Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
draft-ietf-isms-dtls-tm-14

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 14 and is now closed.

(David Harrington) (was Discuss) Yes

(Sean Turner) Yes

(Jari Arkko) No Objection

(Gonzalo Camarillo) No Objection

(Adrian Farrel) No Objection

Comment (2010-05-06 for -)
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A few thoughts about the MIB module. Nothing of any great importance.

It would be helpful if the Imports clause indicated (through comments)
the source documents for the MIB modules from which things are being
imported.

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SnmpTLSAddress

Since I-D.ietf-6man-text-addr-representation is ahead of this document
in the process-chain, it would be good if you could include an RFC 
Editor note requesting the reference to be changed where it appears in 
the Description and Reference clause in the MIB module in this
document.

So the comment
-- RFC Editor: if I-D.ietf-6man-text-addr-representation fails to get
-- published ahead of this draft, RFC3513 has been agreed to be a
-- sufficient replacement instead.
could also be clarified as a specific instruction.

Note that since the I-D is a normative reference, you don't have to
worry about the order of publication.

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SnmpTLSFingerprint

Some problem with line feeds?

---

Do you need to worry about discontinuities with your counters?

(Russ Housley) No Objection

Alexey Melnikov (was Discuss) No Objection

Comment (2010-05-06 for -)
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I am still quite concerned about the following issues and I don't think I've heard convincing enough answers other than "this was discussed in the WG" and "some security people like Pasi and Jeffrey Hutzelman". So I am reluctantly clearing this. I am leaving the text in the Comment section:

In Section 7:

snmpTlstmCertSANAny OBJECT-IDENTITY
    STATUS        current
    DESCRIPTION  "Maps any of the following fields using the
                  corresponding mapping algorithms:

                  |------------+------------------------|
                  | Type       | Algorithm              |
                  |------------+------------------------|
                  | rfc822Name | snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name |
                  | dNSName    | snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName    |
                  | iPAddress  | snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress  |
                  |------------+------------------------|

                  The first matching subjectAltName value found in the
                  certificate of the above types MUST be used when
                  deriving the tmSecurityName."
    ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 5 }

I am generally concerned about 2 things here:
A) too many identity extraction algorithm choices presented in the document
B) snmpTlstmCertSANAny in particular relies on certain ordering of subjectAltName types. I don't think existing TLS APIs are geared toward iterating over subjectAltName types, they are usually allow retrieval of a certain subjectAltName item by type.

(Tim Polk) (was Discuss) No Objection

(Dan Romascanu) (was Discuss) No Objection

Comment (2010-04-29)
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1. For consistency purposes (as TLS is expanded) expand SNMP in the title.

2. In a couple of places (section 1, section 9.1) I encountered the term 'notification responder' while in all other places 'notification receiver' is used. The terms are not exactly synonims, is the inconsistency intentional? 

3. In Section 3.3 

   When configuring a (D)TLS target, the snmpTargetAddrTDomain and
   snmpTargetAddrTAddress parameters in snmpTargetAddrTable should be
   set to the snmpTLSTCPDomain or snmpDTLSUDPDomain object and an
   appropriate snmpTLSAddress value.  When used with the SNMPv3 message
   processing model, the snmpTargetParamsMPModel column of the
   snmpTargetParamsTable should be set to a value of 3.  The
   snmpTargetParamsSecurityName should be set to an appropriate
   securityName value and the snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint parameter
   of the snmpTlstmParamsTable should be set a value that refers to a
   locally held certificate (and the corresponding private key) to be
   used. 

All 'should' seem to need to be capitalized. 

4. In Section 4.1 

   Enterprise configurations are encouraged to map a "subjectAltName"
   component of the X.509 certificate to the TLSTM specific
   tmSecurityName.

I do not think that we have a clear notion of what an 'enterprise configuration' is and why it would be more appropriate for such a mapping. It looks like a (non-capitalized) may is more appropriate here. 

5. In Section 5.2 5b) s/If there is not a corresponding LCD entry/If there is no corresponding LCD entry/

6. In Section 5.4.4

 4)  Have (D)TLS close the specified connection.  This SHOULD include
       sending a close_notify TLS Alert to inform the other side that
       session cleanup may be performed.

Unless I miss something sending the close_notify TLS Alert is always part of the closing sequence, so s/SHOULD/MUST/

7. Some of the references in the MIB module are not included as Informative References - for example RFC 1033, RFC 3490

(Peter Saint-Andre) (was Discuss) No Objection

Comment (2010-05-10)
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Cleared.

(Robert Sparks) No Objection