Analysis of OSPF Security According to the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guide
draft-ietf-karp-ospf-analysis-06

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KARP                                                          S. Hartman
Internet-Draft                                         Painless Security
Intended status: Informational                                  D. Zhang
Expires: May 30, 2013                        Huawei Technologies co. ltd
                                                       November 26, 2012

        Analysis of OSPF Security According to KARP Design Guide
                  draft-ietf-karp-ospf-analysis-06.txt

Abstract

   This document analyzes OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 according to the guidelines
   set forth in section 4.2 of RFC6518.  Key components of solutions to
   gaps identified in this draft are already underway.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 30, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements to Meet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Requirements notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Current State  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  OSPFv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  OSPFv3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Impacts of OSPF Replays  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Gap Analysis and Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Solution Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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1.  Introduction

   This document analyzes the current state of OSPFv2 and OSPFv3
   according to the requirements of [RFC6518].  This draft builds on
   several previous analysis efforts into routing security.  The OPSEC
   working group put together [RFC6039] an analysis of cryptographic
   issues with routing protocols.  Earlier, the RPSEC working group put
   together [I-D.ietf-rpsec-ospf-vuln] a detailed analysis of OSPF
   vulnerabilities.  Solution work to address gaps identified in this
   analysis is underway [I-D.ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying]
   [RFC6506]

   OSPF meets many of the requirements expected from a manually keyed
   routing protocol.  Integrity protection is provided with modern
   cryptographic algorithms.  Algorithm agility is provided: the
   algorithm can be changed as part of re-keying an interface or peer.
   Intra-connection re-keying is provided by the specifications,
   although apparently some implementations have trouble with this in
   practice.  OSPFv2 security does not interfere with prioritization of
   packets.

   However, some gaps remain between the current state and the