Protecting Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Implementations from Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ddos-protection-03

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Last updated 2015-12-16
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IPSecME Working Group                                             Y. Nir
Internet-Draft                                               Check Point
Intended status: Standards Track                              V. Smyslov
Expires: June 18, 2016                                        ELVIS-PLUS
                                                       December 16, 2015

Protecting Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Implementations from Distributed
                       Denial of Service Attacks
                 draft-ietf-ipsecme-ddos-protection-03

Abstract

   This document recommends implementation and configuration best
   practices for Internet-connected IPsec Responders, to allow them to
   resist Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service attacks.
   Additionally, the document introduces a new mechanism called "Client
   Puzzles" that help accomplish this task.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 18, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Nir & Smyslov             Expires June 18, 2016                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE           December 2015

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  The Stateless Cookie  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  The Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Puzzles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Retention Periods for Half-Open SAs . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Rate Limiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Plan for Defending a Responder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.1.  Session Resumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Using Puzzles in the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.1.  Puzzles in IKE_SA_INIT Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       7.1.1.  Presenting Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       7.1.2.  Solving Puzzle and Returning the Solution . . . . . .  15
       7.1.3.  Computing Puzzle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       7.1.4.  Analyzing Repeated Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       7.1.5.  Making Decision whether to Serve the Request  . . . .  17
     7.2.  Puzzles in IKE_AUTH Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       7.2.1.  Presenting Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       7.2.2.  Solving Puzzle and Returning the Solution . . . . . .  20
       7.2.3.  Computing Puzzle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       7.2.4.  Receiving Puzzle Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   8.  DoS Protection after IKE SA is created  . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   9.  Payload Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     9.1.  PUZZLE Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     9.2.  Puzzle Solution Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   10. Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26

1.  Introduction

   Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have always been considered a serious
   threat.  These attacks are usually difficult to defend against since
   the amount of resources the victim has is always bounded (regardless
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