Protecting Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) Implementations from Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ddos-protection-09

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (ipsecme WG)
Last updated 2016-09-29 (latest revision 2016-09-12)
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
Formats plain text pdf html bibtex
Reviews
Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd David Waltermire
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2016-08-18)
IESG IESG state Approved-announcement to be sent::Revised I-D Needed
Consensus Boilerplate Yes
Telechat date
Responsible AD Kathleen Moriarty
Send notices to "David Waltermire" <david.waltermire@nist.gov>
IANA IANA review state IANA - Not OK
IANA action state None
IPSecME Working Group                                             Y. Nir
Internet-Draft                                               Check Point
Intended status: Standards Track                              V. Smyslov
Expires: March 16, 2017                                       ELVIS-PLUS
                                                      September 12, 2016

      Protecting Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2)
       Implementations from Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
                 draft-ietf-ipsecme-ddos-protection-09

Abstract

   This document recommends implementation and configuration best
   practices for Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2)
   Responders, to allow them to resist Denial of Service and Distributed
   Denial of Service attacks.  Additionally, the document introduces a
   new mechanism called "Client Puzzles" that help accomplish this task.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 16, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Nir & Smyslov            Expires March 16, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft          DDoS Protection for IKEv2         September 2016

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Defense Measures while the IKE SA is being created  . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Retention Periods for Half-Open SAs . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Rate Limiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  The Stateless Cookie  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.4.  Puzzles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.5.  Session Resumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.6.  Keeping computed Shared Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.7.  Preventing "Hash and URL" Certificate Encoding Attacks  .  11
     4.8.  IKE Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Defense Measures after an IKE SA is created . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Plan for Defending a Responder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  Using Puzzles in the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  Puzzles in IKE_SA_INIT Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       7.1.1.  Presenting a Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       7.1.2.  Solving a Puzzle and Returning the Solution . . . . .  18
       7.1.3.  Computing a Puzzle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       7.1.4.  Analyzing Repeated Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       7.1.5.  Deciding if to Serve the Request  . . . . . . . . . .  21
     7.2.  Puzzles in an IKE_AUTH Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       7.2.1.  Presenting Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       7.2.2.  Solving Puzzle and Returning the Solution . . . . . .  23
       7.2.3.  Computing the Puzzle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       7.2.4.  Receiving the Puzzle Solution . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   8.  Payload Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     8.1.  PUZZLE Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     8.2.  Puzzle Solution Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   9.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   12. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
Show full document text