Protecting Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Implementations from Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ddos-protection-01

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Last updated 2015-03-09
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IPSecME Working Group                                             Y. Nir
Internet-Draft                                               Check Point
Intended status: Standards Track                              V. Smyslov
Expires: September 9, 2015                                    ELVIS-PLUS
                                                           March 8, 2015

Protecting Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Implementations from Distributed
                       Denial of Service Attacks
                 draft-ietf-ipsecme-ddos-protection-01

Abstract

   This document recommends implementation and configuration best
   practices for Internet-connected IPsec Responders, to allow them to
   resist Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service attacks.
   Additionally, the document introduces a new mechanism called "Client
   Puzzles" that help accomplish this task.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Nir & Smyslov           Expires September 9, 2015               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE              March 2015

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  The Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Puzzles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  The Keyed-Cookie Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  The Puzzle-Required Notification  . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Retention Periods for Half-Open SAs . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Rate Limiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Plan for Defending a Responder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.1.  Session Resumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Using Puzzles in the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  Puzzles in IKE_SA_INIT Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       8.1.1.  Presenting Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       8.1.2.  Solving Puzzle and Returning the Solution . . . . . .  15
       8.1.3.  Analyzing Repeated Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       8.1.4.  Making Decision whether to Serve the Request  . . . .  17
     8.2.  Puzzles in IKE_AUTH Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       8.2.1.  Presenting Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       8.2.2.  Solving Puzzle and Returning the Solution . . . . . .  20
       8.2.3.  Receiving Puzzle Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   9.  DoS Protection after IKE SA is created  . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   10. Payload Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     10.1.  PUZZLE Notification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     10.2.  Puzzle Solution Payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24

1.  Introduction

   The IKE_SA_INIT Exchange described in section 1.2 of [RFC7296]
   involves the Initiator sending a single message.  The Responder
   replies with a single message and also allocates memory for a
   structure called a half-open IKE SA (Security Association).  This
   half-open SA is later authenticated in the IKE_AUTH Exchange, but if
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