Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis-11

[Ballot discuss]
The Gen-ART Review by Elwyn Davies on 4 May 2010 raised a question
  that deserves consideration.  Elwyn said:
  >
  > s3.3.4: The draft states that the list of mandatory to implement
  > suites has been removed due to evolution going too fast.  However
  > there are effectively some mandatory to implement suites; they are
  > listed in other documents.  There should be a way of finding them
  > so that users and implmenters can find them easily.
  >
  Inclusion of a informative reference seems reasonable.  There could be
  warning that the algorithm document is likely to be updated without
  a corresponding update to the protocol.  The RFC index will tell the
  community when the algorithm document is revised.

[Ballot comment]
A fine piece of work, and I admire the way you have avoided paying the page-break tax.

Amongst all the bogus reference warnings...
Section 6
s/[IKEv2]/[IKEV2]/

[Ballot discuss]
Before approving this document I would like to receive some clarifications about the compatibility of the implementations of RFC 4306 and of this document when deployed in a network.

All quoted text is in section 1.7:

> The protocol described in this document retains the same major
  version number (2) and minor version number (0) as was used in RFC
  4306.  That is, the version number is *not* changed from RFC 4306.

This translates for me to the fact that implementations of hosts supporting 4306 and this document can be freely mixed. However, the following changes could possibly lead to interoperability problems.


  This document removes the allowance for rejecting messages where the
  payloads were not in the "right" order; now implementations MUST NOT
  reject them.  This is due to the lack of clarity where the orders for
  the payloads are described.

Implementations of 4306 would still reject messages where the payloads were not in the "right" order. Would that not cause interoperabolity problems?

  In section 1.3.2, changed "The KEi payload SHOULD be included" to be
  "The KEi payload MUST be included".  This also led to changes in
  section 2.18.

Implementations of 4306 may still not include the KEi payload. Would that not cause interoperability problems?

  Section 2.18 requires doing a Diffie-Hellman exchange when rekeying
  the IKE_SA.  In theory, RFC 4306 allowed a policy where the Diffie-
  Hellman exchange was optional, but this was not useful (or
  appropriate) when rekeying the IKE_SA.

Implementations of 4306 may still not do a Diffie-Hellman exchange when rekeying based on policies allowed for that version. Would that not be an interoperability problem?

[Ballot discuss]
The Gen-ART Review by Elwyn Davies on 4 May 2010 raised a question
  that deserves consideration.  Elwyn said:
  >
  > s3.3.4: The draft states that the list of mandatory to implement
  > suites has been removed due to evolution going too fast.  However
  > there are effectively some mandatory to implement suites; they are
  > listed in other documents.  There should be a way of finding them
  > so that users and implmenters can find them easily.
  >
  Inclusion of a normative reference seems reasonable.  There could be
  warning that the algorithm document is likely to be updated without
  a corresponding update to the protocol.  The RFC index will tell the
  community when the algorithm document is revised.

IANA questions/comments:

- This document doesn't appear to contain all the information
associated with the assignments defined by RFC4306. Would it be more
appropriate to add this document as a reference, rather than replace
the references?

Upon approval of this document, IANA will do the following:

Note that there is a question to the authors. See "QUESTION" below.

ACTION 1:

Make the following changes in "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
Parameters" registry located at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters , sub-registry "IKEv2
Configuration Payload Attribute Types"

Value Attribute Type Multi-Valued Length
Reference
----------- -------------------------- ------------ --------------
---------
OLD:
5 INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY NO 0 or 4 octets
[RFC4306]
11 INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS YES 0 or 16 octets
[RFC4306]

NEW:
5 Unassigned
11 Unassigned

QUESTION: Should the removed values be tagged as "Unassigned" or
"Reserved"?
The latter would then garantee that value won't be reused for a future
assignment.


ACTION 2:

Make the following assignments in "Internet Key Exchange Version 2
(IKEv2) Parameters" registry located at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters , sub-registry "IKEv2
Notify Message Types - Error Types"

Value NOTIFY MESSAGES - ERROR TYPES Reference
------------ -------------------------------- ---------
TBA1 TEMPORARY_FAILURE [RFC-ipsecme-ikev2bis-08]
TBA2 CHILD_SA_NOT_FOUND [RFC-ipsecme-ikev2bis-08]


ACTION 3:

Make the following change in "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
Parameters" registry located at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters , sub-registry "IKEv2
Payload Types"

Value Next Payload Type Notation Reference
-------- ------------------------------- --------- ---------
OLD:
46 Encrypted E [RFC4306]

NEW:
46 Encrypted and Authenticated SK [RFC-ipsecme-ikev2bis-08]


ACTION 4:

Make the following changes in "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
Parameters" registry located at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters

Change all references of [RFC4306] to [RFC-ipsecme-ikev2bis-08] in all
sub-registries.

        Document write up for: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis-08

  (1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
        Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
        document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
        version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

        Yaron Sheffer, co-chair of the IPsecME WG, is Shepherd for this
        document. I have reviewed this version and believe it is ready for
        publication.

  (1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
        and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have
        any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
        have been performed?

        The document is the core WG document, and has had a huge amount
        of review by many WG members. This is evidenced by over a hundred
        issues that were opened against this document - and closed by the WG.
        I have no concerns regarding the quality of review.

  (1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
        needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
        e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
        AAA, internationalization or XML?

        I am not aware of any particular additional community that needs
        to review this document.

  (1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
        issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
        and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he
        or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
        has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any
        event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
        that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
        concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
        been filed? If so, please include a reference to the
        disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
        this issue.

        I have no such concerns.

  (1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
        represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
        others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
        agree with it?

        There is solid consensus behind this document.

  (1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
        discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
        separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It
        should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
        entered into the ID Tracker.)

        No extreme discontent.

  (1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
        document satisfies all ID nits? (See the Internet-Drafts Checklist
        and http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are
        not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document
        met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
        Doctor, media type and URI type reviews?

        There are some "glitches" reported by the IDnits tool, I have verified
        each one and none of them is real. Otherwise, the document strictly
        abides by the checklist.

  (1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
        informative? Are there normative references to documents that
        are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
        state? If such normative references exist, what is the
        strategy for their completion? Are there normative references
        that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If
        so, list these downward references to support the Area
        Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].

        References are split. I have found this references to an Informational
        RFC: RFC 3447 (PKCS#1).

  (1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
        consideration section exists and is consistent with the body
        of the document? If the document specifies protocol
        extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
        registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If
        the document creates a new registry, does it define the
        proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
        procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a
        reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC5226]. If the
        document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd
        conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG
        can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?

        The document uses the established IANA IKEv2 infrastructure, with
        very slight changes which are well documented. Tero Kivinen is
        the appointed expert for IKEv2, and by induction, for IKEv2-bis.

  (1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
        document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
        code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
        an automated checker?

        There are no such sections.

  (1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
        Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document
        Announcement Write-Up? Recent examples can be found in the
        "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval
        announcement contains the following sections:
    Technical Summary
        Relevant content can frequently be found in the abstract
        and/or introduction of the document. If not, this may be
        an indication that there are deficiencies in the abstract
        or introduction.

        This document describes version 2 of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
        protocol.  IKE is a component of IPsec used for performing mutual
        authentication and establishing and maintaining security associations
        (SAs).  This document replaces and updates RFC 4306, and includes all
        of the clarifications from RFC 4718.

    Working Group Summary
        Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For
        example, was there controversy about particular points or
        were there decisions where the consensus was particularly
        rough?

        There were no notable issues with the WG process. There were the
        usual heated discussions, one of which had to be resolved by a design
        team. But the eventual result has a wide consensus.

    Document Quality
        Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a
        significant number of vendors indicated their plan to
        implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that
        merit special mention as having done a thorough review,
        e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a
        conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If
        there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review,
        what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type
        review, on what date was the request posted?

        There are multiple implementations of the IKEv2 protocol. Since
        this document essentially clarifies the protocol (with only a tiny
        amount of actual protocol changes), we expect all IPsec
        vendors to ensure that their implementation is in line with this
        document.