Mixing Preshared Keys in IKEv2 for Post-quantum Resistance
draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-10

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (ipsecme WG)
Last updated 2020-01-09 (latest revision 2019-12-26)
Replaces draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2
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Internet Engineering Task Force                               S. Fluhrer
Internet-Draft                                                 D. McGrew
Intended status: Standards Track                           P. Kampanakis
Expires: June 29, 2020                                     Cisco Systems
                                                              V. Smyslov
                                                              ELVIS-PLUS
                                                       December 27, 2019

       Mixing Preshared Keys in IKEv2 for Post-quantum Resistance
                     draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-10

Abstract

   The possibility of quantum computers poses a serious challenge to
   cryptographic algorithms deployed widely today.  IKEv2 is one example
   of a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN
   communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a
   quantum computer is available.  It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be
   extended to support quantum-secure key exchange algorithms; however
   that is not likely to happen in the near term.  To address this
   problem before then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to
   allow it to be resistant to a quantum computer, by using preshared
   keys.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 29, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Fluhrer, et al.           Expires June 29, 2020                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    Mixing PSK in IKEv2 for PQ Resistance    December 2019

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Upgrade procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  PPK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  PPK_ID format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.2.1.  PPK Distribution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.2.2.  Group PPK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.2.3.  PPK-only Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.2.  Informational References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Appendix A.  Discussion and Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   Recent achievements in developing quantum computers demonstrate that
   it is probably feasible to build a cryptographically significant one.
   If such a computer is implemented, many of the cryptographic
   algorithms and protocols currently in use would be insecure.  A
   quantum computer would be able to solve DH and ECDH problems in
   polynomial time [I-D.hoffman-c2pq], and this would imply that the
   security of existing IKEv2 [RFC7296] systems would be compromised.
   IKEv1 [RFC2409], when used with strong preshared keys, is not
   vulnerable to quantum attacks, because those keys are one of the
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