
[10]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp97
[11]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126.html
[12]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-5
[13]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.1
[14]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.2
[15]: https://authors.ietf.org/en/content-guidelines-overview
[16]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/normative-informative-references/
[17]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/downref/

# Document Shepherd Write-Up for Group Documents

*This version is dated 4 July 2022.*

Thank you for your service as a document shepherd. Among the responsibilities is
answering the questions in this write-up to give helpful context to Last Call
and Internet Engineering Steering Group ([IESG][1]) reviewers, and your
diligence in completing it is appreciated. The full role of the shepherd is
further described in [RFC 4858][2]. You will need the cooperation of the authors
and editors to complete these checks.

Note that some numbered items contain multiple related questions; please be sure
to answer all of them.

## Document History

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a
  few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

There is a broad agreement to adopt and progress this work within IPsecME.

2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where
  the consensus was particularly rough?

No controversy is to be reported for the draft. The authors were responsive in
dealing with the comments raised by reviewers during all the document' development phases.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If
  so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the
  responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this
  questionnaire is publicly available.)

No.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of
  the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated
  plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere,
  either in the document itself (as [RFC 7942][3] recommends) or elsewhere
  (where)?

No implementation was reported to the WG.

## Additional Reviews

5. Do the contents of this document closely interact with technologies in other
  IETF working groups or external organizations, and would it therefore benefit
  from their review? Have those reviews occurred? If yes, describe which
  reviews took place.

Yes, the document follows the design guidelines set by the ADD WG for the discovery
of encrypted DNS resolvers. This is acknowledged in the current specification.

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria,
  such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

No formal review is required other than the review required to perform the IANA
actions.

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module
  been checked with any of the [recommended validation tools][4] for syntax and
  formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is
  the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module
  comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified
  in [RFC 8342][5]?

N/A.

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the
  final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code,
  BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

N/A.

## Document Shepherd Checks

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this
  document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready
  to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

Yes.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled [lists of common issues that their
    reviewers encounter][6]. For which areas have such issues been identified
    and addressed? For which does this still need to happen in subsequent
    reviews?

Yes, intarea/ADD WG.

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream ([Best
    Current Practice][12], [Proposed Standard, Internet Standard][13],
    [Informational, Experimental or Historic][14])? Why is this the proper type
    of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

This document requests publication as a Proposed Standard RFC. That
is indicated on the header page. The intended status is justified
given that the document specifies new IKE attributes with a set of normative
behavior to ensure interoperability.

12. Have reasonable efforts been made to remind all authors of the intellectual
    property rights (IPR) disclosure obligations described in [BCP 79][7]? To
    the best of your knowledge, have all required disclosures been filed? If
    not, explain why. If yes, summarize any relevant discussion, including links
    to publicly-available messages when applicable.

Yes, see https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/QMbmRZRI6Wk20JXxnz2lOMAWF18/

13. Has each author, editor, and contributor shown their willingness to be
    listed as such? If the total number of authors and editors on the front page
    is greater than five, please provide a justification.

Yes.

14. Document any remaining I-D nits in this document. Simply running the [idnits
    tool][8] is not enough; please review the ["Content Guidelines" on
    authors.ietf.org][15]. (Also note that the current idnits tool generates
    some incorrect warnings; a rewrite is underway.)

None to report for this version.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa? See the [IESG
    Statement on Normative and Informative References][16].

No.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did
    the community have sufficient access to review any such normative
    references?

None.

17. Are there any normative downward references (see [RFC 3967][9] and [BCP
    97][10]) that are not already listed in the [DOWNREF registry][17]? If so,
    list them.

None.

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready to be
    submitted to the IESG for publication or are otherwise in an unclear state?
    If so, what is the plan for their completion?

The document has a normative dependency on I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https, which is
in the RFC Editor Queue.

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If
    so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs
    listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the
    introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document
    where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No.

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section,
    especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document.
    Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are
    associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm
    that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm
    that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents,
    allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see [RFC 8126][11]).

All requested actions are clearly documented, with adequate pointers to the target
IANA registry. The shepherd is one of the IANA experts for the registries to be
modified, and one of the authors is the another IANA expert, so all IANA experts
of the registries should be familiar with the registrations.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for
    future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear?
    Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

N/A.

[1]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/
[2]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4858.html
[3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942.html
[4]: https://trac.ietf.org/trac/ops/wiki/yang-review-tools
[5]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8342.html
[6]: https://trac.ietf.org/trac/iesg/wiki/ExpertTopics
[7]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp79
[8]: https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/
[9]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3967.html
[10]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp97
[11]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126.html
[12]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-5
[13]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.1
[14]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.2
[15]: https://authors.ietf.org/en/content-guidelines-overview
[16]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/normative-informative-references/
[17]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/downref/