Operations Model for Router Keying
draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-10

[Ballot comment]
  Similarly, designing and deploying the protocol will be easier with
  thought paid to a common operational model.

I applause this approach!

- Section 3.2
Several management operations will be quite common.

Operations is misleading: SNMP-GET and SNMP-SET are two (SNMP) operations.
I think you mean:
(1) several management interfaces will be quite common
or
(2) several configuration interfaces will be quite common
(1) is my preferred option since this term is used multiple times throughout the draft.

- Section 3.2

  The management interface SHOULD
  provide a mechanism to easily update the expiration time for a
  current key used with a given peer or interface.  Also when adding a
  key it is desirable to push the key out to nodes that will need it,
  allowing use for receiving packets then later enabling transmit.
  This can be accomplished automatically by providing a delay between
  when a key becomes valid for reception and transmission.  However,
  some environments may not be able to predict when all the necessary
  changes will be made.  In these cases having a mechanism to enable a
  key for sending is desirable.  Management interfaces SHOULD provide
  an easy mechanism to update the direction of an existing key or to
  enable a disabled key.

Be consistent between "the management interface" versus "management interfaces"

- Wonder why sometimes peer is capitalized?

-  Some idnits
http://tools.ietf.org/idnits?url=http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-09.txt

- A customer router that is an an insider for a BGP peering

- Section 7

  For peer-to-peer protocols such as BGP, this can be relatively easy.

Not sure what "this" is about. It doesn't connect with the previous paragraph.
I guess you mean "key upgrade"

[Ballot comment]
In 3.1:
  o  The direction is valid for the protocol; for example protocols
      that require the same session key be used in both directions MUST
      have a direction of both.

Isn't the thing that must have the direction of "both" the table entry, not the protocol?  IOW:

  o  The direction is valid for the protocol; for example, table
      entries for protocols that require the same session key be
      used in both directions MUST have a direction of both.

In 4.1:

  The key point is that whenever the same key is used in multiple
  protocols, attacks may be possible.

HA!

Shouldn't 4.3 talk about certificate revocation?

[Ballot comment]
In 3.1:
  o  The direction is valid for the protocol; for example protocols
      that require the same session key be used in both directions MUST
      have a direction of both.

Isn't the thing that must have the direction of "both" the table entry, not the protocol?  IOW:

  o  The direction is valid for the protocol; for example, table entries
      for protocols that require the same session key be used in both
      directions MUST have a direction of both.

In 4.1:

  The key point is that whenever the same key is used in multiple
  protocols, attacks may be possible.

HA!

Shouldn't 4.3 talk about certificate revocation?

[Ballot comment]
-- Section 8 --

  Time is used to control when keys MAY
  begin being used and when they MUST NOT be used any longer

Take or leave this: The 2119 language seems odd here; this isn't putting normative requirements on anything, but is describing a situation.  I would lowercase the words.

  If time synchronization is too loose, then a key can be
  used beyond its intended lifetime.

How significant is that, really?  How much does it matter if a key is used for a few seconds longer than intended?  Is it worth saying a few words about that, in regard to keeping time synched to seconds, or milliseconds, or minutes?

IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

IANA has reviewed draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-07, which is currently in Last Call, and has the following comments:

We understand that this document doesn't require any IANA actions.

If this assessment is not accurate, please respond as soon as possible.

The following Last Call announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC:
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (Operations Model for Router Keying) to Informational RFC


The IESG has received a request from the Keying and Authentication for
Routing Protocols WG (karp) to consider the following document:
- 'Operations Model for Router Keying'
  as Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-08-18. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  Developing an operational and management model for routing protocol
  security that works with all the routing protocols will be critical
  to the success of routing protocol security efforts.  This document
  discusses issues and begins to consider development of these models.




The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-karp-ops-model/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-karp-ops-model/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,
Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)?  Why is
this the proper type of RFC?  Is this type of RFC indicated in the title
page header?

  Informational, as noted on the title page header.  This is best as the
  document provides operational advice rather than specify interoperable
  behavior.

(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent
examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

  Developing an operational and management model for routing protocol
  security that works across protocols will be critical to the success
  of routing protocol security efforts.  This document discusses issues
  and begins to consider development of these models. This document also
  gives recommendations for how management and operational issues can be
  approached as protocols are revised and as support is added for KARP
  key tables.

Working Group Summary

  The need for this document is clearly indicated in order to meet the
  KARP charter. There has been little controversy.

Document Quality

  This document has had the benefit of review from many members of the
  Security Area as well as the Routing Area. This document received
  substantial review from individuals participating in the KARP WG, and
  there is a clear consensus to progress it. . The WGLC was also
  advertised to the OPSEC WG, and at least one key review was made by a
  member of that group. Since the document discusses operational
  security, this was critical in confirming the quality of the document.

Personnel

  Brian Weis is the Document Shepherd. The Responsible  Area Director is
  Stewart Bryant.

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by
the Document Shepherd.  If this version of the document is not ready for
publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to the
IESG.

  The document shepherd has reviewed version -06 of the document and
  believes it is ready for publication. Some minor fixes are necessary
  to the references, but nothing notable enough to warrant fixing before
  being forwarded to the IESG.

(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or
breadth of the reviews that have been performed?

  The document shepherd believes the document achieved sufficient review
  during its development and Working Group last call process.

(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from
broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,
DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that took
place.

  The document is related to operational security, which is related to
  the purview of the OPSEC WG. The WGLC was forwarded to that group, and
  at least one review was made from members of that group.

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd
has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the
IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable
with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really
is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and
has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here.

  The document shepherd has no specific concerns or issues with the
  document.

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR
disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78
and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why.

  All of the authors have confirmed that they are not aware of any IPR
  disclosures that should be filed.

(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document?  If
so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR
disclosures.

  No IPR disclosures have been filed.

(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being
silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it?

  This draft has had extensive discussion in the WG, and the shepherd
  believes that consensus is broad.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

  There are no appeals expected, and no claims of discontent are
  expected.

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this
document. (See http://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts
Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be
thorough.

  IDnits reports some minor issues with references and a missing IANA
  Considerations.  (Some of the IDnits complaints about references are
  incorrect, however.) These will be resolved in the next version. None
  of these affect the technical quality of the document.

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review
criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

  There are no required formal reviews.

(13) Have all references within this document been identified as either
normative or informative?

  All references are correctly identified as normative or informative.

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for
advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative
references exist, what is the plan for their completion?

  All normative references are an RFC or an I-D that is further ahead in
  the RFC publication process.

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)?
If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in
the Last Call procedure.

  There are no downward normative references.

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any existing
RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed in the
abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not listed
in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the part of
the document where the relationship of this document to the other RFCs
is discussed. If this information is not in the document, explain why
the WG considers it unnecessary.

  Publication of this document will not change the status of any
  existing RFCs.

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations
section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the
document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes
are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries.
Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly
identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a
detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that
allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a
reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226).

  The IANA considerations section is currently missing, but adding it
  will be a formality because there are no IANA actions necessary.

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future
allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find useful
in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

  There are no IANA actions.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document
Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal
language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

  None of the document is written in a formal language, so no checks
  were done by the Document Shepherd.