A SASL and GSS-API Mechanism for OAuth
draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-03
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (kitten WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | William Mills , Tim Showalter , Hannes Tschofenig | ||
| Last updated | 2012-08-06 | ||
| Replaces | draft-mills-kitten-sasl-oauth | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-03
KITTEN W. Mills
Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter
Expires: February 7, 2013
H. Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
August 6, 2012
A SASL and GSS-API Mechanism for OAuth
draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-03
Abstract
OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
application to obtain access on its own behalf.
This document defines how an application client uses OAuth over the
Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) or the Generic
Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) to access a
protected resource at a resource serve. Thereby, it enables schemes
defined within the OAuth framework for non-HTTP-based application
protocols.
Clients typically store the user's long term credential. This does,
however, lead to significant security vulnerabilities, for example,
when such a credential leaks. A significant benefit of OAuth for
usage in those clients is that the password is replaced by a token.
Tokens typically provided limited access rights and can be managed
and revoked separately from the user's long-term credential
(password).
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 7, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values in OAUTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication. . . . . . . 10
3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. MAC Authentication with Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.4. Failed Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. GSS-API Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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1. Introduction
OAuth [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] enables a third-party application to obtain
limited access to a protected resource, either on behalf of a
resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction, or by
allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own
behalf. The core OAuth specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] does not
define the interaction between the client and the resource server
with the access to a protected resource using an Access Token. This
functionality is described in two separate specifications, namely
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer], and [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac], whereby
the focus is on an HTTP-based environment only.
Figure 1 shows the abstract message flow as shown in Figure 1 of
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2].
+--------+ +---------------+
| |--(A)- Authorization Request ->| Resource |
| | | Owner |
| |<-(B)-- Authorization Grant ---| |
| | +---------------+
| |
| | +---------------+
| |--(C)-- Authorization Grant -->| Authorization |
| Client | | Server |
| |<-(D)----- Access Token -------| |
| | +---------------+
| |
| | +---------------+
| |--(E)----- Access Token ------>| Resource |
| | | Server |
| |<-(F)--- Protected Resource ---| |
+--------+ +---------------+
Figure 1: Abstract OAuth 2.0 Protocol Flow
This document takes advantage of the OAuth protocol and its
deployment base to provide a way to use SASL [RFC4422] as well as the
GSS-API [RFC2743] to gain access to resources when using non-HTTP-
based protocols, such as the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP)
[RFC3501], which is what this memo uses in the examples.
The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a framework
for providing authentication and data security services in
connection-oriented protocols via replaceable mechanisms. It
provides a structured interface between protocols and mechanisms.
The resulting framework allows new protocols to reuse existing
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mechanisms and allows old protocols to make use of new mechanisms.
The framework also provides a protocol for securing subsequent
protocol exchanges within a data security layer.
The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
[RFC2743] provides a framework for applications to support multiple
authentication mechanisms through a unified interface.
This document defines a SASL mechanism for OAuth, but it conforms to
the new bridge between SASL and the GSS-API called GS2 [RFC5801].
This means that this document defines both a SASL mechanism and a
GSS-API mechanism. Implementers may be interested in either the
SASL, the GSS-API, or even both mechanisms. To faciliate these two
variants, the description has been split into two parts, one part
that provides normative references for those interested in the SASL
OAuth mechanism (see Section 3), and a second part for those
implementers that wish to implement the GSS-API portion (see
Section 4).
When OAuth is integrated into SASL and the GSS-API the high-level
steps are as follows:
(A) The client requests authorization from the resource owner.
The authorization request can be made directly to the resource
owner (as shown), or preferably indirectly via the authorization
server as an intermediary.
(B) The client receives an authorization grant which is a
credential representing the resource owner's authorization,
expressed using one of four grant types defined in this
specification or using an extension grant type. The authorization
grant type depends on the method used by the client to request
authorization and the types supported by the authorization server.
(C) The client requests an access token by authenticating with the
authorization server and presenting the authorization grant.
(D) The authorization server authenticates the client and
validates the authorization grant, and if valid issues an access
token.
(E) The client requests the protected resource from the resource
server and authenticates by presenting the access token.
(F) The resource server validates the access token, and if valid,
serves the request.
Steps (E) and (F) are not defined in [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] and are the
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main functionality specified within this document. Consequently, the
message exchange shown in Figure 2 is the result of this
specification. The client will genrally need to determine the
authentication endpoints (and perhaps the service endpoints) before
the OAuth 2.0 protocol exchange messages in steps (A)-(D) are
executed. The discovery of the resource owner and authorization
server endpoints is outside the scope of this specification. The
client must discover those endpoints using a discovery mechanisms
such as Webfinger using host-meta [I-D.jones-appsawg-webfinger]. In
band discovery is not tenable if clients support the OAuth 2.0
password grant. Once credentials are obtained the client proceeds to
steps (E) and (F) defined in this specification.
----+
+--------+ +---------------+ |
| |--(A)-- Authorization Request --->| Resource | |
| | | Owner | |Plain
| |<-(B)------ Access Grant ---------| | |OAuth
| | +---------------+ |2.0
| | |
| | Client Credentials & +---------------+ |
| |--(C)------ Access Grant -------->| Authorization | |
| Client | | Server | |
| |<-(D)------ Access Token ---------| | |
| | (w/ Optional Refresh Token) +---------------+ |
| | ----+
| | ----+
| | +---------------+ |
| | | | |OAuth
| |--(E)------ Access Token -------->| Resource | |over
| | | Server | |SASL/
| |<-(F)---- Protected Resource -----| | |GSS-
| | | | |API
+--------+ +---------------+ |
----+
Figure 2: OAuth SASL Architecture
It is worthwhile to note that this specification is also compatible
with OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849].
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terms used in the OAuth
2.0 specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2].
In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and
server respectively. Line breaks have been inserted for readability.
Note that the IMAP SASL specification requires base64 encoding
message, not this memo.
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3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specification
SASL is used as a generalized authentication method in a variety of
application layer protocols. This document defines two SASL
mechanisms for usage with OAuth: "OAUTH" and "OAUTH-PLUS". The
"OAUTH" SASL mechanism enables OAuth authorizattion schemes for SASL,
"OAUTH-PLUS" adds channel binding [RFC5056] capability for additional
security guarantees.
3.1. Initial Client Response
Client responses are a key/value pair sequence. These key/value
pairs carry the equivalent values from an HTTP context in order to be
able to complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization. The ABNF
[RFC5234] syntax is
kvsep = %x01
key = 1*ALPHA
value = *(VCHAR | SP | HTAB | CR | LF )
kvpair = key "=" value kvsep
client_resp = 1*kvpair kvsep
The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:
auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for
an equivalent HTTP OAuth authroization.
user (REQUIRED): Contains the user name being authenticated. The
server MAY use this as a routing or database lookup hint. The
server MUST NOT use this as authoritative, the user name MUST
be asserted by the OAuth credential.
host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.
port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive
integer string without leading zeros to which the client
connected.
In authorization schemes that use signatures, the client MUST send
host and port number key/values, and the server MUST fail an
authorization request requiring signatures that does not have host
and port values.
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3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values in OAUTH
In the OAUTH mechanism values for path, query string and post body
are assigned default values. OAuth authorization schemes MAY define
usage of these in the SASL context and extend this specification.
For OAuth schemes that use request signatures the default values MUST
be used unless explict values are provided in the client response.
The following key values are reserved for future use:
path (RESERVED): HTTP path data, the default value is "/".
qs (RESERVED): HTTP query string, the default value is "".
post (RESERVED): HTTP post data, the default value is "".
3.2. Server's Response
The server validates the response per the specification for the
authorization scheme used. If the authorization scheme used includes
signing of the request parameters the client must provide a client
response that satisfies the data requirements for the scheme in use.
In the OAUTH-PLUS mechanism the server examines the channel binding
data, extracts the channel binding unique prefix, and extracts the
raw channel biding data based on the channel binding type used. It
then computes it's own copy of the channel binding payload and
compares that to the payload sent by the client in the cbdata key/
value. Those two must be equal for channel binding to succeed.
The server responds to a successfully verified client message by
completing the SASL negotiation. The authentication scheme MUST
carry the user ID to be used as the authorization identity (identity
to act as). The server MUST use the ID obtained from the credential
as the user being authorized.
3.2.1. Mapping to SASL Identities
Some OAuth mechanisms can provide both an authorization identity and
an authentication identity. An example of this is OAuth 1.0a
[RFC5849] where the consumer key (oauth_consumer_key) identifies the
entity using the token which equates to the SASL authentication
identity, and is authenticated using the shared secret. The
authorization identity in the OAuth 1.0a case is carried in the token
(per the requirement above), which SHOULD be validated independently.
The server MAY use a consumer key, a value derived from it, or other
comparable identity in the OAuth authorization scheme as the SASL
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authentication identity. If an appropriate authentication identity
is not available the server MUST use the authorization identity as
the authentication identity.
3.2.2. Server response to failed authentication.
For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627]
formatted error result, and fails the authentication. The error
result consists of the following values:
status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error
codes are defined in the IANA [[need registry name]] registry
specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.
schemes (REQUIRED): A space separated list of the OAuth
authorization schemes supported by the server, i.e. "bearer" or
"bearer mac".
scope (OPTIONAL): The OAuth scope required to access the service.
If the resource server provides a scope the client SHOULD always
request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. The client MAY use a
scope other than the one provided by the resource server. Scopes
other than those advertised by the resource server are be defined by
the resource owner and provided in service documentation or discovery
information (which is beyond the scope of this memo). If not present
then the client SHOULD presume an empty scope (unscoped token) is
needed.
If channel binding is in use and the channel binding fails the server
responds with a status code set to 412 to indicate that the channel
binding precondition failed. If the authentication scheme in use
does not include signing the server SHOULD revoke the presented
credential and the client SHOULD discard that credential.
3.3. Use of Signature Type Authorization
This mechanism supports authorization using signatures, which
requires that both client and server construct the string to be
signed. OAuth 2 is designed for authentication/authorization to
access specific URIs. SASL is designed for user authentication, and
has no facility for being more specific. In this mechanism we
require or define default values for the data elements from an HTTP
request which allow the signature base string to be constructed
properly. The default HTTP path is "/" and the default post body is
empty. These atoms are defined as extension points so that no
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changes are needed if there is a revision of SASL which supports more
specific resource authorization, e.g. IMAP access to a specific
folder or FTP access limited to a specific directory.
Using the example in the MAC specification
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac] as a starting point, on an IMAP server
running on port 143 and given the MAC style authorization request
(with %x01 shown as ^A and line breaks added for readability) below:
host=server.example.com^A
user=user@example.com^A
port=143^A
auth=MAC token="h480djs93hd8",timestamp="137131200",nonce="dj83hs9s",
signature="YTVjyNSujYs1WsDurFnvFi4JK6o="^A^A
The normalized request string would be constructed per the MAC
specification [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]. In this example the
normalized request string with the new line separator character is
represented by "\n" for display purposes only would be:
h480djs93hi8\n
137131200\n
dj83hs9s\n
\n
GET\n
server.example.com\n
143\n
/\n
\n
3.4. Channel Binding
If the specification for the underlying authorization scheme requires
a security layer, such as TLS [RFC5246], the server SHOULD only offer
a mechanism where channel binding can be enabled.
The channel binding data is computed by the client based on it's
choice of preferred channel binding type. As specified in [RFC5056],
the channel binding information MUST start with the channel binding
unique prefix, followed by a colon (ASCII 0x3A), followed by a base64
encoded channel binding payload. The channel binding payload is the
raw data from the channel binding type if the raw channel binding
data is less than 500 bytes. If the raw channel binding data is 500
bytes or larger then a SHA-1 [RFC3174] hash of the raw channel
binding data is computed.
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If the client is using tls-unique for a channel binding then the raw
channel binding data equals the first TLS finished message. This is
under the 500 byte limit, so the channel binding payload sent to the
server would be the base64 encoded first TLS finished message.
In the case where the client has chosen tls-endpoint, the raw channel
binding data is the certificate of the server the client connected
to, which will frequently be 500 bytes or more. If it is then the
channel binding payload is the base64 encoded SHA-1 hash of the
server certificate.
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4. GSS-API OAuth Mechanism Specification
Note: The normative references in this section are informational for
SASL implementers, but they are normative for GSS-API implementers.
The SASL OAuth mechanism is also a GSS-API mechanism and the messages
described in Section 3 are the same, but
1. the GS2 header on the client's first message is excluded when
OAUTH is used as a GSS-API mechanism, and
2. initial context token header is prefixed to the client's first
authentication message (context token), as described in Section
3.1 of RFC 2743,
The GSS-API mechanism OID for OAuth is [[TBD: IANA]].
OAuth security contexts always have the mutual_state flag
(GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) set to TRUE. OAuth supports credential
delegation, therefore security contexts may have the deleg_state flag
(GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) set to either TRUE or FALSE.
The mutual authentication property of this mechanism relies on
successfully comparing the TLS server identity with the negotiated
target name. Since the TLS channel is managed by the application
outside of the GSS-API mechanism, the mechanism itself is unable to
confirm the name while the application is able to perform this
comparison for the mechanism. For this reason, applications MUST
match the TLS server identity with the target name, as discussed in
[RFC6125].
The OAuth mechanism does not support per-message tokens or
GSS_Pseudo_random.
OAuth supports a standard generic name syntax for acceptors, such as
GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE (see [RFC2743], Section 4.1). These
service names MUST be associated with the "entityID" claimed by the
RP. OAuth supports only a single name type for initiators:
GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME. GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME is the default name type.
The query, display, and exported name syntaxes for OAuth principal
names are all the same. There is no OAuth-specific name syntax;
applications SHOULD use generic GSS-API name types, such as
GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME and GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE (see [RFC2743],
Section 4). The exported name token does, of course, conform to
[RFC2743], Section 3.2, but the "NAME" part of the token should be
treated as a potential input string to the OAuth name normalization
rules.
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5. Examples
These example illustrate exchanges between an IMAP client and an IMAP
server.
Note to implementers: Authorization scheme names are case
insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be
"bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".
5.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange
This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange with
an initial client response. Note that line breaks are inserted for
readability.
S: * IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
C: t0 CAPABILITY
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH aG9zdD1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMB
dXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk5
2YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB
S: +
S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long
lines wrapped for readability) is:
host=server.example.com^Aport=143^Auser=user@example.com^A
auth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A
The line containing just a "+" and a space is an empty response from
the server. This response contains error information, and in the
success case the error response is empty. Like other messages, and
in accordance with the IMAP SASL binding, the empty response is
base64-encoded.
5.2. MAC Authentication with Channel Binding
This example shows a channel binding failure. The example sends the
same request as above, but in the context of an OAUTH-PLUS exchange
the channel binding information is missing. Note that line breaks
are inserted for readability.
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S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH-PLUS aG9zdD1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BdXNlcj11c2
VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9TUFDIHRva2VuPSJoNDgwZGpzOTNo
ZDgiLHRpbWVzdGFtcD0iMTM3MTMxMjAwIixub25jZT0iZGo4M2hzOXMiLHNpZ25hdH
VyZT0iWVRWanlOU3VqWXMxV3NEdXJGbnZGaTRKSzZvPSIBY2JkYXRhPVNHOTNJR0pw
WnlCcGN5QmhJRlJNVXlCbWFXNWhiQ0J0WlhOellXZGxQd289AQE=
S: +
S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long
lines wrapped for readability) is:
-
host=server.example.com^A
user=user@example.com^A
port=143^A
auth=MAC token="h480djs93hd8",timestamp="137131200",nonce="dj83hs9s",
signature="YTVjyNSujYs1WsDurFnvFi4JK6o="^A
cbdata=SG93IGJpZyBpcyBhIFRMUyBmaW5hbCBtZXNzYWdlPwo=^A^A
The line containing just a "+" and a space is an empty response from
the server. This response contains discovery information, and in the
success case no discovery information is necessary so the response is
empty. Like other messages, and in accordance with the IMAP SASL
binding, the empty response is base64-encoded.
5.3. Failed Exchange
This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty
Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed
scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH aG9zdD1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BdXNlcj11
c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AQE=
S: + eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3Bl
IjoiZXhhbXBsZV9zY29wZSJ9
S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
The decoded initial client response is:
host=server.example.com^Auser=user@example.com^Aport=143^Aauth=^A^A
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The decoded server error response is:
{
"status":"401",
"schemes":"bearer mac",
"scope":"example_scope"
}
5.4. Failed Channel Binding
This example shows a channel binding failure in an empty request.
The channel binding information is empty. Note that line breaks are
inserted for readability.
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH aG9zdD1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BdXNlcj11
c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AWNiZGF0YT0BAQ==
S: + eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MTIiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3Bl
IjoiZXhhbXBsZV9zY29wZSJ9
S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
The decoded initial client response is:
host=server.example.com^Auser=user@example.com^Aport=143^A
auth=^Acbdata=^A^A
The decoded server response is:
{
"status":"412",
"schemes":"bearer mac",
"scope":"example_scope"
}
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6. Security Considerations
This mechanism does not provide a security layer, but does provide a
provision for channel binding. The OAuth 2 specification
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] allows for a variety of usages, and the security
properties of these profiles vary. The usage of bearer tokens, for
example, provide security features similar to cookies. Applications
using this mechanism SHOULD exercise the same level of care using
this mechanism as they would in using the SASL PLAIN mechanism. In
particular, TLS 1.2 or an equivalent secure channel MUST be
implemented and its usage is RECOMMENDED.
Channel binding in this mechanism has different properties based on
the authentication scheme used. Channel binding to TLS with a bearer
token provides only a binding to the TLS layer. Authentication
schemes like MAC tokens can implement a signature over the channel
binding information. These provide additional protection against a
man in the middle attacks, and the MAC authorization header is bound
to the channel and only valid in that context.
It is possible that SASL will be authenticating a connection and the
life of that connection may outlast the life of the token used to
authenticate it. This is a common problem in application protocols
where connections are long-lived, and not a problem with this
mechanism per se. Servers MAY unilaterally disconnect clients in
accordance with the application protocol.
An OAuth credential is not equivalent to the password or primary
account credential. There are protocols like XMPP that allow actions
like change password. The server SHOULD ensure that actions taken in
the authenticated channel are appropriate to the strength of the
presented credential.
Tokens have a lifetime associated with them. Reducing the lifetime
of a token provides security benefits in case that tokens leak. In
addition a previously obtained token MAY be revoked or rendered
invalid at any time. The client MAY request a new access token for
each connection to a resource server, but it SHOULD cache and re-use
access credentials that appear to be valid.
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7. IANA Considerations
7.1. SASL Registration
The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile:
SASL mechanism profile: OAUTH
Security Considerations: See this document
Published Specification: See this document
For further information: Contact the authors of this document.
Owner/Change controller: the IETF
Note: None
The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile:
SASL mechanism profile: OAUTH-PLUS
Security Considerations: See this document
Published Specification: See this document
For further information: Contact the authors of this document.
Owner/Change controller: the IETF
Note: None
7.2. GSS-API Registration
IANA is further requested to assign an OID for this GSS mechanism in
the SMI numbers registry, with the prefix of
iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms (1.3.6.1.5.5) and to
reference this specification in the registry.
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]
Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-31 (work in progress), August 2012.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer]
Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage",
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-23 (work in progress),
August 2012.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]
Hammer-Lahav, E., "HTTP Authentication: MAC Access
Authentication", draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-01 (work in
progress), February 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
(SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.
[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
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[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5801] Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security
Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms
in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The
GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, July 2010.
[RFC5849] Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol", RFC 5849,
April 2010.
[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
for TLS", RFC 5929, July 2010.
[RFC5988] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 5988, October 2010.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.jones-appsawg-webfinger]
Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., and J. Smarr, "WebFinger",
draft-jones-appsawg-webfinger-06 (work in progress),
June 2012.
[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.
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Appendix A. Document History
[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-03
o Added user field into examples and fixed egregious errors there as
well.
o Added text reminding developers that Authorization scheme names
are case insensitive.
-02
o Added the user data element back in.
o Minor editorial changes.
-01
o Ripping out discovery. Changed to refer to I-D.jones-appsawg-
webfinger instead of WF and SWD older drafts.
o Replacing HTTP as the message format and adjusted all examples.
-00
o Renamed draft into proper IETF naming format now that it's
adopted.
o Minor fixes.
-00
o Initial revision
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Authors' Addresses
William Mills
Yahoo! Inc.
Phone:
Email: wmills@yahoo-inc.com
Tim Showalter
Phone:
Email: tjs@psaux.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
Linnoitustie 6
Espoo 02600
Finland
Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
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