Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Overview, Threats, and Requirements
draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs-06

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (karp WG)
Last updated 2012-09-26
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Intended RFC status Informational
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Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by IESG
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Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2012-09-13)
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Responsible AD Stewart Bryant
IESG note Brian Weis (bew@cisco.com) is the document shepherd.
Send notices to karp-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs@tools.ietf.org
KARP Working Group                                           G. Lebovitz
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Informational                                 M. Bhatia
Expires: March 31, 2013                                   Alcatel-Lucent
                                                      September 27, 2012

    Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Overview,
                       Threats, and Requirements
                    draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs-06

Abstract

   Different routing protocols employ different mechanisms for securing
   protocol packets on the wire.  While most already have some method
   for accomplishing cryptographic message authentication, in many cases
   the existing methods are dated, vulnerable to attack, and employ
   cryptographic algorithms that have been deprecated.  The "Keying and
   Authentication for Routing Protocols" (KARP) effort aims to overhaul
   and improve these mechanisms.

   This document does not contain protocol specifications.  Instead, it
   defines the areas where protocol specification work is needed and a
   set of requirements for KARP design teams to follow.  RFC 6518,
   "Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design
   Guidelines" is a companion to this document; KARP design teams will
   use them together to review and overhaul routing protocols.  These
   two documents reflect the input of both the IETF Security Area and
   IETF Routing Area in order to form a mutually agreeable work plan.

   This document has three main parts.  The first part provides an
   overview of the KARP effort.  The second part lists the threats from
   RFC 4593 (Generic Threats To Routing Protocols) that are in scope for
   attacks against routing protocol transport systems.  This includes
   any mechanisms built into the routing protocols themselves, to
   authenticate packets.  The third part enumerates the requirements
   that routing protocol specifications must meet when addressing those
   threats for RFC 6518's "Work Phase 1", the update to a routing
   protocol's existing transport security.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-

Lebovitz & Bhatia        Expires March 31, 2013                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft   KARP Overview, Threats and Requirements  September 2012

   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 31, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.2.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8

   2.  KARP Effort Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     2.1.  KARP Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     2.2.  Incremental Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     2.3.  Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     2.4.  Non-Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     2.5.  Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

   3.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     3.1.  Threat Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       3.1.1.  OUTSIDERS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       3.1.2.  Unauthorized Key Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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