JSON Web Proof
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-proof-07
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (jose WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | David Waite , Michael B. Jones , Jeremie Miller | ||
| Last updated | 2024-10-21 | ||
| Replaces | draft-jmiller-jose-json-web-proof | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-proof-07
jose D. Waite
Internet-Draft Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones
Expires: 24 April 2025 Self-Issued Consulting
J. Miller
Ping Identity
21 October 2024
JSON Web Proof
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-proof-07
Abstract
The JOSE set of standards established JSON-based container formats
for Keys, Signatures, and Encryption. They also established IANA
registries to enable the algorithms and representations used for them
to be extended. Since those were created, newer cryptographic
algorithms that support selective disclosure and unlinkability have
matured and started seeing early market adoption. The COSE set of
standards likewise does this for CBOR-based containers, focusing on
the needs of environments which are better served using CBOR, such as
constrained devices and networks.
This document defines a new container format similar in purpose and
design to JSON Web Signature (JWS) and COSE Signed Messages called a
_JSON Web Proof (JWP)_. Unlike JWS, which integrity-protects only a
single payload, JWP can integrity-protect multiple payloads in one
message. It also specifies a new presentation form that supports
selective disclosure of individual payloads, enables additional proof
computation, and adds a protected header to prevent replay.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 April 2025.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. JWP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Header Parameter Labeling Requirements . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Registered Header Parameter Labels . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.2. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.3. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2.4. "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.5. "proof_key" (Proof Key) Header Parameter . . . . . . 10
4.2.6. "presentation_key" (Presentation Key) Header
Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2.7. "iss" (Issuer) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2.8. "aud" (Audience) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2.9. "nonce" (Nonce) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. Public Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4. Private Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. JWP Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. Issued Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.1. Issuer Protected Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1.2. Issuer Payloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1.3. Issuer Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. Presented Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2.1. Presentation Protected Header . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2.2. Presentation Payloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2.3. Presentation Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Serializations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Compact Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2. JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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6.3. CBOR Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Encrypted JSON Web Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. Detached Payloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
10.1. JSON Web Proof Header Parameters Registry . . . . . . . 23
10.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.1.2.1. Algorithm Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.1.2.2. Key ID Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.1.2.3. Type Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.1.2.4. Critical Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.1.2.5. Issuer Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.1.2.6. Audience Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1.2.7. Nonce Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1.2.8. Proof Key Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1.2.9. Presentation Key Header Parameter . . . . . . . 25
10.2. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.2.1.1. The application/jwp Media Type . . . . . . . . . 26
10.2.1.2. The application/jwp+json Media Type . . . . . . 26
10.2.1.3. The application/jwp+cbor Media Type . . . . . . 27
10.3. Structured Syntax Suffix Registration . . . . . . . . . 27
10.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10.3.1.1. The +jwp Structured Syntax Suffix . . . . . . . 27
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction
The JOSE specifications are very widely deployed and well supported,
enabling use of cryptographic primitives with a JSON representation.
JWTs [RFC7519] are one of the most common representations for
identity and access claims. For instance, they are used by the
OpenID Connect and Secure Telephony Identity Revisited (STIR)
standards. Also, JWTs are used by W3C's Verifiable Credentials and
are used in many decentralized identity systems.
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With these new use cases, there is an increased focus on adopting
privacy-protecting cryptographic primitives. While such primitives
are still an active area of academic and applied research, the
leading candidates introduce new patterns that are not currently
supported by JOSE or COSE. These new patterns are largely focused on
two areas: supporting selective disclosure when presenting
information and minimizing correlation through the use of Zero-
Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) in addition to traditional signatures.
There are a growing number of these cryptographic primitives that
support selective disclosure while protecting privacy across multiple
presentations. Examples used in the context of Verifiable
Credentials are:
* CL Signatures (https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/562.pdf)
* IDEMIX (http://www.zurich.ibm.com/idemix)
* BBS signatures, described in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures]
* MerkleDisclosureProof2021 (https://github.com/transmute-
industries/merkle-disclosure-proof-2021)
* Mercurial Signatures (https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/979)
* PS Signatures (https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/525.pdf)
* U-Prove (https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/
u-prove/)
* Spartan (https://github.com/microsoft/Spartan)
All of these follow the same pattern of taking multiple claims
(a.k.a., "attributes" or "messages" in the literature) and binding
them together into a single issued token. These are then later
securely one-way transformed into a presentation that reveals
potentially only a subset of the original claims, predicate proofs
about the claim values, or proofs of knowledge of the claims.
| Editor's Note: This draft is still early and incomplete. There
| will be significant changes to the algorithms as currently defined
| here. Please do not use any of these definitions or examples for
| anything except personal experimentation and learning.
| Contributions and feedback are welcomed at https://github.com/
| ietf-wg-jose/json-web-proof (https://github.com/ietf-wg-jose/json-
| web-proof).
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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The roles of "issuer", "holder", and "verifier" are used as defined
by the VC Data Model [VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]. The term "presentation" is
also used as defined by this source, but the term "credential" is
avoided in this specification to minimize confusion with other
definitions.
2.1. Terminology
The following terms are used throughout this series of documents:
binding: A mechanism, indicated in an issued JWP, for how to verify a
presentation was created by the intended holder.
linkability: The property where multiple presentations may be
correlated to a single issued JWP, either through consistency in the
cryptographic integrity or due to particulars of JWP usage by an
application. Such issued JWPs may be referred to as single-use, as
multiple uses may leak unintended knowledge.
unlinkability: The property of issuance and presentation algorithms
and of application usage, where one presentation can only be
correlated with other presentations based on holder-disclosed
information.
2.2. Abbreviations
* ZKP: Zero-Knowledge Proof
* JWP: JSON Web Proof (this specification)
* JPA: JSON Proof Algorithms [I-D.ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms]
* JPT: JSON Proof Token [I-D.ietf-jose-json-proof-token]
3. Background
A _JSON Web Proof (JWP)_ is very similar to a JWS [RFC7515] or COSE
Signed Message [RFC8152], with the addition that it can contain
multiple individual secured payloads instead of a single one. JWP-
supporting algorithms are then able to separate and act on the
individual payloads contained within.
The intent of JSON Web Proof is to establish a common container
format for multiple payloads that can be integrity-verified against a
cryptographic proof value also in the container. It does not create
or specify any cryptographic protocols, multi-party protocols, or
detail any algorithm-specific capabilities.
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To fully support the newer privacy primitives, JWP utilizes the three
roles of issuer, holder, and verifier, as defined by the VC Data
Model [VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]. There are also two forms of a JWP: the
issued form created by an issuer for a holder, and the presented form
created by a holder for a verifier.
The four principal interactions used by JWP are issue, confirm,
present, and verify.
A JWP is initially created by the issuer using the issue interaction.
A successful result is an issued JWP that has a single issuer-
protected header, one or more payloads, and an initial proof value
that contains the issuing algorithm output. The holder, upon
receiving an issued JWP, then uses the confirm interaction to check
the integrity protection of the header and all payloads using the
proof value.
After validation, the holder uses the present interaction to apply
any selective disclosure choices, perform privacy-preserving
transformations for unlinkability, and add a presentation-protected
header that ensures the resulting presented JWP cannot be replayed.
The verifier then uses the verify interaction to ensure the integrity
protection of the protected headers and any disclosed payloads, along
with verifying any additional ZKPs covering non-disclosed payloads.
While issue and confirm only occur when a JWP is initially created by
the issuer, the present and verify steps may be safely repeated by a
holder on an issued JWP. He resulting presented JWP is only
unlinkable when supported by the underlying algorithm.
Algorithm definitions that support JWPs are in separate companion
specifications - just as the JSON Web Algorithms [RFC7518]
specification does for JWS and JWE [RFC7516]. The JSON Proof
Algorithms (JPA) [I-D.ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms] specification
defines how an initial set of algorithms are used with JWP.
4. JWP Header
A JWP Header is a set of Header Parameters that apply to the JWP.
These Header Parameters may be specific to the proof applied to the
JWP, they may identify the party issuing the proof, and they may
describe the application purpose and format of the JWP, as well as
provide other potential metadata.
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A Header Parameter may be represented as JSON or as CBOR. When
represented using JSON, each Header Parameter has a string label and
has a JSON-structured value within a JSON Object. When described
using CBOR, each parameter has either an integer (int) or string
(tstr) label, and has a CBOR-structured value within a CBOR map.
The Header Parameter labels within the JWP Header MUST be unique.
CBOR processing MUST reject messages if two headers with the same
parameter label are encountered. JSON processing SHOULD reject
messages received with the same parameter label, but MAY instead
represent only the lexically last member with that label, as
specified in Section 15.12 ("The JSON Object") of ECMAScript 5.1
[ECMAScript]. JSON processing MUST take one of these two approaches
with regards to encountering duplicate header parameter labels.
Implementations are required to understand the specific Header
Parameters defined by this specification that are designated as "MUST
be understood" and process them in the manner defined in this
specification. All other Header Parameters defined by this
specification that are not so designated MUST be ignored when not
understood. Unless listed as a critical Header Parameter, per
Section 4.2.4, all Header Parameters not defined by this
specification MUST be ignored when not understood.
4.1. Header Parameter Labeling Requirements
As labels are the mechanism for semantically distinguishing parameter
names, it is important to describe the mechanism to reduce the risk
of conflicts.
There are three strategies for labeling header parameters:
1. Registered parameter labels. These labels are coordinated
through the IANA "JSON Web Proof Header Parameters" registry,
which protects against parameters having the same label.
2. Collision-resistant parameter labels. These labels are not
coordinated through IANA, but are otherwise namespaced to prevent
conflict. One example would a string label representing the URI
of a controlled resource, such as the HTTPS-hosted documentation
of the header parameter.
3. Private parameter labels. These labels are not coordinated
through IANA or another party, but are expected to only be used
for testing or in closed environments.
These classes of Header Parameters are intentionally parallel to
those in Section 4 of [RFC7515].
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4.2. Registered Header Parameter Labels
The following Header Parameter names for use in JWPs are registered
in the IANA "JSON Web Proof Header Parameters" registry established
by Section 10.1, with meanings as defined in the subsections below.
As indicated by the common registry, Header Parameters used in the
Issued Form (see Section 5.1) and the Presented Form Section 5.2
share a common Header Parameter space; when a parameter is used by
both forms, its usage must be compatible between them.
4.2.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter
The alg (algorithm) Header Parameter identifies the cryptographic
algorithm used to secure the JWP. The JWP Proof value is not valid
if the alg value does not represent a supported algorithm or if there
is not a key for use with that algorithm associated with the party
that secured the content. alg values should either be registered in
the IANA "JSON Web Proof Algorithms" registry established by
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms] or be a value that contains a
Collision-Resistant Name.
As a JSON-formatted header parameter, the alg value is a case-
sensitive ASCII string containing a StringOrURI value. As a CBOR-
formatted header parameter, this value may also be an integer value.
The list of defined alg values for this use can be found in the IANA
"JSON Web Proof Algorithms" registry established by
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms]; the initial contents of this
registry are registered by [I-D.ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms].
Use of this Header Parameter is REQUIRED.
4.2.2. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter
The kid (key ID) Header Parameter is a hint indicating which key was
used to secure the JWP. This parameter allows originators to
explicitly signal a change of key to recipients.
The structure of the kid value is unspecified.
When kid is used for a JSON Protected Header, its value MUST be a
case-sensitive string. When referencing a JWK, the kid value is
matched to the JWK kid parameter value.
When kid is used for a CBOR Protected Header, its value is a binary
string. When referencing a COSE Key, the kid value is matched to the
COSE_Key kid structure member.
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Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL.
4.2.3. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter
The typ (type) Header Parameter is used by JWP applications to
declare the media type [IANA.MediaTypes] of this complete JWP. This
is intended for use by the application when more than one kind of
object could be present in an application data structure that can
contain a JWP; the application can use this value to disambiguate
among the different kinds of objects that might be present. It will
typically not be used by applications when the kind of object is
already known. This parameter is ignored by JWP implementations; any
processing of this parameter is performed by the JWP application.
Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL.
For COSE Protected Headers, typ MAY also instead be an integer value
which corresponds to the IANA "CoAP Content-Formats" registry
[IANA.CoAP.Formats], which describes the corresponding media type.
Per [RFC2045], all media type values, subtype values, and parameter
names are case insensitive. However, parameter values are case
sensitive unless otherwise specified for the specific parameter.
To keep messages compact in common situations, it is RECOMMENDED that
producers omit an "application/" prefix of a media type value in a
typ Header Parameter when no other '/' appears in the media type
value. A recipient using the media type value MUST treat it as if
"application/" were prepended to any typ value not containing a '/'.
For instance, a typ value of example SHOULD be used to represent the
application/example media type, whereas the media type application/
example;part="1/2" cannot be shortened to example;part="1/2".
The typ value jwp can be used by applications to indicate that this
object is a JWP using the JWP Compact Serialization. The typ value
jwp+json can be used by applications to indicate that this object is
a JWP using the JWP JSON Serialization. Other type values can also
be used by applications.
It is RECOMMENDED that the typ Header Parameter be used for explicit
typing, in parallel to the recommendations in Section 3.11 of
[RFC8725].
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4.2.4. "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter
The crit (critical) Header Parameter indicates that extensions to
this specification and/or [I-D.ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms] are
being used that MUST be understood and processed. Its value is an
array listing the Header Parameter labels present in the JWP Header
that use those extensions. For JSON Protected Headers this is a list
of strings, while for CBOR protected headers it is a list containing
string and/or int values.
If any of the listed extension Header Parameters are not understood
and supported by the recipient, then the JWP is invalid. Producers
MUST NOT include Header Parameter names defined by this specification
or [I-D.ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms] for use with JWP, duplicate
names, or names that do not occur as Header Parameter names within
the JWP Header in the crit list. Producers MUST NOT use the empty
list [] as the crit value. Recipients MAY consider the JWP to be
invalid if the critical list contains any Header Parameter names
defined by this specification or
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms] for use with JWP or if any
other constraints on its use are violated. When used, this Header
Parameter MUST be integrity protected; therefore, it MUST occur only
within the JWP Protected Header. Use of this Header Parameter is
OPTIONAL. This Header Parameter MUST be understood and processed by
implementations.
4.2.5. "proof_key" (Proof Key) Header Parameter
The proof_key (Proof Key) represents the public key used by the
issuer for proof of possession within certain algorithms. This is an
ephemeral key that MUST be unique for each issued JWP.
This header parameter is references a JSON Web Key (JWK) public key
value when represented as a JSON Protected Header, and a COSE Key
Object when represented as a CBOR Protected Header.
It MUST contain only public key parameters and SHOULD contain only
the minimum parameters necessary to represent the key; other
parameters included can be checked for consistency and honored, or
they can be ignored.
When present, this Header Parameter MUST be understood and processed
by implementations.
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4.2.6. "presentation_key" (Presentation Key) Header Parameter
The presentation_key (Presentation Key) represents the public key
with certain algorithms, and is used by the holder for proof of
possession and integrity protection of the presented protected
header.
The issuer MUST validate that the holder has possession of this key
through a trusted mechanism, such as requiring the signature of a
unique nonce value from the holder before issuing the JWP.
This header parameter is references a JSON Web Key (JWK) public key
value when represented as a JSON Protected Header, and a COSE Key
Object when represented as a CBOR Protected Header.
It MUST contain only public key parameters and SHOULD contain only
the minimum parameters necessary to represent the key; other
parameters included can be checked for consistency and honored, or
they can be ignored.
If holder unlinkability is required, this value MUST not be repeated
in multiple issued JWPs; a different presentation key MUST be
included in each issuance.
This Header Parameter MUST be understood and processed by
implementations when present.
4.2.7. "iss" (Issuer) Header Parameter
The iss (issuer) Header Parameter identifies the principal that
issued the JWP. The processing of this claim is generally
application specific.
The iss value is a case-sensitive string containing a StringOrURI
value. Its definition is intentionally parallel to the iss claim
defined in [RFC7519].
Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL.
4.2.8. "aud" (Audience) Header Parameter
The aud (audience) Header Parameter identifies the recipients that
the JWP is intended for. Each principal intended to process the JWP
MUST identify itself with a value in the audience Header Parameter.
If the principal processing the Header Parameter does not identify
itself with a value in the aud Header Parameter when this Header
Parameter is present, then the JWP MUST be rejected.
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In the general case, the aud value is an array of case-sensitive
strings, each containing a StringOrURI value. In the special case
when the JWP has one audience, the aud value MAY be a single case-
sensitive string containing a StringOrURI value.
The interpretation of audience values is application specific.
Its definition is intentionally parallel to the aud claim defined in
[RFC7519].
Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL.
4.2.9. "nonce" (Nonce) Header Parameter
The nonce (nonce) Header Parameter is used to associate protocol
state with a presented JWP. Usage is protocol-specific, but examples
include requiring a unique nonce in requests as part of a strategy to
prevent replay, or for associating a JWP back to the context where it
was requested.
When used as a JSON Protected Header, the value is a case-sensitive
string value.
When used as a CBOR Protected Header, the value is a binary string.
This definition is intentionally parallel to the nonce claim
registered in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry
(#IANA.JWT.Claims).
Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL.
4.3. Public Header Parameter Names
Additional Header Parameter names can be defined by those using JWPs.
However, in order to prevent collisions, any new Header Parameter
name should either be registered in the IANA "JSON Web Proof Header
Parameters" registry established by Section 10.1 or be a Public Name
(a value that contains a Collision-Resistant Name). In each case,
the definer of the name or value needs to take reasonable precautions
to make sure they are in control of the part of the namespace they
use to define the Header Parameter name.
New Header Parameters should be introduced sparingly, as they can
result in non-interoperable JWPs.
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4.4. Private Header Parameter Names
A producer and consumer of a JWP may agree to use Header Parameter
names that are Private Names (names that are not Registered Header
Parameter labels Section 4.2 or Public Header Parameter names
Section 4.3.) Unlike Public Header Parameter names, Private Header
Parameter names are subject to collision and should be used with
caution.
5. JWP Forms
A JWP is always in one of two forms: the issued form or the presented
form. A structural difference between the two forms is the number of
protected headers. An issued JWP has only one issuer protected
header, while a presented JWP will have both the issuer protected
header and an additional presentation protected header. Each
protected header is a JSON object that is serialized as a UTF-8
encoded octet string.
All JWP forms have one or more payloads; each payload is an octet
string. The payloads are arranged in an array for which the ordering
is preserved in all serializations.
The JWP proof value is one or more octet strings that are only meant
to be generated from and processed by the underlying JPA.
Internally, the proof value may contain one or more cryptographic
statements that are used to check the integrity protection of the
header(s) and all payloads. Each of these statements may be a ZKP or
a traditional cryptographic signature. The algorithm is responsible
for how these statements are serialized into a single proof value.
5.1. Issued Form
When a JWP is first created, it is always in the issued form. It
will contain the issuer protected header along with all of the
payloads.
The issued form can only be confirmed by a holder as being correctly
formed and protected. It is NOT to be verified directly or presented
as-is to a verifier. The holder SHOULD treat an issued JWP as
private and use appropriately protected storage.
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5.1.1. Issuer Protected Header
The issuer protected header applies to all of the payloads equally.
It is recommended that any payload-specific information not be
included in this header and instead be handled outside of the
cryptographic envelope. This is to minimize any correlatable signals
in the metadata, to reduce a verifier's ability to group different
presentations based on small header variations from the same issuer.
The protected header is always disclosed, whereas payloads can be
selectively disclosed.
Every issuer protected header MUST have an alg value that identifies
a valid JSON Proof Algorithm (JPA).
For example:
{
"alg": "BBS"
}
5.1.2. Issuer Payloads
Payloads are represented and processed as individual octet strings
and arranged in an ordered array when there are multiple payloads.
All application context of the placement and encoding of each payload
value is out of scope of this specification and SHOULD be well
defined and documented by the application or other specifications.
JPAs MAY provide software interfaces that perform the encoding of
individual payloads which accept native inputs such as numbers, sets,
or elliptic curve points. This enables the algorithm to support
advanced features such as blinded values and predicate proofs. These
interfaces would generate the octet string encoded payload value as
well as include protection of that payload in the combined proof
value.
5.1.3. Issuer Proof
The issuer proof is one or more binary octet strings that are opaque
to applications. Individual proof-supporting algorithms are
responsible for the contents and security of the proof value, along
with any required internal structures.
The issuer proof is used by the holder to perform validation,
checking that the issuer header and all payloads are properly encoded
and protected by the given proof.
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5.2. Presented Form
When an issued JWP is presented, it undergoes a transformation that
adds a presentation protected header. It may also have one or more
payloads hidden, disclosing only a subset of the original issued
payloads. The proof value will always be updated to add integrity
protection of the presentation header along with the necessary
cryptographic statements to verify the presented JWP.
When supported by the underling JPA, a single issued JWP can be used
to safely generate multiple presented JWPs without becoming
correlatable.
A JWP may also be single use, where an issued JWP can only be used
once to generate a presented form. In this case, any additional
presentations would be inherently correlatable. These are still
useful for applications needing only selective disclosure or where
new unique issued JWPs can be retrieved easily.
5.2.1. Presentation Protected Header
The presented form of a JWP MUST contain a presentation protected
header. It is added by the holder and MUST be integrity protected by
the underling JPA.
This header is used to ensure that a presented JWP cannot be replayed
and is cryptographically bound to the verifier it was presented to.
While there are not any required values in the presentation header,
it MUST contain one or more header values that uniquely identify the
presented JWP to both the holder and verifier. For example, header
values that would satisfy this requirement include nonce and aud.
5.2.2. Presentation Payloads
Any one or more payloads may be non-disclosed in a presented JWP.
When a payload is not disclosed, the position of other payloads does
not change; the resulting array will simply be sparse and only
contain the disclosed payloads.
The disclosed payloads will always be in the same array positions to
preserve any index-based references by the application between the
issued and presented forms of the JWP. How the sparse array is
represented is specific to the serialization used.
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Algorithms MAY support including a proof about a payload in the
presentation. Applications then treat that proven payload the same
as any other non-disclosed payload and do not include it in the
presented array of payloads. Rather, proofs about payloads, such as
"age >= 21", are included in the presentation proof.
5.2.3. Presentation Proof
The presentation proof is one or more binary octet strings that are
opaque to applications. Individual proof-supporting algorithms are
responsible for the contents and security of the proof value, along
with any required internal structures.
The proof of a presented JWP will always be different than the issued
proof. At a minimum, it MUST be updated to include protection of the
added presentation header.
Algorithms SHOULD generate an un-correlatable presentation proof in
order to support multiple presentations from a single issued JWP.
The algorithm is responsible for representing selective disclosure of
payloads in a presented proof. If multiple octet strings are
insufficient for representing a proof as defined by an algorithm, the
algorithm is responsible for defining how such information is
represented within one or more octet strings.
6. Serializations
Each disclosed payload MUST be base64url encoded when preparing it to
be serialized. The headers and proof are also individually base64url
encoded.
Like JWS, JWP supports both a Compact Serialization and a JSON
Serialization. These serializations both represent the same JSON-
based Protected Header, payloads and proof, and are thus
interchangeable without breaking the proof value.
A CBOR-based serialization is also defined, which uses the CBOR for
describing Header Parameters. While this supports the same data
model and algorithms, the difference in header representations does
not allow interchangeability with the Compact Serialization and JSON
Serializations.
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6.1. Compact Serialization
The compact serialiation provides a JSON-based, space-efficient
encoding of a JWP in URL-safe characters. In addition to the
alphabet of unpadded BASE64 URL-safe encoding, it uses the "." and
"~" characters as separators.
The Protected Header MUST be JSON-formatted for Compact
Serialization. This includes both headers sets in presented form.
All binary data is BASE64URL encoded, including the octets of the
UTF-8 encoded headers and the individual payloads and proof values.
Payloads and proofs are each concatenated into a single text form by
concatenating the BASE64URL encoded values using the ~ character.
Individual payloads are allowed to be omitted; if a payload is
omitted, it is represented as a zero-length text value, potentially
resulting in leading, trailing, or consecutive ~ characters in the
concatenated form.
If a payload or proof value was a zero-length octet string, it does
not get output as its zero-length BASE64URL-encoded form but as a
single _ character. This character does not represent a valid
BASE64URL-encoded octet string, allowing it to be distinguished from
normally encoded data.
The issued form is created by concatenating the base64url-encoded
issuer protected header, concatenated payloads, and concatenated
proof separated each by a . character. The concatenated payloads MAY
be omitted if the application is using detached payloads.
The presented form is created by concatenating the base64url-encoded
presenter protected header, base64url-encoded issuer protected
header, concatenated payloads, and concatenated proof separated each
by a . character. The concatenated payloads MAY be omitted if the
application is using detached payloads.
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eyJhbGciOiJCQlMiLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3JlY2lwaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsI
m5vbmNlIjoid3JtQlJrS3RYalEifQ.eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJ
UOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRuRXhSMERValU4IiwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxN
zE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~~~.iJG8Vt5P9LYtHStXxWF9lbxGi5x3lJ19MsGdrek-
66i5ycvEFm1amYe5kjIaZHhgiO0H2I1uQlhsyp88-lNLpGOM_XDzZwYqf4HTkLzorpGR5
UVJrYLzP4HYAbdPChG8tfv9VxWarRRstGlNleoIf8qkUjvhbHWevX14Hjj102lif5aG4j
Eh71pYkifmUxARJARKboAv2YWO8rCuzSy4NejsK81X6W93KJW8A_Om9z9myaqflqRP0Jp
70z4r2tYDBVDaOLCMd5DadMR6cfFkKDQMx-qCtb6rqxWRXwupEfie3PmRGHtOtJFN7RZA
v-TcQFREFqMnc80VYJFJhsbzaPjsSDcfyP-omMbr9bIg4F4wTFHrAtlFVYY_YdG_07Dcz
JcTv35A6EdIaTpy9q_NCGlTj_wdRh0p3uNjZAKDG7as9dyQCzRALwiheQL03gtiTx4USV
8yo2UXdsG-5hba4EYMs3YN2iwStQh91ZfzXRw
| Figure: Compact Serialization of Presentation
6.2. JSON Serialization
The JSON Serialization is in the form of a JSON object, with property
names representing the various components.
The Protected Headers MUST be JSON-formatted for JSON Serialization.
This includes both headers sets in presented form.
The issuer key has a string value holding the BASE64URL-encoded
issuer protected header. This key MUST be included.
The presentation key has a string value holding the BASE64URL-encoded
presentation protected header. It MUST be included for presented
form, and MUST be omitted for issued form.
The payloads key has an array value, representing the ordered
sequence of payloads. If a payload has been omitted, it is
represented by the JSON value null. A payload is otherwise reprented
by the BASE64URL-encoded form of the payload octets. A zero-length
payload does not have special encoding rules as needed by compact
encoding, and is represented by the zero-length string output by
BASE64URL. This key MUST be included unless the application is using
detached payloads.
The proofs key has an array value, representing the array of octet
strings produced by the chosen algorithm. These octets are BASE64URL
encoded into a JSON array.
This example JSON serialization shows the presentation form with both
the issuer and presentation headers, and with the first and third
payloads hidden.
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{
"presentation": "eyJhbGciOiJCQlMiLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3JlY2lwaWVudC
5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsIm5vbmNlIjoid3JtQlJrS3RYalEifQ",
"issuer": "eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJUOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRu
RXhSMERValU4IiwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0",
"payloads": [
"MTcxNDUyMTYwMA",
"MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ",
"IkRvZSI",
"IkpheSI",
null,
null,
null
],
"proof": [
"iJG8Vt5P9LYtHStXxWF9lbxGi5x3lJ19MsGdrek-66i5ycvEFm1amYe5kjIaZHhg
iO0H2I1uQlhsyp88-lNLpGOM_XDzZwYqf4HTkLzorpGR5UVJrYLzP4HYAbdPCh
G8tfv9VxWarRRstGlNleoIf8qkUjvhbHWevX14Hjj102lif5aG4jEh71pYkifm
UxARJARKboAv2YWO8rCuzSy4NejsK81X6W93KJW8A_Om9z9myaqflqRP0Jp70z
4r2tYDBVDaOLCMd5DadMR6cfFkKDQMx-qCtb6rqxWRXwupEfie3PmRGHtOtJFN
7RZAv-TcQFREFqMnc80VYJFJhsbzaPjsSDcfyP-omMbr9bIg4F4wTFHrAtlFVY
Y_YdG_07DczJcTv35A6EdIaTpy9q_NCGlTj_wdRh0p3uNjZAKDG7as9dyQCzRA
LwiheQL03gtiTx4USV8yo2UXdsG-5hba4EYMs3YN2iwStQh91ZfzXRw"
]
}
| Figure: JSON Serialization of Presentation
6.3. CBOR Serialization
The CBOR serialization provides a compact binary representation of a
JWP. The serialization consists of two arrays, representing issued
and presented forms.
The protected headers MUST be CBOR formatted for CBOR serialization.
This includes both the issued and presented headers in the presented
form.
The issued form consists of a three-element array, while the
presented form consists of a four-element array.
If an individual payload has been omitted, it is represented by the
CBOR value nil. Payloads MUST be included unless the application is
using detached payloads, which is represented by setting the payloads
value as nil.ΒΆ
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Two tags are defined for representing issued and presented JWPs.
Applications MAY use their own tags to tag other specific types of
JWPs.
CBOR_JWP_Issued = [
IssuerHeader : serialized_map,
payloads : [payload] / nil,
proofs : [bstr]
]
CBOR_JWP_Presented = [
PresenterHeader : serialized_map,
IssuerHeaders : serialized_map,
payloads : [payload] / nil,
proofs : [bstr]
]
empty_or_serialized_map = bstr .cbor header_map
payload = bstr / nil
Tagged_CBOR_JWP_Issued = #6.xxx (CBOR_JWP_Issued)
Tagged_CBOR_JWP_Presented = #6.yyy (CBOR_JWP_Presented)
Figure 1: CDDL [RFC8610] for CBOR Serializations.
7. Encrypted JSON Web Proofs
Access to JWPs containing non-public material by parties without
legitimate access to the non-public information MUST be prevented.
This can be accomplished by encrypting the JWP when potentially
observable by such parties to prevent the disclosure of private
information. The use of an Encrypted JWP is recommended for this
purpose. The processing of Encrypted JWPs is identical to the
processing of other JWEs.
For a JWP with JSON-formatted headers, an Encrypted JWP is a JWE
[RFC7516] with a JWP in Compact Serialization as its plaintext value.
For a JWP with CBOR-formatted headers, an Encrypted JWP should use
COSE_Encrypt0 or COSE_Encrypt [RFC9052] with the CBOR Serialization
as its plaintext.
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The cty (content type) JWE/COSE Header Parameter is used to indicate
that the content of the JWE is a JWP. The cty value of the JWE/COSE
message SHOULD be the same as the typ (type) JWP Header Parameter
value of the unencrypted JWP to be encrypted. If the JWP has no typ
value, then the following JWE Header Parameter cty (content type)
values SHOULD be used:
* jwp is used to indicate that the content of the JWE is a JWP using
the JWP Compact Serialization.
* jwp+json is used to indicate that the content of the JWE is the
UTF-8 encoding of a JWP using the JWP JSON Serialization.
* jwp+cbor is used to indicate that the plaintext of the COSE
message is a JWP in CBOR Serialization.
The cty (content type) Header Parameter MUST be present unless the
application knows that the encrypted content is a JWP by another
means or convention, in which case the cty value MAY be omitted.
8. Detached Payloads
In some contexts, it is useful to make statements about payloads
which are not themselves contained within the JWP, similar to
"Detached Content" in JWS [RFC7515].
For this purpose, the compact, JSON and CBOR serializations allow for
all payloads to be omitted from a serialized form. While this is a
legal serialization, it is not on its own able to be verified.
The recipient is expected to perform some sequence of steps defined
by the application to recreate the array of payloads, including order
and optionality. This effectively recreates the fully specified
serialization of the JWP.
9. Security Considerations
Notes to be expanded:
* Requirements for supporting algorithms, see JPA
* Application interface for verification
* Data minimization of the protected header
* To prevent accidentally introducing linkability, when an issuer
uses the same key with the same grouping of payload types, they
SHOULD also use the same issuer protected header. Each of these
headers SHOULD have the same base64url-serialized value to avoid
any non-deterministic JSON serialization.
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10. IANA Considerations
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries
established by this specification.
Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis
after a three-week review period on the jose-reg-review@ietf.org
mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts.
However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
satisfied that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register JWP header
parameter: example").
Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve
or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the
review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if
applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than
21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the
iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or
useful only for a single application, and whether the registration
description is clear.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list.
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
Experts.
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10.1. JSON Web Proof Header Parameters Registry
This specification establishes the IANA "JSON Web Proof Header
Parameters" registry for Header Parameter names. The registry
records the Header Parameter name and a reference to the
specification that defines it. The same Header Parameter name can be
registered multiple times, provided that the parameter usage is
compatible between the specifications. Different registrations of
the same Header Parameter name will typically use different Header
Parameter Usage Locations values.
10.1.1. Registration Template
Header Parameter Name: The descriptive name of the parameter. (e.g.
"Key Identifier").
Header Parameter JSON Label: The string label requested within a
JSON context. (e.g., kid). Because a core goal of this
specification is for the resulting representations to be compact,
it is RECOMMENDED that the label be short -- not to exceed 8
characters without a compelling reason to do so. This label is
case sensitive, and it is RECOMMENDED to avoid upper-case
characters. Labels may not match another registered names in a
case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that
there is a compelling reason to allow an exception. This registry
value SHOULD be supplied, but MAY be omitted if this header
parameter will never be formatted as JSON.
Header Parameter CBOR Label: The string or integer label requested
within a CBOR context (e.g. 2). This label may not match other
integer values, match other string values in a case-insensitive
manner, or be a differing string value from the JSON label unless
the Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to
allow an exception.
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): The Header Parameter usage
locations, which should be one or more of the values Issued or
Presented. Other values may be used with the approval of a
Designated Expert.
Change Controller: For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IETF". For
others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details
(e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be
included.
Specification Document(s): Reference to the document or documents
that specify the parameter, preferably including URIs that can be
used to retrieve copies of the documents. An indication of the
relevant sections may also be included but is not required.
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10.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
This section registers the Header Parameters defined in Section 4.2
in this registry.
10.1.2.1. Algorithm Header Parameter
* Header Parameter Name: Algorithm
* Header Parameter JSON Label: alg
* Header Parameter CBOR Label: 1
* Header Parameter Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.1 of this specification
10.1.2.2. Key ID Header Parameter
* Header Parameter Name: Key Identifier
* Header Parameter JSON Label: kid
* Header Parameter CBOR Label: 2
* Header Parameter Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.2 of this specification
10.1.2.3. Type Header Parameter
* Header Parameter Name: Type
* Header Parameter JSON Label: typ
* Header Parameter CBOR Label: 3
* Header Parameter Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.3 of this specification
10.1.2.4. Critical Header Parameter
* Header Parameter Name: Critical
* Header Parameter JSON Label: crit
* Header Parameter CBOR Label: 4
* Header Parameter Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.4 of this specification
10.1.2.5. Issuer Header Parameter
* Header Parameter Name: Issuer
* Header Parameter JSON Label: iss
* Header Parameter CBOR Label: 5
* Header Parameter Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented
* Change Controller: IETF
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* Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.7 of this specification
10.1.2.6. Audience Header Parameter
* Header Parameter Name: Audience
* Header Parameter JSON Label: aud
* Header Parameter CBOR Label: 6
* Header Parameter Usage Location(s): Presented
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.8 of this specification
10.1.2.7. Nonce Header Parameter
* Header Parameter Name: Nonce
* Header Parameter JSON Label: nonce
* Header Parameter CBOR Label: 7
* Header Parameter Usage Location(s): Presented
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.9 of this specification
10.1.2.8. Proof Key Header Parameter
* Header Parameter Name: Proof Key
* Header Parameter JSON Label: proof_key
* Header Parameter CBOR Label: 8
* Header Parameter Usage Location(s): Issued
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.5 of this specification
10.1.2.9. Presentation Key Header Parameter
* Header Parameter Name: Presentation Key
* Header Parameter JSON Label: presentation_key
* Header Parameter CBOR Label: 9
* Header Parameter Usage Location(s): Issued
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.6 of this specification
10.2. Media Type Registration
10.2.1. Registry Contents
This section registers the application/jwp media type [RFC2046] in
the IANA "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the manner
described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the
content is a JWP using the JWP Compact Serialization. This section
also registers the application/jwp+json media type in the IANA "Media
Types" registry, which can be used to indicate that the content is a
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JWP using the JWP JSON Serialization.
10.2.1.1. The application/jwp Media Type
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: jwp
* Required parameters: n/a
* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/jwp values are encoded
as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the
empty string) separated by period ('.') and tilde ('~') characters
* Security considerations: See Section 9 of this specification
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
* Published specification: this specification
* Applications that use this media type: TBD
* Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
* Additional information:
- Magic number(s): n/a
- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
* Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael
B. Jones, michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
* Author: Michael B. Jones, michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Change Controller: IETF
* Provisional registration? No
10.2.1.2. The application/jwp+json Media Type
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: jwp+json
* Required parameters: n/a
* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/jwp+json values are
represented as a JSON Object; UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be employed
for the JSON object.
* Security considerations: See Section 9 of this specification
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
* Published specification: this specification
* Applications that use this media type: TBD
* Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
* Additional information:
- Magic number(s): n/a
- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
* Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael
B. Jones, michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
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* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
* Author: Michael B. Jones, michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Change Controller: IETF
* Provisional registration? No
10.2.1.3. The application/jwp+cbor Media Type
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: jwp+cbor
* Required parameters: n/a
* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/jwp+cbor values are
represented as a CBOR data item.
* Security considerations: See Section 9 of this specification
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
* Published specification: this specification
* Applications that use this media type: TBD
* Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
* Additional information:
- Magic number(s): n/a
- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
* Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael
B. Jones, michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
* Author: Michael B. Jones, michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Change Controller: IETF
* Provisional registration? No
10.3. Structured Syntax Suffix Registration
10.3.1. Registry Contents
This section registers the +jwp structured syntax suffix [RFC6838] in
the IANA "Structured Syntax Suffix" registry (#IANA.StructuredSuffix)
in the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate
that the media type is encoded as a JWP using the JWP Compact
Serialization.
10.3.1.1. The +jwp Structured Syntax Suffix
* Name: JSON Web Proof (JWP)
* +suffix: +jwp
* References: Section 6.1 of this specification
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* Encoding considerations: binary; JWP values are encoded as a
series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty
string) separated by period ('.') and tilde ('~') characters
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
* Fragment identifier considerations: The syntax and semantics of
fragment identifiers specified for +jwp SHOULD be as specified for
"application/jwp". (At publication of this document, there is no
fragment identification syntax defined for "application/jwp".)
The syntax and semantics for fragment identifiers for a specific
"xxx/yyy+jwp" SHOULD be processed as follows:
For cases defined in +jwp, where the fragment identifier resolves per
the +jwp rules, then process as specified in +jwp.
For cases defined in +jwp, where the fragment identifier does not
resolve per the +jwp rules, then process as specified in "xxx/
yyy+jwp".
For cases not defined in +jwp, then process as specified in "xxx/
yyy+jwp".
* Security considerations: See Section 9 of this specification
* Contact: Michael B. Jones, michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Author/Change controller: IETF
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms]
Miller, J., Jones, M. B., and D. Waite, "JSON Proof
Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
jose-json-proof-algorithms-06, 16 September 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-
json-proof-algorithms-06>.
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-proof-token]
Miller, J., Jones, M. B., and D. Waite, "JSON Proof
Token", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-jose-
json-proof-token-06, 16 September 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-
json-proof-token-06>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
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[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
11.2. Informative References
[ECMAScript]
Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification,
5.1 Edition", ECMA 262, June 2011, <http://www.ecma-
international.org/ecma-262/5.1/ECMA-262.pdf>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures]
Looker, T., Kalos, V., Whitehead, A., and M. Lodder, "The
BBS Signature Scheme", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-07, 23 September 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
bbs-signatures-07>.
[IANA.CoAP.Formats]
IANA, "CoAP Content Formats",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters/core-
parameters.xhtml#content-formats>.
[IANA.MediaTypes]
IANA, "Media Types",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
Bodies", RFC 2045, DOI 10.17487/RFC2045, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2045>.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8725] Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8725>.
[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]
Sporny, M., Jr, T. T., Herman, I., Jones, M. B., and G.
Cohen, "Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0", 27
December 2023, <https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
This work was incubated in the DIF Applied Cryptography Working Group
(https://identity.foundation/working-groups/crypto.html).
We would like to thank Brent Zundel for his valuable contributions to
this specification.
Appendix B. Document History
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]
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-07
* Changing primary editor
* Broad changes to define a CBOR serialization, which leverage new
CBOR Protected Headers
* Deemphasis of JSON in some parts of the document to represent CBOR
alternatives
* Rewrite Header Parameter parsing requirements for JSON to
emphasize preference to fail on duplicate headers (to match CBOR
behavior). Last-encountered remains as an option to match ECMA
definition.
* Add option to use CoAP Formats for typ in CBOR mode to match COSE,
as a compact indirection over full media types.
* Modify IANA registry template to account for CBOR Labels in header
parameters
* Add application/jwp+cbor media type
* Modify example generation to use proof_key and presentation_key
names
* Change proof_jwk to proof_key and presentation_jwk to
presentation_key to better represent that the key may be JSON or
CBOR-formatted.
* Moved the registry for proof_key and presentation_key to JWP where
they are defined. Consolidated usage, purpose and requirements
from algorith musage under these definitions.
* Clarified that proof_key and presentation_key are required by
particular algorithms and are not more generally required for
issued and presented JWPs.
* Move claims to JPT to live beside cid, and renumber CBOR labels so
that they may be adjacent
-06
* Update reference to new repository home.
* Fixed #83: Added encrypted JWPs.
* Added additional clarification around the compact and JSON
serializations
* Added text around fully detached payloads
-05
* Clarify the use of multiple octet strings in presentation proofs.
* Update BBS algorithm example in JSON serialization to show the
proof as an array with a single octet string.
* Move single-use example appendix from JWP to JPA.
* Registered +jwp structured syntax suffix.
-04
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* Refactoring figures and examples to be built from a common set
across all three documents.
-03
* Improvements resulting from a full proofreading.
* Populated IANA Considerations section.
* Specified JWP Header Parameters.
* Specified representation of zero-length disclosed payloads for the
compact serialization.
* Specified that algorithms may supply multiple octet strings for
the proof, which are separated by ~ characters in the compact
serialization.
* Updated to use BBS draft -05.
* Added Terminology Section.
-02
* Update reference to current BBS algorithm
-01
* Correct cross-references within group.
-00
* Created initial working group draft based on draft-jmiller-jose-
json-web-proof-01
Authors' Addresses
David Waite
Ping Identity
Email: dwaite+jwp@pingidentity.com
Michael B. Jones
Self-Issued Consulting
Email: michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
URI: https://self-issued.info/
Jeremie Miller
Ping Identity
Email: jmiller@pingidentity.com
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