Channel Binding Signalling for the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface
draft-ietf-kitten-channel-bound-flag-00
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
Expired & archived
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Author | Nicolás Williams | ||
Last updated | 2014-01-08 (Latest revision 2013-07-07) | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | |||
Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
Document shepherd | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Channel binding is a technique that allows applications to use a secure channel at a lower layer without having to use authentication at that lower layer. The concept of channel binding comes from the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface (GSS- API). It turns out that the semantics commonly implemented are different that those specified in the base GSS-API RFC (RFC2743), and that that specification has a serious bug. This document addresses both, the inconsistency as-implemented and the specification bug. This Internet-Draft proposes the addition of a "channel bound" return flag for the GSS_Init_sec_context() and GSS_Accept_sec_context() functions. Two behaviors are specified: a default, safe behavior reflecting existing implementation deployments, and a behavior that is only safe when the application specifically tells the GSS-API that it (the application) supports the new behavior. Additional API elements related to this are also added, including a new security context establishment API.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)